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DISSERTATION  ABSTRACT  
  
Mitchell  Ryan  Macrae  
  
Doctor  of  Philosophy  
  
Department  of  English  
  
September  2017  
  
Title:  Between  Us  We  Can  Kill  a  Fly:  Intersubjectivity  and  Elizabethan  Revenge  Tragedy  
  
Using  recent  scholarship  on  intersubjectivity  and  cultural  cognitive  narratology,  this 
project  explores  the  disruption  and  reformation  of  early  modern  identity  in  Elizabethan 
revenge  tragedies.  The  purpose  of  this  dissertation  is  to  demonstrate  how  revenge  tragedies 
contribute  to  the  prevalence  of  a  dialogical  rather  than  monological  self  in  early  modern 
culture.  
My  chapter  on  Thomas  Kyd's  The  Spanish  Tragedy  synthesizes  Debora  Shuger’s 
work  on  the  cultural  significance  of  early  modern  mirrors--which  posits  early  modern 
self-recognition  as  a  typological  process--with  recent  scholarship  on  the  early  modern 
dialogical  self.  The  chapter  reveals  how  audiences  and  mirrors  function  in  the  play  as 
cognitive  artifacts  that  enable  complex  experiences  of  intersubjectivity.  
In  my  chapter  on  Shakespeare's  Titus  Andronicus ,  I  trace  how  characters  construct 
new  identities  in  relation  to  their  shared  suffering  while  also  exploring  intersubjectivity’s 
potential  violence.   When  characters  in  Titus  imagine  the  inward  experience  of  others,  they 
project  a  plausible  narrative  of  interiority  derived  from  inwardness’s  external  signifiers 
iv 
(such  as  tears,  pleas,  or  gestures).  These  projections  and  receptions  between  characters  can 
lead  to  reciprocated  sympathy  or  violent  aggression.  
My  reading  of  John  Marston’s  Antonio’s  Revenge  explores  revenge  as  a  mode  of 
competition.  Marston  suggests  a  similarity  between  the  market  conditions  of  dramatic 
performance  (competition  between  playwrights,  acting  companies,  and  rival  theaters)  and 
the  convention  of  one-upmanship  in  revenge  tragedy,  i.e.  the  need  to  surpass  preceding  acts 
of  violence.  While  other  Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies  represent  reciprocity  and  collusion 
between  characters  as  important  aspects  of  intersubjective  self-reintegration,  Marston’s  play 
emphasizes  competition  and  rivalry  as  the  dominant  force  that  shapes  his  characters. 
My  final  chapter  provides  an  analysis  of  Shakespeare's  Hamlet .  I  argue  that  recent 
scholarship  on  intersubjectivity  and  cognitive  cultural  studies  can  help  us  re-historicize  the 
nature  of  Hamlet’s  “that  within  which  passes  show.”  Hamlet’s  desire  for  the  eradication  of 
his  consciousness  explores  the  consequences  of  feeling  disconnected  from  others  in  a 
culture  wherein  identity,  consciousness,  and  even  memory  itself  depend  on  interpersonal 
relations.  
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CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In  William  Shakespeare’s  Titus  Andronicus ,  a  play  which  is  notorious  for  its  brutal 
and  gore-drenched  violence,  there  is  a  startling  moment  when  consideration  is  given  to  a 
“Poor,  harmless  fly”  killed  at  the  Andronici  dinner  table  (3.2.63).  At  first,  Titus  is 
surprisingly,  even  poignantly,  sensitive  to  the  violence  against  the  fly.  As  the  patriarch  of  a 
family  suffering  its  own  litany  of  traumas,  Titus  empathizes  with  the  grief  that  he  imagines 
the  fly’s  father  would  feel  for  the  death  of  his  winged  progeny:  “But  how  if  that  fly  had  a 
father  and  mother?  /  How  would  he  hang  his  slender  gilded  wings  /  And  buzz  lamenting 
doings  in  the  air”  (3.2.59-62).  This  sympathy  for  the  fly  and  Titus’s  identification  with  its 
father  is  disrupted  by  Titus’s  brother,  Marcus,  who  had  off-handedly  killed  the  fly.  Marcus 
redirects  Titus’s  emotional  energy,  channeling  it  from  empathetic  grief  to  retributive  anger, 
when  he  tells  Titus  that  the  fly  was  not  an  innocent  victim,  but  “a  black  ill-favoured  fly” 
(3.2.66).  Marcus  metonymically  links  the  blackness  of  the  fly  to  the  blackness  of  Aaron,  an 
enemy  of  the  Andronici  and  the  person  responsible  for,  among  other  things,  the  rape  of 
Titus’s  daughter  and  the  dismemberment  of  Titus’s  hand.  In  just  a  few  lines  from  Marcus, 
Titus’s  relation  to  the  fly  shifts  from  mournful  father-by-proxy  to  violent  animosity  as  Titus 
himself  picks  up  the  knife  to  “insult  on”  the  corpse  of  the  fly  whose  presence  Marcus 
identifies  with  their  enemies  (3.2.71).  
This  project  began  from  my  interest  in  this  scene.  Is  it  a  poor,  harmless  fly  that  is 
needlessly  slain?  Or  is  the  fly  malicious?  I  recognize,  of  course,  that  the  question  of  the 
1 
fly’s  intent  seems  absurd.  It  is  difficult  to  believe  either  of  these  possibilities  is  true. 
Ostensibly,  Titus’s  anthropomorphism  and  the  oscillation  of  his  emotional  responses  to  its 
death  are  meant  to  reveal  the  precarious  state  of  his  sanity.  And  yet,  despite  the  absurdity 
(perhaps  even  because  of  it),  I  find  the  scene  remarkable  for  its  depiction  of 
intersubjectivity.  What  catches  my  attention  here  is  the  triangulation  of  identity  that  this 
scene  produces.  On  the  one  hand,  the  fly’s  identity  is  determined  by  how  others  perceive  it. 
On  the  other  hand,  Titus  and  Marcus  also  define  themselves  in  relation  to  the  fly  and  in  this 
relation,  they  justify  or  condemn  the  nature  of  their  own  violence.  If  the  fly  is  harmless  and 
innocent,  Marcus  is  a  murderer,  and  Titus  acts  as  the  fly’s  advocate.  If  the  fly  is  malevolent, 
Marcus  is  a  loving  brother  protecting  Titus  from  an  enemy.  Our  interpretations  of  the 
identities  and  actions  of  both  Marcus  and  Titus  fluctuate  within  the  complex  rhetoric  and 
metaphorics  of  selfhood  and  subjectivity  in  early  modern  culture.  
Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies  use  traumatizing  violence  to  explore  radical 
disruptions  of  subjectivity.  While  other  early  modern  genres,  such  as  comedy,  tragedy,  and 
history  plays,  also  have  characters  willingly  or  unwillingly  exploring  the  protean  nature  of 
early  modern  subjectivity,  revenge  plays  are  unique  in  their  emphasis  on  the  annihilation 
and  reconfiguration  of  identity  in  the  face  of  trauma.  Since  traumatic  violence  is  central  to 
how  these  plays  depict  disrupted  subjectivity,  revenge  tragedies  often  stage  gruesome 
spectacles  of  violence.  Seneca’s  plays,  which  provide  the  blueprint  upon  which 
Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies  are  designed,  concealed  slaughter  and  gore  from  the 
audience,  relegating  violence  to  the  unseen  space  offstage  and  describing  it  through 
dialogue.  Unlike  those  precursors,  English  plays  perform  acts  of  violence  before  the  eyes  of 
2 
their  audiences  and  use  dialogue  to  supplement  and  amplify  the  violence  onstage.  The 
spectacle  and  performance  of  violence  becomes  an  extralinguistic  aspect  of  the  English 
revenge  play,  intersecting  with  the  rhetorics  of  grief,  anger,  and  identity  in  ways  that 
warrant  investigation.  The  impulse  of  early  modern  playwrights  to  challenge  audiences 
with  spectacles  of  violence  has  often  been  elided  from  our  understanding  of  early  modern 
drama  as  critics  have  flinched  from  the  implicit  pleasures  of  violence  in  revenge  tragedies. 
In  1765,  Samuel  Johnson  faults  Titus  Andronicus  for  “the  barbarity  of  the  spectacles”  and 
the  “general  massacre...exhibited”  which,  he  claims,  “can  scarcely  be  conceived  tolerable 
to  any  audience.”   As  late  as  the  1990s,  Harold  Bloom  was  echoing  this  sentiment,  saying 1
of  the  play,  “Boy,  is  that  bad.  It's  just  a  bloodbath.  There's  not  a  memorable  line  in  it”  and 
“I  can  concede  no  intrinsic  value  to  Titus  Andronicus ”  (Achenbach;  Bloom  86). 
While  the  critical  aversion  to  the  “barbarity”  of  plays  that  exhibit  bloodbaths  seems 
to  be  rooted  in  concerns  with  aesthetic  achievement  (or  the  charge  of  aesthetic  failure), 
Cynthia  Marshall  argues  that  this  form  of  ostracization  frequently  occurs  when  early 
modern  texts  fail  to  align  with  the  grand  historical  narrative  of  the  teleological  development 
of  liberal  individualism: 
We  can  account  for  the  negative  critical  assessment  of  these  works  once  we 
acknowledge  that  our  literary  culture  has  valued  texts  confirming  the  dominant 
model  of  heroic  or  autonomous  selfhood.  Works  instead  illustrative  of  the  impulse 
toward  self-shattering  have  been,  for  this  very  reason,  considered  inferior  and  even 
detrimental  to  readers.   2
1  Quoted  in  Jonathan  Bate’s  introduction  to  the  Arden  edition  of  Titus  Andronicus ,  p.  33. 
 
2  Cynthia  Marshall,  The  Shattering  of  the  Self:  Violence,  Subjectivity,  and  Early  Modern  Texts ,  p.  6. 
Marshall  defines  “self-shattering”  as  “an  [audience’s  shared]  experience  of  psychic  fracture  or  undoing”  in 
response  to  “an  emotionally  demanding  text”  (1).  Marshall  argues  that  the  violence  of  early  modern  texts 
provided  early  modern  audiences  a  cathartic  release  from  the  mounting  cultural  pressures  of  the  “nascent 
ethos  of  individualism”  (2).  
 
3 
 
With  the  critical  reassessments  of  the  master  narrative  of  humanism  in  western  history,  of 
which  autonomous  subjectivity  is  a  key  component,  a  study  of  the  anxieties,  disruptions, 
and  reconstructions  of  subjectivity  in  Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies  garners  special 
importance.  
Recent  scholarship  on  early  modern  inwardness  and  intersubjectivity  helps  in 
analyzing  the  disruptions  and  reconfigurations  of  the  self  in  revenge  tragedies  that  cannot 
be  fully  explained  by  critical  assumptions  of  autonomous  selfhood  in  early  modern  culture. 
These  plays  provide  narratives  that  explore  the  limits  of  identity  and  subjective  experience, 
sometimes  displaying  an  emerging  ethos  of  individualism  and  sometimes  working  to 
disrupt  it.  At  times,  they  depict  alternative  or  even  radical  models  of  subjectivity.  Much 
work  has  been  done  on  the  political,  aesthetic,  and  generic  contexts  of  early  modern 
revenge  plays,  but,  with  the  exception  of  the  attention  paid  to  Hamlet ,  few  scholars  have 
examined  the  genre’s  extensive  problematizing  of  early  modern  selfhood.  
Perhaps  the  most  dominant  model  of  early  modern  subjectivity  in  recent  scholarship 
is  Stephen  Greenblatt’s  notion  of  “self-fashioning.”   According  to  Greenblatt,  “...in  the 3
sixteenth  century  there  appears  to  be  an  increased  self-consciousness  about  the  fashioning 
of  human  identity  as  a  manipulable,  artful  process”  ( Renaissance  2).  Greenblatt  identifies 
this  prevalence  of  self-fashioning  as  a  cultural  shift  in  how  identity  is  defined  and  what 
3  For  detailed  discussions  of  the  influence  of  Greenblatt’s  work  on  early  modern  subjectivity, 
self-fashioning,  and  how  this  work  assumes  a  “one-person  model  of  selfhood,”  see  Nancy  Selleck,  The 
Interpersonal  Idiom  in  Shakespeare,  Donne,  and  Early  Modern  Culture ,  especially  pp.  2-16,  21-26.  Also 
see  Christopher  Tilmouth’s  analysis  of  new  historicist  and  cultural  materialist  assumptions  of  autonomous 
selfhood  in  “Passion  and  Early  Modern  Intersubjectivity,”  pp.  15-18. 
4 
practices  produce  it.   Early  modern  subjects  must  exert  will  over  their  self-formation, 4
Greenblatt  argues,  or  risk  having  it  shaped  for  them.   Greenblatt’s  work  provided  a 5
theoretical  model  for  analyzing  early  modern  subjectivity  and  has  proven  to  be  immensely 
productive  and  influential  for  the  study  of  early  modern  identity  and  textual  representations 
of  inwardness. 
Recent  scholarship,  however,  has  noted  some  problematic  assumptions  in 
Greenblatt’s  work  and  the  new  historicist  and  cultural  materialist  criticism  that  it  inspired. 
The  most  pressing  problem  is  the  assumption  of  an  atomistic  individualism  when  discussing 
early  modern  subjectivity.  This  assumption  relies  on  a  limiting,  “dyadic”  model  of  selfhood 
that  posits  a  sharp  boundary  between  “self”  and  “other.”   As  a  consequence  of  this  model, 6
scholars  have  either  recognized  early  modern  subjects  as  unified  individuals  who  were 
essentially  modern  or  they  have  refused  to  acknowledge  that  early  modern  selves  existed  at 
all,  arguing  that  what  we  interpret  as  representations  of  selfhood  in  early  modern  texts  are 
“merely  modern  impositions  upon  the  text,  a  response  to  the  semiotic  mirage,  the 
4  Greenblatt  argues  that  “there  is  in  the  early  modern  period  a  change  in  the  intellectual,  social, 
psychological,  and  aesthetic  structures  that  govern  the  generation  of  identities”  ( Renaissance  1). 
 
5  For  discussion  of  how  “Greenblatt’s  Foucauldian  discourses  of  Power”  describes  self-fashioning  as  a 
conflict  between  the  early  modern  subject  and  an  abstract  ‘other’  “standing  over  and  against  the  isolated 
individual  and  threatening  to  subject  him,”  see  Christopher  Tilmouth,  “Passion  and  Early  Modern 
Intersubjectivity,”  pp.  15-17. 
 
6  For  a  powerful  account  of  the  problem  of  autonomous  or  “atomistic”  individualism,  see  Nancy  Selleck, 
The  Interpersonal  Idiom  in  Shakespeare,  Donne,  and  Early  Modern  Culture .  Selleck  argues  that  an 
intersubjective  understanding  of  early  modern  selfhood  provides  an  alternative  to  “the  currently  familiar 
notion  of  the  other  as  a  foil  or  anti-self  against  which  the  self  defines  itself–a  dyadic  model  that  has 
dominated  critical  discussions  of  early  modern  identity”  (2).  Nor  is  this  “dyadic  model,”  Selleck  argues, 
resolved  by  Foucauldian  notions  of  the  self  as  ideologically  determined:  “Although  Renaissance  scholars 
and  critical  theorists  today  readily  see  the  self  as  a  social  construct,  we  still  tend  to  analyze  that  construct 
on  the  basis  of  a  sharp  distinction  between  the  self  and  other…”  (2).  
 
5 
reality-effect,  of  selfhood  generated  by  soliloquies’  first-person  idioms.”   Francis  Barker, 7
for  instance,  argues  that  any  analysis  of  Hamlet’s  inwardness  anachronistically  assumes  a 
“metaphysics  of  interiority”  that  had  not  yet  emerged  in  early  modern  culture.   Likewise, 8
Catherine  Belsey  searches  for  representations  of  a  unified  subjectivity  in  Hamlet .  Failing  to 
locate  evidence  of  autonomous  individualism,  Belsey  states  that  “[b]ecause  the  speaker 
necessarily  exceeds  the  ‘I’  of  utterance,  the  unity  promised  by  humanism  inevitably  eludes 
it”  (52).  Since  the  “I”  of  Hamlet’s  soliloquies  fails  to  prove  a  “unity,”  Belsey  argues  that 
“the  subject  of  liberal  humanism”  must  be  a  textual  illusion,  “a  chimera,  an  effect  of 
language,  not  its  origin”  (54).  
In  his  own  seminal  text,  Renaissance  Self-Fashioning ,  Greenblatt  oscillates 
between  the  two  possibilities  allowed  by  the  dyadic  model  of  selfhood.  He  opens  his  work 
by  claiming  “my  starting  point  is  quite  simply  that  in  sixteenth-century  England  there  were 
both  selves  and  a  sense  that  they  could  be  fashioned,”  but  confesses  by  the  book’s  end  that 
what  seemed  to  be  autonomous  individualism  might  be  better  explained  by  ideological 
interpellation: 
...as  my  work  progressed,  I  perceived  that  fashioning  oneself  and  being  fashioned 
by  cultural  institutions—family,  religion,  state—were  inseparably  intertwined.  In  all 
my  texts  and  documents,  there  were,  so  far  as  I  could  tell,  no  moments  of  pure, 
unfettered  subjectivity;  indeed,  the  human  subject  itself  began  to  seem  remarkably 
unfree,  the  ideological  product  of  the  relations  of  power  in  a  particular  society. 
Whenever  I  focused  sharply  upon  a  moment  of  apparently  autonomous 
self-fashioning,  I  found  not  an  epiphany  of  identity  freely  chosen  but  a  cultural 
artifact.  If  there  remained  traces  of  free  choice,  the  choice  was  among  possibilities 
whose  range  was  strictly  delineated  by  the  social  and  ideological  system  in  force. 
(256) 
 
7  Tilmouth,  “Passion  and  Early  Modern  Intersubjectivity,”  p.  14.  
 
8  See  Francis  Barker,  The  Tremulous  Private  Body ,  p.  58. 
6 
Though  Greenblatt,  Barker,  Belsey,  and  like-minded  new  historicists  are  attentive  to  the 
complexities  that  must  accompany  any  possible  history  of  human  subjectivity,  their  reliance 
on  a  model  of  selfhood  assumes  a  subject  to  be  either  1)  “pure,  unfettered  subjectivity”  or 
2)  an  ideologically  determined  illusion  of  autonomy.   The  limitation  of  this  model  of 
subjectivity  makes  difficult  any  attempt  to  account  for  the  ways  early  modern  subjectivity 
and  its  external  or  social  manifestations  are  intertwined.  9
Several  recent  scholars--such  as  Nancy  Selleck,  Christopher  Tilmouth,  and 
Katharine  Eisaman  Maus--have  taken  up  the  challenge  of  Greenblatt’s  work  by  seeking 
models  of  subjectivity  that  can  accommodate  the  careful  cultural  analysis  of  new 
historicism  by  acknowledging  that  subjectivity  and  its  social,  philosophical,  and  theological 
implications  are  historically  contingent.  Scholars  of  early  modern  intersubjectivity  do  not 
deny  that  individualism  is  emerging  in  early  modern  culture.  Rather,  they  argue  that  the 
nascent  individualism  of  early  modern  culture  is  steeped  in  interpersonal  relations  that 
enable  notions  of  the  individual  but  do  not  yet  conceive  of  the  individual  as  an 
“autonomous”  subject.   These  scholars  reject  Greenblatt’s  Foucauldian  influence,  turning 10
9  Selleck,  for  instance,  argues  that  “A  great  deal  of  subsequent  criticism  addresses  the  alienated  ‘Other’  in 
early  modern  culture,  largely  ignoring  more  subtle  but  equally  important  ways  in  which  otherness 
structures  Renaissance  selfhood.  In  focusing  on  threatening  rather  than  more  familiar  others,  we  limit  our 
discussion  to  one  model  of  self,  in  which  identity  is  constructed  in  opposition  to  context.  This 
model...makes  it  difficult  to  discover  anything  but  atomized  selves”  (Selleck  2).  Katharine  Eisaman  Maus 
makes  a  similar  critique  of  the  assumed  dichotomous  model  of  subjectivity  in  Inwardness  and  the  Theater 
in  the  English  Renaissance .  According  to  Maus,  new  historicists  approach  the  problem  of  subjectivity  as  a 
divide  between  experiences  of  inwardness  its  public  expressions.  Maus  argues  that  “[t]he  problems  posed 
by  the  gap  between  internal  truth  and  external  manifestation”  are  acknowledged  in  early  modern  culture, 
and  Maus  finds  textual  evidence  of  attempts  to  “remedy”  this  gap  through  “the  difficult  social  tasks  of 
intersubjective  understanding”  (8).  
 
10  Selleck  provides  an  account  of  how  intersubjectivity  resolves  the  dyadic  model  assumed  by  Greenblatt’s 
work:  “[t]o  characterize  selfhood  interpersonally…is  not  the  same  as  saying  there  is  ‘nothing’  there.  It  is 
rather  to  stipulate  that  what  is  there  inheres  not  in  the  individual,  but  in  the  mix  –  in  the  precarious 
engagement  with  others”  (Selleck  18).  Tilmouth  argues  that  the  theory  of  intersubjectivity  provides  an 
approach  “which  (like  Greenblatt’s)  locates  identity  partly  outside  the  individual,  but  does  so  in  a  more 
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to  Mikhail  Bakhtin  as  their  new  key  theorist  for  analyzing  early  modern  subjectivity. 
Selleck,  for  instance,  claims  that  Bakhtin’s  “concept  of  dialogized 
consciousness...recognizes  the  interplay  of  perspectives  in  a  given  speaker  and  casts 
selfhood  as  an  engagement  with,  rather  than  a  reaction  against,  others”  (3).  
Crucial  to  this  notion  of  selfhood  is  the  self’s  tendency  “to  be  engaged  with  the 
other’s  frame  of  reference ,  and  to  be  shaped  by  it”  (Selleck  3).  According  to  Selleck, 
Tilmouth,  and  others,  the  language  of  selfhood  in  early  modern  texts  reveals  notions  of 
identity  which  presume  interaction  between  selves  as  an  essential  aspect  of  identity 
formation.  Selleck  argues  that  the  rhetoric  of  social  interactions  and  interpersonal  relations 
should  be  foregrounded  in  our  study  of  early  modern  subjectivity,  as  “this  language 
provides  its  users  with  conceptions  and  expectations  of  identity  as  an  exchange, 
permeation,  borrowing,  anticipation–in  short,  a  great  variety  of  other-oriented  actions  and 
configurations  largely  alien  to  our  modern  language  of  selfhood”  (Selleck  1).  
Rather  than  approaching  the  early  modern  “self”  as  a  discrete,  ontological  object 
that  is  distinct  from  an  abstract  “Other,”  scholars  are  rethinking  early  modern  subjectivity 
“as  an  experience  situated  at  the  boundary  between  the  person  and  those  to  whom  he 
relates,  within  the  dialogic  domain  of  intersubjectivity”  (Tilmouth,  “Passion”  16).  John 
Jeffries  Martin,  for  example,  argues  that  we  should  not  approach  the  self  as 
a  thing  (the  soul,  the  heart,  the  mind,  the  res  cogitans ,  or  the  like)  but  rather  as  a 
relation .  The  self,  on  this  account,  is  not  ‘a  ghost  in  the  machine’  or  a  puppeteer 
directing  our  outer  movements  and  expressions.  …  We  might  open  the  body,  but 
we  will  find  no  ‘self’  within.  The  self  has  no  physical  location;  it  is  not  our  ‘core’; 
rather,  it  is  discerned  most  clearly  as  a  relation  between  those  dimensions  of 
experience  that  people  describe  as  internal  (conscious  or  unconscious  thoughts, 
persuasive  way;  indeed,  in  a  way  that  both  reflects  contemporary  trends  in  communitarian  ethics  and 
challenges  the  Pocockian  assumption  that  spectatorial  consciousness  developed  only  in  the  eighteenth 
century”  (“Passion”  16). 
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feelings,  beliefs,  emotions,  desires)  and  those  they  describe  as  external  (speaking  or 
writing,  hating  or  loving,  praying  or  blaspheming,  laughing  or  crying,  stealing  or 
buying,  and  so  on).  And,  in  positing  such  a  topography  of  experience,  the  body 
invariably  plays  a  fundamental  role;  for  it  is  the  outer  covering  of  the  body--its 
skin--that  serves  as  a  privileged  frontier  between  these  two  distinct  spheres  of 
experience.  (15) 
 
My  work  agrees  with  Martin,  though  he  focuses  more  heavily  on  embodiment  than  I  do. 
Martin’s  analysis  of  early  modern  subjectivity  as  a  “relation”  between  internal  and  external 
experience  helps  rehistoricize  the  early  modern  notion  of  selfhood  as  a  pre-Cartesian 
concept.  In  my  work,  the  distinction  I  trace  does  not  concern  mind/body  duality  (wherein 
the  mind  is  the  essential  self).  Instead,  I  explore  depictions  of  selves  as  private/public 
hybridities.  
Social  aspects  of  the  self,  such  as  a  character's  identity,  are  intersubjective  in  ways 
that  make  a  person's  sense  of  self  a  site  of  discursive  conflict.  How  the  self  is  defined,  and 
how  characters  speak  of  their  experiences  of  subjectivity,  are  largely  dependent  on  the 
rhetoric  that  is  used  to  describe  a  person's  character.  Moreover,  revenge  tragedies,  in 
particular,  represent  intersubjectivity  through  the  aspects  of  selfhood  that  are  tenuous.  The 
madness  of  the  revenger,  which  is  conventional  in  revenge  plays,  is  often  tied  to  an  anxiety 
about  both  the  inefficacy  of  rhetoric  (such  as  when  victims  of  violence  seek  justice)  and  its 
potential  violence.  Though  my  work  is  indebted  to  recent  scholarship  on  intersubjectivity, 
much  of  this  scholarship  tends  to  view  interpersonal  relations  as  inherently  positive  and 
productive,  resulting  in  the  reification  of  the  self  in  relation  to  others.  
I  would  argue  that  the  interpersonal  nature  of  early  modern  subjectivity  also 
contains  the  possibility  of  the  dissolution  of  the  self,  not  just  in  terms  of  what  Cynthia 
Marshall  describes  as  “self-shattering,”  which  considers  the  cathartic  effect  of  emotional 
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distress  for  the  playgoing  audience,  but  also  in  the  sense  of  characters  onstage  whose 
subjectivities  come  apart  at  the  seams.  Often,  this  dissolution  takes  rhetorical  stances  in 
relation  to  a  decayed,  fallen  state  of  the  world  as  a  whole  (as  in  The  Spanish  Tragedy  and 
Titus  Andronicus )  or  in  terms  of  a  desire  for  oblivion  (as  in  Hamlet ).  If  the  self  exists 
through  relations  with  others,  what  happens  when  those  relations  are  primarily  aggressive 
and  violent?  While  other  genres  of  early  modern  drama  explore  the  contingent  and 
intersubjective  nature  of  early  modern  identity  and  inwardness,  revenge  plays  tend  to 
explore  the  very  limits  of  intersubjective  experience  by  depicting  characters  who  are  so 
violently  dislodged  from  social  and  familial  roles  that  they  struggle  to  recognize  themselves 
or  make  sense  of  their  own  actions  or  inactions.  The  eruptions  of  interpersonal  violence  in 
Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies  trace  the  limits  of  intersubjectivity,  revealing  how  the 
interpersonal  relation  between  ‘self’  and  ‘others’  provides  only  a  tenuous  possibility  for 
selfhood.  Revenge  tragedies  depict  trajectories  of  radically  disruptive  relations  between  the 
self  and  others,  providing  narratives  that  reveal  the  destruction  of  subjectivity  (rather  than 
its  construction)  that  follows  when  interpersonal  relations  are  rooted  in  violent  conflict  and 
aggression. 
In  addition  to  issues  of  intersubjectivity  and  violence,  I  will  also  analyze  the 
theatrical  and  metatheatrical  aspects  of  revenge  tragedies.  Scholarship  on  the  history  and 
significance  of  the  soliloquy  and  the  aside  in  early  modern  drama  reveals  useful  patterns  for 
how  modes  of  self-addressed  speech  are  used  in  revenge  tragedies.  My  work  on  revenge 
plays  considers  the  implications  of  the  theatrum  mundi  motif  and  the  presence  of  the 
audience.  These  cognitive  artifacts  enable  early  modern  notions  of  interiority  that  are  both 
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private  and  interpersonal  without  being  self-contradictory.  Also  important  will  be  my 
tracing  of  the  converging  lines  of  identity  and  theatricality  with  early  modern  practices  of 
citation  or  adaptation.  There  are  aspects  of  self-fashioning  happening  in  these  plays,  but  the 
self-fashioning  of  revengers  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  they  must  conceal  or  encode 
their  motives,  display  ambiguous  threats,  and  locate  co-conspirators.  I  will  trace  how 
revenge  tragedies  present  theatricality  as  a  citational  mode .  This  citationality  of  revenge 
tragedy  is  linked  to  intersubjectivity,  as  r evengers  do  not  just  inhabit  the  role  of  revenger, 
they  also  seek  to  modify,  adapt,  or  surpass  prior  models  of  revenge,  as  would  be  a  common 
practice  while  studying  rhetoric.  The  revenge  project  and  the  identity  of  the  revenger,  I  will 
argue,  is  not  mere  mimicry,  but  expansion  and  modification  of  pre-existing  materials.  
 
Overview  of  Chapters 
My  intention  is  not  to  supplant  the  hard  work  and  brilliant  insights  of  the 
generations  of  critics  and  scholars  who  preceded  me  in  exploring  early  modern  revenge 
tragedy.  Literary  analysis  is,  after  all,  a  craft,  and  whatever  level  of  competency  I  am  able  to 
achieve  in  this  project  is  due,  in  large  part,  to  the  excellent  models  of  analysis  and 
interpretation  which  are  displayed  by  the  many  excellent  scholars  working  both  past  and 
present.  The  purpose  of  my  work  is  to  supplement  the  legacy  of  scholarship,  and  to  respect 
the  intellectual  labors  of  others  by  attempting  to  contribute  to  our  understanding  of  these 
plays  and  continue  moving  things  forward.  Literary  criticism  is  most  productive,  I  believe, 
when  it  is  iterative  rather  than  contentious,  and  even  in  my  moments  of  disagreement  with 
the  scholarship  that  informs  my  own  work,  I  hope  it  is  clear  I  am  working  from  a  position 
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of  deep  respect  and  admiration.  To  this  end,  literary  criticism  often  feels  like  a  project  of 
collaboration  from  a  distance.  The  chapters  which  follow  are  specifically  indebted  to  the 
critical  insights  of  Katharine  Eisaman  Maus,  Nancy  Selleck,  Christopher  Tilmouth,  and 
others.  I  hope  to  use  their  insights  in  ways  that  make  a  contribution  to  our  understanding  of 
early  modern  subjectivity  and  Elizabethan  revenge  tragedy.  
The  first  chapter  in  this  project  explores  the  depiction  of  self-recognition  through 
others.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  demonstrate  how  Thomas  Kyd’s  The  Spanish 
Tragedy  contributes  to  the  prevalence  of  a  dialogical  rather  than  autonomous  self  in  early 
modern  culture.  Audiences  and  mirrors  function  in  The  Spanish  Tragedy  as  cognitive 
artifacts  that  enable  complex  phenomenal  experiences  of  intersubjectivity.  In  my  reading  of 
the  play,  I  analyze  the  rhetoric  of  Hieronimo’s  slide  into  madness  following  his  son’s 
murder.  I  show  how  trauma  creates  a  space  in  which  Hieronimo  is  able  to  redefine  his  role 
and  sense  of  purpose  through  his  relation  with  others.  Key  to  this  reconfiguration  is 
Hieronimo’s  dependence  on  finding  new  models  for  himself  in  others  that  he  can  identify 
with  and  iterate  upon  in  order  to  become  a  figure  of  retribution.  In  addition  adapting  his 
subjectivity  to  follow  the  models  of  grief  and  action  provided  by  others,  culminating  in  a 
selfhood  through  which  he  takes  revenge  against  his  son’s  murderers,  Hieronimo  also  seeks 
to  become  the  mirror  or  model  of  paternal  grief  through  which  the  other  fathers  in  the  play 
might  actualize  their  own  responses  to  the  murders  of  their  sons  (for  which  Hieronimo  is 
responsible).  The  play’s  depictions  of  grief,  anger,  and  murderous  intent  suggest 
conditional  aspects  of  selfhood.  If  Hieronimo  engages  in  “self-fashioning,”  it  is  not  a 
fashioning  which  is  inwardly  generated,  but  one  which  reveals  the  self  to  be  pliable 
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through  engagements  with  others.  Hieronimo  transitions,  in  other  words,  from  a  figure  of 
civic  order  to  a  figure  of  violent  retribution  in  a  process  that  is  not  autonomous  and 
self-reliant  but  relation-dependent  and  communal.   
The  second  chapter  deals  with  the  reconstruction  of  identity  through  the 
reciprocation  between  Titus  and  Lavinia,  which  depicts  subjectivity  not  in  terms  of  an 
autonomous  individuality,  but  as  a  permeable,  expanded  notion  of  the  ‘other  self.’ 
Shakespeare  builds  upon  Thomas  Kyd’s  thematizing  of  revenge  as  a  form  of  violent 
accusation,  a  theatrical  reenactment  of  a  trauma  which  cannot  be  returned  to  the  perpetrator 
through  language  alone.  But  where  Kyd  uses  theatrical  spectacle--the 
play-within-the-play--as  a  medium  for  ‘performance  violence,’  Shakespeare  emphasizes  a 
citational  mode  of  accusation  and  retribution.  In  Shakespeare’s  play,  Lavinia  is  denied 
speech  and  writing,  having  her  tongue  and  hands  lopped  away,  and  in  her  silence  she 
resorts  to  citation.  Rather  than  being  a  text  herself  (from  which  Titus  initially  hopes  to 
“wrest  an  alphabet”)  or  being  relegated  to  the  role  of  the  ‘handmaiden  of  revenge,’  she 
becomes  a  textual  authority .   Lavina  uses  her  wounded  stumps  to  turn  to  the  pages  in  her 11
nephew’s  copy  of  Ovid’s  Metamorphoses ,  citing  Philomel’s  rape  in  order  to  initiate  an 
accusation  and  recommend  a  course  of  Procnean  retribution.  I  will  trace  the  disruptions  of 
Titus  and  Lavinia’s  senses  of  autonomy,  as  configured  by  their  social,  familial,  and  political 
roles  in  Rome,  and  will  demonstrate  how  Shakespeare  uses  practices  from  rhetorical 
training,  such  as  citing  from  and  adapting  preceding  texts,  to  develop  a  citational  mode  of 
11  See  Titus  3.2.44. 
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subjectivity  that  offers  a  radical,  if  ultimately  unsustainable,  alternative  to  early  modern 
individualism.  
The  third  chapter  explores  John  Marston’s  depiction  of  subjectivity  in  Antonio’s 
Revenge  as  metatheatrical.  In  Marston’s  depiction  of  intersubjectivity,  the  self  is  a 
collaborative  project,  and  self-recognition  is  intrinsically  linked  to  how  a  person  is 
acknowledged  in  the  eyes  of  others.  In  this  play,  that  process  of  self-recognition  through 
acknowledgement  is  figured  through  applause.  Marston’s  emphasis  on  rhetoric  as 
inherently  competitive  and,  therefore,  aggressive ,  alters  the  underlying  concern  of  revenge 
plays.  In  Marston’s  work,  retaliation  is  no  longer  a  question  of  justice.  Instead,  Marston 
links  retaliation  to  concerns  of  reputation,  which  is  rooted  in  interpersonal  recognition  of 
personal  achievements.   I  will  explore  Marston’s  interest  in  public  acknowledgement  and 
the  way  it  gives  form  and  extension  to  the  identities  that  characters  believe  themselves  to 
have.  In  Marston’s  play,  applause  becomes  a  signifier  of  consensus  that  provides  a 
perceivable  sign  of  recognition  that  distinguishes  one  character’s  identity  from  another. 
Subjectivity,  in  this  sense,  is  contingent  upon  the  relation  between  a  self  and  the  others 
from  whom  a  self  seeks  recognition.  What  is  true  about  the  self,  in  Marston’s  play,  is  that  it 
exists  in  the  relation  between  performance  and  audience .  
The  fourth  chapter  explores  subjectivity  as  intrinsically  linked  to  memory.  Unlike 
the  revengers  from  other  tragedies,  Hamlet  spends  most  of  the  play  trying  to  talk  himself 
into  taking  revenge,  rather  than  trying  to  talk  himself  out  of  it  (as  is  the  convention).  Hamlet 
claims  he  wants  to  stamp  revenge  in  his  brain,  wants  it  to  be  the  fixation  of  all  his  thoughts 
and  actions.  But  it  is  not.  Instead,  Hamlet  is  burdened  by  the  duty  he  feels  in  remembrance 
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for  his  father.  The  murder  of  Hamlet's  father  is,  for  Hamlet,  less  traumatic  than  the  violation 
done  to  his  memory  through  deliberate  acts  of  forgetting.  What  haunts  Hamlet  is  not  that 
his  father  is  dead,  or  even  that  his  father  has  been  murdered,  but  that  others  already  seem  to 
have  forgotten  him  and  expect  Hamlet  to  forget  him  as  well.  As  in  Marston’s  play, 
Shakespeare  emphasizes  the  importance  of  acknowledgement  from  others  for  a  character’s 
sense  of  self,  but  problematizes  the  temporality  and  mutability  of  acknowledgement. 
Hamlet  combines  issues  of  subjectivity  discussed  in  the  preceding  chapters,  but  includes 
the  complication  of  memory  and  the  foregrounded  desire  for  self-dissolution. 
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CHAPTER  II 
“THE  LIVELY  PORTRAIT  OF  MY  DYING  SELF”:  
DIALOGICAL  INWARDNESS  AND  TYPOLOGICAL  MIRRORS  IN  THE  SPANISH 
TRAGEDY 
 
Thomas  Kyd’s  The  Spanish  Tragedy  (c.  1587)  is  the  first  Elizabethan  revenge 
tragedy  and  establishes  many  of  the  themes  and  conventions  of  early  modern  revenge 
plays.  This  chapter  argues  that  the  narrative  of  violence,  emotional  trauma,  and  revenge  in 
The  Spanish  Tragedy  explores  the  disruption  and  reformation  of  early  modern  identity.  In 
doing  so,  the  chapter  synthesizes  Debora  Shuger’s  work  on  the  cultural  significance  of 
early  modern  mirrors--which  posits  early  modern  self-recognition  as  a  typological 
process--with  recent  scholarship  on  intersubjectivity  and  cultural  cognitive  narratology. 
Using  these  historical  and  theoretical  frameworks,  I  trace  the  significance  of  the  play’s 
depiction  of  early  modern  subjectivity  by:  (a)  analyzing  how  the  convention  of  the  early 
modern  soliloquy  reveals  inwardness  as  an  intersubjective  structure  in  which  the  self 
interacts  with  an  imagined  audience;  (b)  discussing  how  Hieronimo  views  Bazulto  as  an 
early  modern  mirror  or  portrait  through  which  he  might  understand  his  own  fatherly  grief 
and  recognize  its  limitations  for  procuring  justice;  and  (c)  demonstrating  how  Hieronimo 
reverses  the  direction  of  mirroring  and  self-recognition  by  deploying  violent  spectacle  in  the 
play’s  conclusion.  In  the  play’s  final  act,  Hieronimo  uses  himself  as  a  mirror  for  the  other 
grieving  fathers  in  the  play’s  final  scene  and  uses  the  King  as  a  mirror  for  the  world’s 
corruption.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  demonstrate  how  Kyd’s  revenge  play 
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contributes  to  the  prevalence  of  a  dialogical  rather  than  monological  self  in  early  modern 
culture.  Audiences  and  mirrors  function  in  The  Spanish  Tragedy  as  cognitive  artifacts  that 
enable  complex  depictions  of  intersubjectivity.  
Before  discussing  the  play  in  detail,  it  may  be  useful  to  provide  a  brief  summary  of 
the  plot.  The  central  figure  of  the  play  is  Hieronimo,  a  father  whose  son  Horatio  is  stabbed 
and  murdered  by  Lorenzo  (the  nephew  of  the  King  of  Spain)  and  Balthazar  (the  son  of  the 
Viceroy  of  Portugal).  Hieronimo  finds  Horatio's  bleeding  corpse  hung  from  a  tree  in  the 
family  arbor.  Overcome  with  grief,  he  hides  his  son's  corpse  in  order  to  investigate  the 
murder  in  secret.  He  receives  a  letter  from  Horatio's  paramour  Bel-Imperia  that  accuses 
Lorenzo  and  Balthazar  of  the  murder,  but  Hieronimo  fears  it  may  be  a  trick.  Bel-Imperia's 
accusation  is  corroborated  by  a  second  letter  that  Hieronimo  finds  on  the  body  of 
Pedringano,  one  of  Lorenzo's  servants,  after  Hieronimo  oversees  Pedringano's  execution. 
Hieronimo  attempts  to  petition  the  King  for  justice  but  Lorenzo  intervenes,  convincing  the 
king  that  Hieronimo  has  gone  mad.  Hieronimo  tries  to  maintain  his  responsibilities  as 
Knight  Marshal,  but  when  another  father  (Don  Bazulto)  petitions  for  justice  for  his 
murdered  son,  Hieronimo  is  reminded  of  his  own  son's  murder  and  declares  there  is  no 
justice  on  earth.   To  establish  peace,  the  King  of  Spain  and  the  Viceroy  of  Portugal 12
arrange  a  marriage  between  Bel-Imperia  and  Balthazar.  The  king  commissions  Hieronimo 
to  stage  a  play  in  celebration  of  the  wedding.  Hieronimo  conspires  with  Bel-Imperia  to  take 
revenge  against  Lorenzo  and  Balthazar  by  inviting  them  to  participate  in  a  play. 
Hieronimo’s  script  for  the  play  closely  mirrors  the  events  of  his  son's  murder.  Unbeknownst 
12  A  Knight  Marshal  is  a  member  of  the  royal  household  who  acts  as  a  judge.  For  a  more  detailed 
description  of  a  Knight  Marshal's  judicial  role,  see  Calvo  and  Tronch's  footnote  in  the  Arden  edition  of  the 
play,  pg.  123  fn  25. 
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to  Balthazar,  Lorenzo,  and  everyone  present  at  court  (including  the  King  and  the  Viceroy), 
Hieronimo  and  Bel-Imperia  use  real  blades  while  performing  the  play  and  they  slaughter 
Balthazar  and  Lorenzo  onstage.  Everyone  believes  their  death  is  a  performance  until  the 
play  ends  and  Hieronimo  reveals  that  Balthazar  and  Lorenzo  are  dead,  as  is  Bel-Imperia, 
who  committed  suicide  during  her  scene.  Hieronimo  unveils  his  son's  corpse  from  behind  a 
curtain  and  explains  his  reasons  for  the  slaughter  onstage.  Hieronimo  tells  Balthazar  and 
Lorenzo's  fathers  that  they  will  now  understand  the  grief  that  Hieronimo  himself  has 
suffered.  Incredulous,  the  King  orders  Hieronimo  to  be  seized  and  demands  that  he  confess 
his  crimes.  Hieronimo  refuses  to  speak,  biting  off  his  own  tongue  in  defiance.  The  King 
orders  Hieronimo  to  write  his  confession  but  Hieronimo  tricks  the  king  into  providing  him 
with  a  knife  to  sharpen  his  pen.  Using  the  penknife,  Hieronimo  kills  himself. 
The  plot,  themes,  and  rhetorical  style  of  The  Spanish  Tragedy  were  immensely 
influential  on  Elizabethan  theater.  In  Elizabethan  Revenge  Tragedy ,  Fredson  Bowers 
writes:  "Elizabethan  revenge  tragedy  properly  begins  with  Thomas  Kyd's  extant 
masterpiece,  The  Spanish  Tragedy  (1587-1589)  which  presented  revenge  in 
kind--blood-revenge,  the  sacred  duty  of  the  father  to  avenge  the  murder  of  his  son--and 
from  that  sensational  theme  derived  its  popularity"  (65).  Bowers's  work  remains  the  starting 
point  for  any  serious  study  of  early  modern  revenge  tragedy,  as  he  provides  rich  analysis 
that  reveals  the  conventions  of  revenge  plays.  
Among  the  many  common  features  of  revenge  tragedy,  Bowers  notes  that  "[a]n 
important  dramatic  device  is  the  justifiable  hesitation  of  the  revenger,  who  requires  much 
proof,  and,  on  the  failure  of  legal  justice,  supposedly  lacks  a  suitable  opportunity  for 
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straightforward  action"  (Bowers  71).  The  protagonists  of  Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies 
defer  violence  until  it  is  clear  that  legal  recourse  is  impossible,  either  because  there  is  little 
proof  of  a  crime  or  because  the  apparatus  of  the  state  is  corrupt.  According  to  Bowers, 
hesitation  and  the  initial  attempts  to  procure  justice  through  legal  channels  provide  evidence 
of  the  revenger's  moral  character.  Eventually,  Jacobean  revenge  plays  such  as  Thomas 
Middleton’s  The  Revenger's  Tragedy  or  John  Webster's  The  Duchess  of  Malfi  will  find 
delight  in  Machiavellian  revengers  who  hesitate  not  because  they  first  seek  legal  recourse, 
but  because  they  are  cold  and  calculating.  In  Elizabethan  revenge  tragedy,  however,  the 
restoration  of  social  order  is  paramount.  The  revenger's  death  (often  via  a  stoic  suicide) 
functions  as  a  reconciliation,  satisfying  the  audience's  desire  for  the  revenger  to  succeed 
while  also  acknowledging  that  revenge  itself  is  a  violation  of  social  order  that  cannot  go 
unpunished.   13
In  addition  to  hesitation  providing  a  sense  of  moral  indecision  in  revenge  plays, 
Bowers  claims  that  the  convention  of  the  revenger's  hesitation  also  appealed  to  Elizabethan 
tastes,  as  "[i]ntrospection  had  become  a  national  trait"  and  audiences,  delighted  with  Kyd's 
use  of  the  "superficial  polish"  of  Senecan  rhetoric,  "fed  favorably  on  the  elaborate  Senecan 
philosophizing"  common  in  revenge  tragedies  (Bowers  75).  While  I  agree  that 
introspection  is  a  key  element  of  Elizabethan  drama,  I  argue  that  its  ubiquity  on  the  English 
stage  is  driven  by  more  than  the  delight  of  "superficial  polish."  Instead,  the  rhetoric  of 
introspection  in  The  Spanish  Tragedy  reveals  a  complex  structure  of  inwardness.  Drawing 
from  recent  scholarship  in  early  modern  intersubjectivity  and  cognitive  cultural  studies,  I 
13  For  a  more  in-depth  discussion  of  the  cultural  context  of  Elizabethan  attitudes  on  revenge,  see  Bowers 
34-40.  
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will  analyze  how  the  play  depicts  introspection  and  inwardness  as  dialogical  processes.  For 
example,  when  Hieronimo  claims  "I  grew  inward  with  revenge"  (4.4.46),  the  word 
“inward”  does  not  signal  a  retreat  into  an  isolated  self.  As  Clara  Calvo  and  Jesús  Tronch 
note  in  the  Arden  edition  of  the  play,  “inward”  is  used  to  denote  being  "closely  associated 
or  acquainted"  or  "intimate"  with  someone  else.  
Throughout  the  play,  Hieronimo’s  introspections  use  the  rhetoric  of  close 
associations  and  intimacies  with  others.  Even  while  soliloquizing,  Hieronimo’s  rhetoric  is 
structured  as  a  self  in  discourse  with  another.  Several  of  his  soliloquies  attempt  to 
understand  and  associate  with  different  possible  versions  of  himself  while  grappling  with 
feelings  of  grief  and  anger.  Other  soliloquies  posit  imagined  audiences  that  listen  or 
respond  to  his  grievances  and  help  shape  his  actions.  My  analysis  of  The  Spanish  Tragedy 
argues  for  a  new  theory  of  soliloquy.  I  will  demonstrate  how  Kyd’s  use  of  soliloquy 
produces  an  imaginary  social  auditory  rather  than  a  solo  auditory.  While  The  Spanish 
Tragedy  is  explicitly  interested  in  revenge  and  violence  (Revenge  is  even  a  character  in  the 
play),  it  also  explores  the  disintegration  of  a  character’s  sense  of  self  and  depicts  the  process 
of  restructuring  whatever  remains  of  his  identity.  Hieronimo’s  process  of  self-recognition 
following  a  traumatic  event  is  demonstrative  of  the  early  modern  structure  of  subjectivity,  a 
structure  that  is  implicitly  dependent  on  the  interpersonal,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  those 
interpersonal  relations  are  real  or  imagined.  As  a  consequence  of  the  trauma  of  his  son’s 
murder,  Hieronimo’s  subjectivity  is  disrupted  and  he  adopts  a  new  identity  (as  a  figure  of 
revenge)  by  reimagining  himself  within  a  new  personal  narrative,  finding  a  typological 
model  of  grief  in  Don  Bazulto,  and  eventually  becoming  a  model  or  mirror  of  grief  for 
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others  at  the  play’s  conclusion.  In  this  chapter,  I  will  argue  that  Hieronimo’s  need  to  find  a 
“mirror”  or  model  in  which  he  can  begin  to  recognize  whatever  sense  of  himself  remains 
after  suffering  the  traumatic  loss  of  his  son  and  his  need  to  find  or,  perhaps  more  accurately, 
to  create  in  others  a  “loss”  that  “resembles  mine,”  reveals  a  complex  theorization  of  a 
dialogical  self   (4.4.112). 
 
Early  Modern  Intersubjectivity 
Some  35  years  after  its  publication,  Stephen  Greenblatt’s  work  on  self-fashioning  in 
early  modern  culture  continues  to  be  influential  in  its  analysis  of  the  structure  of  early 
modern  identity.  As  I  discussed  in  the  introductory  chapter,  Stephen  Greenblatt’s  work 
demonstrated  ways  of  reading  depictions  of  interiority  on  the  Elizabethan  stage  as  a  social 
effect,  produced  through  personal  relations,  cultural  procedures,  and  institutional  pressures. 
However,  several  scholars  have  pointed  to  an  unresolved  problem  in  Greenblatt’s 
argument,  in  that  it  “entails  a  notion  of  self  prior  to  self-fashioning–a  discrete  entity  already 
in  place  to  be  threatened  by  the  encounter  with  the  ‘Other’”  (Selleck  3).  Hidden  behind  the 
performances  of  a  self-fashioned  subject,  Greenblatt’s  work  suggests  that  there  is  an 
autonomous  self  that  does  the  fashioning  or,  possibly,  that  inwardness  is  itself  a  textual  or 
performative  illusion.  The  ontology  of  inwardness  is  thus  framed  as  a  dichotomy:  either  the 
self  is  autonomous,  capable  of  fashioning  its  public  personas,  or  inwardness  is  illusionary, 
and  there  is  nothing  beneath  the  various  masks  of  identity.  Recent  criticism  argues  that  this 
is  a  false  dichotomy,  and  suggests  instead  that  the  early  modern  subject’s  inwardness  is  first 
generated  in  the  relation  between  the  self  and  ‘Other.’  Nancy  Selleck,  Katherine  Rowe, 
21 
Christopher  Tilmouth,  Leonore  Lieblien,  and  others  provide  an  alternate  understanding  of 
early  modern  subjectivity  by  examining  early  modern  culture’s  emphasis  on  interpersonal 
relations  as  a  condition  of  self-recognition.  Rather  than  assuming  that  either  autonomous 
individualism  is  the  origin  of  inwardness  or  inwardness  itself  is  an  illusion,  recent  textual 
analysis  provides  evidence  that  early  modern  subjectivity  includes  concepts  and 
experiences  of  inwardness  while  also  acknowledging  social  relation  as  a  necessary 
condition  of  inwardness.   Crucial  to  our  understanding  of  early  modern  subjectivity  is  the 
notion  that  “Inwardness  has  been  reconceived  as  an  experience  situated  at  the  boundary 
between  the  person  and  those  to  whom  he  relates,  within  the  dialogic  domain  of 
intersubjectivity”  (Tilmouth,  "Passion"  16). 
To  reassess  the  assumption  of  an  early  modern  self  that  exists  prior  to  an  encounter 
with  an  ‘Other,’  Selleck  applies  Mikhail  Bakhtin’s  concept  of  the  dialogized  self  to  the 
study  of  early  modern  subjectivity.  Whereas  the  modern  concept  of  subjectivity  generally 
assumes  a  monological  self  which  precedes  interpersonal  relations,  Selleck  argues  that  the 
early  modern  subject  was  “a  literally  ecstatic  self  –  a  self  located  beyond  or  outside  itself,  in 
‘dialogue’  with  the  other”  (4).  The  recent  critical  focus  on  intersubjectivity  also  brings  with 
it  a  shift  in  interlocutors.  Greenblatt  and  other  new  historicists  have  tended  to  engage  with 
the  work  of  theorists  such  as  Foucault  and  Althusser,  figures  who  emphasize  the 
construction  of  the  subject  in  relation  to  “anonymous,  homogeneous  forces  –  Greenblatt’s 
Foucauldian  discourses  of  power,  for  example  –  standing  over  and  against  the  isolated 
individual  and  threatening  to  subject  him”  (Tilmouth,  "Passion"  17).  This  focus  on 
structures  of  discursive  power  that  chiefly  emerge  in  the  centuries  after  the  English 
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Renaissance  has  always  been  an  uneasy  fit  for  early  modern  scholarship.  In  recent  efforts  to 
recontextualize  our  understanding  of  early  modern  subjectivity,  scholars  have  turned  to 
theorists  such  as  Bakhtin,  Austin,  Wittgenstein,  and  Merleau-Ponty  to  provide  frameworks 
for  tracing  the  impact  of  interpersonal  relations  and  extended,  dialogized  forms  of 
cognition,  forms  which,  they  argue,  provide  better  models  for  understanding  early  modern 
structures  of  identity.  Rather  than  thinking  of  formative  encounters  of  the  self  in  terms  of  an 
anonymous  or  abstract  ‘Other,’  these  theorists  allow  early  modern  scholars  to  retain  the 
notion  of  formative  encounters  while  also  accounting  for  the  lived  experiences  between  the 
self  and  ‘others,’  wherein  these  ‘others’  are  also  assumed  to  have  personhood.  
These  new  models  seek  to  restore  “the  social  picture”  of  early  modern  subjectivity, 
in  which  the  self  “is  one  of  multiple  agents  engaging  (with  varying  degrees  of  equality)  in  a 
process  of  exchange  and  interchange,  their  competing  perspectives,  interests,  awarenesses 
and  attachments  penetrating  and  (re)shaping  one  another’s  consciousness  and  thereby 
producing  selves  born  of  intersubjectivity”  ("Passion"  17).  Tilmouth  argues  that  early 
modern  scholarship  has  imposed  "a  fluid,  diffuse,  somehow  incomplete  sense  of  self"  on 
the  past  in  order  to  reify  an  assumption  of  "a  modern  subjectivity  which  is  supposedly 
complete,  autarkic  and  particularly  adept  at  fortifying  its  interiority  against  incursions  from 
without"  ("Passion"  16).  For  Tilmouth,  "contemporary  trends  in  communitarian  ethics"  are 
more  closely  aligned  with  early  modern  selfhood  than  new  historicist  or  deconstructionist 
theorizations  of  subjectivity  (“Passion”  16).  By  reading  early  modern  subjectivity  through 
dialogical  self  theory,  scholars  are  challenging  the  notions  of  an  absent  interiority  or  a 
nascent  individualism  that  have  been  frequently  theorized  in  early  modern  scholarship.  In 
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Tilmouth's  assessment,  early  modern  subjects  have  a  developed,  individuated  interiority, 
but  it  is  an  interiority  that  is  produced  and  functioning  "within  the  dialogic  domain  of 
intersubjectivity"  (16).  In  other  words,  there  is  no  notion  of  an  independently-formed  self  in 
early  modern  culture,  no  sense  of  an  interior  without  the  surface  tension  of  a  communal 
exterior.  Nor  is  that  surface  tension  between  self  and  other  impenetrable.  
As  I  will  show  in  my  analysis  of  Hieronimo’s  rhetoric  throughout  The  Spanish 
Tragedy,  the  boundary  between  self  and  other  is  less  rigid  than  has  been  assumed  by  new 
historicist  descriptions  of  early  modern  selfhood.  I  argue  that  this  structure  of  interpersonal 
subjectivity  might  be  pushed  further  outward  to  include  notions  of  subcommunities  which 
operate  within  a  larger  dialogic  domain  of  political  power.  Like  the  interpersonal 
subjectivity  of  the  individual,  which  navigates  between  one's  sense  of  self  in  relation  to 
one's  public  persona  or  reputation,  subcommunities  function  interpolitically,  negotiating 
between  competing  political  investments  (such  as  family  interests  versus  state  interests)  and 
contrasting  subcommunities  which  both  define  the  (ever-porous)  boundaries  of  inclusion 
and  exclusion,  trust  and  suspicion,  affection  and  aversion.  In  my  reading  of  The  Spanish 
Tragedy ,  I  will  examine  how  Hieronimo’s  subjectivity  is  disrupted  and  reconfigured  by 
traumatic  interpersonal  encounters  with  others.  In  the  following  sections,  I’ll  analyze: 
Hieronimo’s  interpersonal  imagination,  expressed  through  his  soliloquies;  Hieronimo’s 
reliance  on  others  for  moments  of  self-recognition  or  self-scrutiny;  and  Hieronimo’s  attempt 
in  the  play’s  conclusion  to  become  a  social  mirror  that  reflects  communal  grief,  guilt,  and 
corruption.  
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Hieronimo’s  Soliloquies  and  Dialogical  Inwardness 
In  a  moment  of  despair,  Hieronimo  contemplates  ending  his  own  life,  soliloquizing 
the  two  paths  he  might  take  to  the  underworld.   He  imagines  each  marked  by  the 
instruments  of  self-slaughter  he  carries  with  him.  With  a  dagger  in  one  hand  and  a  rope  in 
the  other,  Hieronimo  addresses  himself: 
Away,  Hieronimo,  ‘tis  time  for  thee  to  trudge. 
Down  by  the  dale  that  flows  with  purple  gore 
Standeth  a  fiery  tower.  There  sits  a  judge 
Upon  a  seat  of  steel  and  molten  brass, 
And  ’twixt  his  teeth  he  holds  a  fire-brand 
That  leads  unto  the  lake  where  hell  doth  stand. 
Away,  Hieronimo,  to  him  be  gone; 
He’ll  do  justice  for  Horatio’s  death. 
      [ Points  at  the  poniard. ] 
Turn  down  this  path,  thou  shalt  be  with  him  straight; 
      [ Points  at  the  rope ] 
Or  this,  and  then  thou  needs’t  not  take  thy  breath. 
This  way,  or  that  way.  (3.12.6-16) 
 
Hieronimo’s  suicidal  ideation  is  the  result  of  paternal  grief  on  the  one  hand,  and  frustration 
with  the  absence  of  worldly  justice  on  the  other.  The  absence  of  justice  must  feel  especially 
sharp  here,  given  Hieronimo’s  judicial  role  in  the  king’s  household  as  Knight  Marshal.  
Both  the  dagger  and  the  rope  are  “stock  ‘properties’  of  a  would-be  suicide”  (Boas 
405).  James  Siemon  aptly  observes  that  beyond  their  stock  iconography,  the  rope  and 
dagger  have  special  significance  for  Hieronimo,  since  they  “recall  the  circumstances  of  his 
son’s  death  by  hanging  and  stabbing”  (91).  Even  beyond  their  significance  for  Hieronimo, 
Siemon  argues  that  the  words,  objects,  and  actions  in  the  play  are  subject  to  an  overflowing 
of  possible  meanings  that  cannot  be  controlled  or  regulated  by  the  intentions  of  the  play’s 
characters.  For  example,  regarding  Hieronimo’s  contemplation  of  the  dagger,  Siemon 
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argues  that  Hieronimo’s  claim  (that  he  desires  justice)  is  competing  with  a  discursive 
context  introduced  with  the  presence  of  the  dagger  and  his  use  of  Senecan  rhetoric: 
Use  of  the  dagger  as  a  signifier  in  the  language  of  Senecan  emotional  "fury" 
deprives  it  of  a  role  in  the  evidentiary  discourse  of  justice  and  forestalls  its  effective 
function  as  an  instrument  of  revenge.  Thus...the  dagger  is  successively  transformed 
through  Hieronimo's  usage  from  sign  of  despair,  to  expression  of  aggression,  to 
ineffectual  pickaxe,  and  ultimately  to  mere  sign  of  rhetorically  self-defeating 
madness.  (91) 
 
Given  Siemon’s  insight,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  Hieronimo  immediately  rejects  the 
possibility  of  killing  himself,  leaving  justice  in  the  hands  of  the  judge  of  the  underworld  or 
anyone  else.  Instead,  Hieronimo  opts  for  taking  matters  into  his  own  hands,  saying:  “Soft 
and  fair,  not  so;  /  For  if  I  hang  or  kill  myself,  let’s  know  /  Who  will  revenge  Horatio’s 
murder  then?  /  No,  no,  fie,  no.  Pardon  me,  I’ll  none  of  that”  (3.12.16-19).  
Hieronimo,  in  a  gesture  which  displays  his  rejection  of  suicide  (“I’ll  none  of  that”), 
tosses  aside  the  rope  and  poniard,  only  to  take  them  up  again  moments  later,  marking  them 
not  as  items  which  lead  to  paths  of  justice  but  to  a  third  path  invested  with  revenge:  
This  way  I’ll  take,  and  this  way  comes  the  King, 
And  here  I’ll  have  a  fling  at  him,  that’s  flat. 
And  Balthazar,  I’ll  be  with  thee  to  bring, 
And  thee,  Lorenzo  --  Here’s  the  King,  nay,  stay, 
And  here,  ay,  here,  there  goes  the  hare  away.  (3.12.19-24) 
 
Hieronimo’s  punning  on  ‘heir’  and  ‘hare,’  which  rhetorically  transforms  Lorenzo  and 
Balthazar  from  political  figures  to  prey,  demonstrates  how  Hieronimo’s  transition  from 
figure  of  justice  to  figure  of  revenge  invests  language  with  previously  unforeseen 
possibilities.  Like  the  rope  and  dagger,  which  transition  in  their  meaning  throughout  the 
play  from  emblems  of  murder,  then  to  emblems  of  suicide,  and  finally  of  revenge,  so  too 
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does  the  language  that  designates  Lorenzo  and  Balthazar’s  roles  in  the  world  of  the  play  get 
rewritten  by  Hieronimo.  
To  expand  on  the  significance  of  Hieronimo’s  processes  of  reinvesting  or 
reinscribing  words  with  violent  potential,  I  will  borrow  further  from  Siemon’s  analysis  of 
the  play.  Siemon  engages  the  play  using  Bakhtin’s  theory  of  signification,  in  which,  as 
Siemon  says,  “the  word  in  concrete  discourse...is  understood  to  be  neither  stable  nor  single 
in  meaning,  nor  ever  isolated  from  the  interlocking  chains  of  communication,  but  rather  a 
locus  of  contending  voices  and  evaluative  intonations”  (Siemon  87).  Siemon  notes  the 
essential  instability  of  Hieronimo’s  rhetoric  and  use  of  props  (such  as  the  cord  and  dagger) 
and  analyzes  words  and  objects  in  the  play  in  terms  of  their  abstract  instability,  showing 
how  they  might  contain  multivalent  possibilities  (or  “plurisignification”)  for  the  play’s 
audience  or  for  the  structure  of  the  plot  (91).  
Siemon’s  analysis  of  plurisignification  in  the  play,  however,  limits  awareness  of  the 
multivalent  possibilities  of  words,  objects,  and  actions  to  the  privileged  perspective  of  the 
audience.  Watching  the  action  unfold  onstage,  playgoers  are  able  to  imagine  the  various 
possible  meanings  of  what  characters  say  and  do  and  what  certain  objects  might  signify. 
But  is  awareness  of  “plurisignification”  of  words/acts/objects  also  available  to  Hieronimo? 
Siemon  acknowledges  that  a  character’s  words  or  rhetoric  in  the  play  always  contain  the 
possibility  of  being  contested  by  another  character  (this  discursive  conflict  and  its 
consequences  are,  Siemon  suggests,  available  to  the  perspective  of  the  audience),  but  we 
might  also  question  whether  a  character’s  own  words  and  actions  might  be  a  site  of 
discursive  conflict  for  him-  or  herself.  Siemon  persuasively  argues  that  the  play  pits 
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different/differing  perspectives  (or  the  competing  “referential  realities”  that  characters 
inhabit)  against  each  other  in  ways  that  destabilize  for  the  audience  “the  notion  of  an 
unrhetorized,  unconflicted  ‘reality’”  (92).  I  argue  that  we  should  also  consider  how  the  play 
depicts  competing  “referential  realities”  not  only  between  characters  in  conflict  with  other 
characters,  but  also  internally,  when  characters  are  in  conflict  with  themselves. 
Hieronimo’s  soliloquies  throughout  the  play  express  moments  of  grief,  anger,  loss, 
the  desire  for  justice  and  frustration  with  a  corrupt  world.  While  the  contents  of  these 
soliloquies  are  compelling  in  their  own  right,  Hieronimo’s  soliloquies  also  raise  questions 
about  early  modern  subjectivity.  What  remains  of  a  character’s  sense  of  self  after  that  self 
has  been  dislodged  or  disrupted  by  trauma  and  loss?  How  does  a  character  work  through 
grief  when  the  causes  of  his  grief  are  obscured,  dismissed,  or  misrepresented?  What  is  the 
function  and  significance  of  recognition  and  empathy  in  the  context  of  an  intersubjective 
social  picture?  Following  the  murder  of  his  son  Horatio,  Hieronimo  inhabits  a 
subject-position  that  is  dangerous  for  him,  a  subject-position  that  does  not  allow  him  to 
work  through  his  sense  of  grief  without  signaling  to  others  that  he  is  investigating  his  son’s 
murder  and  planning  revenge.  He  must  develop  his  resolve  and  his  identity  as  a  revenger 
while  keeping  his  intentions  concealed  from  anyone  who  might  attempt  to  hinder  him.  This 
seems  to  pose  a  problem  for  the  claim  that  early  modern  subjectivity  is  inherently 
intersubjective,  that  subjectivity  itself  is  produced  through  social  relations  and,  most 
importantly,  through  the  cognitive  medium  of  recognition.  However,  the  play  provides  a 
depiction  of  inwardness  that,  despite  its  isolation  from  others  (or,  even  in  moments  of 
public  outburst,  its  dismissal  or  lack  of  recognition  from  others),  is  produced  without 
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needing  to  invent  a  cognitive  process  which  subverts  early  modern  intersubjectivity. 
Hieronimo’s  reinvention  of  himself  as  revenger  happens  on  two  levels:  1)  through  an 
imagined  audience  that  responds  to  his  expressions  of  grief,  anger,  and  accusation  as 
proxies  for  the  other  characters  or  figures  who  fail  to  acknowledge  him  onstage,  and  2) 
through  moments  of  ‘mirroring,’  when  Hieronimo  recognizes  a  typological  model  for 
himself  in  Don  Bazulto’s  experience  of  despair  and  paternal  grief.  
Hieronimo’s  soliloquies  provide  examples  of  how  self-addressed  speech  can 
account  for  multiple  ‘referential  realities.’  His  soliloquies  provide  various  faux-social 
contexts  wherein  Hieronimo  can  view  himself  in  different  ways  as  he  works  toward  the 
role  of  revenger.  Even  when  Hieronimo  soliloquizes,  speaking  his  thoughts  in  isolation,  his 
soliloquies  are  structured  as  imagined  intersubjective  relations  with  others.  His  soliloquies 
acknowledge,  and  sometimes  give  voice  to,  competing  perspectives  that  may  or  may  not 
align  with  the  “referential  reality”  he  accepts  at  the  time  as  true.  Early  modern  inwardness, 
in  this  sense,  structures  inwardness  not  as  self-generated  and  insulated  or  isolated  from 
others,  but  as  a  process  of  social  interaction,  even  if  that  interaction  is  between  the  self  and 
the  self.  
Kyd's  representation  of  inwardness,  in  other  words,  contains  otherness  as  an 
essential  condition  of  consciousness.  Hieronimo  cannot  soliloquize  or  contemplate  the 
conditions  of  his  suffering  without  framing  his  thoughts,  feelings,  or  experiences  as  sites  of 
discursive  conflict.  Throughout  the  play,  he  explains  himself  to  himself,  and  this  working 
out  of  his  suffering  is  itself  conditional  on  competing  referential  realities  (rather  than  a 
single,  unified  reality)  that  he  himself  holds.  Hieronimo’s  soliloquies  are  not  just 
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denotative--to  borrow  a  line  from  Hamlet ,  they  do  not  simply  “denote”  him  “truly,”  but 
instead  depict  the  forces  of  competing  influences.   Hieronimo  pokes  and  prods  at  himself, 14
questions  himself,  encourages  himself.  His  self-addressed  speeches,  in  other  words,  are  not 
verbalized  expressions  of  a  monological  inner  discourse,  but  are  dialogical,  providing 
polyvocal  representations  of  competing  perspectives.  In  this  sense,  even  the  soliloquy 
becomes  a  site  of  discursive  conflict,  where  possible  values  compete  for  Hieronimo’s 
attention  and  for  commitments  to  (or  against)  various  actions.  Hieronimo’s  words  figure  as 
agentive  forces,  competing  within  the  play’s  literal  and  discursive  conflicts.  
In  one  soliloquy,  Hieronimo  claims  his  “woes”  themselves  are  inscribed  with 
agency.  Having  “surcharged  the  air  /  With  ceaseless  plaints,”  he  describes  his  words  as 
“conspiring”  with  the  “blustering  winds”  in  a  search  for  justice,  and,  in  their  fury,  this 
coalition  of  words  and  winds  have  “moved  the  leafless  trees,  /  Disrobed  the  meadows  of 
their  flowered  green,  /  Made  mountains  marsh  with  spring-tides  of  my  tears  /  And  broken 
through  the  brazen  gates  of  hell”  (3.7.3-9).  Thus,  even  when  alone  and  venting  his  grief 
and  anguish,  he  does  not  think  himself  in  isolation.  His  words  have  being-in-the-world, 
despite  being  unheard  by  the  king  --  or  God,  who  resides  in  “those  empyreal 
heights...countermured  with  walls  of  diamond”  and  is  inaccessible  to  Hieronimo’s  petitions 
for  justice  (3.7.15-16).  The  tendency  of  Elizabethan  playwrights  to  use  personification  in 
soliloquies  is  evidence  of  how  early  modern  consciousness  is  structured  in  terms  of 
interpersonal  relation.  It  expresses  a  person’s  own  inward  experiences  within  an 
intersubjective  framework  of  consciousness.  
14  See  Hamlet  1.2.83. 
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Catherine  Belsey  argues  that  representations  of  inwardness  on  the  Elizabethan  stage 
are  largely  produced  through  soliloquy,  which  provides  “the  condition  of  possibility  of 
presenting  on  the  stage  a  new  conception  of  the  free-standing  individual”  (42).  Belsey  also 
states  that  the  use  of  soliloquy  to  create  “the  impression  of  interiority”  marks  a  shift  from 
Medieval  drama’s  focus  on  biblical  exegesis  to  Humanism’s  emphasis  on  subjective 
experience.   Belsey  analyzes  the  structure  of  the  early  modern  self  as,  paradoxically,  both 15
a  “unity  and  discontinuity”  (48).  According  to  Belsey,  when  the  self  (the  “I”)  soliloquizes, 
there  are  two  selves:  1)  an  “anterior”  self,  or  “the  subject  of  enunciation,”  which  is  the  self 
which  speaks  about  the  self,  and  2)  a  self  “to  be  comprehended  and  dramatized”  by  the 
anterior  self,  which  she  calls  the  “subject  of  the  utterance,’  i.e.  the  self  that  is  discussed 
and/or  defined  by  the  anterior  self  (48-49).  The  structure  of  an  early  modern  subjectivity 
expressed  through  soliloquy  is,  therefore,  not  a  monological,  atomistic  self,  but  is  a  self 
only  in  so  far  as  it  acts  (both  in  the  sense  of  a  being  which  takes  action  and  in  the  theatrical 
sense  of  the  actor ,  a  being  which  personates).  
On  this  point,  Belsey  and  I  agree:  soliloquy  imagines  the  speaker  as  inhabiting  the 
role  of  both  orator  and  audience .  But  despite  Belsey’s  insight  into  the  interpersonal  nature 
of  early  modern  soliloquies,  she  assumes  inwardness  is  inherently  monological:  
...the  occurrence  of  ‘I’  in  speech  is  predicated  on  a  gap  between  the  subject  of  the 
enunciation  and  the  subject  of  utterance,  the  subject  who  is  defined  in  the  speech. 
Since  the  subject  of  enunciation  always  exceeds  the  subject  of  utterance,  the  ‘I’ 
15  In  The  Subject  of  Tragedy ,  Belsey  states:  “As  the  literal  drama  [of  the  sixteenth  century]  discards 
allegory,  and  morality  personifications  give  way  to  social  types,  concrete  individuals,  the  moral  conflicts 
externalized  in  the  moralities  are  internalized  in  the  soliloquy  and  thus  understood  to  be  within  the  mind 
of  a  protagonist.  The  struggle  between  good  and  evil  shifts  its  centre  from  the  macrocosm  to  the 
microcosm”  (42).  Jonathan  Dollimore  makes  a  similar  argument  in  Radical  Tragedy ,  claiming  that  the 
unified  subject  of  medieval  culture  gives  way  to  a  “decentered,  contradictory  subjectivity”  in  the 
Renaissance  (see  Radical  Tragedy  pp.  xxix,  153-156).  For  a  critique  of  these  views,  see  David  Aers,  “A 
Whisper  in  the  Ear  of  Early  Modernists.”  
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cannot  be  fully  present  in  what  it  says  of  itself.  It  is  this  gap  which  opens  the 
possibility  of  glimpsing  an  identity  behind  what  is  said,  a  silent  self  anterior  to 
utterance,  ‘that  within  which  passes  show.’  (48-49) 
 
When  Belsey  describes  a  “gap”  between  “the  subject  of  the  enunciation”  and  “the  subject 
of  utterance,”  she  posits  early  modern  inwardness  as  empty  of  content,  as  “the  self  is 
always  ultimately  un-speakable,  unuttered”  (52).  Though  Belsey  identifies  soliloquy  as  the 
condition  of  possibility  for  representing  inwardness,  the  multivalent  nature  of  soliloquy 
leads  her  to  conclude  that  early  modern  inwardness  is  a  textual  illusion:  “...the  subject  of 
liberal  humanism  is  a  chimera,  an  effect  of  language,  not  its  origin”  (54).  
While  scholars  like  Belsey  rightly  emphasize  the  importance  of  textuality  and 
performance,  they  go  too  far  in  emptying  out  the  early  modern  person.  To  view  early 
modern  inwardness  through  an  ontological  assumption  of  the  monological  self  fails  to  see 
the  model  of  selfhood  (i.e.  the  interpersonal  subject)  that  is  represented  in  the  text. 
According  to  Nancy  Selleck,  the  problem  here  is  that  “It  seems  there  is  either  the  liberal 
humanist  subject,  or  nothing”  (14).  Selleck  argues  that  abandoning  a  monological  model  in 
favor  of  an  intersubjective  model  resolves  the  paradox  of  the  self  as  a  void,  gap,  or  absence: 
“To  characterize  selfhood  interpersonally…is  not  the  same  as  saying  there  is  ‘nothing’ 
there.  It  is  rather  to  stipulate  that  what  is  there  inheres  not  in  the  individual,  but  in  the  mix  – 
in  the  precarious  engagement  with  others”  (18).  It  is  not  the  case  that  early  modern  subjects 
lacked  a  sense  of  inwardness,  but  this  inwardness,  this  sense  of  a  private  self,  cannot  be 
understood  through  an  atomistic  model  of  subjectivity. 
Belsey  reads  the  self  speaking  to  (or  about)  the  self  as  a  gap  which  marks  the  self  as 
split  into  a  void,  a  “lost  presence”  (53).  I  argue  that  what  Belsey  reads  as  a  gap  is  really  a 
32 
relation.  Belsey’s  recognition  of  the  multivalent  self  is  not  a  paradox;  rather,  multivalence  is 
a  condition  of  early  modern  inwardness.  Tilmouth  describes  inwardness  as  “an  experience 
situated  at  the  boundary  between  the  person  and  those  to  whom  he  relates”  (“Passion”  16). 
This  model  of  intersubjectivity  explains  why  in  Shakespeare’s  Richard  II ,  for  example, 
Richard  cannot  even  imagine  a  solipsistic  world  without  creating  for  himself  an  imaginary 
social  network,  a  virtual  world  ‘peopled’  with  his  own  thoughts.  Having  been  uncrowned 
and  deposed  from  the  throne,  Richard  soliloquizes  while  being  held  prisoner  in  the  Tower 
of  London.  Richard’s  elaborate,  extended  metaphor  here  is  a  stunning  example  of  the 
dialogical  condition  of  early  modern  subjectivity: 
I  have  been  studying  how  I  may  compare 
This  prison  where  I  live  unto  the  world: 
And  for  because  the  world  is  populous 
And  here  is  not  a  creature  but  myself, 
I  cannot  do  it;  yet  I'll  hammer  it  out. 
My  brain  I'll  prove  the  female  to  my  soul, 
My  soul  the  father;  and  these  two  beget 
A  generation  of  still-breeding  thoughts, 
And  these  same  thoughts  people  this  little  world, 
In  humours  like  the  people  of  this  world, 
For  no  thought  is  contented... 
... 
Thus  play  I  in  one  person  many  people, 
And  none  contented:  sometimes  am  I  king; 
Then  treasons  make  me  wish  myself  a  beggar, 
And  so  I  am:  then  crushing  penury 
Persuades  me  I  was  better  when  a  king; 
Then  am  I  king'd  again:  and  by  and  by 
Think  that  I  am  unking'd  by  Bolingbroke, 
And  straight  am  nothing:  but  whate'er  I  be, 
Nor  I  nor  any  man  that  but  man  is 
With  nothing  shall  be  pleased,  till  he  be  eased 
With  being  nothing.    ( Richard  II  5.5.1-41) 
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Richard’s  soliloquy  grapples  with  the  disrupted  identity  he  suffers  after  being  stripped  of 
the  crown.  His  sense  of  “being  nothing”  seems  to  suggest  a  conceptual  model  of  a 
monological  self,  perhaps  reaching  toward  the  paradoxical  presence/absence  of  the  self 
described  by  Belsey.  But  even  as  Richard  contemplates  the  possibility  of  “being  nothing,” 
that  possibility  is  endlessly  deferred,  since  even  the  condition  of  his  sense  of  nothingness  is 
relational  (“I  am  unking’d  by  Bolingbroke  /  And  straight  am  nothing”).  
Of  course,  for  Richard  “being  nothing”  might  simply  equate  nothingness  with  not 
being  king.  The  more  salient  fact  here  is  that  Richard  cannot  think  of  himself  without 
thinking  in  terms  of  the  intersubjective  relations  that  make  identity  possible:  “Thus  play  I  in 
one  person  many  people,”  he  says,  and  what  is  devastating  is  that  he  does  not  know  which 
of  these  “many  people”  properly  defines  him:  “And  none  contented.”  Ultimately,  Richard’s 
crisis  is  not  that  his  selfhood  is  empty  of  content  but  that  he  is  discontented,  as  none  of  the 
thoughts  that  “people”  his  solitary  contemplations  are  able  to  assure  him  that  he  still  is  the 
person  he  believed  himself  to  be.  Even  while  tracing  a  process  of  discontentment  that 
seems  to  define  the  nothingness  of  being,  Richard’s  form  of  inwardness  imagines  that  it 
always  has  an  audience.  
I  argue  that  this  interrelation  with  imagined  others  is  also  at  work  in  Hieronimo’s 
depictions  of  inwardness.  In  Hieronimo’s  soliloquy  in  3.2,  his  laments  are  couched  in  a 
metaphor  of  dictation.  When  he  imagines  the  “night”  as  “sad  secretary  to  my  moans,” 
Hieronimo’s  grief  over  his  murdered  son  is  not  expressed  as  solitary,  insulated,  or  private. 
His  moans  are  prompted  and  recorded  by  the  personified  night  (3.2.12).  Nor  are  his 
thoughts  or  movements  figured  as  self-generated.  Instead,  Hieronimo  claims  they  are 
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caused  by  “The  ugly  fiends”  that  “do  sally  forth  of  hell,  /  And  frame  my  steps  to 
unfrequented  paths,  /  And  fear  my  heart  with  fierce-inflamed  thoughts”  (3.2.15-17).  “The 
cloudy  day,”  too,  is  personified  as  a  figure  who  “records”  Hieronimo’s  “discontents”  and 
“Early  begins  to  register  my  dreams,  /  And  drive  me  forth  to  seek  the  murderer” 
(3.2.19-21).  
Even  when  Hieronimo  does  not  employ  personification,  his  soliloquizing  isn’t  just  a 
record  of  his  private  thoughts  but  is  structured  as  a  conversation  between  various  referential 
realities  within  himself.  Throughout  most  of  the  play,  following  his  traumatic  experience  in 
finding  his  son  murdered,  Hieronimo  speaks  as  a  character  trying  to  consolidate 
incompatible  versions  of  who  he  might  be  (or  who  he  might  become).  Hieronimo  often 
oscillates,  sometimes  within  a  single  self-addressed  speech,  between  different  voices.  This 
is  the  rhetorical  equivalent  to  a  trope  in  contemporary  cinema,  in  which  a  character  who  is 
conflicted  (or  who  embodies  conflicted  selves  or  split  personalities)  speaks  into  a  mirror  or 
reflection,  only  to  have  the  self  in  the  reflection  speak  back  to  them  as  if  the  reflection  were 
another  character.   For  example,  in  his  ‘ Vindicta  mihi ’  soliloquy  at  the  start  of  3.13, 16
Hieronimo  oscillates  between  using  “I”  and  “thou”  while  debating  with  himself  whether  he 
should  take  revenge  himself  or  put  his  trust  in  God’s  divine  justice.  He  even,  at  times, 
speaks  to  himself  by  name:  “Ay,  heaven  will  be  revenged  of  every  ill,/  Nor  will  they  suffer 
murder  unrepaid./  Then  stay,  Hieronimo,  attend  their  will,/  For  mortal  men  may  not  appoint 
their  time”  (3.13.2-5).  This  view  that  Hieronimo  gives  voice  to  is  then  contradicted  by  an 
16  There  are  numerous  examples  of  this.  Two  spring  immediately  to  mind  for  me:  Ash  talking  to  himself  in 
the  mirror  in  Evil  Dead  II ,  only  to  have  the  mirror  image  respond  and  then  reach  through  the  mirror  to 
choke  him,  and  Smeagol  talking  to  his  other  self--Gollum--reflected  in  a  pool  of  water  in  Peter  Jackson’s 
The  Two  Towers .  
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opposing  position:  “Strike,  and  strike  home,  where  wrong  is  offered  thee”  (3.13.7). 
Hieronimo  adopts  this  position  as  his  own  (“I  will  revenge  his  death”)  and  his 
self-admonition  to  be  patient  and  wait  for  God’s  justice  becomes  a  warning  to  be  patient 
“Till  to  revenge  thou  know  when,  where,  and  how”  (3.13.44).  
Hieronimo’s  commitment  to  revenge,  his  adoption  of  the  role  of  revenger,  is 
therefore  structured  as  polyvocal.  His  soliloquy  places  two  possible  referential  realities 
(Christian  and  Senecan)  in  dialogue  with  each  other.  In  Richard  and  Hieronimo’s 
soliloquies,  their  depictions  of  the  self  as  multivalent  subject-position  that  incorporates 
otherness  and  alterity  in  the  process  of  self-construction  is  closely  aligned  with  Hubert  J.  M. 
Hermans  and  Thorsten  Gieser’s  description  of  Dialogical  Self  Theory: 
In  the  tradition  of  the  founding  philosopher  of  alterity,  Emmanuel  Levinas  (1969), 
otherness  is  often  equated  with  the  face  of  another  human  being,  while  the  internal 
sphere  of  the  self  is  characterized  by  sameness  and  identity.  However,  such  an 
association  between  self  and  sameness  does  not  sufficiently  take  into  account  the 
differentiation,  diversity  and  even  oppositions  of  a  multivoiced,  dialogical  self  with 
its  relatively  autonomous  parts  characterized  by  alterity.  Cooper  and  Hermans 
(2007)  argued  that,  in  the  context  of  DST,  the  notions  of  ‘difference’,  ‘otherness’ 
and  ‘alterity’  can  be  usefully  extended  from  the  inter personal  realm  to  the 
intra personal  one.  In  this  way,  alterity  can  be  found  and  experienced  not  only 
between  the  self  and  the  actual  other,  but  also  between  different  I -positions  within 
the  self.  The  introduction  of  the  notion  of  self-otherness  is  not  to  suggest  that  alterity 
exists  within  a  self-contained,  isolated  monad.  Rather,  it  is  to  emphasize  that 
otherness  enters  the  self  from  the  most  explicitly  ‘external’  realms  to  the  most 
seemingly  ‘internal’  ones,  whether  expressed  by  the  voices  of  actual  others, 
imagined  others  or  the  different  voices  of  ‘oneself.’  (Hermans  and  Gieser, 
Handbook  of  Dialogical  Self  Theory  7) 
 
Like  the  “self-otherness”  described  in  Dialogical  Self  Theory,  the  condition  of  inwardness 
in  early  modern  soliloquies  includes  alterity  and  differentiated  voices.  
 
 
36 
Intersubjectivity  and  Mirroring 
While  attending  to  the  multivalence  of  his  soliloquy,  Hieronimo  is  drawn  toward 
Senecan  revenge  rather  than  Christian  stoicism  and  finds  an  external  model  for  his  thinking 
in  the  book  of  Seneca’s  plays  that  he  holds  in  his  hand.  Having  discussed  the 
intersubjective  structure  of  Hieronimo’s  soliloquies,  I  will  now  turn  our  attention  to  another 
aspect  of  how  the  play  depicts  the  recovery  and  reformation  of  disrupted  subjectivity.  I  will 
analyze  external  models  or  cognitive  artifacts  as  another  mode  of  self-recognition,  showing 
how  Hieronimo’s  process  of  recognition  is  not  only  a  relation  of  self-to-self  or 
self-to-imagined-audience  through  soliloquy.  Hieronimo’s  process  of  recognition  is  not 
only  a  relation  of  self-to-self  or  self-to-imagined-other.  Kyd’s  depictions  of  dialogical 
selfhood  in  The  Spanish  Tragedy  is  not  limited  to  soliloquy.  Hieronimo  also  has  moments 
of  self-recognition  when  seeing  his  own  experiences,  recognizing  his  own  interiority,  in 
another  person  (specifically  Don  Bazulto)  with  whom  Hieronimo  identifies.   Using  Debora 
Shuger’s  work  on  early  modern  mirrors,  I  will  analyze  the  typological  nature  of  reflection 
in  Hieronimo’s  assertion  that  Don  Bazulto  is  “the  lively  portrait  of  my  dying  self” 
(3.13.82-84).  Hieronimo  sees  in  Don  Bazulto  a  likeness  of  grief  that  allows  him  to 
recognize  and  make  sense  of  his  own  grief,  not  just  as  an  emotion  but  as  an  essential 
element  in  reconfiguring  of  his  sense  of  self,  which  has  been  in  a  state  of  disintegration 
following  the  trauma  of  his  son’s  murder.  
With  recent  scholarship  on  early  modern  ‘mirroring’  in  mind,  I  want  to  turn  to  an 
odd  moment  in  Act  3  of  The  Spanish  Tragedy .  Hieronimo,  attempting  to  fulfill  his  judicial 
duties  as  Knight  Marshal  (i.e.  a  court  judge),  tells  himself  in  an  aside:  “Now  must  I  bear  a 
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face  of  gravity,  /  For  thus  I  used  before  my  marshalship  /  To  plead  in  causes  as  a 
corregidor”  (3.13.56-58).  In  prior  efforts  to  avoid  slipping  into  madness  or  frenzy, 
Hieronimo  has  already  struggled  and  failed  to  keep  his  passionate  grief  in  check.  At  the 
beginning  of  this  scene,  Hieronimo  attempts  to  conceal  his  grief  in  order  to  seem  the  same 
judicial  Hieronimo  he  was  (i.e.  to  “bear  a  face  of  gravity”)  prior  to  his  son’s  murder.  At 
first,  all  seems  routine  as  Hieronimo  prepares  to  settle  various  minor  disputes.  Hieronimo’s 
“face  of  gravity,”  however,  gives  way  when  he  sees  an  old  man,  Don  Bazulto,  who  stands 
off  to  the  side.  Hieronimo  seems  agitated  by  the  old  man,  which  is  implied  in  his  slip  out  of 
judicial  rhetoric:  “But  wherefore  stands  yon  silly  man  so  mute,  /  With  mournful  eyes  and 
hands  to  heaven  upreared?”  (3.13.67-68).  Perhaps  Hieronimo  already  recognizes  the  look 
of  a  grieving  father  in  need  of  justice.  As  it  so  happens,  the  “humble  supplication  /  of  Don 
Bazulto  for  a  murdered  son”  echoes  Hieronimo’s  own  petition  for  justice  (3.13.77-78).  
Hieronimo  himself  had  attempted  to  petition  the  king  for  justice  in  the  preceding 
scene,  exclaiming  “Justice!  Oh,  justice,  justice,  gentle  King!”  (3.12.62).  But  before 
Hieronimo  could  inform  the  king  of  Horatio’s  murder,  Lorenzo  (the  king’s  nephew  and  the 
figure  most  responsible  for  Horatio’s  murder)  intervened,  impeding  Hieronimo’s  attempt  to 
seek  justice  for  his  son.  With  access  to  the  king  hindered,  Hieronimo’s  anguish  was 
exacerbated,  causing  Hieronimo  to  lapse  into  a  Senecan  fury.  While  he  stabbed  his  dagger 
into  the  earth,  Hieronimo  proclaimed  before  Lorenzo  and  within  the  hearing  of  the  king: 
Away!  I’ll  rip  the  bowels  of  the  earth, 
And  ferry  over  to  th’Elysian  plains, 
And  bring  my  son  to  show  his  deadly  wounds. 
Stand  away  from  me! 
I’ll  make  a  pickaxe  of  my  poniard, 
And  here  surrender  up  my  marshalship, 
For  I’ll  go  marshal  up  the  fiends  in  hell 
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To  be  avenged  on  you  all  for  this.  (3.12.70-77) 
 
Given  the  passionate  intensity  of  Hieronimo’s  rhetoric,  it  is  perhaps  little  surprise  that  the 
King’s  response  was  one  of  confusion,  especially  since  the  King  seemed  unaware  of 
Horatio’s  murder  or  Lorenzo’s  involvement.  After  Hieronimo’s  furious  exit  from  the  scene, 
Lorenzo  offered  a  somewhat  dubious  explanation  to  appease  the  King,  claiming  that 
Hieronimo  was  “Distract  and  in  a  manner  lunatic”  because  he  covets  “The  ransom  of  the 
young  Prince  Balthazar”  owed  to  Horatio  (3.12.86-87).  
Hieronimo’s  attention  to  Don  Bazulto’s  grief  and  petition  for  justice,  then,  resonates 
not  only  as  empathy  but  also  as  a  moment  which  provides  an  amendment  to  Hieronimo’s 
own  failed  petition  before  the  king.  Hieronimo’s  consideration  of  Don  Bazulto’s  petition 
for  his  murdered  son  is  a  model  for  the  consideration  Hieronimo  himself  hoped  for  when  he 
shouted  his  own  need  for  justice.  Things  go  awry,  however,  when  Hieronimo  reads  Don 
Bazulto’s  supplication  and  the  likeness  of  their  unresolved  injustices  agitates  Hieronimo’s 
grief,  disrupting  Hieronimo’s  role  as  Knight  Marshal.  His  rhetoric  shifts  from  that  of  a 
magistrate  back  to  that  of  a  petitioner,  a  father  caught  up  in  grief:  “No,  sir,  it  was  my 
murdered  son,  /  Oh,  my  son,  my  son,  oh,  my  son  Horatio!”  (3.13.79-80).  Hieronimo’s 
outburst  marks  the  end  of  his  attempts  to  maintain  the  self  he  was  before  his  son’s  murder,  a 
self  that  was  defined  by  his  identity  as,  on  the  one  hand,  a  proud  father  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  a  magistrate  of  justice.  In  Don  Bazulto  he  recognizes  the  self  he  has  become,  neither 
father  nor  figure  of  justice:  “Here,  take  my  handkerchief  and  wipe  thine  eyes,  /  Whiles 
wretched,  I  in  thy  mishaps  may  see  /  The  lively  portrait  of  my  dying  self”  (3.13.82-84).  
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Hieronimo’s  use  of  the  word  of  “portrait”  here  takes  on  special  significance  for 
early  modern  subjectivity.  While  Hieronimo  describes  Bazulto  as  his  own  “portrait”  rather 
than  as  a  mirror,  early  modern  culture  often  didn’t  distinguish  between  portrait  and 
mirror-image  as  visual  metaphor.   Hieronimo’s  claim  that  Don  Bazulto  is  a  “lively  portrait” 17
marks  a  moment  of  self-recognition  and  self-reflection.  In  this  “lively  portrait”  Hieronimo 
recognizes  an  image  of  grief  which  is  ‘like’  his  own,  allowing  him  to  see  himself,  his 
“dying  self,”  and  his  own  inner  experience  of  paternal  grief  in  relation  to  an  external  model.  
To  understand  why  Hieronimo  sees  a  “lively  portrait”  in  Bazulto,  I  will  turn  our 
attention  to  Debora  Shuger’s  recent  scholarship  on  the  cultural  significance  of  early  modern 
mirrors.  The  prevalence  of  the  mirror  trope  in  early  modern  texts  highlights  the  importance 
of  recognition  from  others  in  early  modern  culture.  In  early  modern  England,  both  real  and 
figurative  mirrors  were  extremely  popular.   But  early  modern  notions  of  reflection  and  of 18
what  one  expects  to  find  in  a  mirror  were  radically  different  from  how  we  tend  to  think  of 
mirroring  today.  According  to  Shuger,  the  early  modern  mirror  did  not  foster  “a  new 
awareness  of  individual  identity”  or  “a  new  reflexive  consciousness”  (22).  Our 
contemporary  conception  of  the  mirror  image  imagines  the  self  (as  subject)  viewing  the  self 
(as  object)  in  isolation.  The  modern,  individuated  self  “stands  alone  in  front  of  the  glass” 
and  is  the  only  thing  seen  in  the  mirror:  “the  mirror  faces  the  one  holding  it  up,  so  that  it 
reflects  only  the  form  and  pressure  of  this  individual  subjectivity”  (Shuger  37).  The 
self-object  viewed  in  the  mirror,  in  this  sense,  is  an  entity  perceived  as  isolated  and  in  this 
17  See  Shuger,  pp.  30-31. 
 
18  For  a  brief  overview  of  the  cultural  and  material  history  of  the  mirror  in  early  modern  England,  see 
Shuger,  pp.  21-22. 
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isolation,  autonomous  and  unique.  This  notion  of  the  mirrored  self  depends  on  a  particular 
form  of  self-awareness,  a  “specular  gaze  or  Cartesian  subjectivity  where  the  perceiving  ‘I’ 
separates  from  and  beholds  –  as  in  a  mirror  –  an  objectified  ‘me’”  (Shuger  22).  
For  early  modern  subjects,  however,  the  mirror  was  not  a  glass  in  which  a  person 
could  view  him-  or  herself,  because  early  modern  subjectivity  did  not  think  of  the  ‘self’  as  a 
discrete,  autonomous  individual  in  the  modern  sense.  Renaissance  selfhood  was  not 
individuated,  as  it  is  in  the  dominant  notion  of  modern  subjectivity,  but  interrelational.  The 
importance  of  interpersonal  relations  becomes  clear  when  Hieronimo  beholds  Bazulto’s 
grief  and  identifies  with  that  grief  as  his  own  “lively  portrait”  or  mirror.  In  this  moment  of 
(self-)reflection,  Hieronimo  see  himself  through  another’s  eyes  in  order  to  speak  to  himself 
about  the  mutual  suffering  he  shares  with  his  “lively  portrait”: 
See,  see,  oh,  see  thy  shame,  Hieronimo. 
See  here  a  loving  father  to  his  son; 
Behold  the  sorrows  and  the  sad  laments 
That  he  delivereth  for  his  son’s  decease. 
If  love’s  effects  so  strives  in  lesser  things, 
If  love  enforce  such  moods  in  meaner  wits, 
If  love  express  such  power  in  poor  estates, 
Hieronimo,  whenas  a  raging  sea 
Tossed  with  the  wind  and  tide  o’erturneth  thee, 
The  upper  billows’  course  of  waves  to  keep, 
Whilst  lesser  waters  labour  in  the  deep, 
Then  shamest  thou  not,  Hieronimo,  to  neglect 
The  sweet  revenge  of  thy  Horatio?  (3.13.94-106) 
 
Though  this  is  marked  by  scholars  as  “an  obscure  passage  brimming  with  textual 
difficulty,”  what’s  clear  is  that  what  Hieronimo  sees  in  the  “lively  portrait”  of  himself  in 
Don  Bazulto’s  face  is  not  a  one-to-one  reflection.   Hieronimo  does  not  see  a  perfect  mirror 19
19  Calvo  and  Tronch’s  commentary  on  the  difficulty  of  this  passage  is  in  the  Arden  edition  of  the  The 
Spanish  Tragedy ,  p.  263. 
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image  of  himself  in  Don  Bazulto,  but  notes  both  the  likenesses  of  their  grief  and  also  the 
difference  in  degree  between  them.  Hieronimo  specifically  comments  upon  Don  Bazulto’s 
“lesser  things,”  “meaner  wits,”  and  “poor  estates”  as  contrasts  to  his  own  status  as  Knight 
Marshal.  But  despite  marking  out  their  difference  in  degree,  Hieronimo  does  not  dismiss 
the  meaningful  likeness  between  his  and  Bazulto’s  “sorrows  and  sad  laments”  and  their 
similar  experience  of  paternal  grief  for  murdered  sons  --  the  passage  can  be  read  more  as  a 
self-address  on  Hieronimo’s  part  than  a  speech  directed  at  Don  Bazulto.  The  unequal  status 
Hieronimo  notes  does  not  seem  primarily  intended  to  disparage  Don  Bazulto,  but  instead 
spurs  himself  on  to  greater  action.  In  other  words,  the  logic  of  the  passage  is  that 
Hieronimo’s  greater  stature  requires  that  he  also  take  greater  action  than  what  has  been 
done  by  Bazulto.  Don  Bazulto,  in  his  lesser,  meaner,  poorer  subject-position,  is  able  to 
petition  for  justice,  but  this  is  to  strive  “in  lesser  things.”  Using  Bazulto  as  a  baseline  for  the 
appropriate  action  of  grieving  fathers,  Hieronimo  claims  his  “love’s  effect”  should,  by 
implication,  compel  him  to  accomplish  more  than  mere  petition,  especially  since  his  attempt 
to  petition  the  king  has  proven  ineffectual. 
Hieronimo’s  emphasis  on  both  ‘likeness’  and  ‘degree’  in  self-scrutiny  is  an  example 
of  early  modern  cognition.  Hamlet,  too,  famously  scrutinizes  his  own  inaction  using  a 
similar  process,  comparing  the  likeness  and  degree  of  his  own  grief  to  those  he  sees 
modeled  by  someone  else.  Having  been  moved  to  tears  by  a  player’s  performance  of  lines 
from  a  play  depicting  the  fall  of  Troy  and  the  death  of  Priam,  Hamlet  states: 
O,  what  a  rogue  and  peasant  slave  am  I! 
Is  it  not  monstrous  that  this  player  here, 
But  in  a  fiction,  in  a  dream  of  passion, 
Could  force  his  soul  so  to  his  own  conceit 
That  from  her  working  all  his  visage  wann'd, 
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Tears  in  his  eyes,  distraction  in's  aspect, 
A  broken  voice,  and  his  whole  function  suiting 
With  forms  to  his  conceit?  and  all  for  nothing! 
For  Hecuba! 
What's  Hecuba  to  him,  or  he  to  Hecuba, 
That  he  should  weep  for  her?  ( Hamlet  2.2.485-495) 
 
Like  Hieronimo,  Hamlet  admonishes  his  inaction  by  finding  points  of  both  likeness  and 
difference  in  an  ‘other’  who  figures  as  a  model  of  comparison  that  allows  for  both 
self-knowledge  and  self-scrutiny.  Through  these  points  of  likenesses  and  differences  he  is 
able  to  define  the  effect  he  feels  he  should  have  on  the  world,  with  the  player’s  efficacy  at 
creating  affect  functioning  as  Hamlet’s  point  of  reference: 
What  would  he  do, 
Had  he  the  motive  and  the  cue  for  passion 
That  I  have?  He  would  drown  the  stage  with  tears 
And  cleave  the  general  ear  with  horrid  speech, 
Make  mad  the  guilty  and  appal  the  free, 
Confound  the  ignorant,  and  amaze  indeed 
The  very  faculties  of  eyes  and  ears.  Yet  I, 
A  dull  and  muddy-mettled  rascal,  peak, 
Like  John-a-dreams,  unpregnant  of  my  cause, 
And  can  say  nothing.  (2.2.495-504) 
 
For  Hamlet,  the  problem  is  not  that  he  lacks  “the  motive  and  the  cue  for  passion,”  but  that 
he  is  unable  to  turn  his  passion  into  a  transferable  affect.  Priam’s  death,  like  the  death  of 
Hamlet’s  father  for  Hamlet,  provides  the  player  with  a  “motive”  and  “cue”  for  passion,  but 
--  unlike  Hamlet  --  the  player’s  performance  of  Hecuba’s  grief  is  representative  of  “actions 
that  a  man  might  play”  ( Hamlet  1.2.84).  The  player  performs  Hecuba’s  grief,  but  he  is  not 
Hecuba  and  cannot  have  her  grief  “denote”  him  “truly”  (1.2.83).  Like  Hieronimo  in  The 
Spanish  Tragedy ,  Hamlet  reasons  that  if  the  player  has  a  lesser  cue  for  passion  than  he,  and 
yet  the  player  is  able  to  move  an  audience  to  tears,  then  Hamlet’s  own  grief,  which  runs 
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deeper  than  mere  theatrical  performance  (“a  fiction...a  dream  of  passion”),  should,  likewise, 
have  a  more  powerful  effect  on  the  court  than  the  player’s  performed  grief  has  had  on  him. 
Through  this  mode  of  self-scrutiny,  Hamlet  and  Hieronimo  are  able  both  to  recognize  their 
own  subject-positions  and  to  identify  their  failures  to  properly  inhabit  those 
subject-positions. 
But  when  Hieronimo  and  Hamlet  look  into  the  faces  of  others  in  order  to  recognize 
themselves,  do  they  see  these  ‘others’  (or,  for  that  matter,  themselves)  as  individuals? 
According  to  Shuger,  what  is  metaphorically  ‘seen’  in  the  trope  of  the  early  modern  mirror 
is  not  one’s  individuality,  but  a  character  type:  “When  the  mirror  is  used  to  reflect  ‘my 
inward  selfe,’  that  self  tends  to  be  “generic  rather  than  individual”  (26).  The  reflection  in 
this  sense  is  typological,  a  cataloguing  of  generic  aspects  of  character.  The  reflections 
available  in  this  trope  are  thus  “unindividuated”  (Shuger  27).  “Unindividuated,”  yes,  but 
not  devoid  of  identity.  The  dominant  modern  sense  of  selfhood  closely  relates  individuality 
and  identity  --  and  to  lose  one  is,  it  is  assumed,  to  lose  the  other.  But  for  early  modern 
culture,  what  resides  in  the  ‘unindividuated’  self  is  a  recognizable  (to  the  self,  and  to  others) 
pattern  of  identity.  It  is  not  one’s  individual  uniqueness  which  grounds  one’s  sense  of  self, 
but  one’s  sense  of  recognizability,  a  sense  that  depends  not  only  on  self-recognition,  but 
also  in  being  recognized  by  others .  
As  discussed  earlier  in  the  chapter,  recent  scholarship  on  this  process  of 
intersubjectivity  argues  that  new  historicism  rightly  emphasizes  the  importance  of  early 
modern  self-fashioning,  but  these  scholars  tend  to  empty  out  the  early  modern  person, 
claiming  there  is  no  sense  of  selfhood/personhood  in  early  modern  inwardness  in  order  to 
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make  this  negative  space  of  selfhood  a  precursor  to  modernity  and  the  subjective  self  that 
follows.  In  short,  they  do  not  see  the  dominant  model  of  selfhood  that  is  present  in  early 
modern  texts  (i.e.  the  interpersonal  subject).  Instead,  such  views  posit  early  modern 
subjectivity  as  a  nascent  form  of  liberal  individualism  in  order  to  tacitly  provide  a  point  of 
origin  for  teleological  understandings  of  modern  and  postmodern  subjectivity.   But  what 20
Hamlet  ‘sees’  in  viewing  himself,  using  the  player  as  his  ‘mirror,’  is  not 
Hamlet-the-individual.  His  concern  is  not  that  his  grief  is  different  from  the  player’s  in  any 
specific  way,  or  that  it  marks  him  as  essentially  unique  as  an  individual;  rather,  his  concern 
is  that  he  has  much  more  cause  for  grief  than  the  player,  but  cannot  utilize  that  grief  to 
greater  effect  on  others.  
To  put  it  simply,  Hamlet  is  concerned  with  how  he  is  perceived.  He  is  frustrated  that 
his  grief  does  not  affect  Claudius,  the  members  of  the  court,  nor  (perhaps  most  distressingly 
for  Hamlet,  as  I  will  discuss  in  a  later  chapter)  Gertrude.  Of  course,  Claudius  and  Gertrude 
acknowledge  that  Hamlet  performs  some  form  of  grief  (“tis  unmanly  grief”  or  “this 
unprevailing  woe”),  but  they  do  not  recognize  or  acknowledge  Hamlet’s  experience  of 
grief,  which  Hamlet  expects  others  to  feel  with  him.  At  issue  for  Hamlet  is  their  inability,  or 
possibly  their  refusal,  to  recognize  his  grief,  a  grief  which  he  claims  is  more  than  the  mere 
20  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  teleological  assumptions  in  the  history  of  scholarship  on  Hamlet ,  see 
Margaret  de  Grazia’s  first  chapter  in  Hamlet  Without  Hamlet,  especially  p.  22 .  De  Grazia  argues  that  since 
the  1800s,  Hamlet  has  served  as  a  model  of  ‘modern’  interiority  for  each  generation  of  scholars.  She  traces 
the  history  of  modern  inwardness,  in  each  of  its  varying  incarnations,  which  scholars,  critics,  and  theorists 
have  excavated  from  Hamlet.  This  excavation  is  made  possible  because,  according  to  de  Grazia,  Hamlet 
has  been  isolated  and  extracted  from  his  historical  context  --  he  is,  in  other  words,  a  character  who  has  been 
removed  from  the  plot  of  the  play  Hamlet ,  and  in  this  removal  he  is  made  to  represent  whatever  currently 
counts  as  modern,  cutting-edge  interiority.  Hamlet  seems  perpetually  modern,  de  Grazia  argues,  because  he 
is  continually  retrofitted  to  fit  each  epoch’s  sense  of  modern-  or  cutting-edge  philosophy  of  the  self.  On  a 
side  note,  it  would  be  intellectually  dishonest  to  ignore  the  possibility  that  my  own  work  on 
intersubjectivity  is  guilty  of  this  as  well. 
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show  of  feeling  (“actions  that  a  man  might  play”)  that  they  suggest  it  is.  Hamlet  sees  a 
lesser  version  of  his  grief  in  the  player’s  performance,  but  no  one  recognizes  Hamlet’s  grief 
as  anything  other  than  “obstinate  condolement,”  a  grief  which  denotes  Hamlet’s 
childishness  rather  than  a  grief  deeply  felt  (1.2.93).  Hamlet’s  rhetoric  throughout  the  play 
suggests  that  his  grief  does  properly  “denote”  his  sense  of  self,  but  this  grief  goes 
unrecognized.  I  will  take  up  the  question  of  Hamlet’s  grievances  again  in  Chapter  5. 
Both  Hamlet  and  Hieronimo  scrutinize  their  own  grief  using  others  (the  player  and 
Bazulto,  respectively)  as  lively  ‘portraits’  or  ‘mirrors’  in  which  they  may  view  themselves 
in  comparison  to  another  whose  grief  is  similar.  According  to  Nancy  Selleck,  the 
recognition  of  likeness  in  early  modern  mirrors  and  portraits  often  has  a  didactic  function 
which  is  closely  linked  to  the  social  process  of  configuring  one’s  sense  of  self: 
...the  mirror  is  almost  never  seen  as  a  passive  reflector...what  appears  in  the  ‘mirror’ 
is  not  a  self-image,  nor  any  other  realistic  image,  but  a  model  –  either  a  positive  or 
negative  exemplar.  The  purpose  of  such  didactic  mirrors  is  not  to  reflect,  but  to 
correct,  and  so  the  mimetic  process  is  reversed:  that  is,  when  you  ‘look  into’  such  a 
mirror,  the  point  is  not  for  it  to  reflect  or  copy  you,  but  for  you  to  imitate  or  apply  to 
yourself  what  you  see  there.  By  presenting  something  other  than  the  self,  such 
mirrors  mean  to  produce  a  more  complex  process  than  just  self-recognition  –  they 
provoke  comparison  and  make  one  aware  of  the  similarity  or  difference  between 
oneself  and  the  model.  Ultimately,  then,  these  ‘mirrors’  do  aim  at  the  viewer’s 
self-scrutiny,  only  the  point  when  the  mirror  presents  such  otherness  is  not  just 
self-knowledge,  but  also  change.  In  this  sense,  didactic  mirrors  are  not  about 
conforming  to  identity,  but  about  destabilizing  it.  (Selleck  102-103) 
 
Likewise,  in  The  Spanish  Tragedy,  Hieronimo’s  engagement  with  his  “lively  portrait” 
demands  more  from  Hieronimo  than  self-recognition.  It  also  prompts  him  to  alter  his 
response  to  Horatio’s  murder.  In  his  scrutiny  of  Bazulto’s  face,  Hieronimo  sees  “a  loving 
father”  whose  “sorrows  and  sad  laments”  are  the  “lively  portrait”  of  Hieronimo’s  own 
fatherly  grief  (3.13.95-96,  84).  But  Hieronimo  does  not  see  a  mirror  image  of  himself  (in 
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the  modern  sense)  in  the  “lively  portrait”  of  Bazulto’s  face.  What  he  does  see  in  this  ‘lively 
portrait”  is  an  externalized  image  of  his  own  grief  in  another’s  face,  and  in  this 
externalization  of  the  grief  he  feels,  he  is  able  to  examine  his  own  grief  and  the  actions  he 
has  taken  to  procure  justice  for  his  murdered  son  by  using  Bazulto’s  grief  and  Bazulto’s 
actions  as  a  model  for  comparison.  In  this  point  of  comparison  between  himself  and  another 
person,  he  is  able  to  evaluate  his  own  response  to  Horatio’s  murder,  which  he  finds 
shamefully  lacking:  “...shamest  thou  not,  Hieronimo,  to  neglect  /  The  sweet  revenge  of  thy 
Horatio?”  (3.13.105-106).  
Having  chastised  himself  for  neglecting  revenge,  Hieronimo  again  succumbs  to  a 
Senecan  fury:  
Though  on  this  earth  justice  will  not  be  found, 
  I’ll  down  to  hell,  and  in  this  passion 
Knock  at  the  dismal  gates  of  Pluto’s  court, 
Getting  by  force,  as  once  Alcides  did, 
A  troop  of  Furies  and  tormenting  hags 
To  torture  Don  Lorenzo  and  the  rest.  (3.13.107-112) 
 
Hieronimo’s  language,  laden  with  hellish  images  of  the  classical  underworld,  casts  Bazulto 
as  a  figure  of  guidance  who  will  lead  Hieronimo  to  revenge:  
Yet  lest  the  triple-headed  porter  should 
Deny  my  passage  to  the  slimy  strand, 
The  Thracian  poet  thou  shalt  counterfeit. 
Come  on,  old  father,  be  my  Orpheus, 
And  if  thou  canst  no  notes  upon  thy  harp, 
Then  sound  the  burden  of  thy  sore  heart’s  grief 
Till  we  do  gain  that  Proserpine  may  grant: 
Revenge  on  them  that  murdered  my  son. 
Then  will  I  rend  and  tear  them  thus  and  thus, 
Shivering  their  limbs  in  pieces  with  my  teeth.  (3.13.113-122) 
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Hieronimo’s  rhetoric  transforms  Bazulto  from  a  “lively  portrait”  of  his  grief  to  an  advocate 
who  will  help  him  advance  his  desire  for  revenge.  The  language  and  imagery  here,  of 
descending  into  hell  in  order  to  procure  retribution  against  Horatio’s  murderers  (i.e. 
Lorenzo  and  Balthazar),  echo  Hieronimo’s  earlier  diatribe  before  the  king,  when,  frustrated 
by  Lorenzo’s  intervention  against  his  petition  for  justice,  he  had  stabbed  at  the  earth  with 
his  dagger  and  claimed  to  “make  a  pickaxe  of  my  poniard”  and  in  order  to  “ferry  over  to 
th’Elysian  plains”  and  “marshal  up  the  fiends  in  hell”  (3.12.74,71,76).  In  the  vitriol  he 
expressed  before  the  king,  Hieronimo  refigured  his  poniard  (a  symbol  of  his  social  status 
within  the  royal  court)  as  a  pickaxe,  a  gravedigger’s  tool  (useful  for  breaking  hard 
foundations  and  digging  toward  the  land  of  the  dead),  and  declared  an  exchange  of  one 
kind  of  “marshalship”  for  another.  With  this  shift,  Hieronimo  no  longer  thought  of  himself 
as  the  king’s  marshal.  Instead,  Hieronimo  fantasized  himself  as  a  martial  figure  of  the 
underworld,  a  commander  of  military  power  rather  than  a  civil/judicial  agent.  
In  his  speech  to  Bazulto,  Hieronimo  again  transforms  objects  representative  of  his 
judicial  role  into  revenge-objects.  He  demonstrates  how  he  will  “rend  and  tear”  Horatio’s 
murderers  to  pieces  by  shredding  with  his  teeth  the  legal  papers  --  the  declarations,  bonds, 
and  leases  --  brought  to  him  by  citizens  seeking  his  judgment  as  Knight  Marshal. 
Hieronimo’s  tearing  of  their  documents  marks  the  completion  of  his  transition  from  a 
marshal  of  justice  to  a  martial  figure  of  retribution.  This  scene  with  Bazulto  is  the  last  scene 
in  which  Hieronimo  attempts  to  function  as  a  judicial  figure.  Hieronimo’s  frantic  exit  -- 
telling  the  citizens  whose  bonds  and  leases  he’s  destroyed,  “catch  me  if  you  can”  --  ends 
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his  commitment  to  justice  (3.13.129).  From  here  on  out  in  the  play,  Hieronimo  is  committed 
to  his  role  as  revenger.  
When  Hieronimo  returns  to  the  stage,  he  no  longer  sees  Bazulto  as  a  “lively 
portrait”  of  his  own  grief.  Instead,  he  mistakes  Bazulto  for  his  son’s  ghost,  which 
effectively  provides  another  presence  that  shapes  Hieronimo’s  sense  of  self: 
And  art  thou  come,  Horatio,  from  the  depth 
To  ask  for  justice  in  this  upper  earth, 
To  tell  thy  father  thou  art  unrevenged, 
To  wring  more  tears  from  Isabella’s  eyes, 
Whose  lights  are  dimmed  with  overlong  laments?  (3.13.130-134) 
 
We  might,  of  course,  question  Hieronimo’s  sanity  here.  In  his  grief,  he  seems  to  have 
slipped  into  madness--a  plot  element  that  becomes  conventional  for  Elizabethan  revenge 
tragedies--but  what  Hieronimo  believes  Horatio’s  presence  would  mean  is  illuminating. 
Hieronimo  imagines  that  if  Horatio  were  to  return  from  “the  depth”  to  “ask  for  justice,”  his 
presence  would  be  a  sharp  reminder  that  Hieronimo  must  take  revenge,  and  it  seems  that 
Isabella’s  tears  are  an  important  element  in  this.  Her  tears,  like  Horatio’s  imagined  presence, 
signify  Hieronimo’s  failure  to  procure  either  justice  or  revenge,  as  her  tears  themselves  are 
signifiers  of  temporality,  being  described  specifically  in  terms  of  “overlong  laments” 
(3.13.134).  Both  Horatio’s  imagined  presence  and  Isabella’s  lamentations  function  as 
implicit  accusations  against  Hieronimo’s  inaction.  This  sense  of  guilt  that  Hieronimo  feels 
for  lagging  in  his  revenge  is  amplified  when  Horatio’s  face  (which  he  sees  when  looking  in 
Bazulto’s  face)  seems  to  age  before  his  eyes,  as  if  the  duration  of  time  since  Horatio’s 
murder  grows  exponentially:  “Had  Proserpine  no  pity  on  thy  youth,  /  But  suffereth  thy  fair 
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crimson-coloured  spring  /  With  withered  winter  to  be  blasted  thus?  /  Horatio,  thou  art  older 
than  thy  father”  (3.13.144-147). 
By  the  end  of  the  scene,  Bazulto  does  begin  to  resist  Hieronimo’s  appropriation  of 
him  as  a  “lively  portrait,”  but  Hieronimo  only  complicates  Bazulto’s  resistance  by 
collapsing  the  distinction  between  them,  blurring  the  boundaries  between  self  and  other  by 
telling  Bazulto:  
Ay,  now  I  know  thee,  now  thou  namest  thy  son. 
Thou  art  the  lively  image  of  my  grief.  
Within  thy  face,  my  sorrows  I  may  see. 
Thy  eyes  are  gummed  with  tears,  thy  cheeks  are  wan, 
Thy  forehead  troubled,  and  thy  muttering  lips 
Murmur  sad  words  abruptly  broken  off 
By  force  of  windy  sighs  thy  spirit  breathes. 
And  all  this  sorrow  riseth  for  thy  son; 
And  selfsame  sorrow  feel  I  for  my  son.  (3.13.  158-166) 
 
Here,  Hieronimo’s  rhetoric  closes  the  difference  between  the  fathers  even  while 
acknowledging  Bazulto  as  Bazulto.  In  Hieronimo’s  rhetoric,  “thy”  and  “my”  no  longer 
function  as  external  points  of  comparison  for  Hieronimo’s  inner  experience  of  grief.  Instead 
of  acknowledging  likeness  while  asserting  difference  in  degree  or  achievement,  as 
Hieronimo  did  earlier  in  the  scene,  Bazulto’s  external  signifiers  (tear-gummed  eyes,  wan 
cheeks,  troubled  forehead,  sad  words  and  windy  sighs)  are  read  by  Hieronimo  as  markers 
of  a  grief  that  is  not  merely  like  Hieronimo’s  grief,  but  identical ,  a  “ selfsame  sorrow” 
(3.13.166,  my  italics).  
Hieronimo  also  further  blurs  the  distinction  between  self  and  other  by  inviting 
Bazulto  to  accompany  him:  “Come  in,  old  man,  thou  shalt  to  Isabel.  /  Lean  on  my  arm;  I 
thee,  thou  me  shalt  stay”  (3.13.167-168).  Let  us  consider,  for  a  moment,  the  strangeness  of 
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Hieronimo's  phrasing  here.  I  thee,  thou  me?  Why  does  Hieronimo  avoid  simply  saying 
"we"?  Perhaps  because  Hieronimo's  tangling  of  pronouns  ("I  thee,  thou  me")  blurs  the 
boundary  between  self  and  other.  The  inverted  parallelism  (i.e.  chiasmus)  of  the  line 
encloses  Bazulto  within  Hieronimo's  first-person  pronouns  (" I  thee,  thou  me "),  which  is 
suggestive  of  the  inclusion  of  alterity  that  structured  the  inwardness  of  Hieronimo's 
soliloquies.  Hieronimo's  use  of  chiasmus  also  creates  a  kind  of  reflected  image  in  the 
language  itself.  The  order  of  pronouns  is  reversed,  as  if  his  own  language  stares  into  a 
mirror  (I-Thou  /  Thou-I),  and  the  rhetorical  flourish  emphasizes  mutual  recognition  through 
“selfsame”  reflection.  This  moment  of  recognition  demonstrates  a  form  of  subjectivity  that 
is  a  relation  between  the  self  and  other  rather  than  a  dichotomy  of  self/Other,  in  which  the 
presence  of  an  ‘Other’  contributes  to  atomistic  notions  of  the  individual.   Hieronimo’s 21
invitation  avoids  having  a  single  pronoun  become  the  atomized  subject  of  the  line  (as 
would  be  the  case  in  the  sentence  "I  will  stay  thee").  Instead,  Hieronimo  creates  a 
compound  subject  (as  in  "I  and  thou  will  stay  each  other").  Far  from  creating  a  gap  (or,  to 
borrow  Belsey's  language,  a  "chimera")  between  the  self  and  other,  Hieronimo's  mirrored 
pronouns  are  chimeric  in  the  sense  that  self  and  other  are  hybridized.  I  argue  it  is  this 
intersubjective  relation  between  I  and  Thou  that  cannot  be  properly  recorded  through  a 
collective  pronoun  like  "we,"  as  the  use  of  "we"  acknowledges  a  unified  subject  position 
21  According  to  Selleck  in  The  Interpersonal  Idiom ,  there  is  a  tendency  in  early  modern  scholarship  to 
resort  to  a  monological  model  of  subjectivity  even  while  analyzing  the  self  in  the  presence  of  an  Other:  “A 
great  deal  of  subsequent  criticism  addresses  the  alienated  ‘Other’  in  early  modern  culture,  largely  ignoring 
more  subtle  but  equally  important  ways  in  which  otherness  structures  Renaissance  selfhood.  In  focusing 
on  threatening  rather  than  more  familiar  others,  we  limit  our  discussion  to  one  model  of  self,  in  which 
identity  is  constructed  in  opposition  to  context.  This  model,  I  would  argue,  makes  it  difficult  to  discover 
anything  but  atomized  selves”  (2).  
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but  obscures  the  relation  between  selves.  Hieronimo’s  language  acknowledges  two 
subjects  (I  and  Thou)  while  also  intertwining  these  subjects  into  a  defining  relation.  
Hieronimo’s  invitation  to  Bazulto  for  the  two  fathers  to  bolster  each  other  is  then 
linked  to  a  metaphor  of  musical  accompaniment  which  further  entwines  three  (Hieronimo, 
Bazulto,  and  Isabella)  into  one  without  eradicating  subject-positions  by  turning  three  into 
“we”:  “And  thou,  and  I,  and  she  will  sing  a  song,  /  Three  parts  in  one,  but  all  of  dischords 
framed”  (3.13.169-170).  The  metaphor  of  the  musical  chord  is  likely  at  the  forefront  of 
Hieronimo’s  mind  after  casting  Bazulto  as  Orpheus,  a  mythological  figure  famed  for  his 
musical  ability  with  the  lyre:  “Yet  lest  the  triple-headed  porter  should  /  Deny  my  passage  to 
the  slimy  strand,  /  The  Thracian  poet  thou  shalt  counterfeit.  /  Come  on,  old  father,  be  my 
Orpheus”  (3.13.113-116).  Hieronimo,  however,  associates  the  Orphic  music  Bazulto  might 
play  not  with  harmonious  melody  but  with  the  harsh  ringing  of  trauma:  “And  if  thou  canst 
no  notes  upon  the  harp,  /  Then  sound  the  burden  of  thy  sore  heart’s  grief”  (3.13.117-118). 
In  the  metaphor  of  a  musical  chord,  in  which  “Three  parts”  (i.e.  three  distinct  notes  or 
voices)  become  one  (a  single  chord),  is  the  image  of  a  interrelated  selves  that  are 
simultaneously  distinct  from  each  other  while  also  resides  in  each  other  to  form  a 
collaboration,  a  shared  sense  of  communal  purpose  through  shared  experiences  of  traumatic 
grief.  
This  process  of  forming  the  subjectivity  of  grief,  which  finds  in  others,  at  various 
times,  likeness,  difference,  identity,  discord,  and  cohesion,  is  the  obliqueness  of  the  early 
modern  mirror  image,  which  works  more  as  a  refraction  than  a  reflection.  Shuger 
demonstrates  that  one  “...oddity  characteristic  of  Renaissance  mirrors  is…[that]  they  do  not 
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reflect  the  face  of  the  person  who  looks  into  them,  so  they  ignore  the  viewer’s 
subject-position,  his  or  her  ‘subjectivity’”  (27).  Shuger  notes  that,  in  early  modern  culture, 
“…the  object  viewed  in  the  mirror  is  almost  never  the  self.  The  viewer  sees  a  great  many 
things  in  Renaissance  mirrors,  but  not,  as  a  rule,  his  or  her  own  face”  (22).  The  self  is 
present  in  the  mirror,  but  not  as  an  isolated,  monological  focal  point.  Rather,  the  early 
modern  subject  is  present  obliquely,  within  an  “ontology  of  similitude”  and  in  relation  to 
encounters  with  others  which  influences  how  the  self  understands  its  being  in  the  world: 
What  Renaissance  persons  do  see  in  the  mirror  are  instead  saints,  skulls,  friends, 
offspring,  spouses,  magistrates,  Christ.  The  mirror  reflects  these  images  because 
they  are  images  of  oneself;  one  encounters  one’s  likeness  only  in  the  mirror  of  the 
other.  Renaissance  texts  and  emblems  consistently  describe  mirroring  in  these 
terms,  which  suggest  that  early  modern  selfhood  was  not  experienced  reflexively 
but,  as  it  were,  relationally.  (Shuger  37) 
 
Instead  of  providing  an  optics  of  individual  autonomy,  the  Renaissance  mirror  emphasizes 
the  notion  of  being-in-the-world  in  its  reflection,  a  notion  which  includes  a  convergence  of 
other  persons  and  icons.   Among  these  reflections,  the  self  is  recognized  and 
contextualized.  Thus,  when  Hieronimo  sees  his  image  (whether  living  ‘portrait’  or  living 
mirror  image)  in  Bazulto,  he  sees  himself  obliquely,  not  as  an  isolated  image  but  as 
connected  through  grief  to  the  discord  of  the  world.  He  doesn’t  simply  see  himself  when  he 
looks  in  Bazulto’s  face,  which  functions  for  Hieronimo  as  a  refracted  mirror  image;  he  sees 
himself  among  grieving  fathers,  wailing  with  grieving  wives  and  mothers,  amid  the 
irrepressible  emblems  (his  son’s  corpse,  his  son’s  blood-soaked  handkerchief,  the  arbour 
where  his  son  was  strung  up  and  stabbed)  of  “murders  and  misdeeds”  (3.2.4).  
Hieronimo’s  metaphor  of  communal  grief  forming  a  musical  chord  does  express 
unity,  but  this  unity  foreshadows  the  confusion  and  destruction  which  he  will  direct,  quite 
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literally,  in  the  play’s  final  act.  Early  modern  Neo-Platonic  thought  echoed  earlier  classical 
beliefs  in  arguing  that  the  universe  itself  is  governed  by  a  principle  of  harmony,  so  much  so 
that  even  the  spheres,  according  to  Pythagoras,  emit  their  own  music.  In  De  Institutione 
Musica ,  Boethius  reaffirms  the  Platonic  belief  that  harmony  and  order  are  closely  linked:  
...music  is  associated  not  only  with  speculation  but  with  morality  as  well.  For 
nothing  is  more  characteristic  of  human  nature  than  to  be  soothed  by  pleasant 
modes  or  disturbed  by  their  opposites.  This  is  not  peculiar  to  people  in  particular 
endeavors  or  of  particular  ages.  Indeed,  music  extends  to  every  endeavor; 
moreover,  youths,  as  well  as  the  aged  are  so  naturally  attuned  to  musical  modes  by 
a  kind  of  voluntary  affection  that  no  age  at  all  is  excluded  from  the  charm  of  sweet 
song.  What  Plato  rightfully  said  can  likewise  be  understood:  the  soul  of  the  universe 
was  joined  together  according  to  musical  concord.  For  when  we  hear  what  is 
properly  and  harmoniously  united  in  sound  in  conjunction  with  that  which  is 
harmoniously  coupled  and  joined  together  within  us  and  are  attracted  to  it,  then  we 
recognize  that  we  ourselves  are  put  together  in  its  likeness.  For  likeness  attracts, 
whereas  unlikeness  disgusts  and  repels.  (Boethius  1.180) 
 
Pythagorean  and  Platonic  thought  finds  a  principle  of  similarity  between  the  musical 
harmony  and  an  ordered,  rational  universe,  and  Boethius  claims  the  presence  of  harmony 
and  order  extends  into  a  theory  of  social  unity.   Hieronimo  uses  this  principle  of  similarity, 22
which  imagines  musical  harmony  as  a  model  for  the  moral  and  social  conditions  of  the 
world,  but  doubts  that  “musical  concord”  and  “voluntary  affection”  properly  characterize 
the  world  he  inhabits.   Since  the  macrocosm  of  the  universe  is  reflected  in  microcosms  (the 
harmony  of  the  spheres  is  reflected  in  the  harmony  of  music,  and  mathematics,  and  social 
relations)  Hieronimo’s  emphasis  on  disharmony  and  discord  reflects  a  vision  of  a 
disordered,  corrupt  world.  Hieronimo  finds  similarity  between  himself,  his  wife,  and 
Bazulto,  but  this  similarity  is  not  one  of  harmony  and  social  order  but  of  devastation.  For 
22  See  Book  1  of  De  Institutione  Musica ,  especially  1.181:  “Plato  holds  music  of  the  highest  moral 
character,  modestly  composed,  to  be  a  great  guardian  of  the  Republic;  this  it  should  be  temperate,  simple, 
and  masculine,  rather  than  effeminate,  violent,  or  fickle.”  
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Hieronimo,  the  musical  chord  they  form  through   the  similarity  of  their  loss  is  explicitly 
composed  of  dis cord:  “Three  parts  in  one,  but  all  of  discords  framed”  (3.14.170).  
Notably,  even  Hieronimo’s  metaphor  of  musical  accompaniment,  of  becoming  a 
three-part  chord,  includes  a  refracted  emblem  of  violence  within  it,  as  Hieronimo  is 
reminded  of  Horatio’s  murder  even  within  the  language  he  uses  to  express  some  form  of 
consolation  between  himself,  Bazulto,  and  Isabella:  “Talk  not  of  cords...  /  For  with  a  cord 
Horatio  was  slain”  (3.14.172).  Though  intersubjectivity  requires  moments  of  relation  and 
recognition  between  the  self  and  others,  I  want  to  be  clear  that  the  dialogical  structure  of 
Hieronimo’s  subjectivity  does  not  necessitate  that  he  be  sympathetic  toward  others.  As 
Knight  Marshal,  Hieronimo  is  in  a  position  to  hear  Bazulto’s  petition  and  to  take  legal 
action.  Instead,  he  is  reminded  of  his  own  grief  and  is  distracted  by  his  own  desire  for 
retribution.  When  Hieronimo  no  longer  needs  a  mirror  or  “lively  portrait”  compelling  him 
to  take  revenge,  the  differentiation  between  Bazulto  and  Hieronimo  is  obscured  and 
Bazulto’s  own  narrative  seems  to  be  swallowed  up  or  assimilated  by  Hieronimo’s.  They 
exit  the  stage,  and  this  is  the  last  we’ll  see  of  poor  Bazulto,  who  only  appears  in  this  single 
scene.  For  the  remainder  of  the  play,  Hieronimo  never  questions  his  commitment  to 
revenge,  and  his  concerns  about  the  ethics  of  revenge  also  seem  to  come  to  an  end. 
Hieronimo  observes  Bazulto’s  grief,  considers  his  petition  for  justice,  and  finds  that 
petitions  for  justice  and  outpourings  of  grief  in  this  world  are  decidedly  lacking  in  efficacy. 
He  absorbs  Bazulto’s  narrative  in  order  to  surpass  it  (a  competitive  dynamic  that  I  will 
discuss  in  later  chapters).  To  surpass  the  model  of  Bazulto’s  grief,  which  supplicates  for 
justice,  Hieronimo  directs  a  narrative  that  sets  aside  justice  for  retaliation.  It  is  not  until  after 
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Hieronimo  orchestrates  Lorenzo  and  Balthazar’s  slaughter  that  he  is  able  once  more  to 
recognize  himself  in  the  face  of  others.  
 
Mirroring  and  Social  Conscience 
In  the  final  act  of  The  Spanish  Tragedy,  Hieronimo’s  revenge  famously  takes  the 
form  of  a  play.  Despite  being  somewhat  concerned  by  Hieronimo’s  disturbing  behavior,  the 
King  tasks  Hieronimo  with  providing  entertainment  for  a  celebration  of  the 
newly-established  peace  between  Spain  and  Portugal.  Hieromimo  dusts  off  a  play  he  wrote 
in  his  youth,  a  tragedy  called  Soliman  and  Perseda .  In  Hieronimo’s  play,  the  king’s 
nephew  Lorenzo  and  the  viceroy’s  son  Balthazar  are  cast  as  characters  to  be  murdered  on 
stage.  The  plot  of  this  play  parallels  the  circumstances  of  the  murder  of  Hieronimo’s  son, 
Horatio,  a  crime  for  which  Lorenzo  and  Balthazar  are  responsible.  Hieronimo’s  play  blurs 
the  line  between  reality  and  fiction,  as  he  has  arranged  for  real  blades  to  be  used  for  what 
the  audience  on  stage  (the  king,  viceroy,  and  the  court)  believe  to  be  fictional  stabbings.  
Hieronimo  writes  Soliman  and  Perseda ,  the  fatal  play-within-the-play,  in  a 
perplexing  assortment  of  foreign  languages.  “Each  one  of  us,”  Hieronimo  says,  “must  act 
his  part  in  unknown  languages,/  That  it  may  breed  more  variety,”  of  which  Balthazar 
complains,  “But  this  will  be  a  mere  confusion”  (4.1.165-166,  172).  Confusion  indeed. 
Much  of  the  scholarship  on  The  Spanish  Tragedy  tends  to  focus  on  the  links  between 
confusion,  disorder,  and  destruction  in  the  play’s  concluding  act.  William  West  states: 
It  is  hard  to  overstate  the  negative  connotations  of  the  word  ‘confusion’  in  early 
modern  England;  it  is  virtually  a  synonym  (along  with  ‘innovation’)  for  ruin.  The 
Homily  on  Obedience,  for  instance,  recited  to  all  church  congregations  several 
times  yearly  between  its  composition  in  1547  and  the  suspension  of  the  Book  of 
Common  Prayer  in  1642,  makes  confusion  something  like  the  limit  of  all  that  can 
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go  wrong,  warning,  ‘For  where  there  is  no  right  order,  there  reigneth  all  abuse, 
carnall  liberty,  enormitie,  sinne,  and  Babylonicall  confusion.’  The  causes  of  the 
intense  interest  in  and  anxiety  about  the  condition  signified  by  words  like 
"confusion"  or  "error"  (although  not  only  those  words),  whether  represented  or 
real,  are  complex  and  multiple.  (219) 
 
S.F.  Johnson,  too,  argues  that  the  play’s  use  of  (or,  at  least,  references  to)  a  variety  of 
languages  other  than  English  contribute  to  a  theatrical  effect  of  confusion  which  is  also 
allusive,  calling  to  mind  the  confusion  and  ruin  of  Babylon  and  the  Tower  of  Babel.  23
Alexandra  Ferretti  analyzes  Hieronimo’s  thematizing  of  violations  of  ‘arenas  of 
performativity’: 
...he  has  moved  an  execution  outside  of  the  logical,  state-sanctioned  context  of  the 
scaffold;  he  has  rendered  the  logic  behind  his  justice  incomprehensible  by  placing  a 
hanged  body  within  the  illogical  setting  of  both  the  royal  court  and  a  theatrical 
performance.  The  King's  response,  ‘Why  hast  thou  done  this  undeserving  deed?' 
(165),  reflects  the  fact  that  this  transformed  context  has  made  Hieronimo’s  language 
and  action  unintelligible  to  the  court.”  (Ferretti  44)  
 
These  scholars  argue  that  violence  leads  to  the  disruption,  violation,  and  decay  of  juridical 
power  and  defuses  the  efficacy  of  language  throughout  the  play.  Characters  speak,  but  their 
voices  are  ignored  or  misunderstood. 
While  I  agree  with  Johnson’s  and  Ferretti’s  readings  of  the  play’s  use  of  violent 
spectacle,  we  still  need  to  account  for  how  Hieronimo  responds  to  the  King  and  Viceroy 
after  the  revelation  of  his  revenge  against  Lorenzo  and  Balthazar.  More  confusing  than 
Hieronimo’s  use  of  violence  is  his  long  speech  which  reveals  his  motives  for  directing 
Lorenzo  and  Balthazar’s  deaths.  When  the  play  ends,  Hieronimo  reveals  that  the  theatrical 
murders  on  stage  are,  in  fact,  real  murders.  After  explaining  his  motive  for  having  killed 
their  sons,  and  after  describing  the  scene  in  which  he  found  his  own  son  murdered, 
23  See  Johnson’s  “ The  Spanish  Tragedy ,  or  Babylon  Revisited”. 
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Hieronimo  addresses  the  viceroy  of  Portugal  and  the  duke  of  Castile,  the  two  fathers  whose 
sons’  corpses  bleed  before  them: 
Speak,  Portuguese,  whose  loss  resembles  mine. 
If  thou  canst  weep  upon  thy  Balthazar, 
’Tis  like  I  wailed  for  my  Horatio. 
[ to  Castile ]  And  you,  my  lord,  whose  reconciled  son 
Marched  in  a  net,  and  thought  himself  unseen, 
And  rated  me  for  brainsick  lunacy 
With  ‘God  amend  that  mad  Hieronimo’, 
How  can  you  brook  our  play’s  catastrophe?  (4.4.112-120) 
 
Whether  or  not  it  is  justified,  Hieronimo’s  reason  for  retaliating  against  Lorenzo  and 
Balthazar  is  clear:  they  murdered  his  son,  and  due  to  their  birthrights,  it  looked  as  though 
they  would  get  away  with  it.   Hieronimo  does  spend  much  of  the  third  act  trying  to  petition 
for  justice,  either  from  the  heavens  or  from  the  king,  only  to  have  his  efforts  thwarted. 
Without  judicial  recourse,  Hieronimo  takes  the  matter  into  his  own  hands,  forming  a  plot 
with  Bel-Imperia  (Lorenzo’s  sister,  but  also  Horatio’s  lover)  to  have  Lorenzo  and  Balthazar 
murdered  in  spectacular  fashion.  But  why  does  Hieronimo  need  to  amplify  the  anguish  of 
Balthazar  and  Lorenzo’s  fathers,  especially  when  neither  father  was  aware  of  his  son’s 
crimes?  
While  The  Spanish  Tragedy  is  considered  the  “first  modern  revenge  tragedy,”  and 
in  fact  establishes  many  of  the  genre’s  conventions  (including  use  of  the 
play-within-the-play),  the  Elizabethan  revenge  plays  which  follow  in  Kyd’s  wake  differ  in 
that  they  tend  to  reserve  the  revenger’s  stoking  of  grief,  anger,  or  fear  for  the  perpetrators 
whose  crimes  are  being  revenged  (Erne  96).  While  revenge  plays  usually  include  at  least 
some  collateral  damage,  Hieronimo’s  revenge  is  already  complete.  Bel-Imperia 
(Hieronimo’s  collaborator  in  the  revenge  plot)  performs  her  suicide  as  part  of  the  spectacle 
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of  the  play.  Presumably,  Hieronimo  also  could  have  killed  himself  within  the  performance 
or,  at  the  very  least,  during  all  the  confusion  immediately  after  the  play.  Thus,  it  seems 
reasonable  to  assume  that  Hieronimo’s  address  to  the  king  and  the  viceroy  has  significance. 
Hieronimo’s  speech  is  all  the  more  perplexing  given  that  after  he’s  done  speaking,  the  king 
has  Hieronimo  restrained  before  he  can  hang  himself  and  demands  of  Hieronimo:  “Speak, 
traitor!  Damned,  bloody  murderer,  speak!/  For  now  I  have  thee,  I  will  make  thee  speak:/ 
Why  hast  thou  done  this  undeserving  deed?”  (4.4.161-163).  Rather  than  speaking  again, 
Hieronimo  bites  out  his  own  tongue.  But  if  he’s  unwilling  to  speak  here,  why  the  long 
speech  moments  before?  
The  significance  of  Hieronimo’s  address  to  the  two  fathers  (the  Viceroy  and 
Castile)  is  in  his  need  to  once  more  view  his  own  paternal  grief  in  the  face  of  another,  to 
know  his  grief  has  been  essentially  replicated  and  that  its  likeness  will  carry  on  after  his 
death.  Before  he  ends  his  own  life,  Hieronimo  desires  to  be  a  mirror  or  portrait  of  grief  for 
the  surviving  fathers  in  the  play,  just  as  Bazulto  functioned  as  a  “lively  portrait”  for 
Hieronimo.  But  Hieronimo  also  goes  one  step  further  by  turning  the  king  into  a  mirror  for 
corruption.  In  the  play-within-the-play,  Hieronimo  stages  an  accusation,  revealing  the 
worldly  corruption  that  failed  to  provide  justice  for  son’s  murder,  and  his  use  of  spectacle 
draws  upon  early  modern  theories  of  the  conscience. 
Much  has  been  written  on  the  presence  (or  absence,  depending  on  the  scholar)  of 
divine  justice  and  thus,  either  explicitly  or  implicitly,  the  working  of  divine  control  over  the 
action  of  the  play.  Geoffrey  Aggeler,  for  instance,  sees  “the  discrepancy  between  the 
orthodox  Christian  beliefs  expressed  by  the  living  characters  with  regard  to  the  process  of 
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divine  justice  and  what  is  revealed  in  the  justice  scenes  which  frame  the  main  plot”  as  the 
“central  crux”  of  the  play  (319).  Philip  Edwards  argues  that  The  Spanish  Tragedy  and  the 
majority  of  Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies  it  has  influenced  “ruminat[e]  with  unbelievable 
freedom,  considering  the  restraints  of  the  time,  on  the  relation  of  the  willed  activities  of  men 
and  women  to  divine  intervention  and  control”  (131).  Less  has  been  said,  however,  about 
Hieronimo’s  own  sense  of  self -control  or  about  his  own  notion  of  culpability  for  his  actions 
at  the  end  of  the  play,  regardless  of  what  the  dramaturgical  design  of  the  play  itself  might 
have  to  say  about  it.  When  scholars  do  comment  on  Hieronimo’s  actions,  they  tend  to 
describe  them  in  terms  of  working  out  justice,  either  along  Senecan  lines  of  talionic 
retribution  or  along  the  lines  of  Hieronimo  functioning  as  a  divine  agent,  meting  out  what 
amounts  to  divine  justice.  
A  great  deal  of  this  confusion  about  the  moral  status  of  Hieronimo’s  actions  results 
from  the  ambiguity  of  the  early  modern  uses  of  the  word  ‘revenge.’  For  example,  when 
Erne  traces  Hieronimo’s  transition  from  Knight  Marshal  to  revenger,  he  presumes  the  two 
roles  are  eschatologically  distinct,  the  first  role  (Knight  Marshal)  defined  by  Christian  ethics 
and  the  second  role  (revenger)  defined  by  Senecan  and  pagan  notions  of  retribution. 
According  to  Erne,  “As  long  as  Hieronimo  has  not  given  up  hope  in  the  workings  of  divine 
justice,  he  also  believes  in  the  possibility  of  obtaining  public  justice  from  the  king”  (108). 
Erne  claims  that  Hieronimo’s  expressed  desire  for  revenge  during  the  play’s  first  half  is  still 
aligned  with  Christian  ethics  and  the  desire  for  public  justice: 
...the  words  ‘revenge’  or  ‘vengeance’  could  denote  not  only  the  private  retribution 
of  an  individual,  but  also  the  public  punishment  exacted  by  the  king  or  the  state.  Up 
to  the  end  of  the  play’s  first  part,  Hieronimo  seeks  the  latter,  as  the  final  lines  of  the 
part  make  clear:  ‘But  wherefore  waste  I  mine  unfruitful  words,/  When  nought  but 
blood  will  satisfy  my  woes?’  (III.vii.67-68).  So  far,  this  may  sound  as  if  Hieronimo 
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was  already  considering  private  revenge.  As  the  next  two  lines  make  clear, 
however,  he  is  not:  ‘I  will  go  plain  me  to  my  lord  the  king,/  And  cry  aloud  for 
justice  through  the  court’  (III.vii.69-70).  Hieronimo’s  sanity  and  his  hope  for  both 
heavenly  and  human  justice  --  all  characterizing  Hieronimo  up  to  the  end  of  the 
play’s  first  half  --  go  hand  in  hand.  (Erne  108) 
 
Erne’s  reading  of  these  lines,  however,  presumes  both  lines  express  the  same  thing,  that 
Hieronimo  has  not  yet  given  up  on  justice  and  that  he  is  not  yet  considering  revenge. 
However,  the  increasing  vehemence  in  Hieronimo’s  speech  leading  up  to  these  lines 
exceeds  the  bounds  of  any  rhetoric  of  justice: 
Of  false  Lorenzo,  are  these  thy  flattering  looks? 
Is  this  the  honour  that  thou  didst  my  son? 
And  Balthazar,  bane  to  my  soul  and  me, 
Was  this  the  ransom  he  reserved  thee  for? 
Woe  to  the  cause  of  these  constrained  wars, 
Woe  to  thy  baseness  and  captivity, 
Woe  to  thy  birth,  thy  body  and  thy  soul, 
Thy  cursed  father  and  thy  conquered  self! 
And  banned  with  bitter  execrations  be 
The  day  and  place  where  he  did  pity  thee!  (3.7.57-66) 
 
Hieronimo’s  repetition  of  ‘Woe’  and  his  condemnation  of  not  only  Balthazar’s  actions,  but 
also  “thy  birth,  thy  body,  and  thy  soul”  are  rhetorical  markers  of  his  rising  anger.  In  Erne’s 
own  analysis  of  Pedringano’s  “double”  victimization,  in  that  he  is  executed  on  the  scaffold 
after  having  also  condemned  his  soul  by  refusing  to  do  penance  for  his  sin  given  that  he 
expects  a  pardon,  it  is  clear  that  Christian  ethics  does  distinguish  between  two  kinds  of 
justice  (earthly  justice  against  the  body  and  divine  justice  upon  the  soul  in  the  afterlife).  24
24  Erne  argues:  “We  are  now  in  a  position  to  understand  better  why  Kyd  has  the  playlet  turn  on  a  pardon 
that  fails  to  materialize:  the  word  is  meant  to  carry  as  much  theological  as  legal  meaning.  While 
Pedringano  is  vainly  waiting  for  the  King’s  pardon,  or  the  legal  document  containing  the  remission  of  his 
crimes,  he  refuses  to  beg  humbly  for  God’s  pardon.  Putting  all  his  hopes  in  a  secular  indulgence,  he  fails  to 
petition  for  and  obtain  the  remission  of  sins.  Pedringano  thereby  becomes  the  double  victim,  that  of 
intrigue  tragedy  and  that  of  the  Morality  play.  On  the  one  hand,  he  is  a  tool  in  Lorenzo’s  intrigue  tragedy, 
on  the  other,  he  is  the  subject  of  the  ultimate  Christian  tragedy  as  he  suffers  death  unprepared”  (89).  
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Hieronimo’s  vehemence  and  condemnation  of  not  only  Lorenzo  and  Balthazar’s  actions, 
but  also  birth,  body,  soul,  and  the  entire  context  (“these  constrained  wars”)  that  enabled 
their  meeting  in  the  first  place  is  not  spoken  from  the  same  ‘referential  reality’  that  urges 
Hieronimo  to  cease  in  “mine  unfruitful  words”  and  “plain  me  to  my  lord  the  King.”  What 
these  lines  suggest  is  that  we  cannot  assume  Hieronimo  inhabits  a  unified  referential  reality, 
nor  does  he  transition  cleanly  from  one  referential  reality  (Christian  ethics)  to  another 
(Senecan  fury).  Both  seem  intractably  intertwined  from  the  moment  Hieronimo  finds  his 
son’s  corpse. 
Geoffrey  Aggeler,  too,  presents  these  same  lines  (“I  will  go  plain  me  to  my  lord  the 
king,/  And  cry  aloud  for  justice  through  the  court”)  as  evidence  of  Hieronimo’s 
commitment  to  justice  and  his  aversion  to  retribution.  According  to  Aggeler,  the  letter  from 
Pedringano,  which  lends  support  to  Bel-Imperia’s  letter  by  accusing  Lorenzo  and  Balthazar 
of  the  murder,  “has  completely  restored  [Hieronimo’s]  wavering  faith  in  divine  justice”  and 
“he  sets  out  to  present  his  case  before  the  one  who  is  or  should  be  the  principal  channel 
through  which  justice  flows  into  the  kingdom”  (326).  However,  even  in  the  passage  Erne 
and  Aggeler  quote,  Hieronimo  clearly  distinguishes  between  justice  that  is  morally 
acceptable  and  revenge  or  retribution  that  is  retaliatory,  threatening,  and  unsanctioned: 
I  will  go  plain  me  to  my  lord  the  King,  
And  cry  aloud  for  justice  through  the  court, 
Wearing  flints  with  these  my  withered  feet, 
And  either  purchase  justice  by  entreats 
Or  tire  them  all  with  my  revenging  threats .  (3.7.69-73,  my  italics) 
 
Hieronimo’s  ultimatum  here,  that  either  his  petition  for  justice  will  be  acknowledged  or  he 
will  commit  himself  to  infernal  retribution,  demonstrates  that  Hieronimo  is  aware  of  the 
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moral  differences  between  justice  and  revenge,  but  that  the  choice  between  the  two  is,  in  a 
sense,  out  of  his  hands.  When  Hieronimo’s  “entreats”  fail  to  “purchase  justice”  in  3.12,  it  is 
clear  that  Hieronimo  sides  with  diabolical  vengeance:  “I’ll  make  a  pickaxe  of  my  poniard,  / 
And  here  surrender  my  marshalship,  /  For  I’ll  go  marshal  up  the  fiends  in  hell  /  To  be 
avenged  on  you  all  for  this  (3.12.74-77).  Something  must  be  done  about  Horatio’s  murder, 
and  it  is  beyond  the  limits  of  Hieronimo’s  imagination  to  simply  let  it  go.  Whatever 
punishment  might  await  the  murderous  and  the  corrupt  in  the  next  world  is  not  enough.  For 
Hieronimo,  there  must  be  a  punishment  for  murder  and  corruption  in  this  world,  too,  and 
while  he  would  prefer  that  punishment  be  just  and  administered  by  the  king,  he 
acknowledges  that  he  is  more  than  willing  to  take  revenge  into  his  own  hands  if  the 
heavens  or  the  king  remains  inactive. 
Ultimately,  the  play’s  final  act  careens  into  violence.  Hieronimo’s  spectacle  of 
violence,  his  unveiling  of  his  son’s  corpse  while  Balthazar  and  Lorenzo’s  bodies  bleed 
onstage,  is  both  an  accusation  against  the  king’s  indifference  and  a  replication  of  paternal 
grief.  The  spectacle  is  also  an  especially  devastating  form  of  accusation  against  the  world  as 
a  whole,  which  has  become  (or  has  revealed  itself  to  be?),  according  to  Hieronimo,  a  “mass 
of  public  wrongs,/  Confused  and  filled  with  murders  and  misdeeds”  (3.2.3-4).  Hieronimo 
seeks  to  transfer  his  recognition  of  the  world’s  corruption  and  the  grief  this  corruption  has 
caused  him  back  to  the  world  and,  given  that  he  is  successful  in  doing  so,  he  lives  long 
enough  to  serve  as  the  world’s  guilty  conscience,  recording  its  misdeeds  and  presenting 
them  back  to  itself.  
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The  dominant  humanist  theory  of  conscience,  according  to  Tilmouth,  is  closely 
linked  to  the  importance  of  the  self’s  recognition  in  the  eyes  of  others.  Tilmouth  argues  that 
humanists  begin  emphasizing  a  person’s  public  reputation  as  a  form  of  an  ‘open’ 
conscience,  wherein  one’s  moral  status  is  not  private  knowledge,  but  is  a  mutually 
acknowledged  between  the  self  and  others.  Tilmouth  argues  that  the  view  gains 
prominence  with  Hobbes's  theory  of  “ con-scientia,”  or  “the  idea  of  a  public,  open,  mutual 
mode  of  moral  consciousness,”  but  is  already  part  of  political  theory  even  preceding 
Hobbes's  work,  as  “...a  number  of  texts  emphasize  the  importance  of  man’s  cultivating  an 
external  scrutinizing  of  his  soul,  in  which  respect  conscience  begins  to  be  constituted  as 
something  exterior  to  the  self,  an  experience  generated  in  conjunction  with  other  men” 
(“Shakespeare’s  Open  Consciences”  503).  
Within  the  theory  of  con-scientia ,  royal  figures  serve  a  special  role.  According  to 
Tilmouth,  the  king  is  not  just  a  political  figurehead,  but  functions  as  "a  collective  national 
conscience,  an  icon  of  perfection  in  which  every  citizen  might  share  and  by  which  each 
might  construct  his  own  syntereris”  (Tilmouth,  “Shakespeare’s  Open  Consciences”  502). 
But  if  the  king  functions  as  an  exemplar,  his  public  reputation,  or  how  he  is  perceived  by 
others,  is  especially  important,  since  “...such  sharing  of  consciousness  could  cut  both  ways, 
its  dynamic  proving  mutually  formative"  (Tilmouth,  “Shakespeare’s  Open  Consciences” 
502).  In  humanist  commentary  on  royal  virtue,  which  imagines  the  prince  as  on  a  world 
stage  ( theatrum  mundi ),  the  prince  functions  as  a  ‘glass’  (or  mirror)  that  the  people  (citizens 
or  subjects)  look  to  as  positive  or  negative  model.  To  his  subjects,  an  iniquitous  prince  is  “a 
‘glass’  wherein  is  written  authority  for  all  their  sins,  and  so  vice  will  prosper”  (Tilmouth, 
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“Shakespeare’s  Open  Consciences”  507).   Tilmouth  argues  specifically  in  terms  of  the 
mutually  formative  consciences  in  Shakespeare’s  plays,  but  his  work  seems  equally 
applicable  to  Kyd.  Hieronimo’s  need  to  make  the  king  a  spectator  of  his  grief  is,  perhaps, 
the  most  effective  way  to  accuse  the  world  as  a  whole,  as  the  king  is  expected  to  function 
in  early  modern  culture  as  the  public  conscience  of  his  citizens.  
Geoffrey  Aggeler  argues  that  Hieronimo’s  turn  from  a  Christian  petition  for  justice 
to  a  Senecan  spectacle  of  bloody  vengeance  is  itself  the  ‘eschatological  crux’  of  the  play.  In 
Aggeler’s  reading  of  the  play,  the  king’s  failure  to  enact  justice  models  a  laissez-faire 
Christian  god:  “...the  King  will,  by  failing  to  respond  to  pleas  for  ‘justice’  from  one  who 
maintains  these  expectations,  precipitate  catastrophe.  Instead  of  mirroring  heaven's  justice, 
of  which  he  is  the  divinely  sanctioned  minister,  he  will  mirror  what  appears  to  be  heavenly 
indifference”  (322).  But  Hieronimo  adapts  the  king-as-mirror  to  his  own  ends  by  having 
the  king  unwittingly  observe  two  murders  and  a  suicide  take  place  before  him,  ostensibly 
for  his  entertainment.  Hieronimo  demonstrates  a  human  ability  to  devastate  the  image  of  the 
king,  whether  he  be  a  figure  of  divine  justice  or  heavenly  indifference,  and  to  refigure  the 
king’s  usual  significance  as  a  model  for  the  audience.  No  longer  a  mirror  of  divine  justice 
or  indifference,  Hieronimo  casts  the  king  as  a  figure  who  fails  to  meet  his  obligations.  The 
king’s  victory  over  Portugal,  which  opens  the  play,  and  his  movement  toward 
reconciliation  between  the  two  kingdoms,  which  the  king  believes  Hieronimo’s  play  is 
meant  to  celebrate,  is  radically  subverted  and  the  narrative  of  kingly  victory  is  hijacked  by 
Hieronimo  and  turned  instead  into  a  gory  spectacle.  Hieronimo  draws  back  the  curtain  that 
conceals  his  son’s  corpse,  making  publicly  visible  the  “murders  and  misdeeds”  that  have 
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gone  unnoticed  and  uncorrected  by  the  king.  In  adapting  the  secretive  murders  and 
misdeeds  of  the  court  (Lorenzo,  Balthazar,  etc.)  into  a  stage  play,  he  extracts  secret, 
illegible  motive  and  sin,  making  it  into  a  legible  public  display,  a  performance  that  is  open 
to  the  scrutiny  of  the  audience.  His  strategy  maps  the  psychological  onto  the  theatrical, 
performs  the  court’s  secret  guilt  on  the  public  stage,  exposing  it  to  be  shamed  and,  too,  to 
inaugurate  a  “glass”  or  model  of  grief  that  the  world  itself  must  look  upon. 
In  the  end,  Hieronimo  adopts  the  Senecan  mindset  long  enough  to  resort  to 
violence.  The  revenger’s  escalation  of  violence  into  spectacle  cannot  repair  the  world,  but  it 
enables  a  perverse  kind  of  communication.  In  revenge  plays,  retribution  functions  less  as 
“wild  justice”  (as  Bacon  phrases  it)  and  is  instead  a  strategy  for  dealing  with  the  limitation 
of  words.   Violence,  it  seems,  has  an  effect  that  words  and  rhetoric  cannot  match. 25
Lorenzo,  himself  a  purveyor  of  violence,  says,  “Where  words  prevail  not,  violence 
prevails”  (2.1:  108)  and  Hieronimo,  in  a  similar  sentiment,  asks  himself,  “wherefore  waste  I 
mine  unfruitful  words,  /  When  naught  but  blood  will  satisfy  my  woes?”  (3.7:  67-68).  While 
these  phrases  are  deployed  cynically,  in  that  they  propose  “words”  as  weak  and  insufficient 
for  the  task  at  hand  (“Where  words  prevail  not”  might  be  read  as  “when  words,  inevitably, 
do  fail”),  we  might  also  read  against  the  grain  of  this  possible  meaning.  Rather  than 
surrendering  to  the  cynical  possibility  of  violence  being  the  more  effective  tool  for  getting 
things  done,  we  might  read  Lorenzo’s  claim  as  signaling  why  the  effective  use  of  “words” 
is  not  only  useful,  but  necessary.  “Where  words  prevail  not,  violence  prevails.”  In  the 
mouth  of  a  less  villainous  character,  this  would  be  a  declaration  of  why  powerful,  effective 
25  See  Bacon’s  essay,  “On  Revenge.” 
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language  is  needed.  Words,  in  this  sense,  are  what  keep  violence  at  bay.  Words,  in  this 
sense,  must  prevent  violence  or  risk  being  superseded  by  it. 
In  this  chapter,  I  analyzed  the  dialogical  structure  of  early  modern  subjectivity,  both 
in  terms  of  how  inwardness  is  depicted  through  soliloquy  and  through  examples  of 
typological  recognition  in  early  modern  mirrors.  Bazulto  provides  a  'mirror'  or  'model'  of 
fatherly  grief  for  Hieronimo.  He  functions  typologically  in  the  play,  allowing  Hieronimo  to 
recognize,  and  identify  with,  a  character  type  or  a  recognized  social  role.  In  the  next 
chapter,  I  will  analyze  a  different  form  of  intersubjectivity  as  depicted  in  Shakespeare’s 
Titus  Andronicus .  Recognition  of  the  self  via  another  is  an  important  aspect  of  subjectivity 
in  both  The  Spanish  Tragedy  and  Titus  Andronicus .  The  key  difference  in  Shakespeare’s 
play,  however,  is  that  Titus  does  not  see  his  daughter  Lavinia  as  a  typological  figure. 
Unlike  Hieronimo,  who  recognizes  a  likeness  of  his  own  grief  when  looking  into  Bazulto’s 
face,  Titus  does  not  know  how  to  categorize  Lavinia’s  suffering.  Rather  than  recognizing  a 
character  type,  he  acknowledges  her  suffering  as  uncategorizable.  While  Hieronimo 
encloses  Bazulto’s  suffering  and  appropriates  it  as  an  extension  of  his  own,  Titus 
reciprocates  Lavinia's  subjectivity,  attempting  to  share  in  it  by  mimicking  her  actions  and 
emulating  her  wounds  on  his  own  body. 
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CHAPTER  III 
“LAVINIA,  SHALL  I  READ?”:  
CITATION  AND  MIMICRY  IN  SHAKESPEARE’S  TITUS  ANDRONICUS 
 
Shakespeare’s  Titus  Andronicus  emphasizes  violence  against  the  organs  of 
communication.  Hands  are  lopped  away,  tongues  removed  and  mouths  gagged,  gestures 
mocked  or  ignored  outright.  In  Shakespeare’s  play,  Titus  and  his  daughter  Lavinia  each 
have  their  sense  of  identity  damaged  through  physical  violence  and  social  ostracization. 
Feminist  readings  of  the  play  tend  to  view  Titus’s  revenge  against  Tamora,  Chiron,  and 
Demetrius  as  happening  at  Lavinia’s  expense,  claiming  that  Titus  turns  her  dismemberment 
and  rape  into  a  wound  on  the  Andronici  family  honor.  Such  readings  view  Titus’s  revenge 
against  Lavinia’s  rapists  as  a  reiteration  of  Titus’s  own  patriarchal  authority.  Recent 
scholarship  on  early  modern  intersubjectivity  provides  an  alternative  reading  of  Titus’s 
revenge,  offering  a  framework  for  understanding  how  Shakespeare  depicts  the  recovery  of 
identity  after  a  series  of  traumatic  events  in  Titus  Andronicus .  The  play  uses  depictions  of 
violence  to  explore  the  limits  of  identity.  I  argue  that  Titus  and  Lavinia  collaborate  in 
reconstructing  their  identities  post-trauma.  Though  much  of  the  recent  criticism  on  Titus 
reads  the  play  as  an  affirmation  of  patriarchal  culture,  I  believe  that  Titus  and  Lavinia’s 
collaborative  recovery  challenges  rather  than  reiterates  patriarchal  authority.  In  my  reading, 
Titus  and  Lavinia  construct  new  identities  in  relation  to  their  shared  suffering,  rather  than  in 
terms  of  Titus’s  wounded  patriarchal  honor,  and  I  will  show  that  it  is  not  Titus  but  Lavinia 
who  instructs  the  family  in  how  to  take  revenge.  My  argument  builds  upon  recent 
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reconsiderations  of  how  identity  and  subjectivity  are  structured  in  early  modern  culture,  and 
I  argue  that  Lavinia’s  use  of  citation,  her  quoting  of  passages  from  Ovid’s  Metamorphoses , 
helps  us  understand  how  Elizabethans  conceptualized  identity  as  not  self-generated  or 
stable,  but  as  iterative  and  performative,  existing  both  in  the  projection  of  how  a  character 
wants  to  be  perceived  by  others  and  in  how  that  projection  is  received.  
 
The  problem  of  Lavinia’s  silence 
Shakespeare’s  play  focuses  on  acts  of  revenge  between  two  families.  Titus,  Rome’s 
general  and  the  patriarch  of  the  Andronici,  returns  to  Rome  after  defeating  the  Goths  and 
taking  captive  the  Goth  Queen  Tamora,  her  three  sons,  Alarbus,  Chiron,  and  Demetrius, 
and  her  lover,  Aaron  the  Moor.  To  appease  the  spirits  of  his  sons  who  have  fallen  in  battle, 
Titus  authorizes  the  ritual  slaughter  of  Alarbus.  Tamora  pleads  with  Titus  to  spare  her  son, 
but  Titus  pays  her  little  attention  and  Alarbus  is  killed.  While  being  presented  to  Saturninus, 
Rome’s  recently  appointed  emperor,  Tamora  catches  his  eye  and  becomes  his  wife. 
Tamora,  Aaron,  Chiron,  and  Demetrius  use  their  elevated  status  in  Rome  to  take  revenge 
against  Titus  and  his  family.  Chiron  and  Demetrius  rape  Titus’s  daughter  Lavinia  during  a 
hunting  excursion  in  the  woods.  Rather  than  kill  her,  they  cut  out  her  tongue  and,  because 
they  are  familiar  with  the  story  of  Philomel  in  Ovid,  lop  off  her  hands  so  that  she  is  unable 
to  speak  or  write  about  what  has  happened  to  her.  Chiron  and  Demetrius  also  kill  Lavinia’s 
husband,  who  happens  to  be  the  emperor’s  brother,  and  frame  two  of  Titus’s  sons  for  the 
murder,  for  which  they  are  subsequently  executed.  When  Titus  sees  Lavinia,  he  vows  with 
his  family  that  they  will  take  revenge,  though  they  don’t  know  whom  to  take  revenge 
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against.  While  Titus’s  grandson  is  studying  Ovid,  Lavinia  chases  him,  taking  the  book  and 
opening  to  the  story  of  Philomel,  Procne,  and  Tereus.  Titus  realizes  Lavinia  is  quoting  from 
Ovid  to  communicate  what  has  happened  to  her.  Lavinia  then  takes  her  uncle’s  staff  in  her 
mouth  and  guides  it  with  the  stumps  of  her  arms,  completing  her  accusation  by  writing  the 
names  of  Chiron  and  Demetrius  in  the  sand.  Titus  takes  his  cue  from  Ovid’s  poem  by 
killing  Chiron  and  Demetrius,  baking  them  in  a  pie,  and  feeding  them  to  Tamora. 
Given  the  sexual  and  physical  violence  that  Lavinia  suffers,  it  should  come  as  no 
surprise  that  she  is  often  read  as  a  figure  of  female  victimization.  Even  while  her  father 
Titus  takes  revenge  against  Tamora,  Chiron,  and  Demetrius,  Lavinia  seems  a  character 
whose  tragic  silence  serves  to  justify  patriarchal  authority  and  male  aggression.  Titus 
repeatedly  claims  insight  into  how  Lavinia’s  gestures  might  be  translated  (“Mark,  Marcus, 
mark.  I  understand  her  signs”),  yet  Titus’s  translations  seem  to  simply  reiterate  his  own 
view  of  the  family’s  devastation:  “Had  she  a  tongue  to  speak,  now  would  she  say  /  That  to 
her  brother  which  I  said  to  thee.  /  …  O,  what  a  sympathy  of  woe  is  this--  /  As  far  from  help 
as  limbo  is  from  bliss”  (3.1.144-149).  In  claiming  to  read  into  her  interiority  and  declare  for 
her  what  she  wants  or  needs  or  feels,  Titus  seems  to  vocalize  his  own  interiority  at  the 
expense  of  whatever  Lavinia  herself  might  be  trying  to  communicate.  Derek  Cohen,  for 
instance,  argues  that  when  Titus  and  the  other  males  of  the  Andronici  family  attempt  to 
interpret  Lavinia’s  speechless  gestures,  “she  becomes  the  source  of  their  greatest  challenge 
as  they  seek  to  become  her  voice,  to  shape  her  thoughts  into  language”  (81).  Cohen 
suggests  that  Lavinia’s  voice  and  the  thoughts  she  might  express  are  no  longer  her  own 
when  the  men  of  her  family  ventriloquize  for  her.  With  the  loss  of  her  hands  and  tongue, 
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she  cannot  effectively  communicate  and  becomes  less  a  character  than  a  cipher  in  the  play, 
a  living  text  from  which  Titus  tries  to  “wrest  an  alphabet”  (3.2.44).  
Douglas  Green  argues  that  Titus  appropriates  not  only  Lavinia’s  voice,  but  also  her 
suffering.  According  to  Green,  Titus’s  identity  depends  on  keeping  the  two  women  of  the 
play,  Tamora  and  Lavinia,  at  the  margins  of  agency.  In  Green’s  argument,  Tamora 
functions  as  a  marginal  Other,  an  oppositional  pressure  against  which  Titus’s  strength  and 
agency  is  constructed  and  maintained.  She  is  the  evil  and  corruption  against  whom  Titus  is 
measured  to  seem  an  avenging  hero.  Green  claims  that  Lavinia  functions  on  “the  other  pole 
of  the  scale”  as  the  marginal  Other  which  “‘articulates’  Titus’  own  suffering  and 
victimization”  (“Interpreting”  322).  Lavinia’s  suffering,  in  this  sense,  is  integrated  into  a 
psychological  pressure  which  ultimately  functions  to  bolster  Titus’s  identity  as  a  revenger, 
so  that  he  might,  as  Titus’s  brother  Marcus  says,  “rail”  against  Lavinia’s  attackers  to  ease 
his  own  mind  (2.3.35).  If  this  is  how  we  understand  Titus’s  response  to  Lavinia,  then  that 
response  is  ultimately  self-serving.  Titus’s  attempts  to  decipher  Lavinia’s  silence  bolster  the 
authority  of  the  male  gaze  and  Lavinia  is  reduced  to  a  passive  text  that  requires  Titus’s 
mastery.  
 
Titus  and  Lavinia’s  relationship  as  a  model  of  intersubjectivity 
While  readings  of  Titus  as  a  play  centering  on  patriarchal  ideology  have  been 
productive  for  thinking  about  the  importance  of  voice  for  early  modern  agency,  such 
readings  imply  a  range  of  misogyny  (from  explicit  to  accidental)  in  Titus’s  responses  to 
Lavinia’s  suffering  that  the  play  itself  seeks  to  avoid.  It  is  possible  to  consider  the  crucial 
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link  between  Lavinia’s  loss  of  language  and  her  loss  of  self-representation  while  also 
acknowledging  how  Titus  and  Lavinia’s  relationship  is  an  interaction  rather  than  a 
one-sided  response.  The  intersection  between  agency  and  language  is  the  play’s  central 
concern,  as  characters  throughout  the  play  struggle  to  properly  understand  and  be 
understood  by  others.  Acknowledging  the  significance  of  Titus’s  attentiveness  to  Lavinia’s 
communicative  gestures  highlights  the  interpersonal  nature  of  early  modern 
self-representation.  To  properly  understand  the  nature  of  Titus’s  relationship  to  Lavinia  and 
the  strategies  Lavinia  uses  to  develop  an  alternative  selfhood  we  must  situate  the  play 
within  the  historical  context  of  early  modern  subjectivity.  Titus’s  relationship  with  Lavinia 
and  the  repeated  emphasis  on  reading  others  as  texts  rely  on  interpersonal  forms  of  selfhood 
that  precede  modern  individualism.  The  play  suggests  that  the  interpersonal  language  of 
selfhood  in  early  modern  culture  has  a  cognitive  structure  that  links  identity  with  personal 
narrative,  and  this  cognitive  structure  is  itself  modeled  on  popular  forms  of  narrative,  such 
as  poetry  and  early  modern  theater,  and  the  cultural  practices  of  narrative  production  taught 
in  humanist  classrooms,  such  as  adaptation,  allusion,  and  citation.  
At  the  center  of  the  play’s  crisis  of  the  interpersonal  nature  of  selfhood  is  Lavinia. 
Lavinia  cites  poetry  as  a  strategy  for  overcoming  speechlessness  by  situating  her  silence 
within  a  narrative  pattern  she  finds  in  Ovid’s  Metamorphoses .  Lavinia’s  strategy  of 
narrative  recovery  is  especially  significant  since  scholars  of  cognitive  cultural  studies  are 
finding  that  “Narrative  does  not  merely  capture  aspects  of  the  self  for  description, 
communication,  and  examination;  narrative  constructs  the  self.”   Titus  Andronicus 26
26  See  Gary  Fireman,  Ted  McVay,  and  Owen  Flanagan’s  introduction  to  Narrative  and  Consciousness: 
Literature,  Psychology,  and  the  Brain ,  p.  5. 
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emphasizes  acts  of  reading,  writing,  and  the  quoting  of  texts  because  identity  and  agency  in 
early  modern  culture  rely  so  heavily  on  language,  on  communication  and  self-expression.  It 
would  be  a  mistake  to  assume  that  Titus’s  attempts  to  ‘read’  Lavinia  are  aligned  with 
patriarchal  strategies  to  turn  her  into  an  ‘object,’  i.e.  a  passive  text  over  which  he  will  assert 
some  form  of  mastery  and  which  he  will  interpret  as  he  pleases.  As  an  effect  in  the  play, 
acts  of  reading  and  writing  provide  a  template  for  thinking  about  early  modern  identity  and 
agency.  
In  language  and  through  language  a  body  becomes  a  person,  and  embodied  actions 
are  identified  with  agency,  which  is  why  Chiron  and  Demetrius  target  Lavinia’s  tongue  and 
hands.  They  specifically  destroy  her  abilities  to  speak  and  write.  They  seek  to  erase  her 
identity  by  eliminating  the  parts  of  her  body  that  facilitate  self-expression.  In  his  attempts  to 
understand  Lavinia’s  gestures,  Titus  seeks  to  be  receptive  to  Lavinia’s  maimed 
communication.  Titus  refuses  to  accept  that  the  channels  of  linguistic  expression,  which  are 
integral  to  early  modern  identity,  have  been  taken  from  Lavinia  permanently.  Instead,  Titus 
commits  himself  to  the  study  of  her  soundless  gestures  and  her  wordless  attempts  to  make 
herself  known,  and  the  language  of  Titus’s  commitment  is  steeped  in  religious  devotion: 
Speechless  complainer,  I  will  learn  thy  thought. 
In  thy  dumb  action  will  I  be  as  perfect 
As  begging  hermits  in  their  holy  prayers. 
Thou  shalt  not  sigh,  nor  hold  thy  stumps  to  heaven, 
Nor  wink,  nor  nod,  nor  kneel,  nor  make  a  sign, 
But  I  of  these  will  wrest  an  alphabet, 
And  by  still  practice  learn  to  know  thy  meaning.  (3.2.39-45) 
 
In  its  proper  context,  it  is  difficult  to  interpret  Titus’s  desire  to  read  and  translate  Lavinia’s 
signs  as  patriarchal  mastery.  He  seeks  to  help  Lavinia  reclaim  her  personhood,  rather  than 
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allowing  others  to  view  her  as  an  object  of  horror  (“Ay  me,  this  object  kills  me”)  or  a  living 
reminder  her  loss  of  self  (“This  was  thy  daughter,”  Marcus  says,  to  which  Titus  responds, 
“Why,  Marcus,  so  she  is”)  ( Titus  3.1.62-64). 
Titus’s  attentiveness  to  Lavinia’s  speechless  suffering,  and  his  desire  to  be 
instrumental  in  her  recovery  of  self-representation,  display  a  configuration  of  subjectivity 
that  is  mutually  generated  rather  than  autonomous  and  individualistic.  Recent  scholarship 
has  questioned  claims  about  the  prevalence  of  Renaissance  individualism  in  order  to  better 
understand  early  modern  models  of  inwardness  and  identity.  In  my  introduction  and  in 
Chapter  2,  I  have  cited  recent  criticism  that  seeks  to  go  beyond  Stephen  Greenblatt’s  notion 
of  self-fashioning.  While  Greenblatt’s  work  and  its  influence  on  new  historicist  and  cultural 
materialist  scholarship  has  been,  and  continues  to  be,  immensely  productive,  some  scholars 
are  questioning  the  critical  assumptions  implicit  in  the  Foucaultian  relations  between  power 
and  identity,  upon  which  our  understanding  of  self-fashioning  is  developed.   Though  it  is 27
true  that  self-fashioning  is  an  emerging  cultural  practice  in  early  modern  London,  our 
critical  interest  in  this  practice  has  created  a  blind  spot  which  overlooks  moments  in  texts 
which  work  against  the  grain  of  self-fashioning  or  which  enable  returns  to  earlier, 
interpersonal  models  of  subjectivity.  Recent  early  modern  scholarship  on  intersubjectivity  is 
working  to  “reject  a  model  of  human  activity  which  is  overly  cognitive”  in  order  to  recover 
early  modern  models  of  inwardness  and  identity  which  spring  from  notions  of  permeable 
27  Cynthia  Marshall,  for  instance,  argues  in  The  Shattering  of  the  Self  that  the  emergence  of  a  private, 
autonomous  interiority  (from  which  a  public  self  can  be  ‘fashioned’  and  performed)  overemphasizes  the 
prevalence  of  liberal  individualism,  which  is  only  in  its  nascent  form  during  the  Renaissance  and  which 
remained  in  tension  with  the  interpersonal  models  of  identity  and  selfhood  which  preceded  it.  Also  see  the 
Introduction  to  Passion  and  Subjectivity  in  Early  Modern  Culture ,  p.  5;  Selleck,  The  Interpersonal  Idiom 
in  Shakespeare,  Donne,  and  Early  Modern  Culture ,  pp.  2-3.  
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and  contingent  embodiment  and  interpersonal  agency  which  may  seem  alien  or 
counterintuitive  to  us  today  (Cummings  and  Sierhuis  5).  
Only  by  acknowledging  competing  theorizations,  models,  and,  ultimately, 
experiences  of  early  modern  selfhood  can  we  begin  to  understand  and  properly  analyze  the 
complexity  of  how  identity  and  subjectivity  are  depicted  in  early  modern  texts.  Nancy 
Selleck  argues  that  early  modern  scholarship  has  emphasized  the  historical  establishment  of 
an  individualism  which  assumes  the  existence  of  an  autonomous  or  “ noncontingent 
interiority,”  an  inwardness  which  is  “a  distinct  thing  that  one  can  have  and  use  without 
reference  to  the  social  context  that  created  it”  (Selleck  45-46).  Cynthia  Marshall,  too,  claims 
that  "Because  the  narrative  terms  in  which  we  have  understood  the  so-called  birth  of 
subjectivity  invest  value  in  the  emergent  self,  we  have  overemphasized  its  early 
dominance…”  ( Shattering  4).  This  assumed  pervasiveness  of  individualism  has  obscured 
the  early  modern  notion  of  the  contingent,  relational  self--a  self  which  is  a  “multiplicity  of 
selves”  produced  through,  and  dependent  upon,  social  relations  and  interactions  with  others 
(Selleck  47). 
While  autonomous  individualism  does  become  the  dominant  form  of  western 
subjectivity,  the  transition  between  ‘past’  and  ‘present’  forms  of  subjectivity  and  its  various 
cultural  practices  is  never  immediate,  nor  does  the  emergence  of  a  new  subjectivity  entirely 
cast  off  the  assumptions  and  practices  which  precede  it.   Marshall  argues  there  is  an 
unexplored  aspect  in  the  depictions  of  violence  in  early  modern  texts  that  enables 
“moments  of  allowable  reversion”  to  traditional  models  of  selfhood  or  that  operate  within 
"an  aesthetic  of  shattering  or  self-negation"  of  the  self  as  "a  counterforce"  to  nascent 
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individualism  (Marshall  2,  4).  Revenge  tragedies  --  with  their  emphasis  on  traumatic 
violence  which  disrupts  characters’  familial  relations,  social  statuses,  and  even  their  sense 
of  self  and  their  notion  of  being  in  the  world  --  provide  an  avenue  for  the  cultural  work  of 
mediating  the  anxieties  created  by  competing  pressures  of  an  emerging  individualism. 
Marshall’s  work  traces  early  modern  audiences’  pleasure  in  theatrical  violence,  locating  it 
in  the  audience’s  experience  of  ‘self-shattering’  that  is  enabled  by  depictions  of  physical 
and  emotional  pain.  Marshall’s  demonstration  of  early  modern  forms  of  resistance  to 
nascent  individualism  and  the  pleasure  in  feeling  one’s  subjectivity  disrupted  is  useful  for 
examining  the  rhetoric  of  grief  and  the  spectacles  of  violence  that  are  key  ingredients  in 
Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies.  
Of  course,  early  modern  subjectivity  is  more  complex  and  varied  than  a 
dichotomous  opposition  between  an  emerging  individualism  and  the  temporary  release 
from  individualism  found  in  self-shattering.  While  Marshall  finds  moments  in  early  modern 
texts  that  provide  evidence  of  the  tensions  between  nascent  individualism  and  models  of 
subjectivity  which  precede  it,  and  locates  practices  of  self-shattering  that  provides  a 
cathartic  release  from  the  pressures  of  subjectivity  (however  temporary  that  release  might 
be),  other  scholars  have  worked  to  display  the  nascent  individualism  of  early  modern 
subjectivity  as  steeped  in  interpersonal  relations  that  enable  early  modern  notions  of  the 
individual  but  that  do  not  yet  conceive  of  the  individual  as  ‘autonomous.’  Nancy  Selleck 
argues  that  in  early  modern  texts  we  find  “an  alternative  language  of  selfhood  that  casts  it  in 
interpersonal  rather  than  individual  terms”  (1).  The  violence  in  Titus  Andronicus  disrupts 
language  and  dislodges  Titus  and  Lavinia’s  sense  of  agency.  This  chapter  locates  and 
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analyzes  this  “alternative  language  of  selfhood”  and  the  alternative  mediums  of 
communication  (including  mimicry  and  citation)  that  Titus  and  Lavinia  use  to  reconstruct 
their  shattered  identities. 
 
Intersubjectivity,  revenge,  and  the  problem  of  sympathetic  identification 
While  the  narrative  focus  of  Titus  Andronicus  is  revenge,  even  revenge  in  the  play 
depends  on  ‘reading’  others  and  making  legible  their  motives  and  hidden  intentions. 
According  to  Selleck,  the  language  of  selfhood  in  early  modern  texts  reveals  notions  of 
identity  which  presume  interaction  between  selves  as  an  essential  aspect  of  identity 
formation:   “this  language  provides  its  users  with  conceptions  and  expectations  of  identity 
as  an  exchange,  permeation,  borrowing,  anticipation--in  short,  a  great  variety  of 
other-oriented  actions  and  configurations  largely  alien  to  our  modern  language  of  selfhood” 
(Selleck  1).  In  Titus ,  Shakespeare  depicts  other-oriented  language  through  a  poetics  of 
sympathy.  As  Titus  and  Lavinia’s  identities  are  destroyed  through  retributive  violence,  their 
attempts  to  restore  their  sense  of  agency  rely  on  the  language  and  gestures  of  shared 
suffering.  
To  understand  the  play’s  poetics  of  sympathy  and  the  importance  of  this  poetics  for 
understanding  the  play’s  depiction  of  early  modern  subjectivity,  we  must  first  understand 
the  early  modern  distinction  between  sympathy  and  pity.  Titus  and  Marcus’s  initial 
responses  to  Lavinia  upon  seeing  her  wounds  mark  an  important  distinction  between  early 
modern  pity  and  sympathy.  Marcus  shows  Lavinia  pity--he  is  horrified  by  Lavinia’s 
wounds  and  grieves  for  her,  but  he  makes  an  effort  to  protect  himself  from  too  closely 
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identifying  with  her  pain.  Titus,  on  the  other  hand,  sympathizes  with  Lavinia,  immediately 
wanting  to  share  in  her  suffering  and  feel  her  pain,  even  going  so  far  as  to  cut  off  his  own 
hand  to  copy  some  of  her  wounds  with  his  own  body.  Marcus  shows  Lavinia  pity,  acting  as 
witness  to  her  suffering,  but  Titus  wants  to  feel  and  understand  Lavinia’s  suffering 
personally.  The  difference  between  Marcus’s  response  and  Titus’s  provides  a  dramatic 
distinction  between  pity  and  sympathy.  Let’s  begin  by  examining  Marcus’s  pity  for  Lavinia 
in  detail. 
Marcus’s  initial  inclination  when  finding  Lavinia  wounded  in  the  woods  is  to 
aestheticize  her  wounds,  turning  her  unspeakable  trauma  into  poetic  expression.  Initially, 
Lavinia’s  appearance  stuns  Marcus  into  a  liminal  state:  “If  I  do  dream,  would  all  my  wealth 
would  wake  me.  /  If  I  do  wake,  some  planet  strike  me  down  /  That  I  may  slumber  an 
eternal  sleep”  (2.4.13-15).  Lavinia’s  wounds  overwhelm  Marcus,  and  he  wishes  to  escape 
their  nightmarish  image.  Since  Marcus  neither  wakes  nor  dies,  he  recoils  from  Lavinia’s 
wounds  using  language,  turning  her  wounds  into  objects  of  poetry.  Marcus  cannot  bear  to 
witness  Lavinia’s  pain.  Unable  to  escape  the  image  of  her  wounds,  he  momentarily 
dissociates,  translating  Lavinia’s  wounds  into  pastoral  images.  He  attempts  to  piece  her 
body  back  together  through  poetic  blazon ,  cataloguing  the  pieces  of  her  body  and 
attempting  to  recover  them  through  metaphoric  description: 
Speak,  gentle  niece,  what  stern  ungentle  hands 
Have  lopp'd  and  hew'd  and  made  thy  body  bare 
Of  her  two  branches,  those  sweet  ornaments, 
Whose  circling  shadows  kings  have  sought  to  sleep  in, 
And  might  not  gain  so  great  a  happiness 
As  have  thy  love?  Why  dost  not  speak  to  me? 
Alas,  a  crimson  river  of  warm  blood, 
Like  to  a  bubbling  fountain  stirr'd  with  wind, 
Doth  rise  and  fall  between  thy  rosed  lips, 
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Coming  and  going  with  thy  honey  breath. 
But,  sure,  some  Tereus  hath  deflowered  thee, 
And,  lest  thou  shouldst  detect  him,  cut  thy  tongue. 
Ah,  now  thou  turn'st  away  thy  face  for  shame! 
And,  notwithstanding  all  this  loss  of  blood, 
As  from  a  conduit  with  three  issuing  spouts, 
Yet  do  thy  cheeks  look  red  as  Titan's  face 
Blushing  to  be  encountered  with  a  cloud.  (2.4.16-32) 
 
The  sites  of  Lavinia’s  physical  suffering--her  hewed  hands  and  bleeding  mouth--are  figured 
as  branches  and  fountains,  as  objects  of  beauty  which  are  incapable  of  feeling  pain. 
Marcus’s  metaphoric  description  momentarily  elides  their  physical  absence  with  linguistic 
presence,  rendering  them  for  the  audience’s  imagination,  “lopp’d  and  hew’d”  though  they 
might  be.  
Marcus’s  attempt  to  reconstruct  Lavinia  through  poetic  description  is,  of  course, 
ineffectual.  His  poetry  is  a  reflex,  a  linguistic  flinch  from  the  reality  of  his  niece’s  suffering. 
Marcus  uses  pastoral  imagery  associated  with  the  blazon ,  which  celebrates  a  woman’s 
beauty  (and,  occasionally,  a  man’s)  through  metaphor  and  simile,  generally  describing 
womanly  features  as  the  finest  of  nature’s  materials  (such  as  ripe  cherries,  ivory,  pearls, 
spun  gold,  etc.),  but  as  Marcus  gradually  accepts  Lavinia’s  suffering,  his  pastoral  imagery 
turns  into  a  poetry  of  loss:  
A  craftier  Tereus,  cousin,  hast  thou  met, 
And  he  hath  cut  those  pretty  fingers  off, 
That  could  have  better  sew'd  than  Philomel. 
O,  had  the  monster  seen  those  lily  hands 
Tremble,  like  aspen-leaves,  upon  a  lute, 
And  make  the  silken  strings  delight  to  kiss  them, 
He  would  not  then  have  touch'd  them  for  his  life! 
Or,  had  he  heard  the  heavenly  harmony 
Which  that  sweet  tongue  hath  made, 
He  would  have  dropp'd  his  knife,  and  fell  asleep 
As  Cerberus  at  the  Thracian  poet's  feet.  (2.4.41-51) 
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Marcus’  lines  here  desire  an  alternate  narrative,  one  in  which  the  “the  monster”  would  have 
refrained  from  monstrous  violence  if  he  saw  and  heard  for  himself  the  charm  of  Lavinia’s 
hands  and  tongue.  No  longer  flinching  from  Lavinia,  Marcus  begins  to  accept  his  role  as  a 
witness  to  her  suffering,  but  not  before  lamenting  what  might  have  been,  if  Lavinia’s 
attackers  were  capable  of  poetic  sensitivity. 
Having  first  flinched  from  her  wounds  and  then  wishing  they  hadn’t  happened, 
Marcus’s  attention  does  gradually  shift  from  her  wounds  to  Lavinia  herself.  Even  in  his 
description  of  her  “lily  hands”  and  “sweet  tongue,”  the  emphasis  is  on  Lavinia’s  activities, 
how  her  hands  light  upon  a  lute  or  how  she  uses  her  tongue  to  sing  a  “heavenly  harmony,” 
and  Marcus  begins  acknowledging  that  Lavinia’s  lopped  hands  and  tongue  are  not  the 
losses  of  objects ,  but  of  instruments  of  her  body.  His  language,  in  other  words,  can  no 
longer  commit  to  the  notion  of  her  wounds  as  a  series  of  inanimate  objects--a  description  in 
which  Lavinia  has  no  presence.  Instead,  the  loss  is  not  just  of  hands  and  tongue,  but  of 
Lavinia’s  performance,  too,  of  music  and  song.  The  loss  is  not  just  her  body  parts  but  also 
the  activities  or  expressions  for  which  she  used  them  and  which  remain  metonymically 
suggestive  of  Lavinia  as  a  person  of  grace  and  eloquence.  
But  despite  the  gradual  shift  in  his  description  of  Lavinia’s  lopped  limbs,  Marcus 
still  doesn’t  sympathize  or  closely  identify  with  her  pain  or  suffering.  Marcus  grieves  for 
Lavinia,  but  his  grief  also  brackets  off  Lavinia’s  pain.  He  clearly  feels  anguish,  but  it  is  an 
anguish  that  is  caused  by  the  sight  of  Lavinia’s  wounds,  not  an  anguish  that  imagines  her 
suffering  as  his  own  or  that  attempts  to  imagine  suffering  from  her  perspective.  Marcus  is 
certainly  affected  by  the  sight  of  Lavinia’s  wounds,  and  he  wishes  he  could  know  what 
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Lavinia  might  tell  him  if  she  still  had  her  tongue:  “Shall  I  speak  for  thee?  Shall  I  say  ’tis  so? 
/  O  that  I  knew  thy  heart,  and  I  knew  the  beast,  /  That  I  might  rail  at  him  to  ease  my  mind!” 
(2.4.33-35).  In  these  lines,  Marcus  does  not  want  to  know  Lavinia’s  “heart”  in  the  sense  of 
wanting  to  feel  or  identify  with  her  trauma  (though  Titus  will  show  this  desire  for  close 
association).  What  Marcus  wants  is  the  secret  knowledge  of  whom  Lavinia  would  accuse. 
He  wants  to  know  who  is  “the  beast”  responsible  for  Lavinia’s  mutilation.  Marcus  admits, 
whether  he  realizes  it  or  not,  that  retaliating  against  the  person  responsible  for  Lavinia’s 
pain  would  ease  his  own  suffering  rather  than  Lavinia’s:  “That  I  might  rail  at  him  to  ease 
my  mind !”  (2.4.35,  my  italics).  Marcus’s  desire  to  know  who  is  responsible  for  Lavinia’s 
mutilation  acknowledges  Lavinia’s  pain  without  necessarily  identifying  with  it.  
The  suffering  Marcus  does  identify  with,  because  he  imagines  it  will  be  similar  in 
kind  to  his  own,  is  Titus’s:  “Come,  let  us  go  and  make  thy  father  blind,  /  For  such  a  sight 
will  blind  a  father’s  eye.  /  One  hour’s  storm  will  drown  the  fragrant  meads:  /  What  will 
whole  months  of  tears  thy  father’s  eyes?”  (2.4.52-55).  Marcus  assumes  that  the  sight  of 
Lavinia’s  mutilation  will  affect  Titus  as  it  has  affected  him.  For  Marcus,  witnessing 
Lavinia’s  suffering  is  dangerous,  and  it  threatens  to  overwhelm  him  with  grief.  The  fact  that 
he  initially  flinches  from  her  pain  by  first  filtering  his  perception  of  her  wounds  through 
poetry  is  psychologically  suggestive.  He  is  understandably  horrified  by  the  violence 
Lavinia  has  suffered.   But  as  he  acknowledges  her  suffering,  his  response  is  one  of  pity.  He 
grieves  for  her  and  wants  to  ease  her  suffering:  “Do  not  draw  back,  for  we  will  mourn  with 
thee.  /  O,  could  our  mourning  ease  thy  misery!”  (2.4.56-57).  But  even  as  Marcus  claims 
“we  will  mourn  with  thee,”  there’s  a  distinction  between  their  suffering  (Marcus  and 
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Titus’s)  and  hers:  “O,  could  our  mourning  ease  thy  misery ”  (2.4.57,  my  italics).  This 
implied  distance  (Marcus  grieves  for  Lavinia)  is  the  crucial  difference  between  having  pity 
for  someone  or  having  sympathy.  Pity  maintains  a  kind  of  distance.  Sympathy  does  not. 
The  sight  of  Lavinia’s  misery  causes  Marcus  a  painful  emotional  response.  Marcus  wants 
to  ease  Lavinia’s  misery--of  course  he  does--but  this  is  motivated,  at  least  in  part,  by  his 
need  to  ease  his  own  misery  as  well.  
Scholars  have  been  puzzled  by  Marcus’s  response  to  Lavinia’s  bloody,  speechless 
suffering,  and  the  general  tendency  is  to  read  Marcus’s  response  as  inherently  patriarchal,  a 
reflexive  closure  of  feminine  suffering  and  shame  through  masculine  procedures  of 
Petrarchan  poetics  and  the  authority  of  male  speech.  Bethany  Packard,  for  instance, 
interprets  Marcus’s  description  of  Lavinia’s  wounds  as  a  metaphorical  doubling  of 
Lavinia’s  trauma.  By  reconstruing  Lavinia’s  wounds  through  florid  metaphor,  Packard 
claims,  “he  repeats  Lavinia’s  dismemberment  even  as  he  tries  to  reconstruct  an  imagined 
perfect  body”  (“Coauthor”  289).  S.  Clark  Hulse  remarks  that  Marcus’s  aestheticizing  of 
Lavinia’s  wounds  “might  be  describing  a  broken  water  main,  not  his  niece,  for  all  the 
emotional  weight  or  interior  reference  his  words  seem  to  carry,”  and  Hulse  suggests  that  the 
scene  marks  a  pivotal  shift  in  the  play,  with  the  efficacy  of  language  being  replaced  by 
action  and  bodily  gesture  (“Wresting”  110).  While  these  concerns  of  patriarchal  authority 
and  the  assumed  masculine  power  of  speech  and  poetics  are  insightful,  important,  and 
persuasively  argued,  we  might  also  consider  how  Marcus’s  reaction  to  Lavinia  serves  a 
dramatic  function.  Contemporary  scholarship  on  the  play  has  not  made  an  adequate 
distinction  between  Marcus  and  Titus’s  reactions  to  Lavinia’s  wounds.  Marcus  and  Titus’s 
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responses  to  Lavinia  are  often  read  as  equivalent  and  emblematic  of  the  denial  of  female 
agency  throughout  the  play.  But  Titus’s  response  to  Lavinia  is  not  identical  to  Marcus’s. 
Rather,  Marcus’s  initial  response  to  her  wounds  provides  a  necessary  and  dramatic  contrast 
to  Titus’s  response.  
Notably,  much  of  the  criticism  and  investigation  of  sympathy  is  relegated  to 
morality  or  ethics.  To  sympathize  with  someone  else  was  thought  to  explain  and  justify 
moral  principles.  In  this  sense,  sympathy  and  its  corollaries,  such  as  compassion  or  pity,  are 
noted  for  their  motivating  function:  they  move  someone  to  feel  something  for  someone  else 
and  to  act  in  accordance  with  that  feeling.  Someone  suffers,  and  we  want  to  ease  their  pain 
or  at  least  share  in  their  suffering.  While  some  emotions  or  passions  can  be,  and  often  are, 
self-contained  (such  as  happiness,  contentment,  curiosity,  fear,  anger,  sorrow,  etc.), 
sympathy  is  inherently  interpersonal,  requiring  a  process  of  identification  with  someone 
else.  According  to  Jean  Marsden,  early  modern  drama  inspires  “a  radical  shift”  from  “the 
didactic  insistence  on  art’s  responsibility  to  ‘please  and  instruct’”  as  playwrights  invest  in  “a 
work’s  ability  to  provoke  an  emotion  and  through  that  emotion  create  a  human  connection 
between  spectator  and  spectacle”  (29). 
Moral  instruction  is  assumed  in  classical  and  medieval  works  of  poetry  and  drama, 
but  that  instruction  is  in  terms  of  behavior:  a  poem  or  play  defines  virtues  (such  as  heroism 
or  villainy)  through  examples,  through  the  actions  of  its  characters.   They  provide  models 
to  emulate  or  avoid  in  terms  of  how  to  act.  The  shift  from  instruction  to  “a  work's  ability  to 
provoke  an  emotion”  and  “create  a  human  connection,”  though,  provides  a  new  model:  not 
just  how  to  ‘act’  but  also  how  to  ‘feel.’  Shakespeare  models  the  distinction  between  pity 
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and  sympathy  in  Marcus  and  Titus's  responses  to  Lavinia.  What's  more,  early  modern 
tragedies  do  not  just  provide  'models'  of  emotional  response,  they  are  also  designed  to 
cultivate  and  evoke  those  emotional  responses  in  the  audience.  Members  of  the  audience 
see  how  different  characters  might  respond  to  horrors  and  violence  on  stage,  but  they  also 
must  grapple  with  their  own  emotional  responses  even  as  they  observe  and  evaluate  the 
responses  of  the  characters  rendered  before  them. 
So  how  does  Titus  model  a  different  way  to  feel?  And  how  does  this  model  help  us 
to  better  understand  not  only  the  play,  but  also  the  importance  of  sympathy  in  early  modern 
cognition?  Unlike  Marcus,  Titus  doesn’t  want  to  pity  Lavinia’s  pain,  he  wants  to 
experience  it  for  himself.  Feminist  and  psychoanalytic  scholars  tend  to  read  Lavinia’s 
wounds  as  a  suppressing  of  Lavinia’s  agency.  In  addition  to  the  ethical  failures  that  lead  to 
the  violence  she  suffers,  scholars  link  Lavinia’s  wounds  with  the  eradication  of  her  identity. 
She  loses  the  ability  to  effectively  communicate,  becoming  a  passive,  silent  subject  who 
require  Marcus  and  Titus’s  attempts  at  penetrative  insight.  They  read  into  her  interiority  and 
declare  for  her  what  she  wants  or  feels  or  needs,  or  how  her  gestures  might  be  translated. 
Marcus’s  description  of  her  wounds,  for  example,  situates  agency  within  the  male  gaze.  He 
looks  upon  her  wounds,  constructing  their  meaning  and  using  them  as  the  raw  material  for 
his  own  poetic  eloquence.  
Titus,  too,  is  often  seen  as  a  figure  of  patriarchal  authority,  a  male  figure  who  uses 
the  women  of  the  play  to  define  his  own  identity  at  the  expense  of  theirs.  Douglas  Green, 
for  instance,  claims  Lavinia’s  forced  silence  and  her  attempt  to  recover  her  voice  through 
writing  are  overloaded  with  hermeneutic  possibility,  and  it  is  a  sign  of  Titus’s  patriarchal 
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dominance  that  he  “wrests”  meaning  from  Lavinia  by  interpreting  her  “signs.”   In  this  kind 28
of  reading,  Lavinia  becomes  a  text  that  Titus  works  to  properly  read  or  translate  as  he 
fashions  himself  into  the  play’s  figure  of  revenge.  Such  readings  ignore  that  Titus 
sympathizes  with  Lavinia,  often  in  extreme  ways.  
Other  scholars,  however,  have  reconsidered  Lavinia's  silence  and  questioned 
whether  her  narrative  arc  is  one  of  marginalized  or  denied  agency.  Most  notable  is 
Katherine  Rowe's  work,  which  argues  Titus  is  a  play  that  uses  the  motif  of  dismembered 
hands  to  explore  the  “mechanical”  concept  of  agency  in  early  modern  culture.  Rowe  argues 
that  hands  are  defined  by  their  capacity  to  grasp  and  are  the  iconographic  link  between  an 
intention  and  an  act.  Since  a  hand  can  be  severed  from  the  body,  the  display  of 
dismembered  hands  (and  their  return  as  “object”  or  prop  in  the  play)  reveals  the  “contingent 
and  supplementary  condition  of  agency”  (Rowe  285).  Rowe  uses  this  contingent  aspect  of 
agency  to  explain  the  breakdown  of  “the  politics  of  fealty”  in  the  play,  and  to  show  how 
the  iconography  of  “hand  in  hand”  (an  image  of  trust  between  people,  or  a  ‘grasping’  of 
hands  which  symbolizes  mutual/reciprocal  agency)  is  refigured  in  terms  of  adaptation  and 
recovered  agency  (Rowe  291-293).  Rowe  argues  against  reading  Lavinia’s  dismemberment 
and  silencing  as  passive  victimization.  Instead,  Rowe  points  to  Lavinia’s  adaptation  of  her 
mouth--with  which  she  ‘grasps’  a  stick  to  write  an  accusation  in  the  sand--as  a  sign  of  a 
recovered  agency.  She  argues  that  Lavinia  herself  functions  “as  an  intending  agent  who 
deploys  manual  icons  to  powerful  effect”  (301).  
Rowe's  argument  of  adaptation  is  compelling  and  provides  a  way  to  consider  the 
28  See  Green,  p.  324.  
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reconstruction  of  agency  in  Shakespeare’s  play.  I  believe  that  it  is  worthwhile  to  expand 
upon  Rowe’s  analysis,  because  Lavinia  and  Titus  link  agency  and  fealty  not  just  through 
adaptations  of  'grasping.’  They  also  reconfigure  agency  through  quotation,  through  which 
Lavinia  locates  narrative  patterns  to  be  redeployed  by  the  Andronici.  Key  to  my  argument 
are  the  moments  in  the  play  in  which  Titus  and  Lavinia  respond  to  each  other  by  mirroring 
each  other’s  gestures,  linking  the  motif  of  citation  or  quoting  with  embodiment.  Mimicry,  in 
this  sense,  is  a  kind  of  bodily  citation,  a  quoting  of  pose  or  gesture.  Tracing  the  play’s  use 
of  quotation  and  mimicry  makes  visible  the  reconfiguration  of  Titus  and  Lavinia's 
relationship,  from  the  traditional  role  of  father  and  daughter  to  a  unique  reciprocal  bond 
wherein  the  boundaries  between  two  selves  begin  to  blur.  While,  admittedly,  the 
co-constitutive  identity  of  Titus/Lavinia  does  not  seem  sustainable  by  the  play’s  end,  the 
play's  emphasis  on  the  possibility  of  private  intersubjectivity  has  been  overlooked  by  critics. 
Having  examined  Marcus’s  response  to  Lavinia’s  wounds  and  how  he  responds  by 
showing  her  pity,  I  will  now  turn  our  attention  to  Titus  to  explore  the  problem  of  sympathy.  
 
Titus  and  Sympathy 
Before  Titus  sees  Lavinia,  he  performs  scenes  of  grief  and  pity  that  are  similar  to 
Marcus’s.  Even  before  Titus  sees  Lavinia’s  suffering,  the  Andronici  seem  to  have  been 
destroyed  from  every  possible  angle--they  are  dishonored,  exiled  from  court,  and  two  of 
Titus’s  sons  are  to  be  executed  for  a  murder  they  didn’t  commit.  For  Titus,  it  seems  the 
earth  itself  is  an  open  maw  thirsting  for  Andronici  blood: 
O  earth,  I  will  befriend  thee  more  with  rain 
That  shall  distil  from  these  two  ancient  urns 
Than  youthful  April  shall  with  all  his  showers. 
In  summer’s  drought  I’ll  drop  upon  thee  still; 
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In  winter  with  warm  tears  I’ll  melt  the  snow 
And  keep  eternal  springtime  on  the  face, 
So  thou  refuse  to  drink  my  dear  sons’  blood  (3.1.16-22) 
 
In  his  lamentation,  Titus’s  tears  are  distilled  into  an  image  of  perpetual  mourning.  Most 
notable  is  that  this  transformation  of  himself  into  an  endless  generator  of  warm  tears  is 
contractual,  an  exchange.  Titus  offers  to  suffer  and  grieve  eternally  in  order  to  stave  off  the 
very  thing  that  he  grieves.  He  will  shed  endless  tears  to  end  the  cause  of  his  sorrow,  i.e.  the 
pending  execution  of  his  two  sons.  But  are  tears  an  adequate  substitute  for  blood?  Even  if 
the  tears  are  endless,  can  they  drown  out  violence  and  death?  Do  tears  surfeit  the  earth’s 
bloody  mouth?  Titus’s  tearful  rhetoric  is  a  plea  rooted  in  desperation  rather  than  possibility, 
a  desperate  strain  of  language  in  which  declarations  of  grief  are  amplified  by  gesture  and 
pose.  The  evocative  power  of  Titus’s  words  lies  also  in  their  delivery,  amplified  by  the 
modulation  and  grain  of  Titus’s  voice  and  evidenced  by  wet  cheeks. 
Titus,  pitying  his  condemned  sons,  presents  this  perpetual  grief  as  the  greatest  price 
he  can  pay.  In  this  scene,  prior  to  witnessing  Lavinia’s  wounds,  his  despair  seems  to  mark 
the  limit  of  possible  suffering  and,  therefore,  his  tearfulness  seems  to  be  the  most  he  can 
offer  to  the  blood-thirsty  earth.  But  this  kind  of  tearfulness  is  actually  sustaining.  Like 
Marcus’s  pity  for  Lavinia’s  wounds,  which  includes  a  desire  to  ease  his  own  suffering, 
Titus’s  tearfulness  works  to  ease  his  own  pain.  If  this  contract  (i.e.  endless  tears  in 
exchange  for  his  sons’  lives)  between  himself  and  the  earth  were  to  be  struck,  his  perpetual 
tears  would  also  be  an  endless  reminder  of  his  success  in  saving  Quintus  and  Martius  from 
execution.  It  would  not  be  difficult  to  imagine  these  perpetual  tears  as  tears  of  joy  rather 
than  grief.  Titus’s  slip  into  pastoral  language  already  contains  this  possibility:  his  tears  are 
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generative,  associated  with  warmth  and  an  eternal  spring  (both  as  a  place  to  draw  water  and 
as  a  season).  The  image  of  his  own  tears  falling  “on  thy  face”  (i.e.  on  the  face  of  the  earth) 
to  “melt  the  snow”  itself  suggests  a  delicate,  lovely  intimacy.  Although  Titus’s  pleading 
with  the  tribunes  and  then  with  the  earth  itself  seems  to  result  from  hopeless  desperation, 
his  image  of  becoming  a  spring  of  endless  warm  tears  is  an  optimistic  fantasy  that 
temporarily  displaces  the  reality  of  his  sons’  pending  executions.  
Though  Titus  is  tormented  by  the  fate  of  his  two  sons,  he  does  not  reach  the  depth 
of  his  sorrow  until  he  sees  Lavinia’s  suffering.  Earlier  in  the  play,  when  Lavinia  makes  her 
first  appearance,  Titus  calls  her  the  “cordial  of  mine  age  to  glad  my  heart”  (1.1169).  In  this 
earlier  scene,  Titus  displays  a  tenderness  for  Lavinia  that  he  doesn’t  seem  to  have  for  his 
sons.  When  Lavinia  is  brought  before  him  and  he  witnesses  her  mutilation,  the  “cordial”  of 
comfort  she  represented  for  him  is  turned  into  his  most  painful  wound:  
This  way  to  death  my  wretched  sons  are  gone; 
Here  stands  my  other  son,  a  banished  man,  
And  here  my  brother,  weeping  at  my  woes.  
But  that  which  gives  my  soul  the  greatest  spurn  
Is  dear  Lavinia,  dearer  than  my  soul.  (3.1.99-104) 
 
Titus’s  torment  is  further  amplified  by  the  knowledge  that  he  witnesses  true  suffering:  “Had 
I  but  seen  thy  picture  in  this  plight,  /  It  would  have  madded  me;  what  shall  I  do  /  Now  I 
behold  thy  lively  body  so?”  (3.1.105-106).  Here,  Titus  claims  that  even  the  image  of 
Lavinia’s  mutilation,  even  if  it  were  not  true  (but  a  lurid  painting?  or  a  dream?),  would  be 
enough  to  disturb  his  mind.  Jean  Marsden  notes  that,  for  seventeenth-  and 
eighteenth-century  theorists,  “In  no  other  form  of  art  is  distress  so  distinctly  ‘present’  as  in 
drama;  it  is  not  fixed  in  time,  as  with  a  painting,  nor  diluted  through  the  act  of  reading,  as 
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with  fiction  or  even  the  silent  reading  of  a  play”  (“Sympathy”  33).  The  distress  made 
possible  by  presence  explains  why  Marcus  uses  poetry  to  flinch  from  Lavinia’s  pain. 
Marcus’s  blazon  of  Lavinia’s  wounds  attempt  to  withdraw  from  the  dramatic  power  of 
Lavinia’s  presence.  He  translates  Lavinia’s  wounds  into  poetry  in  order  to  momentarily 
dilute  her  presence  and  lessen  the  spectacle  of  her  horrific  pain.  This  is  not  to  say  he  is 
uncaring.  Rather,  he  momentarily  protects  himself  from  the  threat  of  an  overwhelming 
sympathy  and  grief  for  Lavinia’s  wounds.  Titus,  however,  resists  this  urge. 
In  contrast  to  his  grief  for  his  condemned  sons,  the  grief  that  Titus  feels  for  Lavinia 
is  not  restorative,  regenerative,  or  sustaining.  Some  kinds  of  grief  are  destructive,  driving 
characters  to  madness  and  cyclical  violence.  In  Bodies  and  Selves  in  Early  Modern 
England ,  Michael  Schoenfeldt  points  to  the  internal  pressure  of  grief  and  the  necessity  to 
relieve  it:  “Indeed,  when  confronting  not  erotic  passion  but  the  emotion  of  grief 
Shakespeare  repeatedly  suggests  that  suppression  is  dangerous  and  ventilation  therapeutic” 
(188  n.  55).  Marcus  himself  feels  this  onset  of  grief  when  he  first  finds  Lavinia  and  asks  her 
to  speak,  to  tell  him  who  committed  this  violence  against  her.  When  Marcus  realizes 
Lavinia  can’t  speak,  he  describes  the  destructive  grief  which  intensifies  with 
speechlessness:  “Shall  I  speak  for  thee?  Shall  I  say  ‘tis  so?  /  O  that  I  knew  thy  heart,  and 
knew  the  beast,  /  That  I  might  rail  at  him  to  ease  my  mind!  /  Sorrow  concealed,  like  an 
oven  stopped,  /  Doth  burn  the  heart  to  cinders  where  it  is”  (2.3.33-37).  The  most  powerful, 
consuming  sorrows  are  burdens  that  must  be  ventilated.  To  speak  one’s  grief  is  to  dispel 
some  of  its  destructive  nature.  
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Dangerous  suppression  and  violent  (rather  than  therapeutic)  ventilation  of  grief 
provide  the  dramatic  energy  of  revenge  in  early  modern  drama.  While  revenge  is 
sometimes  presented  as  a  strategy  for  keeping  grief  at  bay,  revenge  is  more  likely  to  be  the 
result  of  channeling  or  focusing  grief  into  passionate  energy.   Rather  than  working  to 29
dispel  grief,  revenge  narratives  reveal  that  grief  can  be  be  stored  and  weaponized,  turning 
emotional  turbulence  into  a  personal  conviction  which  makes  violent  action  possible.  In 
Shakespeare’s  Richard  III ,  for  instance,  Elizabeth  begins  to  accuse  Richard  of  his  role  in 
the  murder  of  her  two  young  sons,  but  she  refrains  from  venting  her  grief  through  speech 
so  as  to  maintain  its  violent  energy:   “that  still  use  of  grief  makes  wild  grief  tame,  /  My 
tongue  should  to  thy  ears  not  name  my  boys  /  Till  that  my  nails  were  anchored  in  thine 
eyes”  (4.4.221.9-221.11).  Tragedy,  in  general,  reveals  the  wounds  or  fissures  that  expose 
and  reshape  the  self.  Revenge  tragedy,  in  particular,  explores  what  happens  when  this 
internal,  emotional  suffering,  this  “wild  grief”  is  directed  outward  and  made  external.  This 
wild  grief  forces  meaningful  expression  to  leave  the  realm  of  articulation  and  enter  the 
realm  of  spectacular  violence. 
In  Titus  Andronicus ,  we  see  the  transition  from  the  therapeutic  possibility  of  grief 
(as  venting)  to  the  cultivation  of  pathological  grief  via  a  stoppage  of  tears  and  a 
recirculation  of  grief  as  energy  for  retribution.  As  trauma  follows  trauma,  Titus’s  initial 
fantasy  of  warm,  regenerative  tears  will  give  way  to  an  image  of  tears  which  salt  the  earth, 
leaving  the  world  perpetually  barren  and  polluted  with  grief: 
Shall  thy  good  uncle  and  thy  brother  Lucius 
And  thou  and  I  sit  round  about  some  fountain, 
Looking  all  downwards  to  behold  our  cheeks, 
29  In  Shakespeare’s  2  Henry  VI ,  for  example,  Queen  Margaret  states  “Oft  have  I  heard  that  grief  softens  the 
mind,  /  And  makes  it  fearful  and  degenerate;  /  Think  therefore  on  revenge  and  cease  to  weep”  (4.4.1-3). 
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How  they  are  stained  like  meadows  not  yet  dry, 
With  miry  slime  left  on  them  by  a  flood? 
And  in  the  fountain  shall  we  gaze  so  long 
Till  the  fresh  taste  be  taken  from  that  clearness 
And  made  a  brine  pit  with  our  bitter  tears?  (3.1.123-130) 
 
In  these  lines,  Titus’s  earlier  image  of  pastoral  tears  is  swept  away  by  the  briny  muck  of 
tears  that  are  void  of  hope  or  purpose.  These  tears  would  not  exchange  Titus’s  grief  for  the 
deliverance  or  relief  of  his  children.  Instead,  this  grief  would  envelop  all  the  Andronici.  At 
best,  Titus  imagines  they  might  become  figures  of  cultural  memory,  functioning  as  icons  of 
humanity’s  deepest  misery  by  modeling  themselves  after  Lavinia’s  mutilation: 
...shall  we  cut  away  our  hands  like  thine? 
Or  shall  we  bite  our  tongues  and  in  dumb  shows 
Pass  the  remainder  of  our  hateful  days? 
What  shall  we  do?  Let  us  that  have  our  tongues 
Plot  some  device  of  further  misery 
To  make  us  wondered  at  in  time  to  come.  (3.1.131-136). 
 
Rather  than  acting  as  a  figure  of  patriarchal  authority  in  this  scene,  Titus  is  asking 
Lavinia  what  she  would  have  them  do.  Titus’s  inclination  is  to  model  himself  after  Lavinia 
or  to  turn  to  her  for  direction  despite  her  silence.  Despite  Titus’s  collaborative 
reconfiguration  of  agency  with  and  through  Lavinia,  scholars  tend  to  read  Titus  a  figure  of 
oppressive  patriarchal  power  in  the  play.  Douglas  Green  provides  a  nuanced  and  insightful 
representation  of  this  view  of  patriarchy:  
Indeed,  Lavinia’s  speech--or  any  uncurtailed  mode  of  signification  on  her 
part--could  expose  to  the  public  (and  to  the  audience)  her  subjection  to  the  arbitrary 
wills  of  men,  to  the  contradictory  desires  of  her  father,  husband,  rival  fiancé, 
brothers,  and  rapists.  Her  voice  might  not  only  bring  down  Chiron,  Demetrius, 
Aaron,  and  Tamora  but  might  also  accuse  Titus  as  well.  For  Lavinia  to  speak  now 
would  undermine  the  play’s  design--the  reconstitution  of  patriarchy  under  Lucius. 
But  the  play  makes  us  aware  of  the  price  that  this  reconstitution,  this  order,  exacts 
from  women  (and  younger  sons,  and  those  without  power,  or  those  who  are 
otherwise  peripheral);  they,  their  pain,  and  all  their  experiences  are  consigned  to 
silence  and  illegibility”  (324).  
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While  I  appreciate  the  Green's  assessment  of  patriarchal  power  in  the  play,  his  description 
of  silence  and  illegibility  as  signs  of  oppression  seems  less  true  of  the  play  after  Titus 
witnesses  Lavinia's  wounded  suffering.  After  Lavinia  is  brutalized  by  Chiron  and 
Demetrius,  her  silence  does  not  reinforce  patriarchal  power  but  unravels  it,  and  Green's 
view  does  not  account  for  Titus’s  reconfiguration  of  his  relationship  to  Lavinia.  
Though  Titus  at  times  describes  Lavinia  as  a  text  to  be  read  and  interpreted,  even  in 
these  moments  Titus’s  language  does  not  resonate  as  patriarchal  authority.   The  tone  of  his 30
language  is  devotional,  intimating  careful  study  and  attentive  humility.  In  his  attempts  to 
understand  Lavinia’s  gestures,  Titus  seeks  to  be  receptive  to  Lavinia’s  maimed 
communication  and  refuses  to  accept  that  the  channels  of  linguistic  expression,  which  are 
integral  to  early  modern  identity,  have  been  taken  from  Lavinia  permanently.  Instead,  Titus 
commits  himself  to  the  study  of  her  soundless  gestures  and  her  wordless  attempts  to  make 
herself  known,  and  the  language  of  Titus’s  commitment  is  steeped  in  religious  devotion: 
Speechless  complainer,  I  will  learn  thy  thought; 
In  thy  dumb  action  will  I  be  as  perfect 
As  begging  hermits  in  their  holy  prayers: 
Thou  shalt  not  sigh,  nor  hold  thy  stumps  to  heaven, 
Nor  wink,  nor  nod,  nor  kneel,  nor  make  a  sign, 
But  I  of  these  will  wrest  an  alphabet 
And  by  still  practise  learn  to  know  thy  meaning. 
 
In  Titus’s  metaphor,  it  is  communication  with  Lavinia  which  Titus  yearns  for,  not  (as  for 
Marcus)  just  the  secret  knowledge  of  whom  she  might  accuse.   Her  speechless  complaints, 
her  unexpressed  thoughts,  her  gestures,  become  objects  of  study  for  their  own  sake,  not 
simply  to  spur  Titus  to  revenge  in  order  that  he  might  find  ease  for  himself.  Communication 
30  See  3.1.143-145  and  3.2.35-45. 
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becomes  something  akin  to  communion,  the  generation  of  a  deeply  personal  bond  between 
Titus  and  Lavinia.  Titus’s  attempts  to  read  Lavinia’s  gestures  and  speak  her  words  are  not  a 
form  of  ventriloquism.  He  is  not  trying  to  speak  for  her,  he’s  trying  attune  himself  to  her 
“speechless”  complaints  and  “dumb  action”  so  that  she  can  communicate  through  him .  He 
wants  to  be  used  as  a  prosthesis,  as  an  instrument  that  Lavinia  can  use  to  overcome  the 
losses  of  her  speech  and  handwriting.  
Titus’s  sympathy  for  Lavinia  becomes  more  clear  when  we  contrast  his  initial 
response  to  Lavinia’s  wounds  with  Marcus’s.  Where  Marcus  flinches,  turning  her  pain  into 
poetry  and  wanting  to  ease  his  mind  through  revenge,  Titus  pointedly  refuses  to  flinch. 
When  Marcus  brings  Lavinia  to  her  father,  he  warns  him:  “Titus,  prepare  thy  aged  eyes  to 
weep;  /  Or,  if  not  so,  thy  noble  heart  to  break:  /  I  bring  consuming  sorrow  to  thine  age” 
(3.1.59-61).  Marcus  language  echoes  Titus’s  first  lines  to  Lavinia,  in  which  he  welcomes 
her  as  “The  cordial  of  mine  age  to  glad  my  heart,”  but  here  Lavinia’s  presence  is  imagined 
as  poisonous  (1.1.166).  Marcus  assumes  Titus  will  be  overwhelmed  and  consumed  by 
Lavinia’s  suffering,  and  it  is  notable  that  he  presents  her  in  the  past  tense,  implying  an 
irrevocable  loss,  which  Titus  himself  corrects: 
TITUS  
Will  it  consume  me?  let  me  see  it,  then. 
MARCUS  
This  was  thy  daughter. 
TITUS  
Why,  Marcus,  so  she  is.  (3.1.62-64)  
 
Lucius  responds  to  Lavinia  in  the  way  Marcus  expected  from  Titus,  saying,  “Ay  me,  this 
object  kills  me!”  (3.1.64).  Titus,  however,  does  not  flinch  from  Lavinia’s  presence  nor  does 
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he  seek  to  ease  his  own  suffering  in  witnessing  her  pain.  He  tells  Lucius  “Faint-hearted 
boy,  arise,  and  look  upon  her,”  and  turns  his  attention  to  Lavinia,  saying: 
Give  me  a  sword,  I'll  chop  off  my  hands  too; 
For  they  have  fought  for  Rome,  and  all  in  vain; 
And  they  have  nursed  this  woe,  in  feeding  life; 
In  bootless  prayer  have  they  been  held  up, 
And  they  have  served  me  to  effectless  use: 
Now  all  the  service  I  require  of  them 
Is  that  the  one  will  help  to  cut  the  other. 
'Tis  well,  Lavinia,  that  thou  hast  no  hands; 
For  hands,  to  do  Rome  service,  are  but  vain.  (3.1.64,  72-80) 
 
While  Marcus’s  first  inclination  was  to  turn  Lavinia’s  wounds  into  poem,  Titus  seeks  to 
emulate  her  wounds  on  his  own  body.  Nor  is  Titus’s  expressed  desire  to  lop  off  his  hand 
merely  lip  service.  When  Aaron  comes  calling,  claiming  Saturninus  will  accept  Titus’s 
chopped  hand  in  substitution  for  Quintus  and  Martius’s  chopped  heads,  Titus  is  all  too 
willing  to  find  an  axe.  
Ultimately,  Titus  seeks  to  help  Lavinia  reclaim  her  personhood,  rather  than  allowing 
others  to  view  her  as  an  object  of  horror  (“Ay  me,  this  object  kills  me”)  or  a  living  reminder 
her  loss  of  self  (“This  was  thy  daughter”)  (3.1.64,  62).  Their  relationship  depicts  an 
intersubjectivity  in  which  two  selves  overlap.  They  show  that  the  imagined  boundaries 
between  ‘self’  and  ‘other’  can  be  porous.  From  the  moment  Titus  sees  her  wounds,  Lavinia 
becomes  a  complicated  figure  for  Titus.  If  Titus  was  a  figure  of  patriarchal  authority  prior  to 
Lavinia’s  mutilation,  his  witnessing  of  her  suffering  marks  a  shift  from  Titus’s  authority 
over  Lavinia  to  something  more  akin  to  a  symbiosis,  a  distinctly  mutual  relationship.  Titus’s 
attentiveness  to  Lavinia’s  suffering  and  his  willingness  to  share  in  her  suffering  model  a 
distilled,  perhaps  even  extreme,  form  of  sympathy,  and  reveal  how  the  presence  of  others 
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structures  early  modern  subjectivity.  Titus  and  Lavinia’s  subjectivity  is  depicted  in  the  play 
as  an  intertwined  selfhood.  
With  the  Andronici  traumatized  and  dishonored,  Titus  begins  constructing  a  new 
inner  schema  with  Lavinia  as  his  key  point  of  reference  for  navigating  a  world  steeped  in 
grief: 
 
I  am  the  sea.  Hark  how  her  sighs  doth  blow. 
She  is  the  weeping  welkin,  I  am  the  earth. 
Then  must  my  sea  be  moved  with  her  sighs, 
Then  must  my  earth  with  her  continual  tears 
Become  a  deluge  overflowed  and  drowned, 
For  why  my  bowels  cannot  hide  her  woes, 
But  like  a  drunkard  must  I  vomit  them.  (3.1.226-332). 
 
In  his  sequence  of  metaphors,  Titus  and  Lavinia  fluidly  mix.  Titus  description  of  reciprocity 
is  reinforced  by  Lavinia’s  mimicry  of  Titus’s  movements.  As  Titus  kneels  and  calls  for  pity 
from  above  (“one  hand  up  to  heaven”)  or  below  (“And  bow  this  feeble  ruin  to  the  earth”) 
(3.1.206-207),  Lavinia  matches  his  gestures,  kneeling  with  him  in  expression  of  mutually 
shared  grief.  Even  before  this  moment,  Lavinia  has  already  begun  the  project  of 
reciprocation,  evident  when  Lucius  calls  attention  to  Lavinia’s  tears  the  moment  Titus  first 
sees  his  wounded  daughter,  saying,  “Sweet  father,  cease  your  tears,  for  at  your  grief  /  See 
how  my  wretched  sister  sobs  and  weeps”  (3.1.136-137).  
Titus’s  defined  role  as  Lavinia’s  father  and  Lavinia’s  designated  role  as  “cordial”  of 
his  heart  have  been  suspended  by  tragic  violence.  Titus  and  Lavinia  are  still  linked  to  each 
other  (perhaps  now  more  than  ever),  but  their  relationship  is  no  longer  stable  nor  clearly 
defined.  Titus  imagines  his  sighs  of  grief  merging  with  Lavinia’s,  and  describes  their 
merged  suffering  as  having  its  own  powerful  effect: 
What,  wouldst  thou  kneel  with  me? 
Do  then,  dear  heart,  for  heaven  shall  hear  our  prayers, 
Or  with  our  sighs  we’ll  breathe  the  welkin  dim 
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And  stain  the  sun  with  fog,  as  sometime  clouds 
When  they  do  hug  him  in  their  melting  bosoms.  (3.1.211-214) 
 
His  sorrow  and  its  outward  performance  become  her  sorrow.  Her  tears,  the  signs  of  inward 
grief,  flood  Titus’s  body.  Titus  and  Lavinia  become  quotations  of  each  other;  they  mimic 
and  model  and  refine  their  grief  in  relation  to  each  other,  symbiotically.  
 
 
Emotional  Identification,  Counter-humanism,  and  Revenge 
 
While  sympathy  is  an  important  component  of  Titus  and  Lavinia’s  reciprocal 
identity,  Shakespeare’s  play  also  expresses  skepticism  about  how  sympathy  might  be  used. 
The  play  suggests  that  sympathy--the  imagining  of  another  person’s  experience--is  not 
sufficient  on  its  own  to  cultivate  mercy  for  others  or  to  curb  violence.  In  this  sense, 
Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies  are  test  cases  for  the  proper  and  improper  uses  of  sympathy, 
or  the  “emotional  identification”  cultivated  by  the  humanist  curriculum  of  early  modern 
grammar  schools.  
According  to  Leah  Whittington,  “Students  were  regularly  asked  to  perform 
exercises  in  composition  that  encouraged  emotional  identification,  as  they  mentally 
transported  themselves  into  the  psychic  world  of  another  (often  fictional,  often  female) 
person,  whose  emotional  experiences  they  were  meant  to  make  their  own”  (100).  This 
cultivation  of  emotional  identification,  wherein  a  person  practices  imagining  someone  else’s 
traumatic  experience  as  his  or  her  own,  is  not  just  meant  to  sharpen  skills  in  rhetoric  and 
oration,  but  also  provides  moral  instruction.  “The  humanist  schoolroom,”  Whittington 
writes,  “...was  a  laboratory  for  compassion”  (101).  Shakespeare’s  treatment  of  emotional 
identification  in  Titus  Andronicus  reveals  that  emotional  identification,  or  the 
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acknowledgment  of  other  minds,  does  not  inherently  produce  compassion  or  pity;  rather, 
speculation  about  the  psychic  world  of  an  enemy  functions  as  a  necessary  component  of 
revenge.  
Instead  of  creating  a  need  for  mercy,  emotional  identification  becomes  instrumental 
in  creating  and  amplifying  another’s  suffering.  For  example,  in  the  moments  before  she  is 
horrifically  raped  and  mutilated,  Lavinia  pleads  with  Tamora,  Chiron,  and  Demetrius  for 
mercy  and  compassion.  Demetrius  calls  Tamora’s  attention  to  Lavinia’s  tears,  which  are 
themselves  similar  to  Tamora’s  own  tears  when  pleading  with  Titus  in  Act  1.  Here,  as  in 
Act  1,  compassion  fails.   The  key  difference  between  the  two  scenes  is  the  attention  paid  to 
tears.  Tamora’s  tears  and  pleas  for  the  life  of  her  son  Alarbus  are  dismissed  by  Titus,  and 
they  fail  to  inspire  compassion  or  pity  because  he  ignores  them,  being  either  unwilling  or 
unable  to  imagine  Tamora’s  torment  himself.  In  contrast,  Tamora  does  not  dismiss  or  ignore 
Lavinia’s  suffering.  Tamora  is  encouraged  to  recognize  Lavinia’s  tearful  torment  as  a  sign 
that  the  Goths  are  approaching  their  first  moment  of  victory  in  their  retribution  against  the 
Andronici  family;  Demetrius  says  to  his  mother:  “Listen,  fair  madam:  let  it  be  your  glory  / 
To  see  here  tears;  but  be  your  heart  to  them  /  As  unrelenting  flint  to  drops  of  rain” 
(2.3.139-141).  Here,  Lavinia’s  tears  provide  evidence  that  she  is  effectively  tormented, 
extending  lex  talionis  to  encompass  not  only  physical  injury  but  also  emotive  turmoil.  Not 
just  “eye  for  eye,  tooth  for  tooth,”  revenge  reiterates  prior  moments  of  cruelty.  Demetrius’s 
demand,  that  Tamora  take  glory  in  Lavinia’s  tears,  does  not  ignore  Lavinia’s  experience  of 
suffering,  it  does  not  deny  Lavinia’s  ‘psychic  world.’  The  demand  itself  depends  on 
Tamora  recognizing  the  devastation  she  causes  to  Lavinia.  The  ‘glory’  Demetrius  refers  to 
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is  one  which  explicitly  recognizes  and  understands  the  horrific  experience  to  which  Lavinia 
is  being  subjected,  and  still  denies  her  mercy. 
Aaron,  too,  emphasizes  this  inverted  form  of  emotional  identification,  turning 
empathy  into  sadism,  when  confessing  to  Titus’s  son  the  pleasure  he  took  in  witnessing 
Titus’s  tormented  tears:  
I  played  the  cheater  for  thy  father’s  hand, 
And  when  I  had  it  drew  myself  apart, 
And  almost  broke  my  heart  with  extreme  laughter 
I  pried  me  through  the  crevice  of  a  wall 
When  for  his  hand  he  had  his  two  sons’  heads, 
Beheld  his  tears,  and  laughed  so  heartily 
That  both  mine  eye  were  rainy  like  to  his…  (5.1.111-117) 
 
Aaron  matches  Titus  tear  for  tear,  but  his  tears  stand  on  opposite  ends  of  the  spectrum  of 
inward  feeling;  the  more  Aaron  recognizes  Titus’s  despair  and  grief,  the  more  powerful  is 
his  own  feeling  of  glee.  Aaron’s  gleeful  tears  are  an  emotive  inversion  of  Titus’s 
grief-stricken  tears,  but  his  malicious  glee  does  not  ignore  or  misread  Titus’s  tearful 
suffering;  rather,  like  Tamora  taking  ‘glory’  in  Lavinia’s  tears,  it  is  only  possible  because 
Aaron  is  adept  at  recognizing  Titus’s  suffering  and  imagining  its  inexpressible  depth. 
Later  in  the  play,  while  captured  outside  Rome  by  Lucius,  Aaron  confesses  to 
various  ways  he  has  committed  villainy.  Aaron’s  descriptions  of  malicious  acts  are  the 
play’s  clearest  expression  of  emotional  identification  as  instrumental  when  causing 
devastation  to  the  ‘psychic  world’  of  others.  In  his  litany  of  malicious  acts,  Aaron  describes 
a  project  of  torment  using  disinterred  corpses: 
Oft  have  I  digged  up  dead  men  from  their  graves 
And  set  them  upright  at  their  dear  friends’  door, 
Even  when  their  sorrows  almost  was  forgot, 
And  on  their  skins,  as  on  the  bark  of  trees, 
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Have  with  my  knife  carvèd  in  Roman  letters 
‘Let  not  your  sorrow  die  though  I  am  dead.’  (5.1.135-140) 
 
Clearly,  Aaron’s  attunement  to  suffering  does  not  inspire  acts  of  mercy.  Instead,  it 
helps  him  torment  others  more  effectively.  Aaron’s  horrific  torment  of  these  dead  men’s 
grieving  friends  is  a  project  whose  success  requires  a  perceptive  insight  into  the  emotional 
lives  of  others.  Aaron  even  times  his  psychological  violence  for  maximal  potency  (“Even 
when  their  sorrows  almost  was  forgot”)  which  suggests  Aaron  is  precisely  attuned  to  the 
emotional  lives  of  others.  He  imagines  what  the  corpse  of  a  loved  one  best  might  say  to 
cause  a  person’s  relapse  into  a  state  of  grief.  Rather  than  restraining  Aaron’s  malicious 
impulses,  his  emotional  identification  secures  his  sadistic  pleasure  and  increases  his  desire 
to  torment: 
But  I  have  done  a  thousand  dreadful  things 
As  willingly  as  one  would  kill  a  fly, 
And  nothing  grieves  me  heartily  indeed 
But  that  I  cannot  do  ten  thousand  more”  (5.1.140-144).  
 
Aaron’s  malice  demonstrates  a  perspicacious  understanding  of  how  others  will  feel 
in  response  to  the  horrors  he  inflicts  upon  them.  His  attunement  is  devastating  to  the 
assumption  that  a  humanist  education  is  inherently  civilizing.  Despite  Aaron’s  capacity  for 
writing  in  “Roman  letters”  and  his  knowledge  of  Roman  orators,  Aaron’s  depravity 
challenges  what  is  perhaps  the  premier  assumption  of  humanism,  that  rhetorical  training 
and  eloquence  contains  a  ‘civilizing  impulse’  which  is  productive  of  civic  order.  According 
to  Jenny  Mann,  the  Roman  orators  that  humanists  fixed  upon  (such  as  Cicero  and 
Quintilian)  emphasized  the  importance  of  rhetorical  training  “with  reference  to  the 
civilizing  force  of  eloquence  and  the  service  a  wise  orator  can  provide  to  the  state”  (202). 
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This  link  between  rhetorical  eloquence  and  its  civilizing  power  “provided  one  of  the 
enabling  fictions  not  just  of  Renaissance  humanism  but  also  of  the  particular  form  of 
vernacular  humanism  articulated  by  sixteenth-century  English  writers”  (Mann  203). 
 Despite  the  play’s  evidence  of  Aaron’s  humanist  training,  his  ‘impulse’  is  one  of 
civic  destruction  and  disorder,  and  despite  having  insight  into  the  experiences  of  others  and 
having  a  keen  sense  of  the  emotional  pain  he  causes,  Aaron  is  not  deterred  from  inflicting 
suffering  on  others.  In  other  words,  Aaron’s  lack  of  compassion  is  not  the  result  of  a  lack  of 
empathy.  Nor  is  his  cruelty  the  result  of  solipsism.  Indeed,  the  very  pleasure  he  claims  to 
derive  from  tormenting  others  depends  on  an  acknowledgment  of  other  minds.  The 
combination  of  Aaron’s  knowledge  of  Roman  oration,  his  capability  for  imagining  the 
experiences  of  other  minds,  and  his  shocking  torment  of  others  contribute  to  a  skepticism 
toward  the  promises  of  humanism’s  inherent  ability  to  cultivate  good  citizens. 
In  addition  to  challenging  humanism’s  claim  of  an  inherent  ethical  cultivation, 
Aaron’s  villainy  suggests  that  humanism  might  not  have  any  cultivating  effect  on  a 
character’s  ethical  behavior  at  all.  Not  only  is  Aaron  capable  of  inflicting  horrific  suffering 
on  others,  he  also  has  no  qualms  about  his  actions.  Aaron’s  claim  that  he  commits  acts  of 
physical  and  psychological  violence  “as  willingly  as  one  would  kill  a  fly,”  expresses  the 
ease  in  which  he  can  take  pleasure  in  cruelty.  In  King  Lear ,  killing  flies  for  sport  is 
Gloucester’s  image  of  terrifying,  sadistic  cruelty  (and  from  the  gods,  no  less).  That  the  gods 
“kill  us  for  sport”  the  way  “wanton  boys”  kill  flies,  human  suffering--and  perhaps  all 
human  experience--seems  to  be  cosmologically  insignificant.  What  is  awful,  for  Gloucester, 
about  death  and  human  suffering  is  not  that  it  happens,  but  that  it  happens  without 
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teleological  grounding.  Gloucester  imagines  access  to  the  inwardness  of  the  gods,  of  the 
‘secret  motive’  behind  human  death  and  suffering,  and  presents  the  horrifying  possibility 
that  the  motive  may  be  a  trifling,  childish  cruelty.  Such  wanton  boy-gods  are,  at  best, 
sadistic  in  a  similar  vein  to  Aaron’ s .  But  at  least  Aaron’s  form  of  cruelty  (which  recognizes 
and  takes  pleasure  in  someone  else’s  suffering)  gives  attention  to  the  slain  flies.  Perhaps  the 
more  cynical  possibility  is  that  the  boy-gods  aren’t  killing  flies  so  much  as  they’re  killing 
time,  that  their  childish  cruelty  is  driven  by  little  more  than  boredom--more  cynical  because, 
in  this  case,  the  suffering  isn’t  even  the  point,  but  a  mere  diversion.  In  such  a  scenario,  the 
most  horrific  event  for  one  being  (whether  it  be  fly  or  human)  is  a  moment  the  boy-gods 
immediately  forget--not  because  the  inflicted  suffering  is  too  painful  to  gaze  upon,  but 
because  it  matters  so  little  to  the  ones  inflicting  it.  
Aaron’s  claim  that  he  has  done  “a  thousand  dreadful  things  as  willingly  as  one 
would  kill  a  fly”  echoes  an  earlier  scene  in  the  play,  when  Titus  displays  an  acute 
sensitivity  to  violence  when  his  brother  Marcus  kills  a  fly.  In  accordance  with  the  humanist 
ideal  of  sympathetic  imagination,  Titus’s  attunement  to  Lavinia’s  suffering  seems  to  have 
developed  his  moral  sensitivity,  so  much  so  that  killing  a  fly  is  not  something  Titus  would 
do  willingly.  Titus’s  response  problematizes  the  act  of  killing  a  fly  by  marking  violence  as 
consequential,  regardless  of  its  scope: 
TITUS  
What  dost  thou  strike  at,  Marcus,  with  thy  knife? 
MARCUS  
At  that  that  I  have  killed,  my  lord--a  fly. 
TITUS  
Out  on  thee,  murderer!  Thou  kill’st  my  heart. 
Mine  eyes  are  cloyed  with  view  of  tyranny. 
A  deed  of  death  done  on  the  innocent 
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Becomes  not  Titus’  brother.  Get  thee  gone. 
I  see  thou  art  not  for  my  company.  (3.2.52-58) 
 
Titus  marks  any  act  of  violence  against  an  innocent  being  as  wrong  in  principle,  but  what’s 
most  surprising  about  Titus’s  response  to  the  ‘murder’  of  the  fly  is  the  way  in  which  he 
imagines  the  grief  of  the  dead  fly’s  father.  When  Marcus  expresses  how  inconsequential 
this  small  act  of  killing  is,  saying  “Alas,  my  lord,  I  have  but  killed  a  fly,”  Titus  describes  a 
cognitive  map  of  suffering  and  grief  which  magnifies,  rather  than  diminishes,  Marcus’s  act 
of  violence  by  considering  the  extent  of  the  suffering  such  violence  causes  for  the  victim’s 
family:  “‘But?’  How  if  that  fly  had  a  father,  brother?  /  How  would  he  hang  his  slender 
gilded  wings  and  buzz  lamenting  dirges  in  the  air!”  (3.2.60-62).  Titus’s  castigation  of 
Marcus  is  all  the  more  surprising  in  that  he  argues  using  pathos  in  the  same  way  Tamora 
did  when  pleading  for  Alarbus,  when  she  demanded  Titus  imagine  for  himself  a  parent’s 
grief  for  a  slain  child:  
Victorious  Titus,  rue  the  tears  I  shed-- 
A  mother’s  tears  in  passion  for  her  son-- 
And  if  thy  sons  were  ever  dear  to  thee,  
O,  think  my  sons  to  be  as  dear  to  me!  (1.1.105-108)  
 
Both  Titus  and  Tamora’s  mapping  of  grief  presents  violence  as  an  act  whose  effect  is  not 
self-contained  or  autonomous,  but  reverberates  along  unforeseen  fault  lines.  
Even  acts  of  violence,  it  seems,  are  intersubjective  in  their  impact.  Titus’s  empathy 
and  anguish  for  the  fly  is  predicated  on  his  reading  of  the  fly’s  intent.  His  emotional 
identification  with  the  fly,  and  the  fly’s  father,  depends  on  the  fly’s  victimization,  which 
itself  depends  on  the  fly’s  innocence:  “Poor  harmless  fly,”  Titus  laments,  “That  with  his 
pretty  buzzing  melody  /  Came  here  to  make  us  merry…”  (3.2.63-65).  But  Marcus,  in  a 
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single  statement,  turns  Titus’s  abhorrence  for  violence  into  sadistic  glee  by  presenting  the 
fly’s  presence  as  malicious:  “Pardon  me,  sir,  it  was  a  black,  ill-favored  fly,  /  Like  to  the 
Empress  Moor.  Therefore  I  killed  him”  (3.2.66-67).  Titus  and  Marcus  both  claim  insight 
into  the  fly’s  intentions,  marking  it  as  ‘harmless’  or  ‘ill-favored,’  and  this  marking  of  the 
fly’s  interiority  determines  whether  or  not  this  act  of  killing  is  itself  a  malefaction.  
Titus  and  Marcus  grapple  with  a  problem  of  the  mind  of  others  that  is  more 
complicated  than  mere  acknowledgment  of  other  minds.  While  emotional  identification 
makes  it  possible  for  Titus  to  pity  and  grieve  for  the  slain  fly,  it  also  allows  him  to 
commend  its  killing.  Katharine  Eisaman  Maus  writes:  “Given  the  ubiquity  of  such 
conceptual  categories  [of  inwardness  and  ‘hypocrisy’  or  ‘secret  motive’]  in  the  English 
Renaissance,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  the  ‘problem  of  minds’  presents  itself  to  thinkers 
and  writers  not  so  much  as  a  question  of  whether  those  minds  exist  as  a  question  of  how  to 
know  what  they  are  thinking”  ( Inwardness  7).  The  problem,  then,  of  emotional 
identification  is  that  another  character’s  psychic  world  can  be  imagined  in  a  multitude  of 
ways.  
What  aspects  of  the  fly  does  Titus  take  as  evidence  of  its  victimization?  The  fly,  as 
victim,  is  associated  with  voice  and  harmony--the  fly’s  buzzing  becomes  soothing, 
sympathetic  song.  The  fly  as  malicious  agent  relies  on  a  shift  from  aural  to  visual  evidence; 
attention  paid  to  the  fly’s  voice  shifts  to  the  fly’s  skin,  and  the  external  blackness  of  the  fly 
becomes  the  key  to  penetrating  its  interiority,  its  concealed  and  malicious  motivation.  What 
the  fly-killing  scene  reveals  is  that  an  act  of  violence  itself  is  interpreted  in  relation  to  the 
intentions  of  both  the  victim  of  violence  and  its  perpetrator.  If  the  fly  be  a  “poor  harmless 
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fly,”  it  is  marked  as  an  innocent  victim  of  violence,  but  the  violence  also  marks  Marcus  as 
“murderer”  and  “tyrant.”  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  fly  be  “black”  and  “ill-favoured”  then 
Marcus’s  violence  becomes  the  act  of  a  dutiful  brother,  and  Marcus  himself  becomes  not 
villainous  but  valiant.  And  though  Titus  chooses  to  accept  Marcus’s  reading  of  the  fly, 
himself  taking  up  Marcus’s  knife  and  doing  violence  to  its  corpse  “as  if  it  were  the  Moor 
come  hither  purposely  to  poison  me,”  all  intentions  remain  hidden  and  illegible.  The 
problem  of  violence  is  that  one  can  never  be  sure  that  violence  is  justified.  
Since  the  publication  of  Stephen  Greenblatt’s  influential  work  on  Renaissance 
‘self-fashioning,’  there  has  been  much  scholarship  on  the  epistemology  of  early  modern 
inwardness.  In  Titus  Andronicus ,  the  private  self,  which  is  distinct  and  concealed  from  the 
external,  social  sphere,  is  inherently  slippery.  Characters  in  the  play  attempt  to  display,  or 
recognize  in  others,  tangible  signs  of  human  inwardness,  but  have  no  way  to  verify  if  a 
reading  of  these  signs  is  accurate.  But  this  slipperiness  is  productive  rather  than  limiting. 
Inwardness,  motive,  and  identity  are  not  stable  or  ontological,  but  are  the  social  effects  of 
discursive  conflict.  If  we  consider  inwardness,  motive,  and  identity  as  products  of 
competing  hermeneutic  claims  (such  as  Titus  and  Marcus’s  readings  of  the  fly  as 
“harmless”  or  “ill-favoured”),  the  problem  is  no  longer  purely  epistemic.  
There  are  no  guarantees  of  certainty  when  considering  a  character’s  motives  and 
intentions  even  when,  as  Harry  Berger  Jr.  has  shown,  a  character  presents  his  or  her  own 
motives  to  him-  or  herself.   The  more  interesting  problem  is  not  what  someone’s  motive  is, 31
31  Berger  describes  the  problem  of  self-representation  and  its  reception  in  The  Absence  of  Grace ,  p.  14: 
“The  problems  that  beset  this  culture  are  concentrated  in  the  interpretive  combat  between  performer  and 
spectators/auditors,  a  field  of  play  charged  with  the  tension  between  aesthetic  jouissance  and  suspicion. 
Since  in  order  to  represent  themselves  to  others  performers  represent  themselves  to  themselves,  since  they 
watch  themselves  being  watched,  the  force  of  persuasion  and  the  production  of  meaning  are  reversible, 
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but  how  characters  talk  about  motive,  whether  it  be  their  own  or  those  of  others.  To 
approach  interpretations  of  inwardness,  we  must  first  abandon  an  idea  of  inwardness  as 
ontological,  wherein  issues  such  as  ‘motive’  and  ‘identity’  are  viewed  as  autonomous 
objects  which  can  be  excised  from  social  relations  or  from  the  contingencies  of  how 
characters  are  depicted.  Instead,  we  must  think  of  inwardness,  motive,  and  identity  as  the 
subjects  of  a  hermeneutic  practice  that  creates  a  causal  link  between  an  act  and  the 
character  who  performs  it.  When  describing  motive,  we  may  not  attest  a  certainty  of 
inwardness  or  interiority,  but  we  produce  an  interpretation  of  what  that  state  of  inwardness 
might  be.  Even  when  a  character  is  describing  his  or  her  own  motive,  we  might  read  this  as 
a  kind  of  self-interpretation  that  a  character  produces  by  laying  claim  to  the  authority  of  a 
plausible  and  cohesive  narrative.  When  characters  in  Titus  imagine  the  inward  experience 
of  others,  they  project  a  plausible  narrative  of  interiority  in  relation  to  the  external  signifiers 
of  inwardness  (such  as  tears,  pleas,  or  gestures).   Emotional  identification,  then,  itself 
represents  a  commitment  to  one  plausible  narrative,  among  many,  of  another  character’s 
illegible  interiority.  Revenge  tragedies  tend  to  raise  the  stakes  of  emotional  identification  by 
handling  scenarios  that  depict  moments  of  overwhelming  anger  and  grief.  
Scholars  often  focus  on  the  play’s  depictions  of  physical  silencing--such  as  the 
dismemberment  of  Lavinia’s  tongue  and  lopping  away  of  her  hands  to  prevent  her  from 
speaking  or  writing  out  an  accusation--but  the  play  itself  emphasizes  interruptions  of  (or 
alienable,  circular:  they  can  originate  either  in  the  observer  or  in  the  performer.  This  makes  courtly 
negotiation  a  struggle  for  control  over  the  power  to  determine  the  self-representation  the  performer 
conveys  not  only  to  others  but  also  to  himself  or  herself  (a  disjunction  that  reminds  us  the  determination 
may  include  gender).”  Though  Berger  limits  his  discussion  to  the  courtly  practices  of  sprezzatura ,  I 
believe  similar  concerns  of  self-representation  and  reception  are  disseminated  in  English  culture  through 
the  popularity  of  early  modern  theater,  which  provides  a  similar  “field  of  play”  for  “interpretative  combat” 
onstage. 
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swerves  from)  empathetic  identification.  In  the  play,  Lavinia’s  silencing  itself  results  from  a 
pragmatic  consideration  (albeit  a  horrifically  brutal  one)  which  is  meant  to  prevent  Lavinia 
from  revealing  Chiron  and  Demetrius’s  acts  of  violence,  but  the  silencing  is  itself  not  the 
play’s  focus.  Prior  to  suffering  brutal  acts  of  violence,  Lavinia  is  not  silenced  until  her 
pleading  and  her  tears  provide  evocative  signs  of  the  efficacy  of  Tamora’s  retaliation. 
Lavinia’s  physical  silencing  has  been  emphasized  by  scholars  as  emblematic  of  denied 
female  agency,  but  this  foregrounding  of  Lavinia’s  silencing  fails  to  recognize  the  play’s 
concern  with  sympathy.  Silencing  is  itself  part  of  a  larger  ethical  violation,   i.e.  the  refusal 
to  acknowledge  suffering,  or,  even  more  severe,  the  acknowledgment  of  suffering  as  a 
means  to  amplify  it.  The  play  shows  how  imagining  someone’s  pain  and  recognizing  the 
audible  or  visible  signs  of  someone’s  suffering  can  be  used  to  torment  someone  more 
effectively. 
While  revenge  requires  its  perpetrators  to  understand  the  suffering  and 
psychological  trauma  they  cause,  the  emotional  identification  which  makes  this  form  of 
retribution  possible  still  contains  the  possibility  of  pity  or  compassion.  Revenge  must 
imagine  the  experience  of  another’s  suffering  in  order  to  determine  how  best  to  produce 
and  amplify  it.   Emotional  identification,  however,  also  threatens  to  soften  a  revenger’s 
conviction  to  traumatize  his  or  her  enemy.  When  it  comes  to  emotional  identification, 
Aaron’s  capacity  to  fully  understand  the  immense  suffering  and  grief  of  others  even  while 
he  mercilessly  torments  them  is  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule.  In  contrast  to  Aaron’s 
seeming  propensity  for  sadism,  other  characters  in  the  play  find  their  personal  convictions 
for  violence  and  retribution  at  risk  when  confronted  with  signs  or  performatives  of 
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suffering.  When  Demetrius  draws  Tamora’s  attention  to  Lavinia’s  suffering  (“...let  it  be 
your  glory  /  To  see  her  tears...”),  he  also  warns  her  against  identifying  too  closely  with 
Lavinia’s  torment  (“...but  be  your  heart  to  them  /  As  unrelenting  flint  to  drops  of  rain”).  32
Demetrius’s  imperative  that  Tamora  must  harden  her  heart  against  the  evocative  power  of 
Lavinia’s  tears  reveals  an  anxiety  about  Tamora’s  conviction.  Revenge  requires  a  character 
to  understand  the  suffering  and  psychological  trauma  they  cause,  while  also  avoiding 
identifying  too  closely  with  the  victim  of  physical  and  emotional  violence.  If  Lavinia’s  tears 
were  to  seep  into  Tamora’s  heart,  an  empathetic  or  compassionate  response  to  Lavinia’s 
suffering  might  unravel  her  project  of  revenge  against  the  Andronici  family.  
Titus,  too,  seems  concerned  about  meeting  his  enemies  face  to  face,  witnessing  their 
response  to  impending  violence,  while  also  buffering  his  emotional  identification  to  keep 
his  commitment  to  violence  on  track.  When  he  has  Chiron  and  Demetrius  in  his  clutches, 
he  compulsively  demands  that  their  mouths  be  stopped  up  so  he  be  not  dissuaded  from 
slitting  their  throats:  “Therefore  bind  them  sure,  /  And  stop  their  mouths  if  they  begin  to  cry. 
…  Sirs,  stop  their  mouths.  Let  them  not  speak  to  me,  /  But  let  them  hear  what  fearful  words 
I  utter.  …  What  would  you  say  if  I  should  let  you  speak?  /  Villains,  for  shame.  You  could 
not  beg  for  grace”  (5.2.159-60,  166-167,  177-178).  Titus  is  compelled  to  both  silence  his 
enemies  but  also  to  wonder  at  their  silence,  to  imagine  what  they  might  say  if  given  the 
chance,  and  his  conviction  here  seems,  perhaps,  threatened  by  the  possibility  that  the  words 
or  any  performance  of  suffering  (tears,  sighs,  the  grain  of  the  voice  itself,  etc.)  which  calls 
for  mercy  may  be  effective  in  stopping  his  hand.  The  ambiguity  of  the  line,  “Villains,  for 
32  See  Titus  2.3.139-141. 
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shame.  You  could  not  beg  for  grace,”  contains  conflicting  possibilities  for  why  Titus  is 
compelled  to  silence  them.  On  the  one  hand,  Titus’s  line  suggests  they  “could  not  beg  for 
grace”  because  they  are  villains  (or,  to  rephrase,  they  are  incapable  of  begging  for  grace), 
or  they  could  not  beg  for  grace  because  Titus  will  not  grant  them  any  (in  the  sense  that  the 
would  be  begging  on  deaf  ears,  as  Titus  cannot  be  disuasaded  from  revenge).  But  if  either 
of  these  possibilities  (or  both)  are  what  Titus  intends,  then  why  bother  silencing  them  at  all? 
Contrary  to  his  claim  that  they  “could  not  beg  for  grace,”  Titus’s  act  of  having  them  bound 
and  gagged,  and  his  compulsive  repetition  of  the  phrase  “stop  their  mouths,”  suggests  he 
doesn’t  truly  believe  that  their  words  (or,  to  be  more  precise  and  consistent  with  my 
emphasis  on  the  relation  of  intersubjectivity  and  embodiment,  their  voices)  would  have  no 
effect  on  him.  The  physical  silencing  of  Chiron  and  Demetrius  is  Titus’s  tactic  for 
maintaining  a  face-to-face  encounter  that  will  result  in  violence  so  long  as  he  can,  as  in  his 
encounter  with  the  “black  ill-favored  fly,”  mark  the  ‘other’  as  villain. 
We  should  remember,  however,  that  Titus’s  ‘othering’  of  the  fly  is  not  limited  to 
marking  the  ‘other’  as  villain.  Titus  first  views  the  fly  as  an  ‘other’  which  is  not  set  in 
opposition  to  his  sense  of  self,  but  through  which  he  recognizes  his  family’s  own  trauma 
and  grief.  Scholars  of  early  modern  literature  are  arguing  against  the  anachronistic 
distinction  of  the  ‘self’  and  the  ‘other’  that  is  explicit  in  Cartesian  notions  of  autonomous 
selfhood  and  that  remains  even  in  the  theoretical,  poststructural  frameworks  that  overturned 
the  anachronistic  readings  of  the  autonomous  early  modern  self.  This  vestigial  concept  of 
selfhood  remains  even  in  much  of  the  scholarship  that  seeks  to  carefully  recover  and 
historicize  early  modern  subjectivity.  New  historicism,  which  shifts  the  origin  of  the  self 
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from  self-generated  to  socially  constructed,  does  not  escape  the  the  logic  of  a  primal 
distinction  between  self  and  other.  In  The  Interpersonal  Idiom ,  Nancy  Selleck  argues  that 
“Renaissance  speakers…share  a  tendency  to  locate  selfhood  beyond  subjective  experience, 
in  the  experience  of  an  other.  Fathoming  this  idiom  means  recognizing  ‘other  selves’  in  two 
senses–seeing  both  how  they  differ  from  ours  and  how  they  render  selfhood  a  function  and 
property  of  others”  (1-2).  An  interpersonal  /  intersubjective  understanding  of  early  modern 
selfhood  provides  an  alternative  to  “the  currently  familiar  notion  of  the  other  as  a  foil  or 
anti-self  against  which  the  self  defines  itself–a  dyadic  model  that  has  dominated  critical 
discussions  of  early  modern  identity”  (2).  This  “dyadic  model,”  Selleck  argues,  is  not 
resolved  by  Foucauldian  or  New  Historicist  notions  of  the  self  as  a  social  construct: 
“Although  Renaissance  scholars  and  critical  theorists  today  readily  see  the  self  as  a  social 
construct,  we  still  tend  to  analyze  that  construct  on  the  basis  of  a  sharp  distinction  between 
the  self  and  other…”  (2).  Analysis  of  the  intersubjective  nature  of  early  modern  identity 
does  not  dismiss  the  insights  of  New  Historicism,  but  it  addresses  the  limitations  of  the 
‘atomized’  individual,  which  prevents  analysis  of  willfulness  and  social  response  for  early 
modern  subjects.  According  to  Selleck,  a  recovery  of  early  modern  intersubjectivity  helps 
us  “to  move  beyond  the  theoretical  impasses  of  viewing  the  subject  either  as  wholly 
independent  of  or  wholly  determined  by  its  context”  and  instead  allows  us  “to  understand 
how  subjects  also  respond  to  and  reciprocally  affect  their  contexts”  (6). 
Contrary  to  the  ‘dyadic  model’  of  the  self  and  the  other,  the  Renaissance  trope  of 
the  ‘other  self,’  posits  ‘othering’  not  as  an  alienating  effect,  which  differentiates  the  self  by 
marking  in  the  ‘other’  attributes  or  characteristics  which  are  opposed  to  the  self,  but  finds  in 
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an  ‘other’  (or  ‘others’)  points  of  similarity.  According  to  Laurie  Shannon  in  Sovereign 
Amity ,  “Classically  derived  figures  of  friendship  at  the  center  of  the  humanist  curriculum 
held  out  a  discourse  of  more  than  self-fashioning  to  readers  when  they  cast  the  friend  as 
‘another  self’  and  merged  a  pair  of  friends  as  ‘one  soul  within  two  bodies’”  (3).  As  we’ll 
see,  the  possibility  of  finding  one’s  self  in  an  ‘other’  (or  finding  ‘another  self’)  is  as 
important  for  understanding  (inter)subjectivity  in  Titus  as  the  ‘dyadic  model’  which 
emphasizes  the  play’s  use  of  oppositional  ‘othering’  in  terms  of  conflict,  retribution,  and 
foreign  or  alien  threat.  
The  dyadic  model  is  compelling,  and  is  undeniably  visible  in  the  antagonisms 
between  Titus’s  clan  and  Tamora’s,  but,  as  Selleck  reminds  us,  an  encounter  or  engagement 
between  a  ‘self’  and  an  ‘other’  is  not  always  one  of  conflict:  “...while  the  other’s 
perspective  may  be  different,  it  does  not  define  the  other  as  wholly  alien  to  the  self.  It  is 
worth  remembering  here  that  ‘other’  means  more  than  just  difference–it  also  refers  to 
similarity,  to  more  of  the  same  (here’s  one  red  chair,  and  here’s  another)”  (4).  The  ‘self’  is 
not  shaped  in  relation  to  a  single  ‘other’,  but  is  interrelated  between  many  ‘others,’  and 
these  ‘others’  shape  and  condition  the  self  in  different  ways.  
The  antagonism  between  Titus  and  Tamora  is  not  the  only  encounter  that  shapes 
subjectivity  in  the  play.  Titus,  Lavinia,  and  the  Andronici  certainly  find  themselves  in 
violent,  tragic  opposition  to  Tamora,  Aaron,  Saturninus,  and  Chiron  and  Demetrius,  but  the 
Andronici  also  have  profound  moments  of  recognition  and  reconstructions  of  selfhood  by 
engaging  with  each  other’s  suffering  and  trauma,  of  which  Lavinia  stands  as  the  play’s 
central  figure.  Within  the  play’s  narrative  of  retribution  against  the  Goths  there  also  exists  a 
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narrative  of  sensitivity  and  compassion  in  relation  to  family  trauma,  wherein  the  self 
recognizes  the  self  in  the  other. 
This  intersubjective  construction  of  the  self,  which  finds  itself  in  and  through 
‘another  self,’  is  most  apparent  in  the  relationship  that  emerges  between  Titus  and  Lavinia. 
But  even  Marcus’s  initial  response  to  Lavinia,  which  seems  insensitive  and  self-involved 
when  we  emphasize  his  use  of  the  blazon ,  can  be  read  as  a  gradual  movement  toward  this 
dyadic  model.  To  interpret  Marcus’s  response  as  a  repetition  of  Lavinia’s  wounding  via 
poetry  is  to  miss  the  depiction  of  his  response  as  a  progression,  a  movement  from  an  insular 
response  to  increasingly  wider  considerations  of  how  other  minds,  including  Lavinia’s,  are 
affected  by  the  traumatic  event  that  they  all  inhabit,  with  Lavinia  bearing  the  greatest  load 
of  suffering.  Marcus  moves  from  a  response  that  might  be  represented  by  the  ‘dyadic 
model’  of  selfhood,  which  is  only  capable  of  acknowledging  the  experience  of  the 
autonomous  self,  to  wider  and  wider  intersubjective  considerations.  He  first  accounts  for 
his  own  suffering,  wishing  to  ease  his  own  mind,  then  he  considers  how  Titus’s  suffering 
will  be  similar  to  his  own,  and  finally  imagines  a  communal  response  to  Lavinia’s 
wounding,  saying,  “Do  not  draw  back,  for  we  will  mourn  with  thee.  /  O,  could  our 
mourning  ease  thy  misery!”  (2.4.56-57).  In  this  acknowledgment  of  “our”  (the  Andronici) 
suffering  and  Lavinia’s,  there  is  a  formulation  of  a  ‘self’  (or  ‘selves’)  and  an  ‘other’  that  is 
not  antagonistic  or  oppositional.  Selleck  associates  this  alternative  model  to  dyadic  othering 
with  Mikhail  Bakhtin’s  “concept  of  dialogized  consciousness,  which  recognizes  the 
interplay  of  perspectives  in  a  given  speaker  and  casts  selfhood  as  an  engagement  with, 
rather  than  a  reaction  against,  others”  (3).  Key  to  this  notion  of  selfhood  is  the  self’s 
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tendency  “to  be  engaged  with  the  other’s  frame  of  reference,  and  to  be  shaped  by  it” 
(Selleck  3).  Along  these  lines  of  ‘dialogized  consciousness,  Marcus  recognizes  the  minds 
of  others  (Titus,  and  the  other  male  relations)  will  respond  in  a  way  that  is  similar  to  his 
own,  as  a  mournful  witness  to  her  suffering,  but  he  also  acknowledges  that  Lavinia’s  pain 
and  suffering  is  a  different  experience  of  the  traumatic  event  than  his  own  experience  as 
witness.  In  this  formation  of  ‘self’  and  ‘other’  there  is  the  desire  to  reconfigure 
subject-relations,  to  center  around  Lavinia  in  an  attempt  to  share  the  burden  of  her  suffering 
and  ease  her  pain.  In  other  words,  he  expects  to  shape,  and  be  shaped  by,  Lavinia’s  trauma. 
Although  recent  scholarship  has  discussed  the  importance  of  intersubjectivity  in 
early  modern  culture  for  articulating  a  character’s  own  constructions  of  inwardness, 
Shakespeare’s  revenge  play  displays  intersubjectivity’s  potential  violence  and  explores 
inwardness  and  identity  as  a  sites  of  discursive  conflict  when  articulating  the  inwardness  of 
others.  When  characters  in  Titus  imagine  the  inward  experience  of  others,  they  project  a 
plausible  narrative  of  interiority  derived  from  inwardness’s  external  signifiers  (such  as  tears, 
pleas,  or  gestures).  Emotional  identification,  then,  itself  represents  a  commitment  to  one 
plausible  narrative,  among  many,  of  another  character’s  illegible  interiority.  
What  distinguishes  Titus’s  response  to  his  enemies  from  his  response  to  his 
daughter  is  his  willingness  to  continually  struggle  with  his  understanding  of  Lavinia’s 
subjectivity.  Lavinia  reclaims  her  agency  by  refusing  to  be  a  ‘text’  to  be  read,  and  instead 
acts  as  a  textual  authority,  citing  from  Ovid.  Reading  the  interiority  of  another  person  is  an 
act  similar  to  reading  and  interpreting  a  text.  The  authority  of  an  interpretation  depends 
upon  one’s  mastery  over  texts,  which  is  displayed  through  quoting  or  citing  from  canonical 
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works.  Despite  Titus’s  “still  practice”  to  learn  the  meaning  of  Lavinia’s  gestures  and  to 
become  her  mouthpiece,  he  is  unable  to  understand  Lavinia’s  “speechless”  complaints  until 
she  provides  them  context.  Though  Titus’s  recognizes  that  Lavinia’s  sighs,  gestures,  and 
tears  are  meaningful,  they  only  become  coherent  when  she  “quotes  the  leaves.”  Lavinia’s 
citation  provides  Titus  with  the  proper  narrative,  allowing  him  to  properly  interpret  her 
wordless  gestures.  
Lavinia’s  citational  mode  is  how  she  finally  reclaims  her  agency.  While  it  is  true 
that  Lavinia,  in  citing  Ovid,  identifies  with  Philomel  (as  Marcus  did  when  he  found  her  in 
the  woods),  the  moment  is  not  a  reiteration  of  Marcus  or  Titus’s  patriarchal  authority. 
Lavinia’s  citing  of  Philomel’s  story  does  more  than  just  identify  Lavinia  with  Philomel’s 
victimization.  Lavinia  also  provides  an  annotation,  taking  Marcus’s  staff  in  her  mouth  to 
write  an  accusation  in  the  sand.  Lavinia’s  citing  and  annotating  of  the  text  makes  her  more 
than  an  object  of  interpretation  for  the  male  figures  of  the  play.  Despite  losing  her  tongue 
and  hands,  the  play’s  metonyms  for  speech  and  writing,  Lavinia  has  not  lost  her  exegetic 
capacity.  Where  Philomel  weaves  her  narrative  into  a  tapestry,  Lavinia  cites  from  Ovid, 
weaving  her  narrative  with  Philomel’s  as  she  “quotes  the  leaves.”  What’s  more,  Lavinia’s 
identification  is  not  passive.  She  not  only  cites  from  Ovid  to  illuminate  the  nature  of  her 
wounds,  she  also  openly  accuses  Chiron  and  Demetrius  and  provides  the  narrative  pattern 
of  revenge.  In  her  quoting  from  Ovid,  Lavinia  acts  not  only  as  Philomel  but  also  as  Procne, 
who  interprets  Philomel’s  tapestry  and  plots  revenge  against  Tereus.  
Though  Titus  has  already  sworn  the  Andronici  family  to  revenge,  there  is  no  plan 
or  effort  to  take  revenge  until  after  Lavinia  provides  a  narrative  pattern  and  precedent. 
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From  Lavinia,  Titus  learns  to  annotate  texts  into  threatening  accusations.  Immediately  after 
Lavinia  provides  a  “precedent  and  lively  warrant”  for  revenge  in  her  citing  and  annotating 
of  Ovid,  Titus  sends  verses  of  Horace  to  Chiron  and  Demetrius,  verses  which  he  wraps 
around  a  bundle  of  blades.  He  also  has  the  Andronici  wrap  their  complaints  around  arrows 
that  are  fired  into  the  heavens  in  a  barrage  that  falls  upon  Rome.  While  Lavinia’s  tears  and 
gestures  are  insufficient  substitutes  for  speech  and  writing,  she  recovers  her  agency  through 
acts  of  quotation  and  annotation.  In  her  use  of  citation,  Lavinia  resists  being  a  text  to  be 
read  and  instead  “quotes  the  leaves”  to  become  a  textual  authority,  providing  her  father 
Titus  with  a  “pattern,  precedent,  and  lively  warrant”  for  revenge  against  their  enemies 
(4.1.50,  5.3.43).  
 
Conclusion 
 
While  characters  in  Titus  articulate  their  passions--especially  when  those  passions 
are  intense  grief  or  anger--these  are  articulations  are  always  outward-facing  and 
interpersonal  in  nature.  When  Titus  imagines  the  all-consuming  expansion  of  his  grief,  he 
imagines  his  passions  in  relation  to  the  world  he  inhabits,  and  after  he  sees  wounded 
Lavinia,  his  articulations  of  grief  consistently  include  Lavinia’s  inarticulated  grief,  her 
“speechless”  complaints.  Early  modern  scholars  often  refer  to  Montaigne’s  Essais  for 
evidence  of  early  modern  inwardness  in  a  modern  sense.  Montaigne  observes  and  describes 
his  own  inwardness,  cataloguing  their  motions  the  way  a  scientist  notes  how  mice  move 
through  a  maze.  What’s  important  to  remember,  however,  is  that  Montaigne’s  reflexive 
inwardness  is  exceptional  in  early  modern  culture.  Indeed,  he  has  to  invent  a  new  literary 
form  in  the  essay  to  accommodate  the  emergence  of  this  cognitive  mode.  
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Certainly,  the  self-aware,  autonomous  inwardness  which  finds  early  expression  in 
Montaigne’s  work  influences  Shakespeare.  Hamlet’s  soliloquizing  and  his  conception  of 
peopling  a  world  which  only  he  inhabits  (“O  God,  I  could  be  bounded  in  a  nutshell  and 
count  myself  a  king  of  infinite  space,  were  it  not  that  I  have  bad  dreams”)  shows 
Montaigne’s  traces  in  Shakespeare.   But  Hamlet’s  interiority,  too,  is  difficult  for  others 33
(and  even  Hamlet  himself)  to  comprehend.  It  stands  at  the  margins  of  early  modern 
subjectivity,  where  the  self  can  imagine  itself  as  divorced  from  the  world  and  identity  needs 
no  audience,  no  recognition  from  others,  in  order  to  exist.  This  possibility  of  Montaignean 
reflexivity  is  not  present  in  Shakespeare’s  early  drama.  Characters  generally  do  not 
soliloquize  in  Titus .  Their  subjectivity  is  always  conceived  relationally,  in  terms  of  how 
they  perceive,  and  are  perceived,  by  others.  The  complications  of  subjectivity  in  Titus  are 
not  in  terms  of  characters  tracing  their  own  interiorities,  but  in  the  fact  that  their 
interiorities--their  privates  thoughts  and  feelings--are  accepted  or  contested,  or  even  entirely 
dismissed,  depending  on  who  is  present  in  any  given  scene. 
The  play’s  mimicry  and  quotation  uses  repetition  in  order  to  decontextualize  lines  or 
narrative  patterns  and  give  them  new  possibilities.  The  hierarchical  structure  of  patriarchy 
gives  way  in  the  face  of  shared  trauma.  Titus’s  responses  to  Lavinia’s  suffering  and  grief, 
then,  are  not  one-sided  acts  of  interpretation,  but  serve  to  highlight  mimicry  and  quotation 
both  as  strategies  of  collaboration  and  as  a  depiction  of  a  possible  cognitive  structure  of 
intersubjectivity.  Through  collaboration,  Titus  and  Lavinia  recover  agency  that  seemed 
destroyed  by  trauma,  even  if  that  recovery  is,  by  the  play’s  end,  forsaken  in  favor  of 
33  Hamlet  2.2.248-250. 
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retribution.  Violence,  ultimately,  eradicates  subjectivity,  reducing  the  complexities  of 
selfhood  into  the  simplicity  of  role  play,  of  revenger  and  villain.  The  bloodletting  which 
consumes  the  play’s  closing  scene  reveals  the  specific  way  in  which  violence,  according  to 
Levinas,  “does  not  consist  so  much  in  injuring  and  annihilating  persons  as  in  interrupting 
their  continuity,  making  them  play  roles  in  which  they  no  longer  recognize  themselves, 
making  them  betray  not  only  commitments  but  their  own  substance,  making  them  carry  out 
actions  that  will  destroy  every  possibility  for  action”  ( Totality  21).  As  Titus  and  Lavinia 
serve  pies  made  from  Chiron  and  Demetrius,  the  world  is  dislodged  from  the  possibility  of 
mercy  or  reconciliation.  By  the  end  of  the  bloody  banquet,  Titus  and  Lavinia’s  enemies  are 
dead,  but  so  are  Titus  and  Lavinia.  What  remains  in  the  wake  of  violence  are  not  ‘selves,’ 
nor  even  bodies.  Only  corpses.  
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CHAPTER  IV 
“ADORE  MY  TOPLESS  VILLAINY”: 
METATHEATRICAL  RIVALRY  IN  JOHN  MARSTON’S  ANTONIO’S  REVENGE 
 
John  Marston’s  Antonio’s  Revenge  explores  revenge  as  a  mode  of  competition. 
While  characters  speak  various  motives  for  revenge  in  the  play,  these  motives  are 
secondary  to  their  desire  to  surpass  the  physical  and  psychological  torment  produced  by 
preceding  acts  of  violence.  Marston  suggests  a  similarity  between  the  market  conditions  of 
dramatic  performance  (competition  between  playwrights,  acting  companies,  and  rival 
theaters)  and  the  convention  of  one-upmanship  in  revenge  tragedy,  wherein  revengers  seek 
to  return  and  amplify  the  injuries  they  suffered  at  the  hands  of  their  enemies.  In  linking 
revenge  logic  with  marketplace  competition,  the  play  shifts  the  generic  convention  of 
one-upmanship  from  a  matter  of  justice  to  aesthetics.  While  other  Elizabethan  revenge 
tragedies  represent  reciprocity  and  collusion  between  characters  as  important  aspects  of 
intersubjective  self-reintegration,  Marston’s  play  emphasizes  competition  and  rivalry  as  the 
dominant  forces  that  shape  his  characters.  
In  the  opening  scene  of  John  Marston’s  Antonio’s  Revenge ,  the  play’s  villain  Piero, 
smeared  in  gore,  steps  onstage  and  boasts  about  murdering  Antonio’s  father:  "Lord,  in  two 
hours  what  a  topless  mount  /  Of  unpeered  mischief  have  these  hands  cast  up!  /  I  can  scarce 
coop  triumphing  vengeance  up,  /  From  bursting  forth  in  braggart  passion"  (1.1.9-12).  Not 
only  does  Piero  gloat  about  the  success  of  his  revenge,  he  also  seeks  recognition  and 
adoration  for  the  unsurpassed  quality  of  his  revenge:  “Canst  thou  not  honey  me  with  fluent 
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speech  /  And  even  adore  my  topless  villainy?”  (1.1.83-84).  Demanding  praise  for  the 
unsurpassed  quality  of  revenge  is  surprising,  since  revenge  in  Elizabethan  revenge  plays  is 
not  usually  treated  as  a  praiseworthy  act.  Generally,  revenge  is  depicted  as  a  last  resort, 
reserved  for  some  form  of  private  justice  when  all  other  options  have  failed.  Thomas 
McAlindon,  for  instance,  defines  revenge  in  English  revenge  tragedies  as  “justice  without 
law”  (McAlindon  52).  
In  Antonio’s  Revenge ,  however,  retaliation  is  no  longer  primarily  a  matter  of  justice. 
Instead,  Marston’s  play  depicts  revenge  as  a  means  for  attaining  approbation  and  applause 
from  an  imagined  theatrical  audience.  In  demanding  adoration,  Piero  emphasizes  not  his 
ability  to  procure  a  form  of  private  justice  but  instead  highlights  the  aesthetic 
accomplishment  of  his  revenge.  In  wanting  applause,  Piero  moves  revenge  from  a  moral 
consideration  to  an  aesthetic  one.  He  demands  not  ethical  vindication  but  validation  for  an 
act  he  frames  as  a  boastworthy  theatrical  achievement:  “I  am  great  in  blood,  /  Unequalled  in 
revenge”  (1.1.17-18).  Piero’s  ambition  is  not  just  to  punish  his  enemies,  but  also  to  rival 
and  surpass  preceding  narratives  of  vengeance  and  villainy.  
What  is  the  effect  of  thinking  of  revenge  in  terms  of  aesthetic  ambition  and 
theatrical  rivalry?  In  previous  chapters,  I  argued  that  Thomas  Kyd  and  William 
Shakespeare  link  violence  and  silence.  Since  violence  does  not  go  unheeded,  Kyd’s  and 
Shakespeare’s  revengers  resort  to  violence  when  language  fails  to  procure  justice  for  the 
wrongs  they  have  suffered.   For  example,  in  The  Spanish  Tragedy ,  Kyd  depicts  revenge  as 
a  form  of  violence  that  includes  both  accusation  and  punishment.  When  demands  for  justice 
go  unanswered  by  God  and  king,  Hieronimo  stages  for  the  king  a  theatrical  reenactment  of 
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his  son’s  death  that  reveals  the  villains’  crimes  while  Hieronimo  ends  the  villains’  lives.  In 
Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies,  violence  is  a  consequence  of  unheard  petitions  or  ignored 
accusations.  
John  Marston’s  take  on  revenge  tragedy,  however,  overturns  the  link  between 
silence  and  violence.  Marston’s  emphasis  on  rhetoric  as  inherently  competitive  and, 
therefore,  aggressive ,  alters  the  underlying  concern  of  revenge  plays.  Marston  links 
retaliation  to  concerns  of  reputation,  or  one’s  outward-facing  self,  which  is  rooted  in  the 
interpersonal  recognition  of  personal  achievements.  The  reason  Piero  wants  revenge  is  due 
to  the  damage  Antonio  inflicted  on  Piero’s  reputation:  “When  his  bright  valor  even  dazzled 
sense  /  In  off’ring  his  own  head,  public  reproach  /  Had  blurred  my  name–”  (1.1.32-34).  In 
Marston’s  play,  language  itself  becomes  both  a  site  and  a  source  of  violence,  as  revenge  is 
predicated  upon  rhetorical  and  theatrical  competition.  
Drawing  upon  recent  scholarship  on  rivalry  in  the  theatrical  marketplace,  I  will 
argue  that  Marston’s  depiction  of  revenge  logic,  which  alludes  to  prior  acts  of  violence 
while  attempting  to  surpass  them,  allegorizes  the  competitive  nature  of  the  theater.  The 
emerging  practice  of  public  commercial  theater  provides  the  model  of  social 
relations--particularly  the  relation  between  actor  and  audience--whereby  Marston’s 
characters  define  themselves.  I  discussed  a  similar  intersubjective  model  when  analyzing 
Hieronimo’s  soliloquies  in  my  chapter  on  The  Spanish  Tragedy .  However,  unlike  in  The 
Spanish  Tragedy ,  the  intersubjective  rhetoric  that  characterizes  Marston’s  play  makes 
explicit  references  to  the  theater  itself.  In  The  Spanish  Tragedy ,  Hieronimo  may  utilize  the 
theater  when  taking  revenge,  but  there  is  no  rhetoric  of  the  theater  in  the  soliloquies  and 
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collusions  (with  Don  Bazulto,  Bel-Imperia,  etc.)  that  restructure  Hieronimo’s  sense  of  self. 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  demonstrate  that  Marston  depicts  revenge  as  a  medium  for  aesthetic 
achievement  and  portrays  violence  as  a  showcase  for  rhetoric,  acting,  and  intrigue.  Since 
the  Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies  that  precede  Antonio’s  Revenge  use  revenge  to  explore 
the  ethical  or  political  dimensions  of  violence,  Marston’s  depiction  of  revenge  as  an 
aesthetic  concern  marks  a  radical  departure  from  his  contemporaries.  
 
Characters  in  Antonio’s  Revenge  don't  speak  so  much  as  they  extemporize,  riffing 
knowingly  on  the  conventions  of  early  modern  revenge  plays.  The  dialogue  in  the  play  is 
not  just  bombastic  but  theatrically  self-referential,  often  exaggerating  the  stock  rhetoric  of 
revenge  tragedy  to  the  point  that  Marston’s  play  may  seem  indecorously  tongue-in-cheek. 
As  an  effect  of  self-referential  and  intertextual  rhetoric,  the  heightened  language  of 
Marston’s  characters  (whether  expressing  anger  or  grief)  always  seems  strategically 
deployed,  contextualized  (even  by  characters  within  the  play)  as  “mimic  action”  which  is 
“apish”  and  “player-like”  rather  than  voicing  authentic  sentiment  ( Antonio’s  1.5.78,  80). 
Throughout  the  play,  characters  draw  attention  to  the  “player-like”  quality  of  their 
performances.  When  Antonio  learns  that  his  lover  Mellida  will  be  executed,  he,  like 
Pandulpho,  references  ‘mimic  action,’  stating:  “I  will  not  swell  like  a  tragedian  /  In  forced 
passions  of  affected  strains”  (2.3.104-105).  Earlier  in  the  same  scene,  however,  Antonio 
swelled  in  just  such  an  affected  strain  while  grieving  for  his  murdered  father: 
The  chamber  of  my  breast  is  even  thronged 
With  firm  attendance  that  forswears  to  flinch. 
I  have  a  thing  sits  here;  it  is  not  grief, 
’Tis  not  despair,  nor  the  most  plague 
That  the  most  wretched  are  infected  with; 
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But  the  most  grief-full,  despairing,  wretched, 
Accursed,  miserable--O,  for  heaven’s  sake 
Forsake  me  now;  you  see  how  light  I  am, 
And  yet  you  force  me  to  defame  my  patience.  (2.3.11-19) 
 
By  calling  attention  to  the  practiced  performances,  the  “forced  passions,”  of  staged 
tragedies,  the  play  generates  skepticism  towards  the  tragic  rhetoric  of  its  own  characters, 
who  seem  especially  invested  in  upstaging  each  other  as  “unequalled,”  “unsurpassed,”  or 
incapable  of  being  “overtopped,”  whether  it  be  in  performances  of  grief  or  in  executions  of 
violence.  For  example,  when  Pandulpho  claims  to  be  “the  miserablest  soul  that  breathes” 
while  burying  his  murdered  son,  Antonio  challenges  this  claim,  saying  that  no  one  is 
capable  of  “Outmounting”  Antonio  “in  that  superlative,”  as  he  is  “unmatched  in  woe” 
(4.4.53-58).  
Despite  the  play  declaring  itself  a  serious  tragedy,  a  "black-visaged  show"  that 
seeks  to  "weigh  massy  in  judicious  scale,”  the  play’s  metatheatrical  self-referentiality  has 
made  the  play  difficult  for  scholars  and  critics  to  categorize  (Prologue  20,  30).  R.A. 
Foakes,  for  instance,  takes  Marston's  "fustian"  lines,  which  were  written  to  be  performed 
by  the  Children  of  St.  Paul’s,  as  intentionally  and  parodically  melodramatic,  especially 
when  spouted  from  the  lips  of  child  actors: 
The  plays  [i.e.  Antonio  and  Mellida  and  Antonio’s  Revenge ]  work  from  the 
beginning  as  vehicles  for  child-actors  consciously  ranting  in  oversize  parts,  and  we 
are  not  allowed  to  take  their  passions  or  motives  seriously.  Their  grand  speeches  are 
undermined  by  bathos  or  parody,  and  spring  from  no  developed  emotional  situation, 
so  that  we  are  not  moved  by  them,  and  do  not  take  them  seriously  enough  to 
demand  justice  at  the  end.  (“Fantastical”  236)  
 
Marston's  use  of  (often  bombastic)  rhetoric  and  his  defiance  of  conventional  expectations 
for  how  a  revenge  tragedy  “should”  end  have  left  scholars  debating  whether  Marston  is 
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writing  serious  tragedy  or  perhaps  giving  revenge  tragedies,  which  remained  popular  on  the 
English  stage  for  decades  following  Kyd's  success  with  The  Spanish  Tragedy ,  a  parodic 
send-up,  turning  Senecan  speeches  of  grief  and  blood  lust  into  exaggerated  farce.  
In  addition  to  the  disruptive  possibility  of  reading  the  ostensible  tragedy  as  farce,  the 
problem  of  generic  categorization  is  amplified  by  the  play's  performance  history.  Antonio's 
Revenge  likely  directly  competed  with  Shakespeare's  own  Hamlet ,  a  play  which  has 
certainly  weighed  “massier”  than  Marston's  in  the  annals  of  canonical  literature.  The  plays 
feature  similar  plots,  and  both  are  assumed  to  be  adaptations  of  a  preceding  version  of 
Hamlet  (referred  to  by  scholars  as  the  Ur-Hamlet ),  which  might  have  been  written  by  Kyd 
and  of  which  no  known  copy  survives.   Shakespeare’s  play  has  become  an  emblem  of 34
psychological  realism  and,  over  the  last  few  centuries,  has  been  fashioned  into  a  keystone 
text  for  understanding  the  emergence  of  modern  interiority  in  Western  culture.   In  contrast, 35
early  modern  scholars  have  remained  skeptical  that  Marston  is  even  taking  his  material 
seriously  as  a  tragedy.  Phoebe  Spinrad,  for  example,  claims  that  the  play’s 
self-aggrandizing  rhetoric  leaves  scholars  wondering  whether  Marston  wants  us  to 
sympathize  with  the  urges  that  characters  express  for  revenge  or  be  revolted  by  the  play’s 
sensationalism,  or  perhaps  we’re  supposed  to  throw  our  hands  up  and  “see  his  whole  world 
as  absurd  and  not  really  care"  ("Sacralization"  169). 
When  scholars  do  take  Antonio’s  Revenge  seriously  as  tragedy,  they  have  trouble 
interpreting  Marston’s  depiction  of  revenge  without  framing  it  in  ethical  or  socio-political 
34  For  further  discussion,  see  W.  Reavley  Gair’s  introduction  to  the  Revels  edition  of  the  play,  especially 
pp.  16-19.  
 
35  See  Margaret  de  Grazia,  Hamlet  Without  Hamlet ,  pp.  1-7;  and  Katharine  Eisaman  Maus’s  introductory 
chapter  in  Inwardness  and  Theater  in  the  English  Renaissance . 
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terms,  likely  due  to  the  fact  that  Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies  generally  depict  revenge  as  a 
matter  of  justice  (lawless  and  wild  though  it  may  be).  George  Geckle,  for   example,  argues 
that  although  a  few  scholars  have  begun  describing  Marston’s  work  “within  the  context  of 
a  dramatist  who  wrote  for  performance,”  the  “proper”  approach  to  Marston’s  play  is 
“within  the  context  of  the  mainstream  criticism  about  him--and  that  is  Marston  as  a  moralist 
first  and  theatrical  experimenter  second”  ( John  Marston’s  Drama  27-28).  Likewise,  in 
Radical  Tragedy ,  Jonathan  Dollimore  reads  revenge  in  Marston’s  play  not  as  experimental 
metatheater  but  as  socio-political  realism.  According  to  Dollimore,  revenge  tragedies 
rehearse  anxieties  about  “social  and  political  dislocation”  and  present  worldviews  that  deny 
the  teleological  stability  of  providentialism.  Dollimore  claims  that  revenge  tragedies  reveal 
“how  individuals  become  alienated  from  their  society”  and  Marston’s  characters,  in 
particular,  “are  shown  to  be  precariously  dependent  upon  the  social  reality  which  confronts 
them”  (29).  
While  I  agree  with  Dollimore  that  this  is  how  Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies  tend  to 
work,  I  argue  that  the  “social  reality”  of  this  particular  play  is  not  social  realism.  The  play’s 
metatheatricality  strikingly  contrasts  with  the  social  or  psychological  realism  that  scholars 
tend  to  describe  in  revenge  tragedies.  If  we  read  Antonio’s  Revenge  as  a  conventional 
revenge  tragedy,  we  miss  the  crucial  elements  of  the  play’s  aestheticizing  of  revenge.  Nor 
do  I  think  Marston’s  metatheatricality  to  be  mere  farce.  Rather  than  parodying  revenge 
tragedies  (as  Foakes  suggests)  or  rehearsing  anxieties  about  “social  and  political 
dislocation”  (as  Dollimore  claims),  Antonio’s  Revenge  investigates  the  anxieties  of 
marketplace  competition  and  theatrical  rivalry.  By  having  characters  seek  adoration  and 
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praise  while  attempting  to  surpass  not  only  each  other  but  also  other  characters  from  other 
plays  and  texts,  Marston’s  play  explores  revenge  in  terms  of  literary  recognition  rather  than 
social  alienation.  The  play  is  not  politically  motivated  so  much  as  its  theatrically  motivated. 
Where  Dollimore  sees  Marston’s  revenge  tragedy  as  responding  to  the  political  realities  that 
haunt  the  English  stage,  I  view  the  play  as  a  lens  through  which  the  English  stage  views 
itself.  
In  Shakespeare's  Stage  Traffic:  Imitation,  Borrowing,  and  Competition  in 
Renaissance  Theatre ,  Janet  Clare  argues  persuasively  that  reading  intertextually  and  with 
an  eye  toward  the  external  pressures  of  theatrical  rivalry  and  marketplace  competition 
between  playwrights  allows  for  fresh  insight  into  the  textual  variations  of  different  printed 
versions  of  Hamlet .   Reading  with  an  understanding  of  the  competitive  pressures  on 36
playwrights  and  acting  companies  also  provides  answers  to  some  of  the  tangled  questions 
surrounding  Marston's  style  and  tone,  and  can  help  explain  his  disruption  of  audience 
expectations  when  Antonio  lives  after  taking  revenge,  which  is  unconventional  for  a 
revenge  tragedy.  Notably,  Marston’s  revenge  play  is  situated  smack-dab  in  the  middle  of 
the  Poets’  War,  a  time  of  heightened  theatrical  rivalry  between  playwrights.  Though 
Antonio’s  Revenge  is  not  considered  to  be  embroiled  in  the  satirical  attacks  and 
counterattacks  of  the  Poets’  War  (Marston’s  volleys  were  the  comical  satires  of 
Histriomastix ,  Jack  Drum’s  Entertainment ,  and  What  You  Will ),  I  argue  that  Antonio’s 
Revenge  is  shaped  by  the  culture  of  competition  that  was  intensified  by  the  Poets’  War. 
Written  in  an  atmosphere  of  rivalry  in  which  “playwrights  began  the  project  of  assessing 
36  For  Clare’s  discussion  Antonio’s  Revenge  influence  on  Q2  Hamlet  through  the  pressures  of  marketplace 
competition,  see  Shakespeare’s  Stage  Traffic  pp.  181-185. 
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their  own  quality”  and  including  evaluative  principles  within  the  plays  themselves, 
Marston’s  revenge  play  is  compulsively  self-aware  of  its  relation  to  other  revenge  narratives 
(Bednarz  11).  
  Rather  than  portraying  revenge  through  the  lens  of  psychological  realism,  as 
Shakespeare  does  in  Hamlet ,  Marston  invites  audiences  to  compare  his  revenge  play  with 
those  of  other  playwrights  and  to  note  how  his  play’s  depictions  of  vengeance  exceed  all 
others.  While  Shakespeare’s  Hamlet  is  anxious  about  direct  comparisons  between  himself 
and  other  actors  (as  I’ll  discuss  in  detail  in  the  next  chapter),  Marston’s  characters  not  only 
relish  in  the  possibility  of  theatrical  comparison  but,  at  times,  demand  that  these 
comparisons  be  made.  Hamlet’s  anxiety  remains  at  the  level  of  performance--he  worries 
that  his  grief  fails  to  stir  his  mother’s  emotions  because  his  grief  is  unconvincing.  Marston, 
however,  introduces  theatrical  competition  at  both  the  level  of  performance  and  also  in 
terms  of  narrative  competition.  In  particular,  Marston’s  villain,  Piero,  is  driven  by  the 
possibility  of  comparison  between  his  villainy  and  the  villainy  depicted  in  other  plays. 
Piero’s  ambition  is  to  surpass  all  other  revengers  and  villains  in  the  judgment  of  his 
imagined  audience.  With  heightened  rhetoric,  he  continually  demands  attention  for  the 
ingenuity  and  cleverness  of  his  schemes  against  Antonio’s  family.  Earlier  revenge  tragedies 
(such  as  The  Spanish  Tragedy  and  Titus  Andronicus )  depict  revenge’s  effects  on  characters 
within  the  play ,  but  Marston  links  the  visual  and  verbal  extremes  of  revenge  to 
metatheatrical  concerns.  
  When  the  intertheatrical  and  self-referential  aspects  of  the  play  are  ignored,  the 
play’s  rhetoric  looks  like  stylistic  excess  rather  than  an  essential  aspect  of  the  play’s 
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interrogation  of  revenge  logic.  Like  Dollimore,  Spinrad  reads  Antonio’s  Revenge  as 
psychological  realism  and  finds  the  play  to  be  conventional,  interpreting  revenge  in  the  play 
as  a  question  of  justice.  If  there  is  anything  radical  in  Marston’s  treatment  of  revenge, 
Spinrad  argues,  it  is  the  play’s  use  of  Judeo-Christian,  rather  than  pagan,  imagery,  which 
asks  early  modern  audiences  “to  accept  revenge  as  Christian”  (182).  In  her  final  assessment 
of  the  play,  however,  Spinrad  does  suggest  the  possibility  of  intertextual  analysis:  “it  may 
be  that  [Marston]  was  newly  interrogating  revenge  or  revenge  drama...or  that  he  was 
simply  trying  to  make  a  box-office  killing  (no  pun  intended)  through  outrageous 
one-upmanship”  (183).  But  Spinrad  stops  short  by  presenting  these  as  two  separate 
possibilities  without  than  analyzing  how  they  might  be  linked.  
I  argue  that  Piero’s  early  insistence  on  intertextual  and  metatheatrical  comparisons 
between  his  revenge  and  all  other  preceding  narratives--“Say,  faith,  didst  thou  e’er  hear,  or 
read,  or  see  /  Such  happy  vengeance,  unsuspected  death?”--reframes  violence  and  suffering 
(1.1.66-67).  Rather  than  expecting  the  audience  to  sympathize  with  or  be  revolted  by 
violence,  Marston’s  play  invites  the  audience  to  appreciate  violence  aesthetically.  The 
rhetoric  of  revenge  logic  in  Antonio’s  Revenge ,  with  its  emphasis  on  overtopping, 
surpassing,  or  exceeding  others,  calls  attention  to  the  theater  itself  as  a  mode  of  production, 
suggesting  that  the  marketplace  rivalry  between  playhouses  fosters  a  similar  logic  of 
one-upmanship.  Whereas  other  revenge  tragedies  explore  revenge  as  a  mimetic  response  to 
violence,  in  the  sense  that  their  revengers  attempt  to  both  mimic  and  exceed  the  prior  acts  of 
violence  inflicted  on  them  by  the  plays’  villains,  Antonio’s  Revenge  is  a  mimetic  response  to 
the  genre  of  revenge  tragedy  itself.  
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One  way  the  play  provides  a  mimetic  response  to  the  genre  is  by  making  its 
characters  familiar  with  other  revenge  tragedies.  Antonio’s  Revenge  references  other 
revenge  tragedies  even  before  its  first  character  speaks  his  opening  lines.  The  play  begins 
with  Piero  (the  Duke  of  Venice)  having  already  murdered  his  rival  Andrugio  (the  Duke  of 
Genoa  and  Antonio’s  father)  with  poison  and  also  having  just  murdered  Feliche,  the  son  of 
Pandulpho  (a  gentleman  of  the  Venetian  court).  Metatheatrical  and  mimetic  excess  is 
clearly  visible  in  the  play's  opening  scene:  Piero  first  enters  the  play,  according  to  the  stage 
directions,  “ unbraced,  his  arms  bare,  smeared  in  blood,  a  poniard  in  one  hand,  bloody, 
and  a  torch  in  the  other,  STROTZO  following  him  with  a  cord ”  (Marston  57).  Piero’s 
appearance  --  his  clothing  unfastened,  his  bare  arms  smeared  in  gore,  the  props  of  poniard, 
torch,  and  cord  --  already  functions  as  a  visual  allusion  to  the  genre  of  revenge  tragedy.  37
Here,  Piero  reenacts  what  early  modern  audiences  have  already  seen  performed  in  other 
plays  and  as  he  begins  bragging  about  his  murderous  accomplishments,  his  unbraced  and 
gore-smeared  appearance  seems  increasingly  intentional.  He  seems  to  adopt  this 
appearance  because  it  is  how  revengers  are  ‘supposed’  to  look  in  revenge  plays.  
As  characters  display  their  awareness  of  revenge  narratives,  Marston’s  work 
implicitly  challenges  the  notion  of  being  a  self-contained  narrative,  marking  Antonio’s 
Revenge  as  experimental  theater.  The  play  functions  both  as  a  sequel  to  another  play 
( Antonio  and  Mellida )  that  was  written  within  the  conventions  of  another  genre  (comedy), 
and  as  a  play  that  is  in  discourse  with,  and  comments  on,  revenge  tragedy  as  a  popular 
37  For  example,  see  Kyd’s  The  Spanish  Tragedy  3.12,  where  Hieronimo  enters  with  a  poniard  in  one  hand 
and  a  rope  in  another.  In  Hamlet ,  too,  Ophelia  famously  describes  the  danish  prince  approaching  her  with 
“his  doublet  all  unbraced,”  looking  “As  if  he  had  been  loosed  out  of  hell  /  To  speak  of  horrors…”  (2.1.75, 
80-81). 
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theatrical  form.  Piero's  exultation  over  having  murdered  Andrugio  and  Feliche  features 
rhetoric  that  is  self-congratulatory  not  only  in  his  accomplishment  of  "triumphing 
vengeance"  against  his  enemies,  but  also  in  surpassing  of  all  preceding  narratives  of 
revenge.  While  Piero  does  describe  his  motives  for  murdering  Antonio’s  father  Andrugio 
(“We  both  were  rivals  in  our  May  of  blood  /  Unto  Maria”  but  “He  won  the  fair  Lady,  to  my 
honour’s  death,  /  And  from  her  sweets  cropped  this  Antonio)  and  Feliche  (“as  a  bait  upon 
the  line  of  death  /  To  ‘tice  on  mischief”),  these  motives  seem  secondary  to  a  desire  for 
revenge  as  an  end  unto  itself.  Piero  triumphs  as  if  victorious  over  the  competition:  "Lord,  in 
two  hours  what  a  topless  mount  /  Of  unpeered  mischief  have  these  hands  cast  up!  /  I  can 
scarce  coop  triumphing  vengeance  up,  /  From  bursting  forth  in  braggart  passion" 
(1.1.9-12).  For  Piero,  revenge  is  not  just  a  retaliation  for  a  real  or  perceived  injury  to  his 
honor,  it  is  a  theatrical  competition  with  other  revengers,  a  game  of  one-upmanship  and  a 
pleasure  that  he  draws  out  through  rhetoric,  wanting  to  keep  the  triumphant  moment  alive 
and  present  as  long  as  possible.  This  overtopping  and  exultant  self-indulgence  requires  an 
audience--it  is  rooted  in  the  pleasure  of  theatricality  and  bombastic  performance:  
Say,  'faith,  didst  thou  e'er  hear,  or  read,  or  see  
Such  happy  vengeance,  unsuspected  death?  
That  I  should  drop  strong  poison  in  the  bowl,  
Which  I  myself  caroused  unto  his  health  
And  future  fortune  of  our  unity;  
That  it  should  work  even  in  the  hush  of  night,  
And  strangle  him  on  sudden,  that  fair  show  
Of  death,  for  the  excessive  joy  of  his  fate  
Might  choke  the  murder?  Ha,  Stratzo,  is't  not  rare?  
Nay,  but  weigh  it:  then  Feliche  stabbed,  
Whose  stinking  though  frighted  my  conscious  heart,  
And  laid  by  Mellida,  to  stop  the  match,  
And  hale  on  mischief.  This  all  in  one  night?  
Is't  to  be  equalled  thinkst  thou?  (1.1.66-79) 
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Piero  insists  that  his  "happy  vengeance"  be  acknowledged  for  its  unequalled  rarity.  His 
rhetoric  emphasizes  the  intricacy  of  his  revenge  as  a  praiseworthy  accomplishment.  In 
Piero's  self-aggrandizements,  he  seems  primarily  interested  in  revenge  not  as  a  response  to 
a  perceived  injustice  against  him,  but  as  showboating,  as  an  ostentatious  display  of  his  own 
unmatched  ability  to  orchestrate  "unsuspected  death"  and  to  "hale  on  mischief"  (1.1.67, 
1.1.78).  
The  prevalence  of  histrionic  and  self-aware  lines  in  the  play,  which  many  critics 
have  interpreted  as  satirical  or  parodic,  has  proven  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  play’s 
stark,  serious,  and  brutally  visceral  depictions  of  violence.  However,  recent  emphases  on 
disruptive,  decentering  approaches  to  literary  analysis  in  the  wake  of  postmodern  art  and 
poststructural  criticism  have  opened  the  play  to  reevaluations  of  Marston’s  narrative 
inventiveness.  Rick  Bowers  provides  one  such  reevaluation  of  Antonio’s  Revenge ,  arguing 
that  we  should  not  dismiss  the  play  as  mere  farce  but  should  instead  seriously  consider  the 
effect  of  Marston's  use  of  irony  and  metatheatrical  self-awareness.  For  Bowers,  “Marston  is 
nothing  if  not  ironic”  and  argues  that  “to  take  Marston  seriously  is  to  understand  that  his 
thrust  is  basically  sensational,  not  moral;  a  matter  of  contemporary  theatrical  and  popular 
culture,  not  ethical  consistency  excavated  from  the  classics”  (“Marston”  14).  Bowers  shares 
in  my  sense  of  the  play’s  metatheatricality,  which  he  describes  as  an  “unremitting  theatrical 
self-consciousness,  a  stylized  sense  of  presentation  that  explodes  consistent  morality  to 
retail  revenge  in  all  its  mimetic  ridiculousness”  (“Marston”  16).  
  The  raison  d’etre  of  Marston’s  play  is  not  moral  instruction,  as  in  Spinrad’s 
argument  that  the  play  sanctifies  revenge  with  “a  religious  stamp  of  approval” 
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(“Sacralization”  182).  Instead,  the  play  uses  revenge  to  explore  the  acquisition  of  reputation 
and  renown.  Bowers’s  observation--that  Marston’s  play  is  invested  in  exploring 
presentation,  not  in  dramatizing  an  implicit  moral  view--helps  us  make  sense  of  the  play’s 
repeated  references  to  applause:  “You  horrid  scouts  /  That  sentinel  swart  night,  give  loud 
applause;”  “Hell,  Night,  /  Give  loud  applause  to  my  hypocrisy;”  “Applaud  my  agonies  and 
penitence;”  “Sweet  wrong,  I  clap  thy  thoughts;”  “From   hearts,  not  from  lips,  applause 
desires,”  etc.   Marston  wants  not  to  instruct  but  to  surpass .  His  purpose  for  writing  is 38
competitive.  The  play  is,  in  other  words,  written  to  excite  the  audience  and  secure  its 
approval  and  admiration,  and  this  admiration  is  determined  by  how  well  the  play  succeeds, 
not  just  on  its  own  terms,  but  also  in  relation  to  its  competition  with  other  revenge  plays.  
Marston’s  play  thematically  links  the  competitive  drive  of  revenge  (in  which  a 
character  works  to  ‘outdo’  the  violence  of  their  rival/enemy)  to  the  logic  of  the  theatrical 
competition  for  audience  share.  In  Shakespeare's  Stage  Traffic ,  Clare  points  to  the 
"mercantile  nature  of  play-writing"  and  calls  attention  to  “‘theatre  traffic’  as  a 
simultaneously  competitive  and  interactive  process”  (2).  In  this  sense,  “...the  revenge  play 
becomes  a  location  of  dramaturgical  difference,  as  dialogue  and  competition  are  played  out 
in  the  economies  of  both  playhouse  and  bookstall”  (Clare  167).  Playwrights  themselves 
demonstrated  an  awareness  of  the  “mercantile  nature  of  play-writing.”  In  The  Gull’s 
Horn-Book  (1609),  Thomas  Dekker  offers  an  apt  comparison  between  the  theater  and  the 
marketplace:  “The  theatre  is  your  poets’  Royal  Exchange,  upon  which  their  Muses  –  that 
are  now  turned  to  merchants  –  meeting,  barter  away  that  light  commodity  of  words  for  a 
38  Antonio’s  Revenge  1.1.19-21,  1.1.31-31,  2.1.9,  2.2.63-64,  2.5.29. 
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lighter  ware  than  words  –  plaudits  and  the  breath  of  the  great  beast  which,  like  the 
threatenings  of  two  cowards,  vanish  all  to  air”  (qtd.  in  Bruster  7).  In  Dekker’s  analogy, 
words  on  the  English  stage  are  peddled  in  hopes  of  attaining  the  applause,  which  functions 
as  a  kind  of  payment  from  the  audience  (i.e.  the  “great  beast”).  
In  Antonio’s  Revenge,  Piero  discloses  that  his  murderous  hatred  of  Andrugio  is 
caused,  in  part,  by  Andrugio’s  outshining  of  Piero  at  the  end  of  Antonio  and  Mellida : 
“When  his  bright  valor  even  dazzled  sense  /  In  off’ring  his  own  head,  public  reproach  / 
Had  blurred  my  name–”  ( Antonio’s  Revenge  1.1.32-34).  Piero’s  anxiety  about  falling  short 
of  applause,  and  perhaps  even  facing  ridicule,  represents  in  microcosm  the  anxieties  of 
failure  within  the  larger  scope  of  the  theatrical  marketplace.  As  Bruster  notes,  “…the 
playhouses  [were]  frequently  characterized,  by  detractors  and  supporters  alike,  as  markets 
in  miniature”  (7).  Piero’s  sensibility,  his  drive  to  be  unequaled  in  revenge,  is  a  playwright’s 
sensibility.  Piero’s  interest  is  not  just  in  revenge,  but  in  the  intrigue  revenge  allows  and  the 
theatrical  effect  it  creates.  He  approaches  revenge  the  way  a  playwright  must,  by  putting  it 
in  competition  with  preceding  revenge  narratives  and  defining  success  in  terms  of  how  well 
his  “rare”  execution  of  vengeance  is  received  or  “weighed”  by  his  audience.  In  this  sense, 
Marston’s  villain  shares  the  same  purpose  as  Marston  himself:  the  elevation  of  his 
reputation  by  surpassing  rival  narratives.  After  all,  Piero  seems  obsessed  not  only  with  the 
act  of  revenge  but  with  the  aesthetic  production  of  revenge.  For  Piero  and  Marston  alike, 
revenge  is  featured  as  a  form  of  literary  competition.  
T.  F.  Wharton  discusses  Marston’s  literary  ambitions  in  a  vein  similar  to  the  way 
Piero  talks  about  himself  in  the  play.  Wharton  provides  historical  context  for  Marston’s 
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writing  in  relation  to  his  literary  reputation,  especially  his  tendency  to  use  aggression  as  “an 
effective  tool  of  literary  publicity”  (15).   According  to  Wharton,  “Aggression  was...not 39
merely  a  matter  of  temperament”  for  Marston,  but  “was  the  chosen  method  by  which 
Marston  set  out  to  gain  literary  recognition  and  force  his  way  into  the  contemporary  canon” 
(1).  Marston  wrote  aggressive  satire  and  deliberately  sought  rivalry  with  other  writers  in 
order  to  secure  an  audience.  Wharton  writes:  “What  we  see  in  Marston’s  verse  satire  is  an 
author  propagating  his  own  literary  criticism  and  literary  debate.  He  creates  an  imaginary 
audience  and  engages  it  in  literary  debate,  or  occasionally  imagines  it  conducting  the  debate 
quite  separately  from  himself,  at  the  point  of  literary  consumption,  the  book-stall  and  the 
marketplace.”  (2).  For  Marston,  literary  recognition  requires  both  a  receptive  public 
audience  and  also  a  marketplace  of  literary  competition.  To  succeed,  there  must  be  rivals 
worth  surpassing,  and  Marston  expects  his  audience  to  weigh  his  work  against  the 
competition.  According  to  Wharton,  “it  is  clear  that  Marston  believes  that  a  deliberately 
stimulated  hostility  is  the  best  guarantee  of  his  own  renown”  (4).  Marston  includes  his  own 
tendencies  as  a  writer,  to  create  an  ‘imaginary  audience’  and  to  utilize  rivalry  for 
self-promotion,  in  Piero’s  revenge  logic.  
Due  to  Marston’s  representations  of  literary  aggression  in  the  play,  there  is  a  parodic 
quality  to  Piero’s  rhetoric.  Critics  tend  to  read  Piero's  rhetoric  in  terms  of  its  excess  within 
the  play.  Elizabeth  Yearling  argues  that  Piero's  "tirades"  expose  him  as  "immoderate," 
which  signals  that  he  is  villainously  tyrannical  (263).  According  to  Yearling,  "The  Antonio 
plays  introduce  a  policy  of  linguistic  characterization  that  persists  throughout  Marston's 
39  This  strategy  of  aggressive  rivalry  as  a  publicity  tool  is,  of  course,  still  with  us  today.  One  need  only 
consider  rivalries  between  sports  teams  or  ‘beefs’  in  rap  music  to  see  the  efficacy  of  aggressive  rivalry  for 
publicizing  and  securing  lasting  reputations.  
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career:  heroes  are  critically  aware  of  how  they  speak,  fools  are  absurdly  self-conscious,  and 
villains  notice  nothing"  (264).  While  there  is  a  lack  of  moderation  in  Piero's  speeches,  their 
excess  is  specifically  citational,  and  their  citational  mode  makes  them  difficult  to  read  as 
unintentional.  His  speeches,  in  this  sense,  are  either  critically  aware  or  absurdly 
self-conscious--perhaps  a  little  of  both--but  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  anyone  reading  Piero  as 
either  a  hero  or  a  fool.  Piero  is  a  villain  in  a  revenge  tragedy  who  is  explicitly  familiar  with 
the  character  types  and  plots  of  other  revenge  tragedies.  What's  more,  he  does  not  merely 
allude  to  other  revenge  plays,  he  also  demonstrates  an  awareness  of  emerging  conventions 
of  the  genre  itself.   40
Piero's  words  and  actions  are  calculated  to  compete  directly  not  only  just  with  his 
enemies  in  the  play,  but  also  with  the  familiar  theatrics  of  popular  characters  in  other 
revenge  plays.  Like  Kyd’s  Hieronimo  in  The  Spanish  Tragedy ,  Piero  displays  his  poniard 
and  rope  to  the  audience,  but  unlike  Hieronimo  he  is  gleeful  in  their  theatrical  iconography 
and  has  already  used  them  for  revenge.  Like  Hieronimo,  Piero  addresses  the  night,  but 
where  Hieronimo  expresses  a  desire  for  witnesses  to  record  his  grieved  thoughts,  Piero 
addresses  the  night  as  an  actor  demanding  an  ovation  for  the  skillful  entertainment  he  has 
just  provided:  “You  horrid  scouts  /  That  sentinel  swart  night,  give  loud  applause  /  From 
your  large  palms.  …  Hell,  Night,  /  Give  loud  applause  to  my  hypocrisy”  (1.1.17-18,  18-20, 
31-31).  In  The  Spanish  Tragedy ,  the  figure  of  Revenge  fell  asleep  while  awaiting 
Hieronimo’s  vengeance.  In  contrast,  Piero  claims  his  mischief  is  so  superb  that  Vengeance 
itself  can  hardly  refrain  from  cheering  him  on:  “I  can  scarce  coop  triumphing  Vengeance  up 
40  In  his  knowledge  of  the  conventions  of  the  genre  he  inhabits,  Piero  is  much  like  the  killers  in  the 
meta-aware  slasher  film  Scream ,  who  use  their  knowledge  of  slasher  films  to  murder  other 
characters  in  the  style  of  slasher  films. 
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/  From  bursting  forth  in  braggart  passion”  (1.1.11-12).  While  characters  in  other  revenge 
plays  also  create  imaginary  observers  to  record  their  thoughts  and  witness  their  actions, 
Piero  is  unique  in  that  he  imagines  a  specifically  theatrical  audience  whose  favor  he  seeks. 
Piero  invites  this  imaginary  audience  to  evaluate  his  acts  of  violence  and  revenge 
aesthetically.  
Though  Piero  frames  his  murders  as  matters  of  revenge  and  assigns  himself  the  role 
of  the  play’s  revenger  (a  role  that  Antonio  will  usurp),  he  is,  like  Shakespeare’s  Richard  III, 
enamored  with  the  figure  of  the  stage  Machiavel.  Both  Piero  and  Richard  use  gleeful, 
villainous  asides,  and  both  devote  energy  to  wooing  a  grieving  widow.  Like  Richard,  Piero 
is  prone  to  theatrics,  and  ‘stages’  scenes  to  project  a  public  persona  concerned  with  justice 
and  honor.  Both  Shakespeare's  Richard  and  Marston's  Piero  congratulate  themselves  for 
being  successful  dissemblers.  Both  Piero  and  Richard  direct  others  in  how  to  stage  a  scene, 
and  they  seem  to  borrow  from  the  practice  of  stagecraft  the  various  roles  of  playwright, 
director,  and  actor.  What  makes  Piero  different  from  Richard  III,  though,  is  Marston's 
metatheatricality.  Piero  doesn't  just  borrow  from  stage  theatrics,  and  his  use  of  histrionic 
villainy  is  not  a  metaphor  for  the  court  as  a  world  stage.  Piero  inhabits  a  world  in  which 
theater  and  the  Roman  texts  that  animate  its  revenge  narratives  are  his  primary  model  for 
understanding  identity.  
Even  in  moments  which  seem  stock  for  a  revenge  play,  such  as  when  Antonio 
describes  his  “horrid  dreams”  in  which  he  is  visited  by  the  ghosts  of  Andrugio  and  Feliche, 
the  play  calls  attention  to  literary  consumption  and  the  theatrical  marketplace.  While 
describing  his  nightmare,  Antonio  is  interrupted  by  Balurdo,  who  describes  his  own 
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“monstrous  strange  dream”  in  which  he  is  haunted  by  “the  abominable  ghost  of  a 
misshapen  Simile”  (1.3.39,  61,  64).  Antonio’s  nightmare  of  impending  doom,  so  common 
in  revenge  tragedies,  is  displaced  by  Balurdo’s  nightmare  of  clichéd,  unprofitable  writing, 
and  Antonio  seems,  in  contrast  to  Piero,  naive  throughout  the  first  half  of  the  play  for  not 
recognizing  the  generic  conventions  of  revenge  tragedy  that  are  unfolding  around  him.  
 
The  metatheatricality  of  Marston's  revenge  play  seems,  at  first,  simply  to  be  an 
inclusion  of  the  theatrum  mundi  trope  common  in  early  modern  tragedy.  While  the  trope  is 
most  often  deployed  in  philosophical  musings  on  the  social  status  a  character  is  born  into, 
Barbara  Baines  argues  that  Marston’s  uses  the  theatrum  mundi  trope  in  a  unique  way. 
According  to  Baines,  Marston  uses  the  trope  to  draw  attention  to  the  artifice  of  the  play 
itself,  to  reverse  the  usual  deployment  of  the  trope  in  order  to  draw  attention  to  its  own 
fictiveness:  “Within  the  dramatic  illusion,  Marston's  characters  live  out  the  conventions  of 
revenge  tragedy  because  they  literalize,  or  to  use  Rosalie  Colie's  term,  unmetaphor,  the 
theatrum  mundi  trope:  all  the  world's  a  stage  in  a  play  of  revenge.  They  perceive  that  life 
has  provided  them  with  roles  they  are  destined  to  play”  (280).  For  Baines,  the  play’s 
literalization  of  the  theatrum  mundi  trope  creates  cognitive  distance  from  the  audience, 
divorcing  them  from  an  emotive  response  to  the  violence  and  grief  depicted  on  stage:  
By  exaggerating  the  aesthetic  sensibility  of  his  characters  in  such  a  way  that  they 
perceive  life  in  terms  of  art--that  is,  they  live  their  lives  by  consciously  creating 
dramas,  poems,  imaginative  narratives,  and  emblems--Marston  heightens  his 
audience's  awareness  of  the  play  as  a  play  and  thus  limits  its  participation  in  the 
dramatic  illusion.  The  awareness  that  the  audience  is  watching  a  play  rather  than 
life  itself  makes  the  audience  acutely  conscious  of  the  dictates  of  the  convention  and 
invites  an  assessment  of  the  generic  form.  (Baines  280) 
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In  Baines’s  reading  of  Marston’s  use  of  metatheatricality,  the  play’s  distancing  effect  invites 
the  audience  to  analyze  the  play  rather  than  experience  it.  Thus,  in  Marston,  the  theatrum 
mundi   trope  is  deployed  not  as  a  metaphor  or  a  philosophical  expression;  rather,  it  seems 
not  to  be  a  metaphor  at  all.  As  I  have  shown,  Piero,  especially,  seems  aware  that  he  is  not 
'like'  a  character  in  a  play--rather,  he  actively  wants  to  be  one.  Scholars  such  as  Bowers  and 
Baine,  who  emphasize  the  metatheatricality  of  Marston’s  work,  have  noted  that  Antonio's 
Revenge  resonates  with  a  renewed  significance  since  we've  grown  more  familiar  with 
narratives  that  call  attention  to  themselves  as  narratives  and  that  challenge  audience 
expectations  in  order  to  comment  on  generic  forms,  such  as  in  postmodern  and  absurdist 
theater.  
I  agree  with  Baine’s  analysis  of  the  theatrum  mundi  trope  in  Marston’s  play,  but 
would  argue  that  Baine’s  analysis  doesn’t  go  far  enough.  The  crux  of  my  argument  is  that 
Marston’s  play  produces  a  radical  expansion  of  the  theatrum  mundi  trope  by  recognizing 
something  implicit  in  revenge  logic  itself.  Not  just  commenting  on  the  generic  form  of 
revenge  plays,  Marston  comments  on  the  relation  between  a  playwright  and  audiences  who 
have  seen  many  plays  from  many  different  playwrights  and  will  see  many  more.  In 
Marston’s  revenge  tragedy,  the  world  is  not  a  single  stage  on  which  his  characters  are  all 
players--instead,  it  is  a  world  of  competing  stages,  a  world  in  which  success  is  measured  by 
one’s  ability  to  surpass  other  actors,  performances,  and  narratives  (“lesser  plots”)  to  capture 
an  audience’s  attention  (5.6.59).  This  distinction  between  a  metaphor  in  which  the  world  is 
a  singular  stage  and  one  in  which  the  world  is  a  marketplace  of  competition  among 
theaters,  acting  companies,  and  playwrights,  more  fully  explains  the  metatheatrical  qualities 
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of  Marston’s  play.  The  competitive  nature  of  Marston’s  characters  (to  be  unsurpassed  in 
revenge,  or  to  outwoe  all  others  in  grief,  etc.),  combined  with  Marston’s  radical  deployment 
of  the  theatrum  mundi  trope,  suggests  that  revenge  tragedies  allegorize  the  nature  of  the 
theatrical  marketplace.  
Marston’s  expansion  of  the  theatrum  mundi  topos  becomes  clear  if  we  again 
contrast  Piero  with  Shakespeare’s  Richard  III.  Clare  notes  Richard  III's  theatricality  and 
skillful  dissembling  in  Shakespeare's  adaptation  of  history.  However,  as  Clare  herself 
acknowledges,  "Certainly,  Richard's  reputation  as  a  dissembler  was  commonplace"  (57). 
Shakespeare  emphasizes  Richard's  tendency  to  'act'  or  'role-play'  as  a  political  tactic.  In  this 
sense,  Richard’s  form  of  acting  “erases  identity  and  is  potentially  nothing  but  semblance,  an 
uncanny  potential  brought  out  by  this  doubling  where  either  could  be  the  other  and  neither 
is  himself,”  and  in  this  self-obscuration,  Richard  enacts  a  “self-manipulation  [that]  is  closely 
linked  to  the  skill  in  manipulating  others"  (Clare  58).  To  put  it  simply,  Richard's  aim  is  to 
conceal  his  intentions  from  others,  and  he  (in  Shakespeare's  depiction)  adopts  various 
fictional  roles  to  this  end  (such  as  playing  the  lovestruck,  infatuated  wooer  of  Lady  Anne). 
Certainly,  Shakespeare's  Richard  turns  the  theatrum  mundi  trope  to  his  advantage,  making 
the  world  his  stage  by  adopting  various  roles  that  conceal  his  villainy  and  casting  others  in 
roles  that  stack  the  deck  against  them.  
While  there  is  an  undeniable  metatheatricality  to  Shakespeare's  play--especially  in 
Richard's  gleeful,  self-congratulatory  asides  to  the  audience--Marston's  depiction  of  Piero 
traces  metatheatricality  along  other  lines.  In  Shakespeare,  and  in  most  deployments  of  the 
theatrum  mundi  trope,  the  'world  as  stage'  is  a  philosophical  premise.  It  allows  insight  into 
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how  characters  think  about  willful  deception  and  manipulation,  or  perhaps  it  allows 
characters  to  express  what  it  is  to  be  caught  up  in  fate.  In  Antonio’s  Revenge ,  though,  the 
theatrum  mundi  trope  resonates  along  several  new  lines  of  possibility.   First,  the  trope  is 
literalized.  Instead  of  thinking  of  role-play  as  dissembling  or  concealment,  Piero  doesn't 
want  to  simply  adopt  the  role  of  villain,  he  wants  to  embody  it,  to  become  the  exemplar  of 
villainy  against  whom  other  villainous  characters  will  be  judged  or  compared.  While 
Richard  III  wants  to  "play  the  villain"  because  it  best  serves  his  ambition,  Piero's  desire  to 
"overtop"  all  villains  is  not  strategic--it  does  not  function  as  a  means  to  an  end.  Rather,  it  is 
the  end  he  hopes  to  achieve.  Richard  takes  pleasure  in  his  villainy,  but  his  ultimate  purpose 
is  to  become  king  and  to  protect  himself  once  he  does.  For  Piero,  revenge  is  personal  rather 
than  political,  but  even  revenge--the  preliminary  motivation  for  Piero's  violence--is 
subordinated  to  his  desire  for  recognition.  He  wants  his  villainy  to  be  an  aesthetic 
achievement.  
The  second  resonance  of  Marston's  development  of  the  theatrum  mundi  trope  is  in 
its  self-referentiality.  Marston's  play  calls  attention  to  itself  as  a  play.  Characters  often  speak 
lines  which  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  they  are  characters  being  played  by  actors.  While 
this  alone  is  not  a  trope  exclusive  to  Marston  (many  plays  call  attention  to  the  actors  who 
are,  or  will  be,  playing  roles  on  stage--the  convention  of  the  induction  is  one  example), 
Marston's  configuration  of  a  character  who  is  not  just  ambitious  in  the  fictional  world  on 
stage,  but  is  literarily  ambitious,  wanting  to  compete  with,  and  surpass,  the  depictions  of 
villainy  and  revenge  in  other  narratives  and  on  other  stages  is  a  unique  development  of  the 
theatrum  mundi  trope.  In  Marston's  work,  the  trope  is  not  philosophical  in  terms  of  identity, 
138 
it  is  philosophical  in  terms  of  the  poetic  development  of  narrative.  The  world  is  not  a  stage 
in  Marston's  play;  the  world  is  a  competition  between  stages.  Ambition,  in  this  world-view, 
is  not  concerned  with  the  accumulation  of  power  (as  in  Richard  III ),  it  only  wants  an 
audience's  attention  and  applause.  Piero’s  villainy  embodies  what  Wharton  describes  as 
Marston’s  "literary  aggression"  (15).  But  with  competition  and  aggression  comes  the 
possibility  of  failure.  Piero’s  numerous  demands  for  comparison,  recognition,  and  applause, 
while  boastful  in  tone,  also  suggests  an  anxiety  that  he  might  not  secure  the  approbation  he 
craves.  The  frequency  of  his  demands  for  adoration  is  rooted  in  an  awareness  that  his 
audience  might  find  him  less  compelling  than  other  characters  in  Elizabethan  drama:  “Say, 
faith,  didst  thou  e’er  hear,  or  read,  or  see  /  Such  happy  vengeance,  unsuspected  death?” 
(1.1.66-67). 
As  Piero  increasingly  invests  in  his  role  as  stage  Machiavel,  he  also  begins  shaping 
events  in  the  play  as  if  he  were  the  play’s  author  and  director.  Piero’s  transition  from  seeing 
himself  as  an  actor  vying  for  applause  to  an  author-director  of  the  action  playing  out  on 
stage  is  necessitated  by  the  fact  that  he  has  already  murdered  Andrugio,  whom  Piero  views 
as  his  rival  both  in  love  and  honor,  even  before  the  play  begins.  Piero’s  solution  to  this 
narrative  closure  is  to  claim  that  his  revenge  has  no  conclusion  and  to  extend  his  rivalry  to 
Andrugio’s  son  Antonio.  Piero  expresses  this  through  soliloquy,  telling  the  audience  that 
though  Andrugio  be  dead,  “think  not  my  hate  is  dead”  (2.1.6.).  He  outlines  the  shape  his 
extended  revenge  will  take:  he  will  accuse  Antonio  of  murdering  his  father,  marry  Maria 
(Andrugio’s  widow  and  Antonio’s  mother),  clear  his  daughter  Mellida’s  name  (which  he 
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himself  slandered  to  interrupt  Antonio’s  love  for  her)  and  have  her  wedded  to  Galeatzo,  the 
son  of  the  Duke  of  Florence.  
Piero  then  rehearses  the  staged  accusation  he  and  Strotzo  (his 
co-conspirator/lackey)  will  make  against  Antonio,  wherein  Strotzo  will  act  as  if  he  were 
Antonio’s  remorseful  conspirator  in  the  murder  of  Andrugio  and  the  defamation  of  Mellida. 
Piero  acts  as  playwright/director,  providing  Strotzo  lines  (“fall  on  thy  face  and  cry,  ‘Why 
suffer  you  /  So  lewd  a  slave  as  Strotzo  is  to  breathe?’”)  and  giving  detailed  instructions  on 
how  to  perform  his  role  convincingly,  telling  him  to  “Rush”  with  “Halter  about  thy  neck, 
and  with  such  sighs,  /  Laments  and  acclamations  lifen  it,”  and  to  “Do  it  with  rare  passion” 
and  “Swear  plainly,”  (2.5.6,  14,  16-17,  20-21).  
This  scene  of  rehearsal  is  the  part  of  the  play  most  explicitly  concerned  with 
theatricality  and  the  performance  of  players.  Notably,  Piero  views  his  own  plotting  and 
intrigue  in  terms  of  theatricality:  “O  now  Tragoedia  Cothurnata  mounts”  (2.5.45).  Piero 
rehearses  this  scene  with  Strotzo,  but  does  Piero  view  Strotzo  as  a  collaborator?  If  Piero 
views  his  murder  as  narrative  art,  Strotzo  seems  less  a  collaborator  in  Piero’s  play  and  more 
like  a  test  audience.  Concerning  the  quality  of  his  revenge,  Piero  asks  Strotzo,  “Is’t  not 
rare?”  (1.1.81).  “Yes,”  Strotzo  replies,  likely  with  a  sullen  tone,  having  just  been  ostracized 
by  Piero  for  his  inferior  speech.  But  Strotzo’s  monosyllabic  affirmation  of  Piero’s  villainy  is 
maddeningly  unsatisfying  for  Piero,  who  seeks  praise  that  would  properly  validate  the 
“rare”  heights  of  his  malicious  accomplishment:  “No!  Yes!,  Nothing  but  ‘no’  and  ‘yes’, 
dull  lump?  /  Canst  thou  not  honey  me  with  fluent  speech  /  And  even  adore  my  topless 
villainy?”  (1.1.81-84). 
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Even  while  seeming  to  collaborate  with  Strotzo  in  writing  the  upcoming  scene  in 
which  they  will  slander  Antonio,  Piero  includes  ‘additions’  that  effectively  write  Strotzo 
out  of  the  rest  of  the  play.  After  Strotzo  exits  the  stage,  Piero  reveals  that  he  means  to  use 
Strotzo  to  cast  aspersions  on  Antonio  and  clear  Mellida’s  name.  Piero  plans  to  then  feign 
righteous  fury  and  choke  Strotzo  to  death  using  the  rope  that  Strotzo  intended  to  use  as  a 
mere  theatrical  prop,  a  visual  aid  for  acting  out  his  remorse.  His  elimination  of  Strotzo 
(successfully  carried  out  in  4.3)  serves  two  purposes:  1)  it  ties  up  loose  ends,  so  to  speak, 
since  Strotzo  is  the  only  character  aware  of  Piero’s  villainy  --  in  fact,  the  letters  later  found 
in  Strotzo’s  study  are  what  brings  Piero’s  villainy  to  light  --  and  2)  it  allows  Piero  to  take 
full  credit  for  the  “ Tragoedia  Cothurnata ”  that  he  sees  himself  writing  and  directing  before 
the  audience.  
Piero’s  desire  for  singular  credit  taps  into  the  emerging  ‘Cult  of  the  Author’  that 
celebrates  the  playwright  as  the  origin  of  a  singular  creative  vision,  and  which  excludes  the 
practice  of  collaboration.  This  changing  cultural  valuation  of  the  author  was  emerging  at 
this  time  in  large  part  due  to  Ben  Jonson,  Marston’s  theatrical  rival.  According  to  Roslyn 
Knutson,  “Ben  Jonson  would  have  put  himself  in  such  a  category,  for  he  seems  to  have 
thought  that  his  reputation  would  be  enhanced  if  he  were  judged  only  by  his  solo  work. 
Jonson  collaborated  on  projects  early  in  his  career,  but  when  he  published  a  collection  of 
his  poems  and  plays  in  Works  (1616),  he  omitted  his  theatrical  collaborations"  (346). 
Marston,  too,  seems  enamored  with  the  recognition  that  a  playwright  might  attain  and  when 
his  own  plays  were  sought  for  publication.  He  worked  closely  with  printers  “to  ensure  the 
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accurate  transmission”  of  his  writing  because  “Like  his  rival,  Jonson,  Marston  looked  upon 
his  plays  as  ‘Works’”  (Gair  2).  
In  Antonio’s  Revenge ,  all  acts  of  violence  and  revenge  are,  first  and  foremost, 
competitive  acts  within  an  imagined  theatrical  space.  All  the  world’s  a  stage  for  Piero,  and 
even  violence  done  in  secret  has  an  imagined  audience  from  whom  he  seeks  approval  and 
recognition.  Having  “burned  in  inward  swelt’ring  hate,”  Piero  exults  in  the  success  of  his 
malicious  betrayal  of  Andrugio,  saying  “Hell,  Night,  /  Give  loud  applause  to  my 
hypocrisy”  (1.1.60-61).  Marston’s  metatheatrical  emphasis,  in  which  world  and  stage 
mirror  each  other,  distills  competition  into  an  abstract  value--and  in  such  a  view,  to  be 
‘rare,’  ‘topless,’  or  ‘unsurpassed,’  regardless  of  context,  is  itself  worthy  of  attention.  For 
Piero,  there  seems  to  be  no  difference  between  admiration  and  abhorrence,  so  long  as  his 
acts  are  unforgettable.  This  competitive  mode  turns  bodies  into  props  displayed  for 
theatrical  effect,  as  when  Piero  hangs  Feliche’s  body  in  Mellida’s  window  as  a  gruesome 
prop,  or  when  Antonio  turns  Piero’s  son  into  a  Thyestean  dish  of  hot  revenge.  By  using  the 
language  of  marketplace  competition  between  playwrights,  acting  companies,  and  theaters, 
Marston  links  the  audience’s  demand  for  one-upmanship  and  novelty  in  theatrical  violence 
to  the  nature  of  retribution  itself,  as  a  demand  for  escalations  of  violence  that  recirculates 
and  amplifies  prior  forms  of  violence  in  order  to  supersede  them.  
Piero  advertises  his  villainy  to  the  audience  even  as  he  conceals  it  by  slandering  his 
own  daughter.  Feliche’s  body  is  strung  up  like  a  broadside,  announcing  Piero’s  peerless 
violence  both  to  the  characters  on  stage  and  to  the  audience,  but  in  different  ways.  For 
Marston’s  audience,  Piero’s  act  of  hanging  Feliche’s  stabbed  body  and  having  it  revealed 
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from  behind  a  curtain  is  itself  citational.  Just  as  the  way  characters  throughout  Elizabethan 
revenge  tragedies  cite  lines  from  Seneca,  Piero’s  display  of  Feliche’s  body  is  a  visual 
citation  of  Horatio’s  body,  strung  up  behind  a  curtain  and  revealed  by  Hieronimo  in  in  the 
final  act  of  Kyd’s  Spanish  Tragedy .  The  corpse  is  thus  doubled  in  its  signification.  Not  just 
a  “gory  ensign”  announcing  Piero’s  homicide  to  the  other  characters  on  stage,  the  corpse  is 
also  Piero’s  publication--the  text  that  marks  his  entry  into  the  marketplace  of  gratuitous 
violence  in  revenge  narratives  (1.3.131).  Like  grindhouse  cinema,  Piero  capitalizes  on 
repulsion  as  a  source  of  fascination.  For  Piero,  the  only  thing  that  matters  is  notoriety,  and 
only  the  most  shocking  violence  is  memorable.  Piero’s  desire  to  be  lavishly  praised  (“Canst 
thou  not  honey  me  with  fluent  speech  /  And  even  adore  my  topless  villainy”?)  is  an 
exaggerated  and  unrestrained  demand  reminiscent  of  the  generally  more  restrained 
expression  of  hope  for  an  audience’s  approval  of  a  work  commonly  found  in  a  play’s 
prologue  and  epilogue. 
Piero’s  metatheatrical  competitiveness  makes  him  a  unique  stage  Machiavel.  In 
contrast  to  Piero,  Shakespeare’s  Richard  never  reveals  a  convincing  reason  for  his  violence, 
nor  does  the  audience  get  a  sense  of  what  motivates  his  run  for  the  throne.  Even  his  claim, 
that  he  "is  determined  to  play  the  villain,"  is  duplicitous  and  raises  a  question  that  lingers, 
unanswered,  over  the  entire  play:  if  he  is  "determined"  to  play  the  villain,  is  this  a 
self-determination  (like  a  grad  student  who  is  'determined'  to  finish  his  or  her  dissertation 
within  a  reasonable  time  frame?),  or  is  he  'determined'  in  the  sense  that  playing  the  villain 
has  been  determined  'for  him'?  Is  he  is  determined  in  a  cosmological  sense--determined  as 
in  fated?  Richard  seems,  like  Heath  Ledger's  Joker  in  The  Dark  Knight ,  "a  dog  chasing  a 
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car"  and  he  "wouldn't  know  what  to  do  if  [he]  caught  one."  But  Richard  does  catch  the 
thing  he  chases,  and  the  general  consensus  is  that  he  becomes  less  interesting  when  he’s 
holding  the  throne  than  when  he's  pursuing  it.  Piero,  on  the  other  hand,  has  a  less  abstract 
motive.  While  Richard  seems  to  pursue  intrigue,  violence,  and  power  for  no  other  reason 
than  that  he  is  determined  to  do  so,  Piero  has  a  defined  goal--even  if  it  is  not  his  'confessed' 
motive  of  revenge.  For  Piero,  revenge  is  a  means  to  another  end.  He  wants  to  be 
recognized  as  a  villain  who  surpasses  all  literary  villains,  whether  they  be  from  the  classical 
(i.e.  Senecan)  past  or  the  villains  of  Elizabethan  theater.  Piero  wants  applause.  Piero  wants 
to  glory  in  the  experience  of  compelling  theatrical  performance. 
 
Unlike  their  predecessors  in  revenge  plays,  the  characters  in  Antonio’s  Revenge 
fixate  on  the  theatricality  of  revenge  as  an  occasion  for  displays  of  rhetorical  flourish.  Piero 
calls  out  to  the  “Night”  and  “Hell,”  demanding  his  audience  to  “Give  me  thy  ears”  as  Piero 
describes  the  “rare”  performance  of  his  “pretense  of  love”  to  bring  about  Andrugio’s 
“unsuspected  death”  (1.1.49-74).  Marston’s  revenge  play  ‘plays’  to  the  audience;  it  is  a 
play  in  which  characters  act  like  characters  who  have  seen  revenge  plays  and  are  working 
to  surpass  them  all,  as  when  Piero  invites  comparison  between  his  revenge  and  other 
revenge  narratives:  “Say,  faith,  didst  thou  e’er  hear,  or  read,  or  see  /  Such  happy 
vengeance,  unsuspected  death?”  (1.1.66-67);  “Nay,  but  weigh  it”  (1.1.75);  “Is’t  to  be 
equalled  think’st  thou?...  /  Is’t  not  rare?”  (1.1.78-81).  Repeatedly,  the  rhetoric  of  the  play 
suggests  that  successful  revenge  depends  on  overtopping  all  others.  Andrugio’s  Ghost,  for 
instance,  tells  Antonio  to  “be  peerless  in  revenge”  (3.5.29).  After  taking  his  “peerless” 
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revenge  against  Piero,  Antonio  calls  on  his  servants  to  “Sound  doleful  tunes,  a  solemn 
hymn  advance,  /  To  close  the  last  act  of  my  vengeance”  and  he  lays  claim  to  the  play’s 
narrative  as  an  unsurpassed  tragedy,  saying  “Never  more  woe  in  lesser  plot  was  found” 
(5.6.59). 
Scholars  have  recognized  the  competition  and  theatrical  rivalry  that  is  inherent  in 
the  comical  satires  (especially  of  the  Poets’  War),  but  the  productive  energy  of  competitive 
rivalry  between  playwrights  and  acting  companies  is  ignored  when  discussing  revenge 
tragedies.  Critics  are  quick  to  note  allusions  and  intertextual  references  between  revenge 
plays.  However,  I  would  argue  that  such  references  signal  that  the  context  of  literary 
competition  shapes  the  content  of  the  revenge  plays  themselves.  Not  merely  ornamental, 
the  moments  in  revenge  tragedies  in  which  playwrights  imitate,  adapt,  or  allude  to 
preceding  revenge  plays  are  rooted  in  the  principles  of  competition  initiated  by  the 
humanist  educators,  whose  classrooms  provided  the  training  ground  for  early  modern 
playwrights.  According  to  Clare:  "The  practice  of  imitation  began  in  the  schoolroom. 
Humanist  pedagogy  was  based  on  the  selection  of  a  model,  and  the  replication  of  its 
argument  and  rhetorical  strategies.  Erasmus  had  recommended  the  emulation  of  'a  passage 
from  some  author  where  the  spring  of  eloquence  seems  to  bubble  up  particularly  richly', 
and  advised  the  student  'to  equal  or  even  surpass  it'"  (4).  
In  revenge  tragedy,  imitation  and  surpassing  are  the  modus  operandi  of  the 
revenger,  who  takes  a  prior  offense  and  returns  it  to  the  offender  in  an  amplified  form.  This 
use  of  imitation  seems  to  explore  the  potential  darkness  and  cynicism  of  humanism  and  art. 
In  Marston’s  play,  Piero  is  many  things:  a  betrayer  of  his  own  kin,  a  murderer,  a  thrill-killer, 
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a  liar  who  knowingly  and  maliciously  makes  false  accusations,  a  narcissist,  a  tyrant,  a 
sadist,  immoderate  and  explicitly  theatrical,  disruptive,  devious,  petty,  and  perverse.  But  he 
also  represents  the  dark  possibility  of  imitatio ,  adaption,  and  poesis.  He  turns  the  project  of 
humanist  education  --  which  encourages  students  to  study,  imitate,  and  attempt  to  surpass 
prior  models  --  into  a  project  of  invective.  He  is  a  poet  of  the  grudge. 
To  surpass  a  prior  model  is  also  to  supplant  it,  to  become  the  model  that  others  must 
study  and  imitate.  Imitatio  is  figured  in  Antonio’s  Revenge  not  only  as  villainous  ambition 
but  as  a  physiology  of  influence.  Gail  Kern  Paster  has  shown  that  early  modern  mind  is 
closely,  almost  inextricably,  linked  to  the  body,  so  that  “psychology  and  physiology  are 
one”  ( Humoring  14).  An  understanding  of  the  culture’s  materialist  psychology  provides 
some  insight  for  understanding  Marston's  literal  and  figurative  uses  of  ‘belking’  or 
regurgitation,  the  swallowing  or  sucking  of  blood,  and  the  consuming  of  human  flesh  in 
Antonio’s  Revenge.  Piero,  for  instance,  marks  the  satisfaction  of  his  revenge  against 
Andrugio  as  a  vomitous  expulsion  of  his  body’s  inner  rancor,  of  which  Andrugio  is 
presumed  to  be  the  cause: 
We  were  both  rivals  in  our  May  of  blood 
Unto  Maria,  fair  Ferrara’s  heir. 
He  won  the  Lady,  to  my  honour’s  death, 
And  from  her  sweets  cropped  this  Antonio;  
For  which  I  burned  in  inward  swelt’ring  hate, 
And  festered  rankling  malice  in  my  breast, 
Till  I  might  belk  revenge  upon  his  eyes.  (1.1.23-29) 
 
In  his  murder  of  Andrugio,  Piero  links  the  (temporary)  relief  of  hatred  to  the  relief  which 
might  be  had  through  purgatives.  
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In  Kyd’s  The  Spanish  Tragedy,  Revenge’s  presence,  sitting  and  observing  (or 
dreaming  of)  vengeful  action,  proliferates  ‘inward  swelt’ring  hate’  throughout  the  play.  But 
in  Antonio’s  Revenge ,  the  desire  for  vengeance  is  transferred  or  transmitted  through  the 
portals  of  the  body  in  terms  of  sucking,  swallowing,  and  ‘belking’  (i.e.  burping  or 
vomiting).  When  Piero  theatrically  displays  himself  to  Antonio  and  others  as  the  play’s 
revenger,  his  ‘belking’  of  malice  begins  creating  revengers  in  his  own  image.   For  example, 
after  Piero  accuses  his  own  daughter  Mellida  (who  also  happens  to  be  Antonio’s  beloved) 
of  being  “unchaste,  /  Tainted,  impure,  black  as  the  soul  of  hell,”  Antonio  draws  his  rapier, 
exclaiming,  “Dog,  I  will  make  thee  eat  thy  vomit  up,  /  Which  thou  hast  belked  ’gainst 
taintless  Mellida”  (1.4.3-6).  Antonio,  like  Piero,  links  outbursts  of  rhetorical  aggression 
with  bodily  purging  of  inner  fluids  and  gasses.  
Piero  seems  to  relish  Antonio’s  outburst  and  encourages  him  to  take  violent  action 
even  as  he  doubles  down  on  his  theatrical  performance,  telling  Antonio,  regarding  the 
‘vomit’  of  his  accusations,  “Ram’t  quickly  down,  that  it  may  not  rise  up  /  To  embraid  my 
thoughts.  Behold  my  stomach’s  --  /  Strike  me  quite  through  with  the  relentless  edge  /  Of 
raging  fury”  (1.4.6-10).  Piero’s  demand  that  Antonio  ram  down  the  rhetorical  vomit  that  he 
spews  includes  the  possibility  of  infection.  According  to  Piero,  the  vomit  that  still  threatens 
to  “rise  up”  might  “embraid”  his  mind.  W.  Reavley  Gair  glosses  “embraid”  as  “upbraid,” 
which  means,  according  to  the  OED,  to  reproach  or  reproof.  This  gloss,  however,  doesn’t 
make  any  sense,  as  it  would  mean  Piero’s  concern  is  that  his  own  word-vomit  might  rebuke 
or  scold  his  thoughts.  Given  the  context  of  the  word,  it  is  more  likely  Piero  means  the  word 
in  its  second  sense,  which  the  OED  defines  as  “To  plait  or  braid;  to  interlace,  intertwine.” 
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In  this  sense,  Piero  suggests  the  accusations  he  “belks”  against  Mellida,  that  she  is  “Tainted, 
impure,  black  as  the  soul  of  hell,”  are  themselves  infectious,  capable  of  also  corrupting  any 
person  who  speaks  or  hears  them.  The  negative  qualities  contained  in  (rhetorical)  vomit 
contain  the  possibility  of  being  swallowed  up  by  another  person’s  thoughts  and,  by 
implication,  tainting  his  or  her  moral  character.  
The  ‘embraiding’  of  one  person’s  words  with  another  person’s  thoughts  reveal  a 
concern  with  the  nature  of  rhetoric.  George  Puttenham,  for  instance,   makes  this  startling 
claim  in  The  Art  of  English  Poesy :  
For  the  ear  is  properly  but  an  instrument  of  conveyance  for  the  mind,  to  apprehend 
the  sense  by  the  sound.  And  our  speech  is  made  harmonious  or  melodical  not  only 
by  strained  tunes,  as  those  of  music,  but  also  by  choice  of  smooth  words;  and  thus 
or  thus  marshalling  them  in  their  comeliest  construction  and  order,  and  as  well  by 
sometimes  sparing,  sometimes  spending  them  more  or  less  liberally,  and  carrying  or 
transporting  them  farther  off  or  nearer,  setting  them  with  sundry  relations  and 
variable  forms  in  the  ministry  and  use  of  words,  do  breed  no  little  alteration  in  man. 
For  to  say  truly,  what  else  is  man  but  his  mind?  Which,  whosoever  has  skill  to 
compass  and  make  yielding  and  flexible,  what  may  he  not  command  the  body  to 
perform?  He  therefore  that  hath  vanquished  the  mind  of  man  hath  made  the  greatest 
and  most  glorious  conquest.  (Puttenham  281)  
 
Puttenham's  description  of  rhetoric  relies  on  a  notion  of  penetration  --  language  is  an 
instrument  or  a  vehicle  for  transferring  ideas  from  one  person  to  another,  and  this 
transmission  can  be  made  more  effective  through  the  poetic,  aesthetically-pleasing  handling 
of  the  meaning  or  "sense"  a  person  wishes  to  convey.  Style,  in  this  sense,  is  an  art  of 
manipulation.  Rhetoric  provides  a  subtle  and  effective  form  of  coercion,  capable  of 
overcoming  psychological  resistance.  A  speaker’s  words  can  become  an  audience’s 
actions.  However,  this  penetration  of  another's  mind  and  the  vanquishing  of  another's  will 
is  not  instantaneous.  Puttenham’s  characterization  of  rhetoric  is  not  as  a  quick  thrust  or 
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strike  of  language.  Amplification  and  repetition  are  necessary  components  of  his  notion  of 
rhetoric  as  mental  conquest:  
Then  must  also  the  whole  tale  (if  it  tend  to  persuasion)  bear  his  just  and  reasonable 
measure,  being  rather  with  the  largest  than  with  the  scarcest.  For  like  as  one  or  two 
drops  of  water  pierce  not  the  flint  stone,  but  many  and  often  droppings  do,  so 
cannot  a  few  words  (be  they  never  so  pithy  or  sententious)  in  all  cases  and  to  all 
manner  of  minds  make  so  deep  an  impression  as  a  more  multitude  of  words  to  the 
purpose,  discreetly  and  without  superfluity  uttered--the  mind  being  no  less 
vanquished  with  large  load  of  speech  than  the  limbs  are  with  heavy  burden. 
(Puttenham  281-282) 
 
Rhetoric  is  persuasive,  capable  of  'vanquishing'  another's  mind  when  one's  words  are  both 
pleasing  and  copious.  They  overwhelm  or  overload  the  mind,  but  they  also  invite  the 
listener  to  willingly  be  overwhelmed.  
Piero  fancies  himself  a  skilled  rhetorician,  reprimanding  Strotzo  early  in  the  play  for 
interrupting  his  self-laudatory  enumerations  of  his  villainous  accomplishments: 
“Unseasoned  sycophant  …  stroke  not  the  head  /  Of  infant  speech  till  it  be  fully  born” 
(1.1.37,  39-40).  Is  Piero’s  rhetoric  throughout  the  play  successful  as  a  kind  of  Puttenhamian 
coercion?  He  does  cast  others  in  the  roles  he  writes  for  them,  but  these  roles  pose  inherent 
risks  to  him.  Does  he  foresee  the  possibility  of  being  surpassed?  If  he  is  aware  of  the  tropes 
of  revenge  tragedy  and  Machiavellian  villainy,  why  did  he  not  seem  concerned  with  his 
position  within  the  narrative  that  he,  himself,  sets  in  motion?  Why  push  someone  into 
desiring  revenge  and  then  be  surprised  when  that  revenge  comes  back  on  him?  He  seems 
self-consciously  the  author  of  tragedy,  but  casts  himself  in  two  contradictory  roles;  he 
performs  as  the  play’s  revenger,  but  this  role-play  dissembles  the  metatheatrical  role  he 
plays  for  Marston’s  audience  as  the  villain,  the  stage  Machiavel  who  gloats  in  his  ambition 
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to  outperform  all  other  villainy,  and  in  instigating  a  series  of  murders,  he  sets  up  his  own 
fall. 
Baines  notes  that  Piero  approaches  villainy  aesthetically  rather  than  ethically:  “More 
important  to  him  than  the  deed  is  the  artistry  with  which  it  is  accomplished  and  the 
recognition  of  his  artistry.  This  self-conscious  artistry  sets  the  pattern  for  all  of  the 
characters  of  the  play”  (Baines  281).  In  setting  the  pattern  for  “self-conscious  artistry,” 
Piero  is  more  successful  than  he  knows,  and  perhaps  he  succeeds  in  ways  he  didn’t  account 
for,  since  Antonio  does,  whether  consciously  or  not,  model  himself  upon  the  malice  Piero 
“belks”  on  stage.  The  structure  of  Piero's  metatheatrical,  narcissistic  role-play  is  transferred 
to  the  play's  titular  revenging  hero,  Antonio,  in  troubling  ways.  While  mirroring--and, 
ultimately,  surpassing--the  villain  in  deployments  of  intrigue,  violence,  and  psychological 
turmoil  is  expected  in  a  revenge  tragedy,  Antonio  pushes  audience  expectation  into 
uncomfortable  cognitive  dissonance  when  Piero's  suffering  and  Antonio's  malicious 
brutality  in  the  play’s  final  act  recast  the  villain  as  helpless  victim  and  the  hero  as  sadist.  
Several  scholars  have  made  convincing  and  influential  arguments  about  Antonio’s 
brutal  murder  of  Piero’s  son  Julio  (whom  Antonio  will  feed  to  Piero)  as  creating  an 
intentional  effect,  meant  to  disrupt  the  audience’s  sympathy  for  Antonio.   In  the  brutality 41
of  the  play’s  ending,  Marston  forces  an  early  modern  audience  to  take  a  hard  look  at 
revenge  as  nihilistic,  a  closed  loop  of  violence  creating  the  desire  for  violence,  so  that  “the 
scene  retains,  even  stresses,  overstated  theatrical  imperatives”  (Bowers  21).  In  this  sense, 
Antonio’s  bloodlust  is  not  a  character  study--rather,  the  troubling  nature  of  the  scene  calls 
41  In  addition  to  Bowers,  see  R.  A.  Foakes,  “John  Marston’s  Fantastical  Plays:  Antonio  and  Mellida  and 
Antonio’s  Revenge ,”  p.  236;  and  Philip  Ayres,  “Marston’s  Antonio’s  Revenge :  The  Morality  of  the 
Revenging  Hero,”  which  deals  extensively  with  the  play’s  ending  as  a  critique  of  the  Kydian  revenger. 
150 
attention  to  the  genre  itself  as  it  “unsettles  dramatic  conventions  and  de-centres  moral 
certainties”  commonly  found  in  Kydian  revenge  plays  (Bowers  23).  
Marston’s  play  depicts  a  sort  of  closed  circuit  of  violence  leading  to  more  violence, 
a  depiction  which  reveals  revenge  to  be  more  than  simple  repayment  or  equivalent 
response.  Each  reenactment  of  violence  both  echoes  and  amplifies  the  violence  that 
precedes  it.  In  this  oscillation,  violence  takes  on  its  own  voice  and  presence,  increasing  in 
intensity  until  it  overloads  the  system  which  produces  it,  like  the  ‘howl’  of  audio  feedback 
produced  by  the  Larsen  effect  in  modern  audio  technology.  During  Antonio’s  slaughter  of 
an  innocent  youth,  the  rhetorics  of  villain  and  revenger  become  indistinct,  interchangeable, 
and  more  frequent.  Piero  extends  his  hatred  for  Andrugio  to  Antonio,  and  Antonio,  too, 
transfers  his  hatred  for  Piero  to  Piero’s  child  Julio,  taking  revenge  against  the  father  through 
his  son.  Moments  before  slaying  Julio,  Antonio  tells  him:  
Come,  pretty,  tender  child,  
It  is  not  thee  I  hate,  not  thee  I  kill.  
Thy  father’s  blood  that  flows  within  thy  veins 
  Is  it  I  loathe,  is  that  revenge  must  suck… 
Sprite  of  Julio, 
Forget  this  was  thy  trunk.  I  live  thy  friend. 
Mayst  thou  be  twined  with  the  soft’st  embrace 
Of  clear  eternity;  but  thy  father’s  blood 
I  thus  make  incense  of:  
[ANTONIO  allows  JULIO’S  blood  to  fall  upon  the  hearse. ]  
to  Vengeance! 
Ghost  of  my  poisoned  sire,  suck  this  fume;  
To  sweet  revenge,  perfume  thy  circling  air 
With  smoke  of  blood.  I  sprinkle  round  his  gore  
And  dew  thy  hearse  with  these  fresh-reeking  drops.  
Lo,  thus  I  heave  my  blood-dyed  hands  to  heaven,  
Even  like  insatiate  hell,  still  crying;  ‘More!  
My  heart  hath  thirsting  dropsies  after  gore.’  
Sound  peace  and  rest  to  church,  night-ghosts  and  graves; 
Blood  cries  for  blood,  and  murder  murder  craves.  (3.3.33-36,  55-71) 
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Antonio’s  language  in  the  play’s  final  act  is  almost  indistinguishable  from  Piero’s  villainous 
rhetoric  throughout  the  play.  Here,  Antonio’s  fascination  with  the  drinking  of  blood  or  the 
sucking  of  fumes  echoes  Piero’s  soliloquy  at  Andrugio’s  funeral,  where  Piero  proclaims  “I 
have  been  nursed  in  blood,  and  still  have  sucked  /  The  steam  of  reeking  gore”  (2.1.19-20). 
Like  Piero  in  the  play’s  opening  scene,  Antonio  raises  his  gore-smeared  arms  to  the  sky  for 
recognition  and  approval  of  his  violence.  When  Piero's  vituperative  phrases  begin  falling 
from  Antonio's  own  lips,  the  distinction  between  the  two  characters  begins  to  blur.  
Antonio’s  other  Piero-esque  trait  which  develops  over  the  course  of  the  play  is  his 
competitive  streak.  As  we  have  seen,  Piero  fixates  on  the  ‘rarity’  of  his  murders  and 
intrigues,  claiming  he  is  “great  in  blood,  /  Unequalled  in  revenge”  (1.1.17-18).  Antonio, 
also  determined  to  display  unsurpassable  ability,  will  not  be  outdone  in  his  experience  of 
grief.  Having  suffered  the  murder  of  his  father  and  the  devastating  loss  of  his  beloved 
Mellida,  Antonio  exclaims:  “Behold  a  prostrate  wretch  laid  upon  his  tomb;  /  His  epithet 
thus:  Ne  plus  ultra.  Ho!  /  Let  none  out-woe  me,  mine’s  Herculean  woe”  (2.3.131-133). 
Antonio’s  claims  to  an  unsurpassed,  “Herculean”  woe  provides  him  with  the  passionate 
energy  necessary  for  a  protagonist  to  commit  to  revenge.  Antonio,  like  Shakespeare’s  Titus 
(who  depicts  tears  as  obstacles  to  revenge  once  his  mind  is  set  on  retribution),  declares 
comfort  and  commiseration  as  threats  to  one’s  will  to  vengeance:  “Confusion  to  all 
comfort!  I  defy  it.  /  Comfort’s  a  parasite,  a  flatt’ring  Jack,  /  And  melts  resolved  despair” 
( Antonio’s  1.5.48-50).  The  key  to  resolve,  then,  is  to  bolster  it  with  desperation  and 
anguish:  
O  boundless  woe,  
If  there  be  any  black  yet  unknown  grief,  
If  there  be  any  horror  yet  unfelt,  
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Unthought  mischief  in  thy  fiendlike  power,  
Dash  it  upon  my  miserable  head,  
Make  me  more  wretched,  more  cursed  if  thou  canst.  (1.5.50-55)  
 
The  herculean  labor  of  the  revenger  is,  in  this  sense,  to  bear  the  weight  of  immense, 
unimaginable  grief--a  grief  that  contains  (at  least  rhetorically)  all  the  world’s  grief.  
Antonio,  like  all  revengers  of  the  Kydian  ilk,  declares  grief  and  patience  as 
inadequate  responses  to  a  traumatic  experience  of  such  grand  scope:  
That  grief  is  wanton-sick  
Whose  stomach  can  digest  and  brook  in  the  diet  
Of  stale  ill-relished  counsel.  Pigmy  cares  
Can  shelter  under  patience’  shield,  but  griefs  
Will  burst  all  covert.  (2.3.2-6)  
 
Antonio  declares  his  grief  immeasurable,  a  grief  which  cannot  be  compared  to  other  griefs:  
I  have  a  thing  sits  here;  it  is  not  grief,  
’Tis  not  despair,  nor  the  most  plague 
That  the  most  wretched  are  infected  with;  
But  the  most  grief-full,  despairing,  wretched, 
Accursed,  miserable…  (2.3.13-17) 
 
  This  immeasurability  allows  Antonio  to  configure  himself  as  a  convergence  point  for  all 
grief.  Hearing  Pandulpho,  Maria  (Antonio’s  mother),  and  Mellida  (Antonio’s  betrothed) 
exclaim  their  own  griefs,  he  assigns  himself  the  role  of  grief’s  great  receptacle: 
Pan .  Woe  for  my  dear,  dear  son! 
Mar.  Woe  for  my  dear,  dear  husband! 
Mel.  Woe  for  my  dear,  dear  love. 
Ant.  Woe  for  me  all;  close  all  your  woes  in  me, 
In  me,  Antonio.  Ha!  Where  live  these  sounds? 
I  can  see  nothing;  grief’s  invisible 
And  lurks  in  secret  angles  of  the  heart. 
Come,  sigh  again,  Antonio  bears  his  part.   (2.3.65-72) 
 
By  appropriating  all  grief,  Antonio  becomes  instrumental  in  the  formation  of  a 
subcommunity  of  revengers  who  share  in  the  experience  of  trauma  and  conspire  together  to 
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hold  Piero  accountable,  one  way  or  another.  But  despite  Antonio  positioning  himself  as  a 
convergence  point  where  grief  is  a  shared  burden,  Antonio’s  claim  to  a  grief  that  both 
contains  and  surpasses  all  other  experiences  of  grief,  is,  like  Piero’s  braggart  villainy, 
self-congratulatory  and  intensely  competitive.  When  Pandulpho,  grieving  over  the  corpse 
of  his  son  Feliche,  declares  himself  “the  miserablest  soul  that  breathes,”  Antonio  challenges 
Pandulpho’s  claim,  saying  no  one  is  capable  of  “Outmounting”  him  “in  that  superlative” 
and  that  he  alone  is  “unmatched  in  woe”  (4.4.53-58).  
Given  the  play’s  penchant  for  metatheatrical  allusions,  we  should  consider  how  the 
competitive  nature  of  Antonio’s  unsurpassed,  “Herculean  woe”  might  extend  beyond  the 
boundaries  of  the  stage  at  St.  Paul’s  (2.3.133).  For  instance,  Baines  argues  that  Antonio’s 
superlative  claims  about  grief  contain  allusions  to  the  rivalry  between  child  and  adult  acting 
troupes:  
The  Renaissance  audience  would  certainly  have  recognized  Antonio's  conscious 
creation  of  himself  as  an  emblem,  since  his  motto,  Ne  plus  ultra ,  is  a  variation  of  a 
familiar  heraldic  device  derived  from  the  alleged  inscription  on  the  pillars  of 
Hercules.  Since  the  Globe  theater  was  traditionally  associated  with  Hercules 
through  his  labor  of  supporting  the  globe,  ‘Herculean  woe’  is  a  logical  allusion  to 
the  tragedies  of  the  Globe.  ‘Let  none  out-woe  me’  is  Marston's  vaunt  that  calls 
attention  to  the  fact  that  he  is  striving  for  heightened  emotional  effect.The  likelihood 
that  Marston's  line  refers  to  the  rivalry  of  the  theaters  is  reinforced  by  Shakespeare's 
allusion  to  the  rivalry  between  the  child  and  the  adult  troupes:  to  Hamlet's  question, 
‘Do  the  boys  carry  it  away,’  Rosencrantz  responds,  ‘Ay,  that  they  do,  my 
lord--Hercules  and  his  load  too.’  (Baines  485) 
 
Scholars  such  as  Baines,  S.  L.  Bethell,  and  Michael  Shapiro  have  noted  the  play’s 
metatheatrical  allusions  and  its  self-referentiality,  which  creates  “a  dual  perspective,”  the 
audience  being  made  aware  of  the  figures  on  stage  both  as  ‘actors’  and  as  ‘characters’ 
(Baines  279).  
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Antonio’s  “Herculean  woe”  is,  like  Piero’s  “rare”  villainy,  invested  in  theatrical 
rivalry,  marking  him  as  a  character  not  only  in  competition  with  the  other  characters  on 
stage,  but  also  in  competition  with  other  stages  and  the  characters  of  other  playwrights. 
Marston’s  characters  present  themselves  in  ways  which  allude  to  preceding  revenge  plays, 
and  the  metatheatrical  referentiality  implicitly  asks  the  audience  to  compare  the  aesthetic 
quality  of  Antonio’s  Revenge  to  the  plays  it  alludes  to.  After  declaring  himself  “unmatched 
in  woe,”  Antonio  directs  his  (less  grieved)  co-conspirators  (i.e.  Pandulpho  and  Alberto)  to 
dig  a  grave  for  Feliche.   As  they  dig  into  the  earth  with  their  daggers  to  make  a  grave, 
Antonio  creates  a  scene  which  alludes  to  Hieronimo’s  mad  stabbing  of  the  earth  in  The 
Spanish  Tragedy.  However,  the  allusion  also  works  to  exceed  Kyd’s  play  in  a  literal  sense, 
by  tripling  the  number  of  revengers  who  ravage  the  earth  with  their  blades.  Where  Kyd  has 
a  single  character  who  grieves  and  digs  the  earth,  Marston  has  three. 
In  addition  to  the  competitive  inclusion  of  allusions  to  other  revenge  narratives  and 
other  playhouses,  Antonio’s  Revenge  is  also  insistently  self-referential.  When  Antonio  first 
appears  on  stage  he  wakes  with  an  optimism  which  befits  the  resolution  of  Antonio  and 
Mellida ,  the  prior  play,  but  which  is  here  steeped  in  dramatic  irony.  We  already  know  what 
Antonio  doesn’t:  that  his  happiness  has  ended  in  the  night  with  the  murder  of  his  father. 
Unlike  Piero,  a  character  in  a  play  who  acts  like  a  person  who  wants  to  be  a  character  in  a 
play,  Antonio  does  not  see  through  the  metafictional  fourth  wall  throughout  most  of  the 
play.  His  first  lines  are  tuned  to  display  his  unawareness  that  he  is  in  a  tragedy:  “Darkness 
is  fled;  infant  morn  hath  drawn  /  Bright  silver  curtains  ’bout  the  couch  of  night,  /  And  now 
Aurora’s  horse  trots  azure  rings,  /  Breathing  fair  light  about  the  firmament”  (1.3.1-4). 
155 
Antonio’s  description  emphasizes  an  airy  brightness  which  seems  almost  like  an  aubade. 
Such  a  description  forms  a  naive  contrast  to  the  setting  and  trappings  of  the  stage  itself. 
Antonio  describes  a  morning  light  which  seems  more  spring  than  winter,  which  itself 
would  already  be  contradicted  by  the  likely  season  of  the  play’s  performance,  which  the 
prologue  describes  as 
The  rawish  dank  of  clumsy  winter  ramps 
The  fluent  summer’s  vein;  and  drizzling  sleet 
Chilleth  the  wan  bleak  cheek  of  the  numbed  earth, 
Whilst  snarling  gusts  nibble  the  juiceless  leaves 
From  the  naked  shudd’ring  branch,  and  pills  the  skin 
From  off  the  soft  and  delicate  aspects.  (Prologue  1-6) 
 
If  the  prologue  truly  does  call  attention  to  a  nasty  winter,  it  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  the 
audience  feeling  their  suspension  of  disbelief  strained  when  Antonio  describes  a  warm, 
bright  dawn.   Perhaps  even  more  ironic  would  be  Antonio’s  claim  that  the  “infant  morn 42
hath  drawn  /  Bright  silver  curtains  ’bout  the  couch  of  night.”  
While  Antonio  is  speaking  metaphorically,  his  lines  are  again  contradicted  by  the 
stage  being  literally  draped  in  black ,  which,  too,  is  a  detail  of  the  stage  emphasized  by  the 
prologue,  which  warns  anyone  unwilling  to  be  disturbed  by  violent  tragedy  to  “Hurry 
amain  from  our  black-visaged  shows ;  /  We  shall  affright  their  eyes”  (prologue  20-21,  italics 
mine).  In  annotating  this  line  for  the  Revels  edition,  Gair  notes  that  “the  stage  was  draped 
in  black”  and  cites  a  line  from  a  play  by  Wood:  “The  stage  of  heav’n,  is  hung  with  solemn 
black,  /  A  time  best  fitting  to  Act  Tragedies”  (55).  It  is  not  until  Antonio  begins  speaking  of 
his  “horrid  dreams”  in  which  he  saw  “two  meager  ghosts”  that  his  lines  seem  to  fit  the 
black-visaged  show.  
42   The  play  was  likely  written  to  be  performed  in  the  winter  of  1599.  See  Gair’s  discussion  in  the  Revels 
intro,  pp.  12-15. 
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Although  the  play  is  titled  Antonio’s  Revenge ,  much  of  the  first  half  of  the  play  is 
devoted  to  Piero.  It  is  not  until  Antonio  commits  to  revenge  that  he  begins  monopolizing 
the  stage.  The  audience’s  understanding  of  the  play’s  plot  is  mostly  provided  by  Piero’s 
conversations  with  (and  often  at )  Strotzo  or  through  Piero’s  asides  and  soliloquies. 
Katharine  Eisaman  Maus  argues  the  importance  of  recognizing  the  early  modern 
convention  of  the  villain’s  use  of  soliloquy  and  the  aside.  For  playgoers,  Maus  argues, 
confidence  in  the  “self-disclosure”  of  stage  Machiavels  is  assumed  to  be  “entirely  reliable” 
( Inwardness  54).  For  the  first  three  acts  of  Antonio’s  Revenge,  Maus’s  claim  rings  true  and 
the  audience  has  access  to  Piero’s  inwardness  through  his  “self-disclosures”  on  stage.  But 
Antonio’s  brutal  silencing  of  Piero  in  the  play’s  final  act  problematizes  the  audience’s 
relation  to  Piero  by  reversing  Piero’s  role  as  perpetrator  of  malicious  violence  to  that  of 
violence’s  victim,  while  also  disrupting  the  audience’s  access  to  Piero’s  self-disclosure.  
As  Piero  is  silenced,  the  audience’s  access  to  Piero’s  self-disclosure  is  limited  to  his 
tears.  As  visible  and  material  signifiers  of  his  now-undisclosed  inwardness,  Piero’s  tears 
require  interpretation  or  translation.  Antonio,  leading  a  trio  of  revengers  (Pandulpho, 
Alberto,  and  Maria),  provokes  Piero’s  speechless  tears  by  removing  his  tongue  and 
bringing  him  pieces  of  his  son  on  a  platter.  The  revengers  then  read  meaning  into  Piero’s 
tears  for  the  audience.  But  as  Piero’s  theatrical  rhetoric,  with  its  performative 
self-disclosures,  is  closed  off  to  the  audience  by  Antonio,  Maria,  and  Pandulpho,  so  too  is 
the  assumed  “special  intimacy  with  the  audience”  that  revealed  Piero’s  inner  maliciousness 
and  provided  the  warrant  for  an  audience  to  condone  retribution  against  him.   Rather  than 
marking  a  moment  of  successful  retribution  --  “He  weeps!...  /  I  have  no  vengeance  if  I  had 
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no  tears,”  Pandulpho  exclaims  (5.5.44-45)  --  Piero’s  tears  cause  the  justifications  (or, 
perhaps,  rationalizations)  of  violence  to  seem  suddenly  and  shockingly  inadequate.  Piero’s 
tears  replace  his  earlier  verbal  self-disclosure’s  villainy.  The  audience  must  view  these  tears 
as  their  own  event,  signaling  suffering  and  providing  evidence  of  human  cruelty.  The  tears, 
rather  than  celebrating  retribution,  short-circuit  the  desire  to  see  retribution  played  out.  The 
suffering  is  too  much,  forcing  the  audience  to  question  any  motives  capable  of  creating 
such  tears.  Rather  than  inaugurating  a  consensus  of  revenge  as  restoration  and  civic 
recalibration,  it  creates  a  sense  of  culpability  which  includes  the  audience.  If  violent 
retribution  is  a  kind  of  accusation  that  exceeds  language,  then  tears  reflect  back  that 
accusation,  leaving  no  one  innocent  in  the  face  of  suffering.  Antonio,  after  taking  revenge, 
commits  himself  to  constant  remembrance  of  Mellida  via  “true  affection’s  tears”  (5.6.40).  
Marston’s  ending  reveals  the  mutability  of  the  self  in  relation  to  experiences  and 
interpersonal  relations,  a  view  which  was  increasingly  important  when  theatrical 
competition  heated  into  a  full-blown  ‘poets’  war.’  As  James  Bednarz  states,  theatrical 
rivalry  between  Jonson,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Marston,  Dekker,  and  Shakespeare  on  the 
other,  became  a  major  theatrical  conflict  concerning  “the  epistemological,  literary,  and 
ethical  assumptions  upon  which  [Jonson]  based  his  assertion  of  poetic  authority”  (3).  While 
Jonson  worked  to  establish  neoclassical  principles  of  drama  as  the  standard  to  which 
English  theater  should  be  held  and  which  would  “establish  for  himself  and  for  his  age  a 
new  paradigm  of  poetic  authority,”  Marston,  Dekker,  and  Shakespeare  “were  willing  to 
object  to  what  Thomas  Greene  calls  Jonson’s  ‘centered  self’  and  Jonathan  Dollimore  terms 
the  philosophy  of  ‘humanist  essentialism’”  (Bednarz  3).  Jonson’s  poetic  authority  derives 
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from  this  humanist  essentialism,  his  poetic  authority  pinned  on  a  stable,  self-determined 
identity  that  assumes  it  can  view  itself  and  name  itself  in  a  way  preceding  (and  is  thus, 
independent  of)  social  recognition.  The  public  theater  is  where  Jonson’s  opponents, 
including  Marston,  depict  an  opposing  ontology  to  Jonson’s  ‘centered  self’  by  providing 
“insight  into  the  insubstantial  and  transient  condition  of  human  consciousness”  (Bednarz  3). 
Though  Antonio’s  Revenge  is  not  considered  to  be  a  play  which  Marston  wrote  as  part  of 
his  involvement  in  the  Poets’  War,  the  play  explores  self-aggrandizing  claims  to  poetic 
authority  and  shows  them  to  be  subject  to  the  mutability  of  human  experience,  as  is 
Marston’s  depiction  of  subjectivity.  In  the  play’s  final  act,  Piero’s  bombastic  rhetoric  is 
literally,  materially  silenced  as  his  tongue  is  torn  from  his  mouth.  He  is  transformed  by  the 
play’s  revengers  through  their  violence  and  rhetoric,  as  they  remove  his  ability  to  speak  as  a 
stage  Machiavel  and  compel  him  to  both  experience  and  perform  their  own  victimization. 
In  place  of  Piero’s  self-congratulatory  exaltation,  the  revengers  force  him  to  produce  tears, 
showing  him  to  be  an  aggrieved  father  capable  of  feeling  despair,  anguish,  and  pain  in  a 
way  that  mirrors  the  suffering  he  has  caused  for  them.  
Even  if  Piero’s  acts  of  malicious  violence  were  of  the  “rarest”  form,  as  he  aspired, 
Antonio  and  his  co-conspirators  surpass  them:  not  just  killing  Piero’s  son,  but  bringing  him 
cooked  pieces  of  the  corpse  to  eat;  not  just  politically  silencing  Piero’s  complaints,  but 
removing  his  tongue;  not  just  taking  pleasure  in  Piero’s  tears,  but  openly  mocking  them;  not 
just  plotting  Piero’s  death,  but  fantasizing  an  endless,  eternal  recurrence  of  his  murder:  “Sa, 
sa;  no,  let  him  die  and  die,  and  still  be  dying.  /  And  yet  not  die,  till  he  hath  died  and  died  / 
Ten  thousand  deaths  in  agony  of  heart”  (5.5.73-75).  Piero’s  subjectivity  is  shown  to  be 
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mutable,  pliable  to  human  experience  and  subject  to  material  conditions.  Likewise,  Antonio 
and  the  other  revengers  –  especially  Pandulpho,  who  is  established  as  the  voice  of  Neostoic 
philosophy  in  the  play  –  are  also  subject  to  change,  their  sense  of  themselves  and  their 
views  of  the  world  radically  altered  by  trauma  and  their  violent,  retributive  response  to  it,  so 
much  so  that  they  leave  the  play  in  self-imposed  exile,  functioning  as  the  play’s  living 
embodiments  of  traumatized  memory.  They  are  no  longer  the  untainted  figures  of  ideal 
love,  order,  and  stoic  virtue  that  they  were  at  the  start  of  the  play,  and  they  have  performed 
moments  of  violence  which  are  arguably  more  brutal  than  Piero’s  –  who  himself  sought  to 
surpass  and  overtop  all  other  acts  of  villainy.  They’ve  outstripped  topless  villainy.  
Marston’s  play  toys  with  the  mutability  of  the  audience  as  well.  Piero,  in  his 
metatheatrical  addresses  to  an  audience  beyond  the  diegetic  boundaries  of  the  stage,  casts 
the  audience  at  times  (whether  the  audience  accepts  it  or  not)  as  his  auditors,  and  in  this 
sense  he  commands  how  the  audience  should  respond  to  him,  demanding  that  they  judge 
his  actions  not  in  moral  or  ethical  terms,  but  aesthetically.  He  demands,  in  other  words,  that 
they  respond  to  him  as  a  character  in  a  play,  and  that  they  judge  his  murders  in  terms  of 
how  ‘rare’  they  are  compared  to  those  of  other  stage  villains.  By  the  end  of  the  play, 
Antonio  reconfigures  the  audience’s  relation  to  the  play,  making  the  audience  extensions 
into  his  own  adopted  role  as  a  living  traumatic  memory,  inviting  them  to  share  in  his  tears 
and  requesting  that  the  tragedy  of  Mellida’s  death  be  remembered  and  not  Piero’s  villainy. 
Antonio  describes  Mellida’s  death  as  a  loss  incapable  of  being  surpassed.  He  suggests  that 
if  a  tragedy  ever  is  written  which  is  able  to  surpass  what  we’ve  just  seen  staged,  it  cannot 
be  about  some  other  character’s  tragic  death.  Only  a  more  powerful  adaptation  of  Mellida’s 
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death  would  suffice.  Perhaps  Antonio’s  greatest  form  of  revenge  against  Piero  is  not  in 
killing  him,  nor  silencing  him,  nor  tormenting  him  with  his  son’s  corpse.  Antonio  does  not 
just  recast  Piero  as  a  victim,  nor  does  he  simply  silence  him,  he  also  silences  the  applause 
Piero  so  stridently  wished  to  hear,  the  approval  and  recognition  which  would  validate 
Piero’s  aspiration  of  being  the  rarest  of  villains.  This  is  Antonio’s  revenge.  
As  Christopher  Tilmouth  points  out,  applause  is  an  act  of  “labeling”  and 
“determining,”  asserting  approval  and  appreciation  for  what  has  been  observed  in  a  person 
(or,  in  this  case,  a  character).   As  I  discussed  in  a  previous  chapter,  an  audience  (whether 43
real  or  imagined)  is  an  early  modern  cognitive  artifact,  providing  the  possibility  of 
reception,  recognition,  or  social  acknowledgment  for  a  character’s  sense  of  self.  As  a 
particular  mode  of  interpersonal  response,  applause  provides  an  extension  of  the  self 
through  which  a  person/character  recognizes  him-  or  herself.  But  tears  suggest  a  different 
kind  of  audience  investment.  To  applaud  an  act  and  to  be  moved  to  tears  by  it  are 
determined  by  radically  different  emotional  responses.  When  Piero  wants  applause,  he 
wants  others  to  take  pleasure  in  his  acts  (just  as  he  does)  and  he  wants  validation  that  he  has 
succeeded  in  surpassing  all  previous  forms  of  villainy  and  revenge,  that  his  murders  and 
43  See  Tilmouth’s  analysis  in  “Passion  and  Intersubjectivity  in  Early  Modern  Theater”  of  the 
intersubjectivity  of  applause  in  Shakespeare’s  Troilus  and  Cressida : 
 
Like  a  twentieth-century  behaviourist,  Ulysses  grants  no  reality  to  mental  powers  conceived  as 
existing  in  potentia .  For  him,  self-definition,  the  affirmation  of  one’s  lordship,  can  only  arise  in 
performative  contexts.  This  is  the  more  true  because  what  a  person’s  capacities  are,  how  they  are 
interpreted,  depends  upon  the  context  which  receives  and  constructs  them.  It  is  the  audience 
which  puts  ‘form’  on  a  man’s  parts  and  actions,  labelling  them  as  virtues,  powers,  or  neither,  and 
thereby  determining  how  that  individual  will  know  himself.  Furthermore,  that  forming  applause  is 
capricious,  affirming  identity  today  only  to  deconstruct  it  tomorrow.  Ajax,  as  yet  unwanted,  in 
Ulysses’s  words  ‘  knows  not  what’  he  is  (127);  but  he  will  come  to  know  himself  anew  once  the 
Greeks  begin  forming  him  in  their  applause.  Meantime  Achilles,  having  withdrawn  from  public 
service,  faces,  phenomenologically  speaking,  annihilation,  a  ceasing  to  be,  because  his  form  is 
lost  as  soon  as  compatriots  cease  to  regard  him.  (19) 
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intrigues  are  indeed  ‘rare,’  a  word  he  endlessly  repeats  when  discussing  his  own  actions.  If 
others  applaud  Piero,  this  applause  gives  form  and  extension  to  his  sense  of  malicious 
grandeur,  solidifying  the  identity  he  believes  himself  to  have  by  providing  a  perceivable 
sign  of  recognition  and  acknowledgment  of  his  identity  from  others.  In  this  sense,  applause 
forms  a  consensus  of  recognition.  Piero’s  sense  of  self  is  closely  tied  to  reputation  and 
recognition.  What  is  true  about  Piero’s  self  is  what  both  Piero  and  others  agree  upon 
concerning  himself.  In  removing  Piero  from  the  metatheatrical  roles  of  actor,  writer,  and 
director,  Antonio  cuts  Piero  off  from  the  theatrical  applause  through  which  he  constructs 
and  validates  his  sense  of  self. 
In  replacing  Piero’s  access  to  the  audience  with  his  own,  Antonio  reconfigures  the 
audience’s  relation  to  the  play.  In  the  play’s  closing  lines,  Antonio  identifies  tears  as  a  more 
powerful  show  of  an  audience’s  approval  of  a  staged  tragedy  than  applause:  
And,  O,  if  ever  time  create  a  muse 
That  to  th’  immortal  fame  of  virgin  faith  [i.e.  Mellida] 
Dares  once  engage  his  pen  to  write  her  tragedy, 
May  it  prove  gracious,  may  his  style  be  decked 
With  freshest  blooms  of  pure  elegance;  
May  it  have  gentle  presence,  and  the  scenes  sucked  up 
By  calm  attention  of  choice  audience; 
And  when  the  closing  Epilogue  appears, 
Instead  of  claps,  may  it  obtain  but  tears.  (5.6.60-69) 
 
Within  the  theatrical  space  of  the  tragic  stage,  tears  are  most  often  markers  of  grief  (whether 
genuinely  felt  or  feigned),  but  beyond  the  stage,  in  the  realm  of  the  audience,  Antonio 
marks  tears  as  material  signs  of  the  proper  form  of  aesthetic  appreciation.  Marston’s  lines 
here,  written  for  Antonio,  also  seem  to  reference  the  competition  the  play  faces  from  other 
theaters.  After  all,  Antonio  expresses  the  hope  of  success  he  has  for  the  playwright  who 
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pens  the  tragedy  of  Mellida’s  death,  which  Marston,  in  a  sense,  has  just  done  in  the  play  the 
audience  has  attended.  
The  speech  is  still  more  meta-theatrically  complicated,  as  Antonio  speaks  both  as  a 
character  ‘in  the  play’  and  also  speaks  as  the  play’s  epilogue,  expressing  what  he  hopes  the 
play  achieved  and  what  the  achievement  might  obtain  from  the  audience  if  they  were  to 
show  their  approval.  Regardless  of  how  we  might  read  Antonio’s  final  lines,  they  seem 
counter  in  tone  and  content  to  the  reading  some  scholars  endorse  of  the  play  as  a  kind  of 
parody  of  revenge  tragedy.  It  is  clear  –  given  the  continual  emphasis  in  the  play  on 
overtopping  or  surpassing  –  that  Marston  is  interested  in  writing  a  tragedy  that  surpasses  all 
those  that  came  before  it.  If  his  play  is  extravagantly  violent  and,  at  times,  psychologically 
disturbing  and  morally  problematic,  this  is  not  the  result  of  a  parodic  mode,  which  would 
be  over-the-top  for  the  sake  of  satirizing  the  genre  of  blood  tragedy.  Rather,  it  seems 
Marston  attempts  to  write  the  revenge  tragedy  to  end  all  revenge  tragedies.  The  play’s 
spectacle  and  violence  are  extreme  because  of  this  competitive  mode,  which  directs  the 
writing  of  the  play  and  explicitly  places  it  in  comparison  to  the  violence  and  spectacle  of 
the  revenge  tragedies  that  precede  it.  Like  Antonio  and  Piero,  who  continually  cite  their 
words,  actions,  and  emotions  as  more  ‘rare’  and  in  a  unique  position  to  claim  the 
superlative  of  ‘most’  (most  villainous,  most  grieved,  most  worthy  of  revenge,  etc.),  Marston 
seeks  to  write  a  play  that  stands  as  the  pinnacle  of  revenge  narratives.  Heather  Anne 
Hirschfeld  notes  how  rivalry  and  animosity  function  as  symptoms  of  feared  displacement 
(443).  How  might  this  illuminate  the  threat  and  amplification  of  competition  in  Antonio's 
Revenge?   In  the  play's  final  lines,  Antonio  reimagines  the  play  with  Mellida  as  its  central 
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figure  rather  than  Piero,  usurping  the  theatrical  legacy  that  Piero  so  stridently  desired.  What 
revenge  could  be  more  successful  than  that? 
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CHAPTER  V 
“MUST  I  REMEMBER?”:  
MEMORY,  AFFECT,  AND  ACTING  IN  SHAKESPEARE’S  HAMLET 
 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  analyze  anxieties  about  consciousness  and  ‘being’  in  Hamlet . 
The  character  of  Hamlet  has  traditionally  been  read  as  a  precursor  of  modern 
consciousness.  I  argue  that  Hamlet’s  performances  of  ‘inwardness’  are  not  unique  or  a 
radical  break  from  other  characters  on  the  English  stage.  What  is  unique  about  Hamlet  is 
not  that  he  has  “that  within”  as  a  new  form  of  interiority,  but  that  Hamlet  feels  his 
performances  of  grief  to  be  relatively  ineffective.   He  feels  his  grief  lacks  social  and 44
interpersonal  impact.  This  produces  an  anxiety  about  consciousness  itself.  It  is  not  that 
Hamlet  feels  his  inwardness  is  unique  because  is  it  insulated  from  others  --  it  is  this 
insulation  itself  which  he  finds  devastating,  and  it  is  something  that  he  does  not  develop  for 
himself.  Rather,  his  insularity  is  forced  upon  him  by  how  he  is  treated  or  received  by 
others.  This  anxiety  results  in  a  strange  kind  of  suicidal  desire.  He  does  not  want  to  simply 
die  (as  death  itself  may  have  an  afterlife,  a  consciousness  which  continues  on  even  after  the 
body  has  expired),  he  wants  to  cease  to  exist  altogether.  He  wants  to  no  longer  have  a 
consciousness  at  all.  In  place  of  consciousness,  he  desires  that  what  has  eluded  his  dead 
father:  memorialization.  
In  my  reading  of  Hamlet,  I  argue  that  recent  scholarship  on  intersubjectivity  and 
cognitive  cultural  studies  can  help  us  rehistoricize  the  nature  of  Hamlet’s  “that  within  which 
44  See  Hamlet  1.2.76-86. 
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passes  show.”  Hamlet’s  desire  for  the  eradication  of  his  consciousness  explores  the 
consequences  of  feeling  disconnected  from  others  in  a  culture  wherein  identity, 
consciousness,  and  even  memory  itself  depends  on  the  structure  of  interpersonal  relations. 
Explaining  Hamlet’s  dilemma  through  the  lens  of  intersubjectivity  and  cognitive  cultural 
studies  helps  us  better  understand  not  just  Hamlet’s  ‘inwardness’  in  relation  to  its  historical 
context,  it  also  helps  us  understand  how  the  structure  of  early  modern  consciousness  shapes 
experiences  and  descriptions  of  death,  metaphors  of  corrupt  materiality  (of  human  bodies, 
of  the  earth  itself,  etc.),  the  function  of  early  modern  misogyny,  and  anxieties  about  social 
memory.  
 
In  revenge  plays,  violent  trauma  destroys  characters’  identities.  The  injustice  of  a 
crime  (usually  a  murder)  leaves  victims  confused  about  who  they  are,  how  they  should  act, 
and  how  they  understand  the  world  around  them.  Along  with  their  emotional  devastation, 
revengers  also  face  an  epistemological  disruption.  They  feel  as  though  the  world  they  knew 
up  to  that  point  was  a  lie.  To  take  revenge,  characters  must  first  realize  that  no  one  else  will 
right  their  injustices.  It  all  depends  on  them.  They  must  take  matters  into  their  own  hands. 
This  means  creating  a  new  sense  of  self--a  self  that  wants  to  punish  others  for  their 
corruption.  In  most  revenge  tragedies,  pleas  for  justice  go  unheeded,  and  since  words  and 
rhetoric  are  ineffective,  revengers  resort  to  physical  violence  to  make  their  point.   Revenge 
becomes  their  singular  obsession,  a  kind  of  radical  commitment,  and  their  retributive 
violence  draws  attention  to  the  injustices  of  the  world  while  punishing  those  responsible.  
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Though  Hamlet  has  the  hallmarks  of  a  revenge  tragedy,  its  protagonist  in  fact 
handles  revenge  unconventionally.  Despite  being  in  a  revenge  tragedy,  Hamlet  doesn’t 
easily  fit  the  role  of  the  revenger.  The  injustice  of  the  play  is,  for  Hamlet,  not  his  father’s 
murder  but  how  easily  and  quickly  everyone  seems  to  forget  his  father.  Hamlet  saw  his 
father  as  a  model  or  a  mirror  for  himself,  and  with  his  father  dead  and  perhaps  deliberately 
forgotten  by  all  of  Denmark,  Hamlet  faces  the  possibility  that  he  might  be  as 
inconsequential  as  his  father’s  memory.  To  recover  his  sense  of  self,  then,  Hamlet  turns  not 
to  vengeance  but  to  restoring  his  father’s  place  in  Denmark’s  memory. 
Unlike  other  revengers,  who  become  figures  of  violence,  Hamlet  turns  his  attention 
to  the  technology  of  theater.  He  determines  “acting”  rather  than  action  to  be  the  most 
effective  way  to  move  others  to  remembrance.  For  Hamlet,  theatrical  performance  is 
capable  of  producing  emotional  responses  in  others.  To  take  a  kind  of  revenge,  Hamlet 
becomes  not  a  revenger  but  an  actor,  as  his  burden  of  grief  and  memory  might  be 
transferred  to  others  if  he  generates  affect  through  acting.  Only  when  facing  his  own  death 
does  Hamlet  turn  to  retributive  violence,  and  even  then  only  momentarily.  In  the  end, 
Hamlet  does  not  want  to  right  a  wrong  so  much  as  he  wants  to  be  remembered.  
 
Hamlet  as  Unconventional  Revenger 
Hamlet  has  all  the  hallmarks  of  a  revenge  tragedy:  a  murdered  father,  whose  Ghost 
cries  out  for  revenge;  a  corrupt,  villainous  King;  grief  and  madness;  the  topos  of 
disillusionment  with  the  world  ( contemptus  mundi );  suicidal  ideation;  the  Kydian 
play-within-the-play.  But  Hamlet,  the  play’s  central  character,  does  not  easily  fit  the  role  of 
the  revenger.  
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First,  Hamlet’s  status  as  prince  of  Denmark  removes  the  sense  of  social 
disempowerment  which  most  revenge  tragedies  tend  to  explore  and  which  powers  revenge 
plots.  Other  Elizabethan  revengers  tend  to  seek  legal  recourse  to  right  the  wrongs  they  have 
suffered  and  only  resort  to  revenge  when  the  proper  channels  of  justice  have  failed.  They 
turn  to  revenge  in  order  to  seek  justice.  Revenge  plays  are  interested  in  disillusionment 
with,  or  the  decay  of,  a  fair  and  harmonious  social  order,  and  “private  revenge  is  a  vote  of 
no  confidence  in  official  bodies  charged  with  providing  fair  treatment”  (Woodbridge  6).  In 
contrast,  Hamlet  never  mentions  justice  and  rarely  speaks  of  revenge,  despite  having  more 
political  power  than  the  typical  revenger.   When  he  does  speak  of  revenge,  he  reprimands 45
himself  for  lacking  proper  motivation:  “How  all  occasions  do  inform  against  me  /  And  spur 
my  dull  revenge.”   46
If  Hamlet  is  a  play  interested  in  exploring  disillusionment  with  the  social  order,  it 
does  not  follow  the  theme  of  disparity  that  is  central  to  Elizabethan  revenge  tragedies.  Kay 
Stockholder,  for  instance,  argues  that  Hamlet’s  rank  as  prince  makes  him  an  odd  figure  for 
revenge:  
Only  in  Hamlet  is  the  revenger  of  a  rank  equal  to  that  of  his  antagonist...The  lack  of 
social  disparity  between  the  avenger  and  his  victim  obscures  in  Hamlet  the  integral 
links  between  caste  and  family  resentments  that  are  central  to  the  revenge  tradition 
from  the  Spanish  Tragedy  through  the  plays  of  Webster,  Tourneur,  Chapman  and 
Middleton,  all  of  which  assign  their  avengers  a  lower  place  in  the  social  order  than 
their  victims”  (Stockholder  95-96).  
 
45  The  only  occurrence  of  the  word  “justice”  in  Hamlet  appears  during  Claudius’s  attempt  at  prayer  in  Act 
3:  “Offence’s  gilded  hand  may  shove  by  justice  /  And  oft  ’tis  seen  the  wicked  prize  itself  /  Buys  out  the 
law...”  (3.3.58-60).  For  textual  evidence  of  Hamlet’s  political  support  from  the  people  of  Denmark,  see 
Claudius’s  concerns  in  4.3.1-11  and  4.7.10-25. 
 
46  Hamlet  4.4.32.  Hamlet’s  line  echoes  the  Ghost’s,  who  appears  before  Hamlet  “to  whet  thy  almost  blunted 
purpose”  (3.4.107).  Also  see  2.2.506-522. 
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Given  Hamlet’s  position  as  prince  of  Denmark  and  the  ostensible  successor  of  his  father’s 
throne,  if  Hamlet  were  to  take  action  against  Claudius,  there  is  a  reasonable  expectation  that 
the  form  of  action  he  would  take  would  involve  political  conflict  rather  than  private 
retribution.  This  is  the  kind  of  retaliation  that  fills  Shakespeare’s  history  plays  and  that  we 
see  from  other  rivals  to  the  throne  in  Hamlet .  Young  Fortinbras,  gathering  an  army  and 
threatening  Claudius  with  martial  conflict,  provides  an  example  of  the  form  of  action  one 
might  expect  from  Hamlet.  Laertes,  too,  angry  at  the  injustice  of  his  father’s  murder  at 
Hamlet’s  hands,  leads  a  rebellion  and  threatens  to  overthrow  Claudius: 
The  ocean,  overpeering  of  his  list, 
Eats  not  the  flats  with  more  impiteous  haste 
Than  young  Laertes,  in  a  riotous  head 
O'erbears  your  officers.  The  rabble  call  him  lord 
And,  as  the  world  were  now  but  to  begin, 
Antiquity  forgot,  custom  not  known, 
The  ratifiers  and  props  of  every  word, 
They  cry  'Choose  we:  Laertes  shall  be  king!'-- 
Caps,  hands,  and  tongues,  applaud  it  to  the  clouds: 
'Laertes  shall  be  king,  Laertes  king!'  ( Hamlet  4.5.99-108) 
 
But  Hamlet  himself  never  seems  interested  in  leading  a  rebellion  or  taking  the  throne.  
It  is  not  even  clear  at  the  start  of  the  play  that  revenge  against  Claudius  might  be 
necessary.  The  ubiquity  of  Hamlet  as  a  touchstone  of  western  culture  makes  it  difficult  to 
remember  that  Claudius’s  role  as  the  play’s  villain  is  not  apparent  at  the  beginning  of  the 
play.  Old  Hamlet’s  death  happens  before  the  play  begins  and  the  audience  does  not 
immediately  know  that  the  king  was  murdered  nor  that  Claudius  was  the  murderer.   This  is 
unusual  for  a  revenge  tragedy,  whose  audience  often  sees  the  play’s  initial,  instigating 
violence  onstage  or  knows  the  villain’s  motive  from  the  start.  
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The  identity  of  the  villain  might  be  a  mystery  to  the  play’s  revenger,  but  it  is  rare  for 
this  to  be  a  mystery  to  the  audience.  If  we  can  imagine  an  audience  that  does  not  already 
know  the  plot  of  Hamlet ,  the  initial  conflict  between  Hamlet  and  Claudius  makes  Claudius 
seem  diplomatic  rather  than  villainous.  Hamlet  is  visibly  dissatisfied  with  Claudius’s 
marriage  to  Gertrude,  and  with  acerbic  wit  Hamlet  voices  his  frustration  that  everyone  is 
celebrating  their  marriage  so  soon  after  his  father’s  death.  Claudius,  however, 
acknowledges  the  quickness  of  their  marriage  and  directs  the  court’s  attention  to  the 
looming  threat  of  young  Fortinbras’s  aggressions  along  their  border.  Without  the 
knowledge  that  Claudius  murdered  his  brother  to  advance  to  the  throne,  Hamlet’s 
frustration  seems  petty  in  contrast  to  Claudius’s  concern  with  reports  that  Fortinbras  is 
raising  an  army.  Neither  Hamlet  nor  the  play’s  audience  has  reason  to  suspect  Claudius’s 
crime  until  it  is  revealed  by  the  Ghost  of  Hamlet’s  father  in  Act  1.4.  
Even  after  Hamlet  is  told  by  the  Ghost  that  Claudius  murdered  Hamlet’s  father, 
Hamlet  does  not  seem  committed  to  revenge.   Unlike  Elizabethan  revengers  like 47
Hieronimo,  Titus,  or  Antonio,  who  must  restrain  their  grief  and  fury  in  order  to  plan  their 
retribution,  Hamlet  seems  to  lack  the  passionate  intensity  for  revenge.  Heather  Anne 
Hirschfeld  argues  that  “[r]evenge  in  Hamlet  is  a  means  of  revisiting  a  traumatic  scene,  not 
47  Though  the  Ghost  appears  “In  the  same  figure,  like  the  king  that's  dead,”  it  is  debatable  whether  the 
Ghost  is  the  ghost  of  Hamlet’s  father  or  a  “goblin  damn'd”  (1.1.40,  1.4.40).  Hamlet  decides  to  speak  with 
the  Ghost  despite  being  uncertain  it  is  really  his  father,  saying:  “Be  thy  intents  wicked  or  charitable,  / 
Thou  comest  in  such  a  questionable  shape  /  That  I  will  speak  to  thee:  I'll  call  thee  Hamlet…”  (1.4.42-44). 
Horatio  is  less  willing  to  give  the  Ghost  the  benefit  of  the  doubt,  warning  Hamlet: 
 
What  if  it  tempt  you  toward  the  flood,  my  lord, 
Or  to  the  dreadful  summit  of  the  cliff 
That  beetles  o'er  his  base  into  the  sea, 
And  there  assume  some  other  horrible  form, 
Which  might  deprive  your  sovereignty  of  reason 
And  draw  you  into  madness?   (1.4.69-74) 
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one  for  resolving  it”  (Hirschfeld  439).   Rhodri  Lewis  argues  that  Hamlet  not  only  fails  to 
engage  in  the  conventional  fury  of  revenge  rhetoric,  but  seems  to  actively  avoid  the  ethos 
of  retribution:  “In  reacting  to  the  Ghost’s  words,  Hamlet  uses  his  rhetorical  skills  not  to 
body  forth  his  fury  at  Claudius’s  fratricidal  treachery  or  to  stir  himself  up,  but  to  shield 
himself  from  the  inconvenient  truth  that,  despite  having  the  details  of  his  father’s  murder 
presented  to  him  in  the  most  singular  fashion,  he  is  possessed  by  neither  the  passion  nor  the 
will  to  vengeance”  (Lewis  635).  Hamlet  is,  of  course,  noted  for  his  introspection,  and  while 
this  usually  helps  revengers  hone  their  anger  and  sharpen  their  resolve,  Hamlet’s 
inwardness  seems  to  be  an  obstacle  to  him  taking  action. 
Does  Hamlet  wants  revenge?  And  if  so,  revenge  against  whom?  He  does  not  seem 
angry  at  Claudius  so  much  as  disgusted  by  Claudius’s  inferiority  to  his  father.  Even  when 
he  learns  that  Claudius  poisoned  his  father,  he  does  not  seem  especially  vitriolic  toward 
Claudius.  There  is  not  a  moment  in  the  play  when  he  struggles  to  restrain  himself  from 
slaughtering  him.  Hamlet  even  passes  up  a  good  opportunity  after  he  tests  the  conscience  of 
the  king  and  is  convinced  of  his  guilt.  Hamlet  reasons  that  killing  Claudius  while  he  prays 
is  not  adequate  retribution  (since  his  father  was  murdered  unshriven).  But  this  is  a  rather 
unconvincing  equivocation,  especially  since  his  description  of  when  he  might  send 
Claudius  into  the  realm  of  death  lacks  the  passionate  heat  that  we  hear  from  revengers  like 
Hieronimo,  Titus,  and  Antonio.  Rather  than  pressing  forward  with  the  vow  of 
remembrance  he  has  sworn  to  the  Ghost,  which  also  implies  the  duty  of  a  son  to  avenge  a 
murdered  father,  Hamlet  delays  and  defers.  Even  Hamlet’s  description  of  how  he  might  kill 
Claudius  is  surprisingly  pedestrian,  as  he  imagines  finding  Claudius  in  a  moment  “That  has 
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no  relish  of  salvation  in’t”  when  he  might  “Then  trip  him  that  his  heels  kick  at  heaven” 
(3.4.92-93).  This  is  not  exactly  the  kind  of  hot,  Senecan  rhetoric  we  expect  from  a  revenge 
tragedy.  As  we  will  see,  Hamlet  shows  more  passionate  intensity  in  response  to  the  player’s 
speech  about  Hecuba’s  grief  than  he  does  for  revenge  against  Claudius.  
 
The  Problem  of  Inwardness 
The  prevailing  explanation  for  Hamlet’s  seeming  aversion  to  revenge  is  that  he  is  a 
contemplative  person  rather  than  a  ‘man  of  action.’  Hamlet’s  interiority  has  long  been  the 
subject  of  scholarly  debate.  The  topos  of  Hamlet  as  a  purveyor  of  inwardness,  as  the  model 
of  modern  consciousness  itself,  first  developed  in  the  eighteenth  century,  but  it  has  an 
ineluctable  persistence.   In  Shakespeare:  The  Invention  of  the  Human ,  for  instance,  Harold 48
Bloom  states  that  “The  internalization  of  the  self  is  one  of  Shakespeare's  greatest 
inventions,  particularly  because  it  came  before  anyone  else  was  ready  for  it”  (409). 
Bloom’s  suggestion  that  Hamlet  anticipates  modernity  echoes  Upton  Sinclair’s  assessment 
of  Hamlet  in  1922: 
If  you  read  the  vast  mass  of  criticism  which  has  grown  up  about  the  figure  of 
Hamlet,  you  learn  that  Hamlet  is  the  type  of  the  “modern  man.”  Shakespeare  was 
able  to  divine  what  modern  man  would  be;  or  perhaps  we  can  go  farther  and  say 
that  Shakespeare  helped  to  make  the  modern  man  what  he  is;  the  modern  man  is 
more  of  Hamlet,  because  he  has  taken  Hamlet  to  his  heart  and  pondered  over 
Hamlet’s  problems.  (Sinclair  48) 
 
Of  course,  when  Sinclair  states  that  Hamlet  is  the  very  model  of  modernity  and  that  “the 
modern  man”  is  defined  by  Hamlet’s  problems,  he  does  not  mean  that  the  modern  man  is  a 
melancholy  prince  who  sees  his  father’s  ghost  or  whose  uncle  has  usurped  the  throne.  The 
48  See  Margareta  de  Grazia,  Hamlet  Without  Hamlet ,  especially  1-7,  for  further  discussion.  
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claims  of  Hamlet’s  modernity  point  to  Hamlet’s  interiority,  his  contemplations  of 
consciousness  and  existence,  and  his  incapacity  of  action. 
So  how  did  Hamlet  become  the  key  text  for  thinking  about  the  emergence  of 
modern  subjectivity?  It  is  not  as  if  expressions  of  interiority  are  absent  from  Shakespeare’s 
other  plays.  In  Titus  Andronicus ,  one  of  Shakespeare’s  earliest  plays  and  a  popular  revenge 
tragedy,  characters  fixate  on  private  experiences  of  grief,  hide  their  intentions  from  others, 
soliloquize,  theorize  the  quality  and  nature  of  their  existence--all  things  commonly 
associated  with  Hamlet’s  unique  inwardness.  
What  makes  Hamlet  ‘seem  modern’  is  his  recognition  of  a  divide  between  seeming 
and  being .  Gertrude  tells  Hamlet  that  his  father’s  death  “’tis  common”  since  “all  that  lives 
must  die,  /  Passing  through  nature  to  eternity”  and  she  questions  Hamlet’s  show  of  grief  for 
his  father,  asking  “Why  seems  it  so  particular  with  thee?”  (1.2.72,75).  Hamlet,  in  response, 
calls  attention  to  Gertrude’s  passing  use  of  “seems,”  using  the  word  to  trace  surface 
displays  of  grief  which  he  contrasts  with  authentic  feeling:  
Seems,  madam!  nay  it  is;  I  know  not  ‘seems.’ 
'Tis  not  alone  my  inky  cloak,  good  mother, 
Nor  customary  suits  of  solemn  black, 
Nor  windy  suspiration  of  forced  breath, 
No,  nor  the  fruitful  river  in  the  eye, 
Nor  the  dejected  ’havior  of  the  visage, 
Together  with  all  forms,  moods,  shapes  of  grief, 
That  can  denote  me  truly:  these  indeed  seem, 
For  they  are  actions  that  a  man  might  play: 
But  I  have  that  within  which  passes  show; 
These  but  the  trappings  and  the  suits  of  woe.  (1.2.76-86) 
 
Hamlet  claims  that  the  exterior  self  is  always  falsifiable  because  external  signs  of  inner 
experience,  whether  these  signs  are  in  appearance  (such  as  Hamlet’s  “inky  cloak”  and  his 
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“customary  suits  of  solemn  black”)  or  in  “dejected  ’havior”  (sighs,  tears,  etc.),  can  be 
mimicked.  By  implication,  then,  Hamlet  suggests  that  only  “that  within,”  or  his  interior, 
subjective  experience,  defines  his  true  self.   49
Mary  Thomas  Crane  notes  that  “Hamlet’s  claim  to  have  ‘that  within  which  passes 
show’  (1.2.85)  has  become  one  of  the  most  debated  lines  in  early  modern  literature  since  it 
seems  to  make  a  definite  statement  about  a  highly  contested  topic,  the  nature  of  subjective 
interiority  and  its  relation  to  the  existence  (or  nonexistence)  of  the  human  ‘individual’” 
( Shakespeare’s  Brain  116).  According  to  Katharine  Eisaman  Maus,  “The  point  of  such 
distinctions  is  normally  to  privilege  whatever  is  classified  as  interior”  and  Hamlet’s  claim  to 
“have  that  within  which  passes  show”  suggests  an  interiority  which  “is  beyond  scrutiny, 
concealed  where  other  people  cannot  perceive  it”  ( Inwardness  4).  Hamlet’s  seeming 
modernity  is  in  his  mapping  of  seeming  and  being  onto  external  displays  of  the  self  and  the 
internal  experience  of  emotion.  In  this  sense,  Hamlet’s  claim  to  “have  that  within  which 
passes  show,”  which  pairs  interior  subjective  experience  with  being,  seems  to  theorize  an 
ontology  of  the  self  that  is  aligned  with  the  autonomous  individualism  associated  with 
modernity.  
The  problem,  however,  is  that  even  though  Hamlet  claims  his  inwardness  is 
inscrutable  to  everyone  but  him,  in  the  context  of  the  play  he  does  not  seem  to  really 
believe  this  himself.  If  Hamlet  knows  the  authenticity  of  his  own  grief,  why  does  he  work 
so  hard  to  convince  himself  and  others  that  he  truly  grieves?  As  I  will  argue,  Hamlet  is  not 
49  For  a  detailed  historical  account  of  early  modern  distinctions  between  seeming  and  being,  and  the 
epistemological  difficulties  inherent  in  Hamlet’s  claim  that  he  has  “that  within  which  passes  show,”  see 
Katharine  Eisaman  Maus’s  introduction  to  Inwardness  and  Theater  in  the  English  Renaissance ,  pp.1-33. 
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satisfied  with  his  own  claim  of  having  “that  within.”  To  demonstrate  Hamlet’s  frustration 
with  his  own  inwardness,  and  to  explain  why  Hamlet’s  inwardness  is  a  not  a  precursor  of 
modern,  autonomous  individualism  but  is  instead  rooted  in  early  modern  forms  of 
intersubjectivity,  I  will  turn  our  attention  to  issues  of  memory,  theatricality,  and  audience 
reception  in  the  play. 
 
Hamlet  and  Memory 
For  Hamlet,  the  injustice  of  the  play  is  not  his  father’s  murder  but  how  easily  and 
quickly  everyone  seems  to  forget  his  father.  What  is  the  relation  between  revenge  and 
memory?  Is  vengeance  a  problem  of  memory,  of  being  unable  to  forget?  It  seems  to 
incorporate  this,  but  being  unable  to  forget  does  not  “denote”  vengeance  truly.  There's  also 
an  anxiety  about  memory--not  that  one  is  unable  to  forget,  but  that  forgetting  (at  least  in  this 
play)  is  too  easy.  In  Hamlet ,  the  problem  is  not  being  unable  to  forget,  but  being  unable  to 
remember.  It  is  memory  that  is  difficult  in  Hamlet .  What  Hamlet  reveals  about  revenge  is 
that  it  takes  effort  to  maintain--it  is,  at  best,  a  short-term  goal.  It  requires  passionate 
intensity,  but  the  energy  for  revenge  in  Hamlet  is  not  an  endless  well.  Unlike  those  who 
experience  loss  in  other  Elizabethan  revenge  plays,  such  as  in  Titus  or  The  Spanish 
Tragedy ,  Hamlet  has  had  time  to  grieve,  to  let  passionate  intensity  dissipate  and  settle  into 
“common”  grief.  Hamlet  has  trouble  mustering  a  sustainable  grief  and  anger  to  direct  at 
Claudius--his  most  violent  fantasy  against  Claudius  involves  kicking  up  his  feet.  The 
possibility  of  a  Kydian  revenge  plot  is  questioned  when  revenge  is  initiated  after  the  initial 
trauma  has  begun  to  heal.  Hamlet ’s  question,  of  whether  revenge  is  possible  when  the  grief 
and  anger  of  loss  are  no  longer  fresh  and  sharp,  is  a  question  that  redirects  the  genre  of 
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revenge  tragedy.  Jacobean  revenge  plays--such  as  The  Revenger's  Tragedy --will  explore 
what  revenge  is  when  it  is  cold  and  calculated.  Revenge,  in  Jacobean  theater,  will  be 
characterized  as  a  long-term  goal,  a  project  carefully  orchestrated  and  that  borrows  from 
Machiavellian  villainy  rather  than  Senecan  fury. 
To  reiterate,  Hamlet’s  grief  for  his  father  is  not  initially  a  response  to  a  violent  crime. 
After  Hamlet  learns  that  his  father  was  murdered,  his  grief  retroactively  becomes  grievance. 
In  this  play,  trauma  is  not  a  situated  within  a  singular  moment,  event,  or  action;  instead, 
trauma  is  a  kind  of  echolocation,  a  resonance  of  meaning  distributed  across  multiple 
wounds  and  moments  of  trauma,  encompassing  both  physical  trauma  and  traumatic 
recollection.  Hirschfeld  argues  that  Hamlet  deploys  a  “hermeneutic  logic...of  trauma,  or  the 
interpretive  structure  by  which  a  prior  devastation,  precisely  because  its  full  horror  cannot 
be  comprehended  at  the  moment  it  occurs,  [but]  is  realized  or  recognized  only  through 
subsequent  devastation,  the  impact  of  which  is  always  conditioned  by  the  earlier  event” 
(425).  The  meaning  or  significance  of  trauma,  Hirschfeld  claims,  is  always  in  repetition  or 
doubling  of  some  prior  violation.  This  hermeneutic  of  trauma  which  haunts  Hamlet ,  and 
which  gives  shape  to  the  narrative  structure  of  tragedy  in  general,  is  derived  from  the 
Christian  doctrine  of  the  Fall,  in  which  Adam  and  Eve  disobey  God,  resulting  in  a 
corruption  of  body  and  soul  which  infects  the  totality  of  material  existence:  “...it  is  not  just 
the  taint  of  the  transgressive  act  itself  but  also  the  resultant  corruption  that  is 
transferred--literally  bequeathed--to  all  the  world”  (Hirschfeld  427).  
This  corruption,  triggered  first  through  violation  (the  eating  of  the  forbidden  fruit 
and  the  consequence  of  expulsion  from  Eden)  and  its  consequence  (the  penalty  of 
176 
mortality)  realized  through  violence  (Cain  slaying  Abel),  is  a  traumatic  realization  repeated 
with  variation  throughout  early  modern  revenge  tragedy.  Elizabethan  revenge  often  bears 
out  Hirschfeld’s  reading.  Hieronimo’s  grief  for  his  murdered  son,  Horatio,  in  Kyd’s 
Spanish  Tragedy  sets  the  precedent  for  staged  tragic  grief  which  triggers  a  transference 
(usually  performed  as  a  moment  of  cynical  recognition)  from  the  corruption  of  a  single  act 
to  a  corruption  of  all  the  world.  When  Hieronimo  and  the  parade  of  Kydian  revengers  who 
follow  in  his  wake  (Titus,  Antonio,  etc.),  suffer  a  personal  loss,  so  too  does  he  lose  all  the 
world,  which  becomes  a  negative  presence,  exclaiming:  “O  world!  no  world,  but  mass  of 
public  wrongs,  Confus’d  and  fill’d  with  murder  and  misdeeds!”  ( Spanish  Tragedy  3.2.2-4). 
The  world  itself  (or,  perhaps  more  accurately,  the  world  Hieronimo  knew)  is  absent,  is  “no 
world,”  and  in  its  place  exist  only  violations.  Titus,  too,  unable  to  repair  the  series  of 
traumas  suffered  by  himself  and  his  family,  views  the  world  as  a  setting  for  his  family's 
dumb  show  of  perpetual  tears,  which  he  imagines  as  salting  the  earth  and  consuming  all  in 
mire  and  slime.  These  lost  worlds  can  evoke  the  repeated  Edenic  traumas  and  loss. 
But  for  Hamlet?  His  initial  traumatic  event,  unlike  those  in  the  bulk  of  earlier 
revenge  plays,  precedes  the  play's  opening.  Something  is  already  rotten  in  the  state  of 
Denmark.  The  play  opens  in  a  world  in  which  disillusionment  and  the  transfer  of 
corruption  from  private  loss  to  a  Kydian  “mass  of  public  wrongs”  has  already  occurred. 
The  murder  of  Hamlet's  father,  when  revealed  to  Hamlet,  does  not  rattle  him.  If  anything, 
he  seems  energized  by  it,  at  least  momentarily.  He  wants  to  stamp  revenge  into  his  brain, 
wants  it  to  be  the  fixation  of  all  his  thoughts  and  actions.  But  it  is  not.  The  violation  of  the 
living  body  of  Hamlet's  father  is,  for  Hamlet,  less  traumatic  than  the  violation  of  his 
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memory.  Hamlet  is  drawn  to  the  Ghost  not  because  it  speaks  truths  about  murder  and 
misdeeds,  but  because  it  is  a  more  pervasive  presence  of  his  father  than  memory  alone.  
“I’ll  call  thee  Hamlet,  /  King,  father,  royal  Dane,”  Hamlet  says  to  the  Ghost 
(1.4.44-45).  Hamlet  (the  son)  in  this  address  defines  three  roles  modeled  for  him  by  the 
name  “Hamlet.”  The  name,  as  more  than  a  name,  as  a  kind  of  nomenclature,  presents  a 
troubling  proposition  for  the  younger  Hamlet.  No  longer  doubled  between  father  and  son, 
the  name  “Hamlet”  became  Hamlet's  responsibility  following  his  father’s  death.  In  the  void 
left  by  his  father  lies  a  filial  obligation  that  rests  entirely  on  Hamlet's  shoulders.  If  “Hamlet” 
is  both  a  name  and  a  set  of  duties,  young  Hamlet  only  meets  the  requirement  of  being  a 
“royal  Dane.”  He  is  not  (yet)  king  nor  father.  His  earlier  snarky  retort  to  Claudius,  that  he  is 
“too  much  in  the  sun”  (1.2.67),  is  also  an  apt  self-criticism.  Hamlet  can  no  longer  be  too 
much  “in  the  son,”  he  must  become  like  his  father.  
Hamlet  must  become  like  Hamlet.  But  if  Hamlet  must  be  like  Hamlet,  there  are 
unacknowledged  roles  attached  to  the  nomenclature  that  surface  with  the  arrival  of  the 
Ghost.  Since  Hamlet  says  “I'll  call  thee  Hamlet”  not  to  his  father,  but  to  the  Ghost,  what 
unspoken  attributes  go  unrecognized  alongside  the  model  of  king,  father,  and  royal  Dane? 
The  Ghost  itself  commands  Hamlet  to  “remember  me”  and  also  makes  allegations  which 
mark  “Hamlet”  as  a  name  for  victimization,  since  Old  Hamlet  was  poisoned  while  in  a 
vulnerable  state  of  sleep,  damned  by  an  unshriven  death,  and  forgotten  through  Claudius's 
usurpations  as  king,  husband,  and  father.  To  be  “Hamlet,”  then,  is  a  traumatic  victimization 
that  risks  obscurity  in  being  forgotten  unless  someone  is  commissioned  to  remember. 
“Hamlet”  names  not  just  an  obscured  victimization,  it  also  names  the  burden  of  memory, 
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the  obligation  to  remember.  But  how  can  the  young  Hamlet  be  “Hamlet”  in  this  way? 
Hamlet  cannot  be  both  the  memory-bearer  and  also  the  memory  to  be  borne. 
Other  readers  of  the  play  have  pointed  to  Hamlet’s  resistance  to  the  burden  of 
remembrance.  Hester  Lees-Jeffries  writes  that  “ Hamlet ,  both  character  and  play,  is  deeply 
troubled  by  memory”  and  “The  Ghost’s  ‘Remember  me!’  is  a  crucial,  if  vexed,  injunction, 
but  we  would  do  equally  well  to  pause  on  Hamlet’s  no  less  vital  and  anguished  plea,  ‘Must 
I  remember?’,  and  append  a  silent  addition:  ‘and  if  so,  how?’”  (Lees-Jeffries  7-8). 
Lees-Jeffries’s  comment  suggests  that  the  burden  of  memory  that  is  imposed  on  Hamlet  is 
more  complex  than  it  would  initially  seem.  Hamlet  uses  metaphors  of  books  and  wax 
writing  tablets  to  describe  committing  revenge  to  memory: 
Ay,  thou  poor  ghost,  while  memory  holds  a  seat 
In  this  distracted  globe.  Remember  thee? 
Yea,  from  the  table  of  my  memory 
I'll  wipe  away  all  trivial  fond  records, 
All  saws  of  books,  all  forms,  all  pressures  past, 
That  youth  and  observation  copied  there, 
And  thy  commandment  all  alone  shall  live 
Within  the  book  and  volume  of  my  brain, 
Unmixed  with  baser  matter.  Yes,  yes,  by  heaven.  (1.5.96-104) 
 
But  the  metaphor  immediately  fails.  Hamlet's  anger  at  Claudius  seems  parasitic  on  his  anger 
at  his  mother.  Even  when  Hamlet  is  compelled  by  the  voice  of  the  Ghost  to  swear 
vengeance,  Hamlet  thinks  of  his  mother  before  he  thinks  of  Claudius: 
O  most  pernicious  woman! 
O  villain,  villain,  smiling,  damned  villain! 
My  tables,--meet  it  is  I  set  it  down, 
That  one  may  smile,  and  smile,  and  be  a  villain; 
At  least  I'm  sure  it  may  be  so  in  Denmark: 
Writing 
So,  uncle,  there  you  are.  Now  to  my  word; 
It  is  ‘Adieu,  adieu!  remember  me.’ 
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I  have  sworn  't.  (1.5.105-113) 
 
Despite  Hamlet’s  attempt  to  clear  his  brain  of  “baser  matter”  in  order  to  record  the 
“commandment”  to  take  revenge,  he  cannot  clear  his  mother  (“O  most  pernicious 
woman!”)  from  his  mind.  
At  least,  the  context  here  makes  it  seem  as  if  he  cannot  clear  his  mother  from  his 
mind--but  if  this  is  a  reflex,  an  uncontrolled  slip  into  a  “baser  matter”  in  the  “book  and 
volume”  of  his  brain,  is  this  a  ‘base  matter’  which  cannot  be  erased  or  overwritten?  Both 
Hamlet  and  the  Ghost  seem  concerned  that  a  murdered  father  can  be  forgotten  but  a 
“pernicious  woman”  cannot  be,  suggesting  Gertrude’s  violation  of  dead  Hamlet’s  memory 
is  more  devastating  that  Claudius’s  fratricide.  Steven  Mullaney  argues  that  Hamlet’s  grief  is 
“produced  as  much  by  Gertrude's  sexual  vitality  as  by  his  father's  death”  (Mullaney  153). 
This  grief,  caused  by  the  unintentional  remembrance  of  his  “pernicious”  mother 
(“pernicious”  because  of  her  transferred  affection  and  sexual  appetite:  “she  would  hang  on 
him,  /  As  if  increase  of  appetite  had  grown  /  By  what  it  fed  on”),  suggests  Hamlet  is,  like 
Janet  Adelman's  interpretation  of  Richard  III,  a  figure  who  is  threatened  by  the  possibility 
of  maternal  independence,  of  women  who  are  not  figured  through  their  relationships  with 
men.   The  play’s  concern  with  Gertrude’s  sexuality  is  also  similar  to  the  patriarchal  anxiety 50
described  by  Coppelia  Kahn  in  her  discussion  of  Titus  Andronicus :  “Eluding  [proper 
patriarchal  control],  the  maternal  womb  burgeons  aggressively,  pollutes  patrilineal  descent, 
and  destroys  civil  order…”  ( Roman  Shakespeare  55).  I  argue  that  Hamlet’s  desire  to  erase 
his  mother’s  betrayal  from  memory  is  rooted  in  the  culture  of  misogyny  described  by  these 
50  See  Janet  Adelman,  Suffocating  Mothers:  Fantasies  of  Maternal  Origin  in  Shakespeare's  Plays,  Hamlet 
to  the  Tempest ,  pp.  2-3. 
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critics.  Claudius  can  kill  the  living  body  of  Hamlet's  father.  But  Gertrude,  Hamlet  seems  to 
worry,  is  capable  of  killing  his  living  memory.  
Memory  is  a  vital  component  of  revenge  tragedies,  and  Hamlet  swears  to 
remember.  The  Ghost  describes  how  he  was  murdered  (as  in  a  game  of  “Clue,”  we  learn 
that  Claudius  did  it  with  poison  in  the  orchard)  and  evokes  the  ethos  of  revenge  as  familial 
obligation:  “If  thou  hast  nature  in  thee,  bear  it  not”  (1.5.81).  The  link  between 
remembrance  and  vengeance  is  common  in  revenge  tragedy,  but  memory  tends  to  be  a 
rather  simple  affair  in  other  revenge  plays.  Usually,  the  revenger  carries  with  him  some 
simple  prop  which  signifies  the  persistence  of  their  memory  (Hieronimo,  for  instance,  keeps 
his  dead  son’s  blood-soaked  handkerchief  in  The  Spanish  Tragedy ).  But  Hamlet’s 
metaphor  for  remembrance  (“the  table  of  my  memory…  /  Within  the  book  and  volume  of 
my  brain”)  theorizes  memory  more  complexly  and  abstractly.  His  use  of  a  writing  tablet  has 
garnered  scholarly  attention.  In  a  landmark  article  on  Hamlet’s  memory,  Peter  Stallybrass, 
Roger  Chartier,  J.  Franklin  Mowery,  and  Heather  Wolfe  discuss  the  paradoxical  nature  of 
writing  tables,  their  ability  to  “memorialize  the  ability  to  forget”  (Stallybrass  et  al.  413). 
Writing  tablets  may  act  as  “memorial  prostheses”  that  aid  memory,  but  the  need  for  them  is 
also  a  constant  reminder  that  their  contents  can  easily  be  forgotten  or  erased  (Stallybrass  et 
al.  413).  
If  writing  tablets  are  useful  tools  for  recording  things  that  might  easily  be  forgotten, 
what  use  do  they  serve  in  revenge?  There  is  some  question  as  to  why  Hamlet  would  even 
need  to  clear  the  ‘baser  matter’  of  his  brain  in  order  to  make  room  for  the  Ghost’s 
injunction  to  “Remember  me!”  Why  wouldn’t  Hamlet  remember?  Why  does  the  Ghost 
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need  to  demand  that  Hamlet  remember  at  all?  Ghosts  and  murders  tend  to  make  an 
impression.  The  revelation  that  Hamlet’s  father  was  murdered  by  Claudius  does  not  seem 
like  the  kind  of  information  that  might  slip  Hamlet’s  mind.  Generally,  early  modern 
revengers  are  incapable  of  forgetting.  It  is  the  pervasive  memory  of  a  wrongful  death  that 
tends  to  drive  revengers  toward  actual  moments  of  madness  in  revenge  plays.  Several 
scholars  have  noted  this  seeming  discrepancy  in  the  play.  Stephen  Greenblatt  claims  it 
would  be  “fairly  ludicrous”  for  Hamlet  to  forget  the  revelation  that  his  father  was  murdered 
by  his  uncle  ( Hamlet  in  Purgatory  207).  Lewis  agrees  with  Greenblatt,  arguing  it  is 
unimaginable  that  Hamlet  might  forget  what  the  Ghost  reveals  to  him,  which  makes  it  “[a]ll 
the  more  notable,  then  that  both  the  Ghost  and  Hamlet  himself  appear  to  believe  otherwise: 
for  them,  Hamlet’s  ability  to  preserve  and  to  reverence  the  memory  of  his  father  is  very 
much  open  to  question”  (Lewis,  “Hamlet,  Metaphor,  and  Memory”  612).  The  fact  that 
neither  Hamlet  nor  the  Ghost  trusts  Hamlet’s  memory  increases  the  onus  on  scholars  to 
explain  how  remembrance  functions  in  the  play.  
Lewis  argues  there  is  an  important  distinction  between  “memory”  and 
“recollection”  in  Aristotelian  theories  of  memory,  also  known  as  ars  memoriae  or  the  art  of 
memory  (618).  Where  memory  simply  brings  a  past  image  or  event  to  mind,  recollection 
“involves  deliberate  mental  activity”  which  “depends  upon  the  use  of  the  reason  in  tandem 
with  the  imagination  and/or  memory”  (Lewis  619).  In  other  words,  recollection  is  a  chain 
of  mnemonic  associations,  a  “reconstructive  and  heuristic  act,  analogous  to  following  a  trail 
while  hunting”  (Lewis  619).  Like  metaphor,  which  creates  meaning  or  significance  by 
asserting  unfamiliar  resemblance  between  two  things,  recollection  places  memories  in 
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relation  to  other  memories  or  ideas  in  order  to  tease  hidden  truths  to  the  surface.  What 
Hamlet  suggests,  though,  is  that  recollection  might  not  require  deliberate  mental  activity. 
Hamlet’s  recollection  may  be  involuntary.  Even  as  Hamlet  attempts  to  wipe  away  “all 
trivial  fond  records”  from  his  memory,  Hamlet  cannot  help  but  recall  his  mother’s  betrayal 
of  his  father’s  memory.  
Hamlet’s  attempt  to  isolate  and  record  a  single  memory  (“thy  commandment  all 
alone  shall  live  /  Within  the  book  and  volume  of  my  brain”)  immediately  fails,  because 
Hamlet’s  memory  of  his  father  cannot  be  divorced  from  the  associations  that  give  his 
father’s  memory  meaning.  Along  these  lines,  Margareta  de  Grazia  argues  that  Hamlet  is 
conflicted  by  memory  and  how  it  determines  the  nature  of  his  revenge.  De  Grazia  argues 
that  despite  the  Ghost’s  demand  for  remembrance  and  retribution,  Hamlet  cannot  forget  his 
own  frustration  in  being  disenfranchised  from  the  throne.  In  remembering  that  his  father 
lost  the  throne  to  Claudius,  Hamlet  cannot  help  but  remember  that  he,  too,  is  denied  the 
throne.  De  Grazia  argues  that  the  “Ghost’s  disclosure”  allows  Hamlet  to  “express  his 
resentment”  (De  Grazia  89).  In  remembering  Claudius’s  betrayal  of  Old  Hamlet,  young 
Hamlet  is  unable  to  forget  the  wrongs  that  he  presently  suffers  as  a  consequence  of  his 
father’s  death.  According  to  de  Grazia,  the  imperative  to  remember  and  avenge  the  wrongs 
suffered  by  Hamlet’s  father  is  not  powerful  enough  to  override  Hamlet’s  desire  to 
remember  and  avenge  the  wrongs  he  himself  suffers.  What  Hamlet  cannot  forget,  cannot 
erase  from  his  memory,  is  that  “at  his  father’s  death,  just  at  the  point  when  an  only  son  in  a 
patrilineal  system  stands  to  inherit,  Hamlet  is  dispossessed  --  and,  as  far  as  the  court  is 
concerned,  legitimately”  (De  Grazia  1). 
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De  Grazia  also  provides  a  reasonable  explanation  for  why  Hamlet  thinks  of  his 
mother  while  claiming  to  record  Claudius’s  guilt  in  his  memory.  Is  Hamlet  disgusted  with 
Gertrude’s  sexual  appetite  because  it  betrays  his  father’s  memory,  as  Mullaney’s  analysis 
suggests?  Or,  as  de  Grazia  suggests,  is  he  angry  at  the  possibility  that  Gertrude  might 
provide  Claudius  with  an  heir,  further  displacing  Hamlet’s  claim  to  the  throne?   Either  is 51
possible,  nor  are  they  mutually  exclusive.  Perhaps  it  should  come  as  no  surprise  that 
Hamlet  has  trouble  focusing  solely  on  revenge  against  Claudius.  If  anything,  Hamlet  adopts 
the  Ghost’s  own  confusion  on  the  matter.  At  first,  the  Ghost  warns  Hamlet  to  forget  about 
Gertrude  while  taking  revenge:  
...howsoever  thou  pursuest  this  act, 
Taint  not  thy  mind,  nor  let  thy  soul  contrive 
Against  thy  mother  aught:  leave  her  to  heaven 
And  to  those  thorns  that  in  her  bosom  lodge, 
To  prick  and  sting  her.  (1.5.84-88) 
 
However,  the  Ghost,  too,  seems  to  forget  whether  it  is  Claudius’s  act  of  murder  that  needs 
to  be  revenged  or  Gertrude’s  sexual  appetite.  After  describing  the  murder,  the  Ghost  evokes 
the  ethos  of  revenge  as  familial  obligation:  “If  thou  hast  nature  in  thee,  bear  it  not”  (1.5.81). 
But  what  is  the  “it”  that  Hamlet  must  not  bear?  Though  the  description  of  the  murder 
precedes  the  Ghost’s  imperative  to  “bear  it  not,”  the  lines  that  follow  it  suggest  it  is  not 
murder  that  is  unbearable:  “Let  not  the  royal  bed  of  Denmark  be  /  A  couch  for  luxury  and 
damned  incest”  (1.5.82-83).  
The  association,  then,  between  remembering  Old  Hamlet’s  murder  and 
remembering  Gertrude’s  sexual  appetite  for  Claudius  is  first  made  by  the  Ghost.  This 
51  See  de  Grazia  pp.  87-91,  105-108. 
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mnemonic  chain  of  murder,  revenge,  and  “damned  incest”  helps  explain  why  Hamlet 
seems  to  be  resistant  to  the  role  of  the  revenger.   The  disdain  in  Hamlet’s  rhetoric  when 52
thinking  of  Gertrude,  however,  seems  to  exceed  whatever  anger  he  has  for  Claudius.  The 
vehemence  with  which  Hamlet  talks  about  Gertrude  (or  to  her,  as  I  will  discuss  later  in  the 
chapter)  suggests  that  Hamlet’s  grievance  is  more  complex  than  a  concern  with  succession 
alone.  Since  Hamlet  never  expresses  a  desire  for  the  throne,  even  privately,  it  is  unlikely 
that  Hamlet’s  disgust  with  Gertrude’s  remarriage  is  rooted  in  royal  ambition.  
Gertrude’s  remarriage  may  explain  why  Hamlet’s  memory  swerves  from  Claudius. 
But  it  still  does  not  explain  Hamlet’s  concern  with  remembrance  itself.  Perhaps  Gertrude 
forgets  her  husband,  but  why  must  Hamlet  imagine  his  brain  as  a  “book  and  volume” 
devoted  to  a  single  memory?  Perhaps  Hamlet’s  metaphor  is  pure  hyperbole,  designed  to 
convey  single-minded  devotion  common  for  revengers.  But  the  vastness  of  textual  space 
that  Hamlet  imagines  must  be  reserved  for  a  single  memory  suggests  that  any  other  memory 
recorded  alongside  it  threatens  to  subsume  it.  According  to  Stallybrass  et  al.,  if  Hamlet’s 
purpose  is  to  secure  permanence  for  his  memory,  the  metaphor  is  itself  contradictory: 
A  supplement  or  ‘adiunckt’  to  memory,  whether  in  the  form  of  a  book  or  of  writing 
itself,  would  cast  suspicion  on  the  reliability  of  a  speaker's  memory.  A  supplement 
would  ‘import’  (both  ‘introduce’  and  ‘signify’)  the  very  thing  that  it  would  cure: 
‘forgetfulnesse.’  But  this  general  claim  takes  on  a  specific  charge  when  the 
‘adiunckt’  is  an  erasable  table,  designed  for  a  form  of  writing  that  can  be  wiped 
away  at  any  moment.  Such  a  supplement  suggest  the  difficulty  of  making  any 
complete  separation  between  remembering  and  forgetting.  A  technology  of 
memory,  the  tables  are  also  a  technology  of  erasure.  (Stallybrass  et  al.  417) 
 
52  For  further  discussion  of  Hamlet’s  resistance  to  his  role  as  the  revenger,  see  Emily  Bartels,  “Breaking  the 
Illusion  of  Being:  Shakespeare  and  the  Performance  of  Self,”  pp.  173–  75;  Mary  Thomas  Crane, 
Shakespeare’s  Brain ,  p.  118;  and  Rhodri  Lewis,  “Hamlet,  Metaphor,  and  Memory,”  p.  635.  
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Stallybrass  et  al.  argue  that  Hamlet’s  project  of  remembrance  is  doomed  to  fail  from  the 
start.  After  all,  Hamlet’s  vow  of  remembrance  is  predicated  on  an  act  of  forgetting.  If  all 
prior  memories  recorded  in  the  tables,  books,  and  volumes  of  his  brain  can  be  wiped  out  in 
order  to  record  the  Ghost’s  commandment,  then  how  can  Hamlet  trust  the  permanence  of 
what  he  now  records  there? 
While  Stallybrass  et  al.  show  the  contradictory  nature  of  Hamlet’s  metaphor,  Lewis 
argues  that  Hamlet  chooses  the  metaphor  of  writing  tables  because  it  provides  the 
possibility  of  erasure  or  forgetfulness.  According  to  Lewis,  Hamlet’s  metaphor  not  only 
lacks  permanence,  it  actively  reverses  the  established  order  of  remembrance  (Lewis  615). 
Writing  tables,  with  their  erasable  surfaces,  were  meant  to  function  in  tandem  with 
commonplace  books  as  a  way  to  practice  or  record  ideas  before  deciding  whether  or  not 
they  were  worth  writing  permanently  in  ink.  Lewis  claims  that 
Hamlet’s  shift  from  the  ‘table  of  my  memory’  to  the  ‘book  and  volume  of  my  brain’ 
reflects  the  relationship  between  writing  tablets  and  commonplace  books:  the 
sixteenth-century  student  would  have  made  a  record  of  the  things  that  he  had  read 
or  audited  on  the  former,  but  then  transferred  them  to  the  latter  as  a  site  of  more 
permanent  and  better  organized  data  storage.  (Lewis  615) 
  
As  a  metaphor,  Hamlet  maps  the  functions  of  writing  tables  and  commonplace  books  onto 
the  cognitive  processes  of  memory  storage.  
Copying  writing  from  the  writing  table  to  forms  of  permanent  inscription  (books 
and  volumes)  is  akin  to  transferring  something  from  short  term  memory  into  long  term 
memory.  But  rather  than  imagining  some  forms  of  inscription  as  temporary  or  malleable 
(such  as  the  wax  surface  of  writing  tables)  and  some  forms  as  permanent  (books  and 
volumes  written  in  ink),  Hamlet  imagines  he  can  erase  either  form  of  memory  at  will.  Thus, 
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while  Hamlet’s  soliloquy  claims  he  will  erase  the  ‘baser  matter’  of  his  brain  to  make 
permanent  the  Ghost’s  commandment,  Lewis  notes  that  Hamlet’s  metaphor  implies  a 
deliberate  form  of  forgetting  or  erasure.  To  understand  Hamlet’s  metaphor,  Lewis  argues  “it 
is  vital  to  distinguish  between  the  processes  of  forgetting  and  of  erasure;  the  former  is 
involuntary  and  accidental,  whereas  the  latter  is  by  definition  a  deliberate  act  of  mnemonic 
effacement,  the  conscious  obliteration  of  what  one  has  learned  or  experienced  in  the  past” 
(Lewis  616).  There  arises,  then,  a  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  forgetting:  1)  an 
accidental  or  involuntary  forgetting,  and  2)  a  deliberate  act  of  forgetting  or  erasure.   For 
Lewis,  Hamlet  resorts  to  the  metaphor  of  memory  as  a  writing  table  precisely  because  it 
allows  for  the  possibility  of  deliberate  erasure.  
Rather  than  his  brain  being  a  “book”  of  permanence,  Lewis  argues  Hamlet’s 
memory  “is  supplanted  by  the  memory  as  ‘table’”  or  a  wax  tablet  on  which  writing  is 
impermanent,  and  Hamlet’s  rhetoric  of  remembrance  instead  constructs  a  displacement  of 
an  imperative  he  does  not  want  to  internalize: 
What  Shakespeare  gives  us  within  it  is  a  self-deluding  confection,  the  young 
Prince’s  in-adequately  drawn  attempt  to  compensate  for  the  absence  of  the  feelings 
that  he  had  anticipated  when  the  Ghost  began  his  narration.  In  reacting  to  the 
Ghost’s  words,  Hamlet  uses  his  rhetorical  skills  not  to  body  forth  his  fury  at 
Claudius’s  fratricidal  treachery  or  to  stir  himself  up,  but  to  shield  himself  from  the 
inconvenient  truth  that,  despite  having  the  details  of  his  father’s  murder  presented  to 
him  in  the  most  singular  fashion,  he  is  possessed  by  neither  the  passion  nor  the  will 
to  vengeance.  (Lewis  635) 
 
Lewis’s  distinction  between  accidental  and  deliberate  acts  of  forgetting  provides  insight  and 
compelling  analysis  of  Hamlet’s  discourse  on  memory.  What  Lewis  does  not  consider, 
however,  is  whether  this  the  issue  of  deliberate  forgetting  first  arises  at  this  particular 
moment  in  the  play.  In  fact,  the  possibility  of  deliberate  acts  of  forgetting  or  erasure  is  more 
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potent  and  occurs  earlier  in  the  play  than  Lewis’s  analysis  accounts  for.  Acts  of  deliberate 
forgetting  is  a  problem  that  Hamlet  seeks  to  remedy  by  turning  to  the  theater  as  a 
technology  of  memory.  
To  explain  why  theatricality  serves  as  a  desirable  mnemonic  practice  for  Hamlet, 
we  need  to  understand  Hamlet’s  larger  concern  with  the  differences  between  public  and 
private  forms  of  memory.  For  Lewis,  deliberate  forgetting  is  an  act  that  is  uniquely 
Hamlet’s.  But  when  Hamlet  is  compelled  by  the  Ghost  to  “Remember  me!,”  he  already  has 
a  mode  of  deliberate  forgetting  in  mind  because  he  has  already  seen  it  at  work  in  social 
memory.  Hamlet  turns  from  “book,”  “volume,”  and  “tables”  because  their  purpose  is 
limited  to  personal,  private  memory.  What  Hamlet  records  in  private  memory  will  only  be 
remembered  by  Hamlet .  But  affective  power  of  the  theater  has  the  radical  potential  to 
transfer  private  memories  and  griefs  to  an  audience,  generating  a  collective,  subjective 
experience  that  is  socially  shared. 
 
Having  “that  within  which  passes  show” 
I  want  to  return  the  question  I  posed  earlier:  If  Hamlet  knows  the  authenticity  of  his 
own  grief,  why  does  he  work  so  hard  to  convince  himself  and  others  that  he  truly  grieves? 
Maus  helps  us  answer  this  question  when  she  describes  two  key  aspects  of  Hamlet’s  claim 
of  inwardness:  “For  Hamlet,  the  internal  experience  of  his  own  grief  ‘passes  show’  in  two 
senses.  It  is  beyond  scrutiny,  concealed  where  other  people  cannot  perceive  it.  And  it 
surpasses  the  visible,  its  validity  is  unimpeachable.  The  exterior,  by  contrast,  is  partial, 
misleading,  falsifiable,  unsubstantial”  ( Inwardness  4).  Maus’s  work  on  early  modern 
inwardness  provides  an  excellent  assessment  of  the  private  truth  of  Hamlet’s  experience  of 
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grief.  For  Maus,  Hamlet’s  claim  to  “having  that  within  which  passes  show”  is  deployed  as 
an  epistemological  claim;  his  grief  is  a  fact  that  only  Hamlet  can  verify.  The  problem, 
however,  is  that  Hamlet’s  self-representation  becomes  painfully  insular.  Robert  Weimann 
argues  that  Hamlet  faces  a  “profound  crisis  in  representativity  …  with  the  rupture,  in 
Hamlet  himself,  between  what  is  shown  and  what  is  meant,  and  his  related  capacity  for 
both  dissociating  and  associating  his  own  feigning  and  his  ‘I  know  not  seems’”  (Weimann 
282).  Hamlet’s  grief  may  be  self-evident  and  beyond  scrutiny  for  him ,  but  resorting  to  a 
claim  of  unimpeachable  inwardness  displaces  the  essential  reciprocity  of 
self-representation.  Hamlet's  dissatisfaction  with  “what  is  shown  and  what  is  meant”  is  not 
a  question  of  whether  or  not  his  “seeming”  is  a  false  representation.  The  problem  is  not  that 
Hamlet's  “nightly  color”  and  all  its  trappings  of  represented  grief  are  capable  of  being 
misrepresented  or  misunderstood  by  Gertrude  and  Claudius.  The  problem,  for  Hamlet,  is 
that  his  representation  of  grief  has  no  affective  power.  He  is  not  worried  that  he  is  a  divided 
self  so  much  as  that  he  is  like  (to  borrow  a  line  from  Macbeth )  the  “poor  player  /  That  struts 
and  frets  his  hour  upon  the  stage”  but  leaves  the  audience  unmoved  ( Macbeth  5.5.24-25).  I 
argue  that  Hamlet’s  concern  is  not  with  the  unimpeachable  nature  of  his  inner  experience 
but  instead  raises  questions  concerning  the  importance  of  reception  by  others.  Hamlet  is  not 
satisfied  with  having  an  inscrutable  interiority.  He  is  frustrated  that  his  grief  has  no  impact 
on  others. 
  If  we  think  of  Hamlet’s  claim  of  “that  within  which  passes  show”  in  terms  of  the 
culture’s  longing  for  intersubjective  recognition,  Hamlet’s  claim  serves  two  purposes.  First, 
it  counters  the  disapproval  of  Hamlet’s  grief  as  “obstinate  condolement”  that  exceeds  the 
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bounds  of  “filial  obligation”  (1.2.91-93).  In  the  context  of  Claudius  and  Gertrude’s  attacks 
on  Hamlet’s  grief  as  immature  and  excessive,  Hamlet’s  claim  to  an  authentic  inward 
experience  of  grief  is  deployed  as  an  accusation,  contrasting  his  grief  with  their  own 
performances  that  lack  an  internal  component  and  therefore  do  not  resemble  his  experience. 
Only  in  a  state  of  corruption--in  which  all  shows  of  grief  for  the  dead  king  are  assumed  to 
be  ritual  displays,  theatrical  and  performative  but  empty  of  ‘true’  feeling--is  Hamlet's  grief 
is  illegible.  Hamlet  has  not  invented  a  new,  modern  form  of  inwardness  or 
subjectivity--instead,  Hamlet's  accuses  others.  “Of  course  my  grief  seems  like  a  show  to 
you,”  he  seems  to  say,  “because  no  one  here  ever  really  felt  grief  when  my  father  died.” 
The  second  purpose  of  Hamlet’s  claim  is  to  insulate  him  from  the  problem  of  others 
failing  to  recognize  his  grief  properly.  If  only  Hamlet  recognizes  the  authenticity  of  his 
grief,  how  can  his  grief  be  affirmed?  In  The  Spanish  Tragedy ,  Kyd  provide  one  possible 
solution  to  this  problem  by  having  Hieronimo  relate  to  imagined  observers  who  recognize 
and  affirm  his  grief.  Hamlet’s  grief,  however,  is  not  recognized  as  authentic  feeling  but  as 
an  ostentatious  display  that  is  out  of  place  with  the  performances  of  grief  at  court.  Hamlet 
attempts  to  refigure  this  lack  of  recognition  as  evidence  for  the  authenticity  of  his  grief. 
The  illegibility  of  Hamlet’s  inwardness  is  conditional,  not  ontological--it  is  premised  on  a 
consistency  of  everyone  else’s  mimicked  or  inauthentic  grief.  
Hamlet’s  not-so-subtle  loathing  of  Claudius  and  Gertrude  at  court  and  Hamlet’s  first 
soliloquy  once  the  court  has  vacated  express  contempt  for  the  deliberate  erasure  of  his 
father’s  memory.  Hamlet’s  initial  discontentment  in  the  play,  even  before  meeting  the  Ghost 
and  learning  of  his  father’s  murder,  is  that  his  father’s  death  seems  to  leave  little  imprint  on 
190 
the  culture  of  Denmark.  Hamlet  intuits  one  of  the  central  problems  of  memory:  if  he  forgets 
something,  it  is  lost  and  cannot  be  recovered.  But  this  is  only  true  if  we  conceive  of 
memory  as  personal,  private,  non-transferable.  If  Hamlet  alone  is  the  arbiter  of  his  father's 
memory,  then  that  memory  is  his  burden  to  bear--his  mind  must  be  wiped  clean  in  order  to 
keep  his  father's  memory  alive  and  ever-present.  But  this  is  not  the  only  way  memory  can 
function.  Memory  can  also  be  social.  We  can  have  shared  memories,  or  cultural  memories. 
Hamlet  notes  just  this  kind  of  social  memory  when  he  greets  the  players,  and  it  is  his 
inability  to  transfer  his  father’s  memory  to  others,  his  failure  to  convert  his  father's  memory 
into  a  social  memory,  that  he  finds  so  galling.  
Psychologists  distinguish  between  “generic  event  memory”  (or  memory  which  fits  a 
general  schema  or  a  common  cultural  practice),  “episodic  memory”  (which  is  the  recall  of  a 
specific  event  which  occurred  to  a  particular  person  at  a  particular  time--this  form  of 
memory  tends  to  involve  specific  details  from  a  person’s  past),  and  “autobiographical 
memory”  (or  memory  which  is  significant  to  a  person’s  narrative  construction  of  his  or  her 
self--these  are  formative  memories).  In  “The  Psychological  and  Social  Origins  of 
Autobiographical  Memory,”  Katherine  Nelson  gives  the  following  examples: 
...what  I  ate  for  lunch  yesterday  is  today  part  of  my  episodic  memory,  but  being 
unremarkable  in  any  way,  it  will  not,  I  am  quite  sure,  become  part  of  my 
autobiographical  memory.  It  has  no  significance  to  my  life  story  beyond  the  general 
schema  of  lunch.  In  contrast,  the  first  time  I  presented  a  paper  at  a  conference  is  part 
of  my  autobiographical  memory:  I  remember  the  time,  place,  and  details  of  the 
program  and  participants,  and  I  have  a  sense  of  how  that  experience  fits  into  the  rest 
of  my  personal  life  story.  It  is  important  to  make  this  distinction  at  the  outset, 
because,  as  recent  research  has  established,  very  young  children  do  have  episodic 
memories,  but  do  not  yet  have  autobiographical  memory  of  this  kind.   (Nelson  8). 
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When  Claudius  dismisses  Hamlet’s  grief  for  his  dead  father  as  immature  and  unnatural,  his 
reprimand  of  Hamlet  suggests  the  passing  of  Old  Hamlet  should  fall  into  a  kind  of  ‘generic 
event  memory.’  Hamlet’s  experience  of  grief  is  interchangeable  with  any  son’s  experience 
of  grief  for  a  father  who  has  died.  The  rhetorical  strategy  is  to  reveal  the  experience 
“common”  and  Hamlet’s  treatment  of  it  as  therefore  “unnatural.”  Claudius  relegates 
Hamlet’s  grief  as  out  of  sync  with  the  general  schema  of  grief  (which,  presumably, 
Claudius,  Gertrude,  and  the  court  model  as  their  view  of  a  proper  response  to  Old  Hamlet’s 
passing).  Gertrude,  too,  presses  Hamlet  to  refrain  from  experiencing  his  father’s  death  as 
“particular”  to  him: 
QUEEN  GERTRUDE 
Good  Hamlet,  cast  thy  nighted  colour  off, 
And  let  thine  eye  look  like  a  friend  on  Denmark. 
Do  not  for  ever  with  thy  vailed  lids 
Seek  for  thy  noble  father  in  the  dust: 
Thou  know’st  ’tis  common;  all  that  lives  must  die, 
Passing  through  nature  to  eternity. 
HAMLET 
Ay,  madam,  it  is  common. 
QUEEN  GERTRUDE 
If  it  be, 
Why  seems  it  so  particular  with  thee?  (1.2.68-75) 
 
Claudius  and  Gertrude  transfer  the  memory  of  Old  Hamlet’s  death  from  the  ‘particular’  (or 
episodic  memory,  with  its  emphasis  on  the  specifics  or  particularity  of  the  event),  which 
keeps  Old  Hamlet’s  death  sharp  and  present  in  memory,  to  an  acceptance  of  death  as  part 
of  a  common  schema  of  grief,  which  has  implications  for  generic  or  appropriate  degrees  of 
grief,  including  grief’s  intensity  and  duration.  Hamlet  feels  his  father  has  not  been  grieved 
with  adequate  intensity  and  duration.  Gertrude’s  grief,  in  particular,  he  feels  is  over  much 
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too  quickly  and,  as  a  consequence,  he  questions  her  displays  of  grief  as  mere  shows  of 
intensity--“Like  Niobe,  all  tears”  rather  than  an  authentic  display  of  grief  (1.2.149).  
For  Hamlet,  this  situation  is  especially  troubling  because  the  lack  of  reception  he 
has  of  his  own  grief  is  counterproductive  to  the  work  of  mourning.  Instead  of  helping 
Hamlet  work  through  his  loss,  the  resistance  to  his  performance  of  grief  and  the  accusations 
they  make  that  his  grief  is  common,  unnatural,  or  merely  a  hollow  appearance  (“Seems, 
madam!  nay  it  is;  I  know  not  ‘seems’”)  force  Hamlet’s  hand.  Left  to  defend  his  grief,  he 
doubles  down  on  it,  fixates  on  it,  to  such  an  extent  that  memory  and  grief  threaten  to 
become  a  key  aspect  of  his  identity,  a  burden  of  memory  Hamlet  expressly  does  not  want 
(“Must  I  remember?”).  In  pushing  Hamlet  to  accept  a  brief  show  of  grief  as  a  common, 
natural  response  to  a  father’s  death,  Claudius  and  Gertrude  inadvertently  prompt  Hamlet  to 
make  his  father’s  death  a  formative  memory,  an  aspect  of  autobiographical  memory  that  he 
attempts  to  force  others  to  accept  with  him.  Nelson  describes  autobiographical  memory  as 
“specific,  personal,  long-lasting,  and  (usually)  of  significance  to  the  self-system. 
Phenomenally,  it  forms  one’s  personal  life  history”  (8).  Not  only  is  Hamlet  grappling  with 
his  father’s  grief,  he  is  also  alienated  by  it.  He  both  grieves  and  is  put  in  a  situation  where 
he  must  defend  or  justify  his  grief.  Hamlet  cannot  forget  his  father  because  he  cannot  forget 
that  everyone  else  seems  to  forget  his  father  and  that  they  fail  to  recognize  Hamlet’s 
experience.  In  his  conflict  with  Claudius  and  Gertrude,  Hamlet  misperceives  what  is 
becoming  autobiographical.  It  is  not  grief  itself  (though  he  misrecognizes  it  as  that)  but  the 
experience  of  having  one’s  isolation  from  others  marked  (when  they  don’t  share  one’s 
feeling)  and  having  one’s  experience  denied  that  becomes  autobiographically  significant.  
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According  to  Nelson,  children  develop  autobiographical  memory  in  order  to 
develop  a  sense  of  self.  This  development  requires  categorizing  certain  memories  as 
significant  to  the  self,  and  organizing  these  formative  memories  into  a  personal  narrative. 
Research  on  memory  shows  that  repetition,  or  “reinstatement,”  is  necessary  to  solidify 
memory.  For  a  memory  to  persist,  it  must  be  recalled  with  some  frequency  or  risk  being 
forgotten.  But  autobiographical  memory  requires  reception  by  an  audience.  In  sharing 
memories  the  self  is  integrated  into  the  community.  According  to  Nelson,  “sharing 
memories  with  other  people  performs  a  significant  social-cultural  function,  the  acquisition 
of  which  means  that  the  child  can  enter  into  the  social  and  cultural  history  of  the  family  and 
community”  (12).  Nelson  argues  that  this  kind  of  recall  is  inherently  intersubjective  and 
language-dependent:  
...human  language  is  unique  in  serving  the  dual  function  of  mental  representation 
and  communication.  These  dual  functions  make  possible  its  use  in  establishing  the 
autobiographical  memory  system.  And  because  such  memory  is  at  once  both 
personal  and  social,  it  enables  us  not  only  to  cherish  our  private  memories,  but  also 
to  share  them  with  others,  and  to  construct  shared  histories  as  well  as  imagined 
stories,  in  analogy  with  reconstructed  true  episodes.  (Nelson  13).  
 
This  approach  to  understanding  the  significance  of  shared  memory  is  called  the 
“social  interactionist  model”  in  cognitive  psychology.   This  model  helps  establish  a  links 53
between  self-construction,  memory,  and  social  reception  (both  of  the  shared  memory  and  its 
significance).  Smith  argues  that  “Through  social  interaction  with  adults,  children  learn  how 
to  narrate  their  memories,  what  memories  are  valued,  what  stories  can  be  told”  (Smith  90). 
Smith  also  notes  that,  following  Nelson’s  model,  “Thus  autobiographical  memory  becomes 
53  See  Sidonie  Smith,  “Material  Selves:  Bodies,  Memory,  and  Autobiographical  Narrating”  in  Narrative 
and  Consciousness ,  p.  93. 
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possible  with  the  achievement  of  certain  linguistic  skills--the  familiarity  with  narrative” 
(Smith  93).  Smith  argues  that  autobiographical  memories  are  formed  and  structured  in 
relation  to  the  normative  pressures  implicit  in  facing  an  audience:  “We  might  say  that  as 
autobiographical  memory...emerges,  the  child  learns  complex  narrative  forms--in  terms  of 
the  agents  of  the  narrative,  the  action  in  the  narrative,  the  emotional  valence  of  the 
narrative,  the  ideological  context  of  the  narrative,  the  mode  of  presentation,  and  the 
appropriate  forms  of  address”  (Smith  93).  The  social  interactionist  model  informs  my 
thinking  about  Hamlet's  concern  with  memory,  and  about  how  and  why  the  dismissals  of 
his  memory  and  grief  are  isolating  for  him.  Hamlet’s  anxiety  about  the  burden  of  his 
father’s  memory  (“Must  I  remember?”)  and  the  inadequacy  of  his  metaphor  of  memory  as 
writing  tablet  or  commonplace  book  are  the  consequences  of  Hamlet’s  memory  being 
dismissed  or  ignored  by  others.  While  Hamlet’s  performance  of  grief  invites  others  to  share 
in  his  remembrance  of  his  father,  Claudius,  Gertrude,  and  all  the  court  seem  to  engage  in 
deliberate  acts  of  forgetting.  Claudius  notes  this  deliberate  transition  from  remembering  Old 
Hamlet  to  a  joint  focus  on  self-remembrance  in  his  first  lines  in  the  play: 
Though  yet  of  Hamlet  our  dear  brother's  death 
The  memory  be  green,  and  that  it  us  befitted 
To  bear  our  hearts  in  grief  and  our  whole  kingdom 
To  be  contracted  in  one  brow  of  woe, 
Yet  so  far  hath  discretion  fought  with  nature 
That  we  with  wisest  sorrow  think  on  him, 
Together  with  remembrance  of  ourselves.  (1.2.1-7) 
 
Hamlet  cannot  bear  to  have  his  father  fade  not  fully  remembered  or  deliberately 
forgotten,  but  to  be  the  sole  arbiter  of  his  father’s  memory,  as  we  have  seen,  causes  him  to 
be  isolated  and  misrecognized.  While  the  writing  tablet  may  externalize  the  Ghost’s 
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injunction  to  ‘remember  me,’  it  does  not  free  Hamlet  of  the  burden  of  his  father’s  memory. 
To  do  that,  Hamlet  realizes  he  must  externalize  this  injunction  using  a  different  technology 
of  memory--not  the  writing  tablet  or  the  commonplace  book  (which  are  memory  aids  for  an 
individual )  but  the  technology  of  theater,  which  Hamlet  theorizes  as  a  technology  of  social 
memory.  I  will  now  turn  our  attention  to  Hamlet’s  theorizing  of  the  theater  as  a  medium  for 
conveying  autobiographical  memory,  for  transferring  private  memory  into  public  discourse.  
 
Theatricality  and  Reception 
Thus  far,  I  have  argued  that  Hamlet  saw  his  father  as  a  model  or  a  mirror  for 
himself,  but  with  his  father  dead  and  willingly  forgotten  by  all  of  Denmark,  Hamlet  faces 
the  possibility  that  he  might  be  as  inconsequential  as  his  father’s  memory.  To  recover  his 
sense  of  self  Hamlet  turns  not  to  vengeance  but  seeks  to  restore  his  father’s  place  in  his 
mother’s  memory.  In  this  section,  I  argue  that  unlike  other  revengers,  who  become  figures 
of  violence,  Hamlet  turns  his  attention  to  the  technology  of  theater.  He  determines  “acting” 
rather  than  action  to  be  the  most  effective  way  to  move  others  to  remembrance.  For  Hamlet, 
performing  his  grief  is  the  way  his  burden  of  grief  and  memory  can  be  transferred  to  others. 
To  take  a  kind  of  revenge,  Hamlet  becomes  not  a  revenger  but  an  actor.  Only  when  facing 
his  own  death  does  Hamlet  turn  to  retributive  violence,  and  even  then  only  momentarily.  In 
the  end,  Hamlet,  too,  wants  to  be  remembered.  
Mary  Thomas  Crane  notes  that  “Hamlet’s  claim  to  have  ‘that  within  which  passes 
show’  (1.2.85)  has  become  one  of  the  most  debated  lines  in  early  modern  literature, 
because  it  seems  to  make  a  definite  statement  about  a  highly  contested  topic,  the  nature  of 
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subjective  interiority  and  its  relation  to  the  existence  (or  nonexistence)  of  the  human 
‘individual’”  ( Shakespeare’s  Brain  116).  Yet  I  believe  that  what  is  unique  about  Hamlet  is 
not  that  he  has  “that  within”  as  an  expressed  form  of  subjectivity  interiority,  but  that  Hamlet 
feels  his  performances  of  grief  to  be  relatively  ineffective.  I  argue  that  readings  of  Hamlet’s 
“that  within”  as  evidence  of  a  unique  individualistic  interiority  has  misconstrued  the  crux  of 
this  line.  Hamlet  feels  his  grief  lacks  social  and  interpersonal  impact.  This  produces  an 
anxiety  about  consciousness  itself.  In  my  reading,  Hamlet’s  claim  of  having  “that  within 
which  passes  show”  does  not  express  autonomous  inwardness  but  Hamlet’s  insulation  from 
others--and  the  insulation  itself  is  what  devastates  him.  
Recent  scholars  argue  Hamlet’s  distinction  between  the  interior  self  and  exterior 
signs  or  actions,  needs  proper  historical  context.  Discussing  Hamlet’s  criticism  of  the 
external  “actions  that  a  man  might  play,”  David  Hillman  asks  “...what  kind  of  exterior  is 
Hamlet  referring  to  here?  He  includes  not  merely  clothes  and  words  but  even  corporeal 
signs--sighs,  tears,  facial  expressions--which  clearly  emerge  from  the  interior  of  the  body.  It 
is  as  if  the  inside  and  its  outside  can  be  fully  separated--as  if  the  body’s  skin  were  an 
epistemological  boundary”  (Hillman  85).  Grace  Tiffany  argues  that  Hamlet’s  claim  to  have 
“that  within  which  passes  show”  does  not  deny  the  possibility  of  representing  interior 
experiences  of  grief,  but  doubts  whether  visual  representation  is  adequate.  According  to 
Tiffany,  Hamlet's  claim  “is  often  presumed  to  invoke  a  radical  distrust  of  all  theater's 
capacity  to  represent  inner  states  of  mind.  I  would  suggest,  however,  that  Hamlet's  words, 
taken  in  their  entirety,  suggest  not  that  his  inner  state  cannot  be  represented  but  that  it 
cannot  be  represented  visually”  (Tiffany  313-314).  While  Hillman  locates  an 
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epistemological  boundary  spatially,  with  the  body’s  skin  marking  the  division  between 
interior  experience  and  external  expression,  Tiffany  argues  that  Hamlet’s  concern  is  with 
two  competing  modes  of  representation,  one  of  them  related  to  theater  and  theatricality: 
He  condemns  the  shows  of  mourning—the  ‘inky  cloak,’  the  ‘customary  suits  of 
solemn  black,’  the  ‘fruitful  river  of  the  eye,’  the  ‘dejected  havior  of  the  visage,’  the 
‘trappings  and  the  suits  of  woe’—as  mere  ‘shapes  of  grief,’  inauthentic  ‘actions  that 
a  man  might  play’  (1.2.77-84).  His  description  of  a  grief  that  ‘passes  show’ 
suggests  a  Protestant  distrust  of  theater's  power  to  present  truth  to  the  eye  yet 
Hamlet  nowhere  suggests  that  truth  might  not  be  articulated  when  freedom  is  given 
to  speak.  His  heart  breaks  because  he  ‘must  hold  [his]  tongue’  (1.2.159).  (Tiffany 
313-314) 
 
I  agree  with  Tiffany’s  suggestion  that  Hamlet  expresses  a  concern  about  modes  of 
representation,  but  I  would  reconsider  her  conclusion  that  Hamlet  expresses  “distrust  of 
theater’s  power  to  present  truth  to  the  eye.”  After  all,  Hamlet  does  not  claim  that  his 
outward  signs,  shows,  or  suits  of  woe  are  false  or  at  odds  with  the  grief  he  feels  within.  His 
frustration  that  they  fail  to  “denote”  him  “truly”  is  a  realization  that  the  authenticity  of  his 
emotions  alone  is  not  enough  to  generate  pathos.  His  experience  of  inwardness  is 
ineffective  for  moving  others,  for  creating  an  affect  or  a  shared  response  of  grief.  We  see 
this  more  clearly  when  Hamlet  meets  with  the  acting  company  that  arrives  to  provide  the 
court’s  entertainment. 
Earlier,  I  argued  that  Lewis  and  Stallybrass  et  al.  were  correct  in  assessing  the 
tension  between  remembrance  and  forgetting  in  Hamlet's  discussion  of  writing 
technologies,  but  that  tension  only  accounts  for  the  problem  of  personal,  private,  or 
individual  memory.  The  play  itself  dramatizes  social  concern  with  the  disruption  or 
obfuscation  of  the  remembered  past.  Hamlet’s  metaphoric  linking  of  (private)  memory  with 
writing  does  not  resolve  the  tension  between  remembrance  and  forgetting,  since  the 
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metaphor  itself  is  contradictory.  In  Lees-Jeffries  analysis  of  Hamlet’s  writing  metaphor, 
“memory  becomes  at  once  imperative  and  fixed,”  while  simultaneously  “provisional  and 
able  to  be  rewritten”  (Lees-Jeffries  25).  Private  memory  is  like  a  wax  tablet  or  a 
commonplace  book  in  which  a  person  jots  down  what  he  or  she  personally  wants  to 
commit  to  memory,  but  these  inscribed  memories  have  little  effect  on  what,  or  how,  others 
might  remember  Hamlet’s  father.  In  Hamlet’s  metaphor  of  memory  as  a  form  of  private 
writing,  Hamlet  intuits  one  of  the  central  problems  of  individual  memory:  whatever  he 
records  in  the  “book  and  volume”  of  his  brain  is  at  risk  of  being  forgotten  not  just  by  him 
but  by  others,  given  that  the  record  of  his  memory  seems  locked  in  Hamlet’s  interiority.  If 
Hamlet  alone  is  the  arbiter  of  his  father's  memory,  then  that  memory  is  his  burden  to 
bear--his  mind  must  be  wiped  clean  of  all  other  content  in  order  to  keep  his  father's  memory 
alive  and  ever-present.  Even  more  troubling  for  Hamlet  is  his  sense  that  private  memory  is 
an  insufficient  form  of  remembrance.  It  is  his  inability  to  transfer  his  father's  memory  to 
others,  his  failure  to  generate  his  father's  memory  into  a  social  memory,  that  he  finds  so 
galling.  If  Hamlet  alone  remembers  his  father,  it  does  not  seem  much  different  from  his 
father  being  forgotten  altogether.  For  a  person’s  memory  to  matter  at  all,  it  must  reside 
within  social  discourse,  and  since   Hamlet’s  memory  of  his  father  is  personal,  private,  and 
nontransferable,  his  father  may  already  be  all  but  forgotten.  
The  form  of  memory  Hamlet  requires  must  be  social  (and,  as  Nelson’s  research  has 
shown,  some  memories  must  be  made  social  in  order  to  persist  at  all).  Hamlet’s  exchange 
with  Ophelia  provides  evidence  that  Hamlet  weighs  the  worth  of  a  person’s  life  in  relation 
to  social  memory: 
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HAMLET 
O  God,  your  only  jig-maker.  What  should  a  man  do 
but  be  merry?  for,  look  you,  how  cheerfully  my 
mother  looks,  and  my  father  died  within  these  two  hours. 
OPHELIA 
Nay,  ’tis  twice  two  months,  my  lord. 
HAMLET 
So  long?  Nay  then,  let  the  devil  wear  black,  for 
I'll  have  a  suit  of  sables.  O  heavens!  die  two 
months  ago,  and  not  forgotten  yet?  Then  there’s 
hope  a  great  man’s  memory  may  outlive  his  life  half 
a  year:  but,  by’r  lady,  he  must  build  churches, 
then;  or  else  shall  he  suffer  not  thinking  on,  with 
the  hobby-horse,  whose  epitaph  is  ‘For,  O,  for,  O, 
the  hobby-horse  is  forgot.’  (3.2.118-128) 
 
For  Hamlet,  the  inscription  of  “a  great  man’s  memory,”  whether  it  be  recorded  in  wax, 
parchment,  or  stone,  amounts  to  little,  and  as  the  play  proceeds,  Hamlet  continues  to  lose 
trust  in  the  power  of  private  memory  and  writing  itself,  as  books  becomes  meaningless 
“words,  words,  words”  (2.2.189).  Stallybrass  et  al.  note  that  “The  play  moves  relentlessly 
away  from  the  kind  of  records  that,  stored  in  a  library,  might  protect  the  remembrance  of 
the  old  king  for  posterity”  (Stallybrass  et  al.  419).  This  is  true,  but  writing  is  not  the  only 
way  memory  can  function.  Hamlet  doubts  both  writing  and  private  memory  as  adequate 
forms  of  remembrance,  bun  in  their  place  he  imagines  remembrance  through  a  new 
medium,  not  in  individual  brains,  erasable  writing-tables,  or  in  books  and  volumes  but  in 
theater,  with  the  playhouse  functioning  as  a  site  of  living,  repeatable  social  memory.  
Hamlet  notes  just  this  kind  of  social  memory  when  he  greets  the  players  who  arrive 
to  seek  patronage.  Here,  Hamlet  identifies  the  function  players  perform  as  arbiters  of  social 
memory: 
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Good  my  lord,  will  you  see  the  
players  well  bestowed?  Do  you  hear,  let  them  be  well 
used,  for  they  are  the  abstract  and  brief  chronicles  of  
the  time:  after  your  death  you  were  better  have  a  bad 
epitaph  than  their  ill  report  while  you  live.  (2.2.460-464) 
 
Hamlet  contrasts  the  practices  of  inscription  (such  as  a  “bad  epitaph”)  with  the  efficacy  of 
the  theater  as  a  technology  of  memory.  Having  linked  individual  memory  with  the 
technology  of  writing,  Hamlet  realizes  that  the  social  memory  of  acting  companies  has  a 
lasting  permanence  that  individual  memory  does  not--hence  Hamlet’s  claim  that  the 
player’s  opinions  of  a  person  can  have  further  reaching  consequences  than  that  person’s 
tombstone.  As  Lees-Jeffries  notes,  “Different  but  very  complementary  perspectives  on 
memory  are  introduced  when  the  Players  arrive”  because  they  “are  traders  in  memories” 
(Lees-Jeffries  26,  27).  
Hamlet  requests  lines  from  a  play  he  remembers  hearing  the  actors  perform,  telling 
the  First  Player,  “One  speech  in  it  I  chiefly  loved  /  …  if  it  live  /  in  your  memory,  begin  at 
this  line”  and  Hamlet  himself  recites  a  few  lines  from  memory  (2.2.383-386).  The  speech 
Hamlet  requests  from  the  First  Player  recounts  Priam’s  death  at  the  hands  of  Pyrrhus  during 
the  fall  of  Troy  .  Lees-Jeffries  notes  the  link  between  memory  and  trauma  in  Hamlet’s 
request.  After  all,  the  speech  deals  with  the  death  of  a  king--Hamlet  has  dead  fathers  on  the 
brain.  Lees-Jeffries  reads  Hamlet’s  request  as  a  partially-failed  attempt  to  “fully  ‘remember’ 
the  trauma  of  his  father’s  death”  since  “he  cannot  remember  the  speech,  which  vividly 
imagines  (and  in  a  way  that  mirrors  the  temporal  out-of-joint-ness  that  Hamlet  himself  is 
experiencing)  a  scene  of  violence  and  its  shattered  aftermath”  (Lees-Jeffries  27).  
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But  Hamlet’s  request  here  is  not  a  failed  remembrance.  Hamlet  is  not  concerned 
that  his  own  memory  might  be  faulty.  The  speech  is  not  how  Hamlet  himself  wants  to 
remember  his  father,  but  provides  a  model  for  how  he  wants  Gertrude  to  remember.  When 
Polonius  complains  the  speech  is  too  long,  Hamlet’s  encouragement  to  the  player  to 
continue  (“say  on:  come  to  Hecuba”)  is  telling.  Rather  than  requesting  a  speech  which 
expresses  a  son’s  grief  or  desire  for  revenge  (such  as  lines  common  in  any  revenge 
tragedy),  Hamlet  asks  to  hear  a  description  of  Hecuba’s  grief  for  Priam.  The  request  reveals 
again  Hamlet’s  fixation  on  a  wife  carrying  the  burden  of  memory  and  grief.  It  was 
Gertrude’s  failure  to  properly  grieve  like  Hecuba  that  drew  Hamlet’s  ire  in  his  first 
soliloquy:  
...within  a  month: 
Ere  yet  the  salt  of  most  unrighteous  tears 
Had  left  the  flushing  in  her  galled  eyes, 
She  married.  O,  most  wicked  speed,  to  post 
With  such  dexterity  to  incestuous  sheets!  (1.2.153-157) 
 
Hamlet  is  moved  by  the  description  of  Hecuba’s  grief,  rather  than  Priam’s  death,  because 
he  yearns  for  the  time  (though  all  too  short,  over  “within  a  month”)  when  his  mother’s  grief 
resembled  his  own,  before  hers  proved  false.  Following  the  description  of  Hecuba’s  grief, 
Hamlet’s  “that  within”  is  made  visibly  readable,  as  evident  when  Polonius  says  in  an  aside: 
“Look  where  he  has  not  turned  his  colour  and  has  /  tears  in’s  eyes”  (2.2.457-458).  
The  player’s  ability  to  move  Hamlet  to  tears  is,  for  Hamlet,  a  notable  difference 
between  his  private  feeling  of  grief  (his  sense  of  “that  within”  which  fails  to  affect  Gertrude 
or  anyone  else  at  court)  and  the  power  of  theatrical  performance.  Unlike  inwardness  or 
Hamlet’s  inscribed  memory,  theatrical  performances  are  designed  with  audience  reception 
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in  mind.  Alastair  Fowler  argues  that  the  presence  of  “involved  spectators”  in  early  modern 
poetry  and  fiction  reveals  a  “need  to  negotiate  through  such  surrogate  figures”  that  “stems 
from  a  widespread  change  in  sensibility,  and  in  the  consciousness  of  art”  (Fowler  66). 
According  to  Fowler,  this  “widespread  change”  is  in  the  role  of  the  spectator.   Unlike  the 
detached  or  “comparatively  disengaged”  narrators  of  medieval  fiction,  the  observations  of 
the  early  modern  spectator  influence  or  shape  what  is  observed:  “What  I  want  to  notice 
here  is  that  the  witness  is  also  a  participant…  Viewers  actively  involved  like  this  differ  from 
modern  readers,  as  they  do  from  the  dreamers  and  narrators  of  the  Middle  Ages.  They 
belong  to  a  distinctively  Renaissance  phase  of  mimesis”  (Fowler  66).  The  audience’s 
reception  was  so  intrinsic  to  a  work  that  early  modern  paintings,  poems,  and  plays  often 
depict  or  dramatize  audience  response  in  the  art  itself. 
The  player’s  speech  provides  a  model  of  how  to  anticipate  an  audience’s  response 
and  shape  it  through  skillful,  dramatic  rhetoric.  Heather  James  argues  that  the  Player’s 
account  of  Priam’s  death  projects  an  imagined  audience  and  that  the  audience’s  reception  is 
built  into  the  descriptive  moment  in  the  speech: 
The  Player’s  description  of  Pyrrhus’s  sword  constitutes  a  meditation  on  the  relation 
of  action  to  pity,  felt  not  by  Pyrrhus  but  by  the  unknown  viewer.  This  spectator  can 
be  glimpsed  in  three  response-related  adjectives  applied  to  the  persons  and  events 
described  in  the  speech:  ‘senseless’  Ilium,  Pyrrhus’s  ‘declining’  sword,  and  Priam’s 
‘milky’  head.  Ilium  figures  as  the  first  surrogate  spectator,  one  in  such  deep 
sympathy   with   Priam   that   ‘he’  is   first   to   respond   to   the   imminent   threat   to 
the  king’s  life.  As  the  Player  takes  care  to  emphasize,  however,  Ilium  is  insensate: 
only  if  we  project  a  viewer’s  sympathies  onto  the  citadel  can  we  imagine  ‘senseless 
Ilium  /  Seeming  to  feel  [the]  blow’  of  Pyrrhus’s  fell  sword.  Under  the  powerful 
sway  of  sympathy,  the  citadel  comes  fully  into  ‘his’  own  as  a  personification:  in 
compassion  for  the  fallen  king,  Troy’s  citadel  is  humbled  when  it  ‘Stoops  to  his 
base,’  and  then  rises  to  action  when  ‘Tak[ing]  prisoner  Pyrrhus’  ear.’  As  an 
allegorical  personification  of  sympathy  followed  by  decisive  action,  the  citadel 
functions  as  a  model  for  imitation.  (James  379) 
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As  James  demonstrates  above,  the  language  used  to  describe  Pyrrhus’s  violence  also  directs 
the  audience’s  sympathies.  The  language  used,  along  with  the  player’s  delivery  (grain  of 
the  voice,  theatrical  performance,  etc.),  compel  the  audience  (Hamlet,  but  also  the 
theater-goers  watching  as  Hamlet  watches  the  Player’s  the  performance)  to  identify  not 
with  Pyrrhus’s  wrath  but  to  pity  Priam.  And  when  the  depiction  of  Priam’s  death  adopts  the 
frame  of  Hecuba’s  gaze,  the  Player’s  dramatic  recounting  provides  an  impetus  to  transfer 
Hecuba’s  personal  experience  of  grief  into  an  artifact  of  social  memory.  Through  the 
technology  of  theater,  Hecuba’s  experience  becomes  the  audience’s  experience.  
We  might  recall  here  that  Mullaney  argues  that  the  theater  as  a  technology  invested 
in  audience  reception,  and  the  transference  of  social  memory  arose  in  response  to  a 
historical  period  of  radical  instability.  According  to  Mullaney,  early  modern  plays  were 
often  a  repository  for  social  memories  that  shifting  regimes  might  prefer  deliberately 
forgotten.   Hamlet’s  interest  in  using  the  theater  both  to  restore  his  father  to  social  memory 54
and  to  reveal  Claudius’s  guilt  aligns  with  Mullaney’s  insight  that  the  early  modern  theater 
functions  as  a  response  to  “a  dissociated  past”  created  by  “deep  and  structural  attacks  on 
social  memory”  (Mullaney  77).  Hamlet’s  realization  of  the  importance  of  theater  does  not, 
however,  solve  Hamlet’s  problem  with  memory.  In  his  soliloquy,  immediately  following  the 
player’s  speech,  Hamlet  will  recognize  that  theatrical  performance  alone  is  not  enough.  A 
54  Mullaney  states: 
 
In  the  space  of  a  single  generation,  from  1530  to  1560,  there  were  no  fewer  than  no  fewer  than  five 
official  state  religions,  five  different  and  competing  monotheisms,  incompatible  versions  of  the 
one  god,  the  one  faith,  the  one  truth,  the  one  absolute.  What  one  monarch  declared  to  be  sacred 
and  timeless,  the  next  declared  to  be  heresy  or  worse,  in  a  reformation  and  counter-reformation  by 
state  decree,  which  was  also  a  family  feud,  with  one  Tudor  half-sibling  divided  against  another  in 
the  name  of  God.  One  of  the  results  was  a  lasting  sense  of  unsettlement,  another  was  a  lasting 
cynicism.  (71) 
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performance  must  be  capable  of  moving  an  audience,  of  generating  affect,  in  order  to  be 
memorable.  
Once  Hamlet  is  alone  and  can  contemplate  the  player’s  speech,  he  initially  seems 
disdainful  of  theatrical  performance: 
Is  it  not  monstrous  that  this  player  here, 
But  in  a  fiction,  in  a  dream  of  passion, 
Could  force  his  soul  so  to  his  own  conceit 
That  from  her  working  all  his  visage  wann’d, 
Tears  in  his  eyes,  distraction  in’s  aspect, 
A  broken  voice,  and  his  whole  function  suiting 
With  forms  to  his  conceit?  and  all  for  nothing! 
For  Hecuba! 
What’s  Hecuba  to  him,  or  he  to  Hecuba, 
That  he  should  weep  for  her?  (2.2.486-495) 
 
Hamlet  acknowledges  that  the  player’s  performance  of  grief  was  “a  fiction...a  dream  of 
passion.”  While  Hamlet’s  soliloquy  seems,  at  first,  to  recoil  from  the  fictional  portrayal  of 
emotion,  what  Hamlet  finds  “monstrous”  is  not  the  player’s  ability  to  skillfully  perform  an 
affecting  show  of  grief  for  Hecuba;  rather,  what’s  “monstrous”  is  the  gap  in  skill  between 
the  player’s  ability  to  move  his  audience  to  sympathy  and  Hamlet’s  inability  to  do  so 
himself.  Hamlet’s  concern  is  not  with  the  Player’s  performance  of  grief  (which  moves 
Hamlet  to  tears,  despite  having  no  true  “motive  and  cue  for  passion”),  but  with  his  own 
failed  performance.  Hamlet  is  unable  to  grieve  in  a  way  that  moves  others  to  share  in  it.  
Shankar  Raman  states  that  “the  player  brings  Hamlet  visage  to  visage  with  his  own 
failure  to  transform  himself  in  the  way  the  player  so  successfully  has”  (Raman  129). 
Hamlet  does  have  the  inner  experience  of  grief  which  the  player  merely  acts  out,  but  even 
with  the  emotive  energy  of  authentic  grief,  Hamlet  fails  to  draw  any  response  from  others 
aside  from  dismissal  (suggested  in  Gertrude’s  question,  “Why  seems  it  so  particular  with 
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thee?”).  Hamlet  calls  attention  to  his  failure  to  properly  dramatize  his  grief  by  imagining 
what  the  player  of  the  Hecuba  speech  might  do,  “Had  he  the  motive  and  the  cue  for 
passion  /  That  I  have?”:  
He  would  drown  the  stage  with  tears 
And  cleave  the  general  ear  with  horrid  speech, 
Make  mad  the  guilty  and  appal  the  free, 
Confound  the  ignorant,  and  amaze  indeed 
The  very  faculties  of  eyes  and  ears.  (2.2.497-501) 
 
A  skilled  actor  with  a  traumatic  wound  would  be  capable  of  turning  Hamlet’s  experience  of 
private  emotion  into  a  devastating  social  affect,  a  powerful  shared  grief  which  an  audience 
would  find  unforgettable.  But  despite  having  this  deep  reserve  of  emotion,  Hamlet  realizes 
that  he  lacks  the  theatrical  skill  to  use  his  grief  to  move  Denmark  into  a  state  of  mournful 
remembrance.   As  Raman  so  bluntly  puts  it,  “Hamlet  is  thus  a  bad  actor”  (Raman  129).  
Like  a  bad  actor,  Hamlet  fails  to  move  anyone  other  than  himself  to  feel  what  it  is 
like  to  lose  a  father.  This  failure,  this  lack  of  reception,  is  what  turns  Hamlet’s  attention 
back  on  himself.  Hamlet’s  self-referentiality  does  not  solve  or  resolve  the  problem  of  his 
ineffective  performance  of  grief,  but  announces  his  confusion  about  it.  The  Player,  who 
feels  no  true  grief  for  Priam,  moves  Hamlet  to  tears;  Hamlet,  who  believes  himself  to  have 
a  “motive  and  cue  for  passion,”  has  his  grief  dismissed  by  Claudius  and  Gertrude  before 
the  members  of  the  court.  The  problem  is  not,  as  Hamlet  initially  retorts,  with  the  trappings 
and  suits  of  woe,  or  that  grief  can  be  a  part  a  man  might  play--the  problem  is  that  this  part 
(as  the  player  proves)  could  be  played  by  someone  better  than  Hamlet.  
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Speaking  Daggers 
Hamlet  lacks  the  necessary  skill  to  turn  his  private  memory  into  social  memory.  He 
fails  to  find  a  proper  medium  to  convey  his  private  memory,  except  in  a  limited  sense: 
speaking  daggers  to  his  mother.  John  Kerrigan  states  that,  unlike  other  revengers  on  the 
early  modern  stage,  “...Hamlet  never  promises  to  revenge,  only  to  remember”  (Kerrigan 
114).  Yes,  but  this  requires  some  additional  explanation.  For  Hamlet,  memory  is  more 
important  than  revenge  against  Claudius.  But  it  is  not  more  important  than  his  revenge 
against  Gertrude.  Hamlet’s  revenge  does  take  place  in  the  play  and  is,  in  fact,  successful, 
but  it  is  not  revenge  along  conventional  lines  of  early  modern  revenge  tragedies.  Hamlet 
uses  rhetorical  daggers  rather  than  literal  ones,  and  he  strikes  at  Gertrude’s  conscience 
rather  than  at  her  physical  body.   Even  Gertrude  momentarily  expects  conventional 
revenge,  fears  that  Hamlet  seeks  physical  retribution:  
 
HAMLET 
Come,  come,  and  sit  you  down;  you  shall  not  budge; 
You  go  not  till  I  set  you  up  a  glass 
Where  you  may  see  the  inmost  part  of  you. 
QUEEN  GERTRUDE 
What  wilt  thou  do?  thou  wilt  not  murder  me? 
Help,  help,  ho!   (3.4.17-21) 
 
For  Hamlet,  forcing  Gertrude  into  a  state  of  remembrance  is  itself  an  act  of  revenge  (after 
all,  he  is  ‘speaking  daggers,’  which  employs  the  iconography  of  a  revenger’s  concealed 
weapon).  However,  it  also  disperses  the  need  for  revenge.  Hamlet  wants  revenge  against 
Gertrude  precisely  because  she  doesn’t  remember,  and  her  lack  of  remembrance  displaces 
the  burden  of  a  great  man’s  memory  onto  Hamlet.  Her  sexual  appetite  is  above  all,  for 
Hamlet,  evidence  that  Gertrude  has  forgotten  Old  Hamlet  and  has  replaced  him  with 
207 
Claudius.  Ironically,  Hamlet’s  project  of  revenge  (speaking  daggers,  and  forcing  his  mother 
to  remember  his  father  so  that  he  no  longer  has  to),  when  successful,  also  undoes  the  need 
for  revenge.  The  assurance  of  Gertrude’s  remembrance  allows  Hamlet  to  forget.  And 
indeed  he  does.  
Despite  the  Ghost’s  reminder  not  to  harm  Gertrude,  made  while  Hamlet  confronts 
his  mother,  Hamlet  is  no  longer  interested  in  revenge  or  memory  following  Gertrude’s 
internalization  of  guilt  and  her  acceptance  of  the  burden  of  Old  Hamlet’s  memory.  When 
Hamlet  returns  to  Denmark  from  England,  for  instance,  he  is  almost  immediately  distracted 
from  revenge  against  Claudius  when  he  happens  upon  the  Yorick’s  skull.  Again,  Hamlet  is 
reminded  of  the  burden  of  memory,  as  Yorick’s  skull  again  triggers  Hamlet’s  guilt  in 
forgetting: 
Alas,  poor  Yorick!  I  knew  him,  Horatio. 
A  fellow  of  infinite  jest,  of  most  excellent  fancy.  He  hath 
borne  me  on  his  back  a  thousand  times,  and  now  how 
abhorred  in  my  imagination  it  is!  My  gorge  rises  at  it.  (5.1.174-177) 
 
While  anguishing  over  poor  Yorick’s  skull,  Hamlet’s  contemplation  is  interrupted  by 
Ophelia’s  funeral.  Perhaps  Hamlet  is  only  disturbed  by  death  when  a  person  seems  not  to 
inspire  remembrance  in  others.  When  Ophelia  is  properly,  devastatingly  mourned  by  her 
grief-stricken  brother,  Hamlet  suddenly  enters  into  a  mode  of  competitive  rhetoric  (similar 
to  Antonio’s,  discussed  last  chapter),  jumping  into  Ophelia’s  grave  and  declaring  that  he 
has  the  greater  claim  to  grief.  
Some  scholars  argue  that  the  play’s  interest  in  inwardness  ends  once  Hamlet  returns 
from  England.  Crane,  for  instance,  argues  the  play  shifts  from  an  examination  of  internal 
cognition  to  external  influences  on  behavior:  “The  graveyard  scene  similarly  suggests  that 
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inner  cognitive  process  can  never  be  known,  and  the  play’s  previous  preoccupation  with 
such  process  is  replaced  by  a  focus  on  other  biological  processes,  such  as  decay  and 
digestion,  or  else  on  legal  process,  which  attempts  to  define  intentionality  from  outside” 
( Shakespeare’s  Brain  143).  However,  Crane  assumes  here  that  the  “inner  cognitive 
process”  is  separate  and  distinct  from  what’s  “outside”  the  self.  In  Cognition  in  the  Globe , 
Evelyn  Tribble  argues  that  cognition  is  not  fundamentally  an  internal  operation,  but  is 
distributed  “across  body,  brain,  and  world”  (5).  Rather  than  interpreting  Hamlet’s 
preoccupations  with  “inner  cognitive  process”  as  distinct  from  “biological  processes,” 
“legal  process,”  and  “intentionality  from  outside,”  it  may  be  useful  to  view  inner  and  outer 
processes  in  terms  of  what  Tribble  terms  “distributed  cognition.”  According  to  Tribble  and 
scholars  of  “theory  of  mind,”  it  is  a  fundamental  misunderstanding  to  think  of  cognition  as 
an  exclusively  interior  cognitive  process.  Cognition,  in  this  sense,  is  not  just  the  presence  of 
private  thoughts.  Instead,  cognition  is  an  interactive  process,  a  distribution  of  thinking 
which  includes  not  just  thought-processes,  but  also  the  social  and  cultural  apparatuses 
which  allow  certain  kinds  of  thinking  (such  as  “legal  process”)  possible.   Tribble  notes 55
that  ‘cognitive  artifacts’  offload  some  of  the  cognitive  load  into  the  ‘surround’  itself.  Thus, 
Hamlet  uses  certain  cognitive  practices  (such  as  rhetorical  training,  which  he  weaponizes, 
speaking  ‘daggers’  to  his  mother,  and  his  rhetoric  is  supported  by  the  visual  aid  of  Old 
Hamlet  and  Claudius’s  portraits,  which  Hamlet  uses  to  cue  his  mother  memory)  is  able  to 
unload  the  burden  of  his  father’s  memory  onto  Gertrude.  Hamlet  grapples  with  two 
55  For  a  compelling  account  of  early  modern  inwardness  and  external  display  as  mutually  analogous,  see 
Maus,  Inwardness  and  Theater  in  the  English  Renaissance .  Maus  argues  that  “the  public  domain  seems  to 
derive  its  significance  from  the  possibility  of  privacy--from  what  is  withheld  or  excluded  from  it--and  vice 
versa”  (29). 
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imperatives:  “Remember  me”  and  revenge  me.  He  seems  reluctant  to  do  either  (“Must  I 
remember?”  And  the  Ghost  appears  to  reprimand  Hamlet  for  being  slow  to  revenge). 
Hamlet’s  solution  is,  in  part  to  turn  remembrance  into  theatrical  performance,  to 
memorialize,  distributing  the  cognitive  burden  of  memory  to  an  audience.  Like  Hamlet 
turning  to  a  wax  tablet  or  a  book  as  a  cognitive  artifact  which  can  remember  for  him, 
Hamlet  uses  rhetoric  and  theatricality  as  cultural,  cognitive  artifacts  within  which  he  can 
deposit  the  memory  of  his  father’s  death  and  the  affect  of  grief  or  sorrow  in  the  loss,  in 
order  to  free  himself  of  cognitive  burden.  
Others  remember  (Gertrude,  via  Hamlet’s  rhetoric,  which  penetrates  her  interiority 
and  forces  her  to  view  herself  as  he  sees  her--and  the  audience  of  the  Mousetrap,  which 
turns  Claudius’s  murder  into  a  stage  plot)  so  that  Hamlet  does  not  have  to.  With  the  Ghost’s 
imperative  (“Remember  me!”)  fulfilled,  having  been  dispersed  through  rhetoric  and 
theatrics,  Claudius’s  death  happens  almost  as  an  afterthought.  Kerrigan  notes  that  Hamlet, 
even  when  finally  striking  at  Claudius,  does  not  do  so  as  an  act  of  vengeance  for  his  father:  
…[Hamlet]  does  not  revenge  his  father.  The  weapons  finally  used  to  kill  Claudius 
(the  venomous  rapier  and  poisoned  drink)  mark  Hamlet's  attack  as  spontaneous 
retaliation,  not  long-delayed  retribution:  the  King  dies  for  the  murder  of  Gertrude 
and  the  Prince,  not  for  the  murder  in  the  orchard.  (“Hieronimo,  Hamlet,  and 
Remembrance”  119) 
 
Concerning  revenge,  Kerrigan  notes  that:  “Old  Hamlet  is  not  even  mentioned  by  his  son  in 
the  last,  violent  minutes  of  the  play  —  an  omission  which  seems  the  more  striking  when 
Laertes,  who  is  being  hurried  off  by  the  fell  sergeant  death  with  yet  more  despatch  than  the 
prince,  finds  time  to  refer  to  Polonius”  (Kerrigan  119).  An  excellent  point.  Hamlet  never 
truly  takes  revenge  in  the  play,  not  in  the  traditional  manner.  Hamlet  retaliates  against 
210 
Claudius  for  poisoning  him  and  his  mother,  not  for  the  murder  of  his  father.  If  anything,  as 
Kerrigan  notes,  Hamlet  seems  to  finally  take  revenge  against  Claudius  for  poisoning 
Gertrude.  Hamlet’s  violence  against  Claudius  reenacts  Hamlet’s  own  (impending)  death 
and  Gertrude’s:  Hamlet  stabs  Claudius  with  the  pointed  tip  of  the  rapier  and  then  forces 
Claudius  to  drink  poison  from  Gertrude’s  cup.  Neither  actions  recall  the  murder  of  Old 
Hamlet,  and  even  Hamlet’s  final  castigation  suggests  it  is  his  mother,  not  Old  Hamlet,  who 
is  being  revenged:  “Here,  thou  incestuous,  damned  Dane,  /  Drink  of  this  potion.  Is  the 
union  here?  /  Follow  my  mother”  (5.2.309-311).  
 
Conclusion 
Facing  his  own  death,  Hamlet  commissions  Horatio  to  be  the  bearer  of  his  memory: 
O  God,  Horatio,  what  a  wounded  name, 
Things  standing  thus  unknown,  shall  live  behind  me! 
If  thou  didst  ever  hold  me  in  thy  heart 
Absent  thee  from  felicity  awhile, 
And  in  this  harsh  world  draw  thy  breath  in  pain, 
To  tell  my  story.  (5.2.328-333) 
 
Hamlet's  commission  of  remembrance  is  also  a  repetition  of  the  Ghost's  imperative  to 
“Remember  me!”  The  play  suggests  that  being  forgotten  is  a  fate  worse  than  death.  Earlier 
in  the  play,  due  to  the  distress  of  being  unacknowledged  or  unrecognized  by  others,  Hamlet 
expressed  a  desire  to  cease  thought,  to  resolve  into  a  dew,  to  be  a  figure  without  impulse, 
passion,  or  form.  Even  death,  if  it  be  “an  undiscovered  country”  in  which  consciousness 
must  roam  eternally  (if  the  Ghost  is  any  indication),  was  not  a  solution  to  isolated 
subjectivity.  After  all,  even  in  death,  the  Ghost  cannot  forget  that  he  might  be  forgotten. 
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As  social  recognition  eluded  him  throughout  the  play,  Hamlet  finally  settles  on  a 
form  that  does  not  require  his  self-consciousness  or  self-awareness.  Hamlet  wants  to  be 
translated  into  story,  to  become  social  memory.  He  wants  to  become  narrative  itself. 
Horatio's  living  breath  is  figured  as  a  vessel  for  Hamlet's  living  memory,  and  the 
transmission  of  this  memory  becomes  the  reason  for  Horatio's  continued  breathing.  Hamlet 
lives,  not  as  "words,  words,  words"  in  a  commonplace  book  or  wax  tablet,  but  as  living 
memory,  recollected  through  Horatio's  mouth.  Where  other  revenger  tragedies  restore  social 
or  civic  order  (as,  one  could  argue,  this  play  does  to),  Hamlet  seems  to  restore  not  order  so 
much  as  the  affective  power  of  narrative  memory.  He  wants  stories  of  the  dead  to  be 
impactful  rather  than  easily,  deliberately  forgotten.  He  wants  his  own  loss,  and--by 
proxy--his  father's  loss--to  affect  the  world.  He  wants  to  pass  on  “that  which  passes  show” 
to  those  who  hear  his  sad  tale.  Kerrigan,  too,  notes  Hamlet’s  desire  to  become  social 
memory:  “If  the  graveyard  focuses  Hamlet's  imagination  on  his  approaching  end,  it  also 
reminds  him  of  the  possibility  of  survival  through  memory.  As  he  has  cherished  his  father, 
so  he  hopes  to  be  cherished.  That  is  why  Horatio  is  so  important  to  him  at  the  end  of  the 
play…”  (Kerrigan  120).  
  By  the  play’s  the  end,  Hamlet  wants  to  be  a  memory  without  being  burdened  by 
memory.  He  wants  others  to  remember  him,  so  he  need  not  himself  remember.  He  wants  to 
be  the  story,  but  not  the  storyteller  nor  the  audience.  Only  in  imagining  himself  as  narrative 
does  Hamlet  finally  find  an  end  to  his  own  problem  of  subjectivity  by  becoming  a  subject, 
in  the  sense  that  he  becomes  a  topic,  an  object  of  inquiry  which  demands,  like  the  Ghost,  to 
be  remembered,  to  be  interpreted,  to  be  made  meaningful  through  our  ceaseless 
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contemplation  of  him.  Horatio  must  not  die,  nor  can  he  rest  from  bearing  Hamlet's  memory. 
Horatio  is,  perhaps,  the  narrative  embodiment  of  textual  scholarship  itself,  it  is  the  role  we 
inhabit  when  Hamlet  is  a  figure  on  whom  we  think,  write,  or  teach. 
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